Is Multisig Worth the Extra Complexity?

[MisFoxie]

If you still like extra security with wallet that is not multisig but just usual normal wallet, you can add passphrase to your seed phrase. Make the passphrase to be strong or you can generate another seed phrase and make use of it as your passphrase.

Although using a seed phrase as a passphrase is very secure because of this we may have to face  big risk.

If we use the seed phrase as a passphrase when we need to access the hidden wallet we will have to manually type the 12 or 24 word seed phrase because of this some mistakes may happen such as typos or double spacing which can cause fund loss.

In my opinion using only 4 or 6 random words for example (silver mango forest tunnel) can provide a lot of entropy because of which you can protect yourself from brute force attacks.

[AndrewWint]

Multisig stops theft but doubles the ways to lock yourself out — bad trade for most. Bigger risk: if something happens to you, does anyone know the seed exists? A written recovery plan for family matters more than extra keys. Keys stay yours. Who gets in if you can't?

https://cryptoownbank.com/?ref=CKN8XXVN&utm_source=forum&utm_medium=reply&utm_campaign=oct-push&utm_content=forum-20261005-01

[PostQuantumBTC]

In my opinion using only 4 or 6 random words for example (silver mango forest tunnel) can provide a lot of entropy because of which you can protect yourself from brute force attacks.

If a good hacker or I get hold of your seed phrase with 4 to 6 random words, just know that your bitcoin is gone because I will be able to access the bitcoin. A hacker can steal the cryptocurrencies of the seed phrase within minutes. For someone like me, just know that it is not really different than not using passphrase. Make sure that you use a long characters, add numbers and other characters to it. Use at least 15 characters.

[knowngunman]

Self-custody gives you control, but that control also means protecting your keys and having a plan if something goes wrong.

Which plan are you referring to here? Bitcoin has no plan B after something goes wrong. If you lost your back up or your wallet is compromised, the only plan that work is planning to get started again. In Bitcoin, you don't plan after things have gone wrong, the only plan that work is the plan before anything goes wrong.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Depending on how much you're holding but I think a single wallet should be more than enough for personal holdings as long as you can keep it secured. The larger your holding becomes, the more you think of adding complexity and of course, the more you become knowledgeable about security management.

[5W-KILO]

It's complexity Vs best security, only you can choose which one suits you the most, I personally will avoid complexity because there is a high chance of doing something wrong that can lead to lose of assets.

Instead of going fully multisig don't forget that you can keep your recovery seed offline and still use passphrase to make it more stronger, it doesn't have to be multisig.

[spiker777]

One thing I’ve been thinking about lately is how much responsibility comes with owning Bitcoin.

Self-custody gives you control, but that control also means protecting your keys and having a plan if something goes wrong.

That’s why I find multisig interesting. You don’t have to rely on a single private key, so losing or compromising one key doesn’t necessarily mean losing your Bitcoin.

It does add some complexity, though.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Multisig is good. But the process is a bit complicated. it is dificult for a Bitcoin newbie to understand and get used to. Besides, Bitcoin's native wallets are also safe enough for day-to-day Bitcoin use and storing coins.
So if only securing the funds is your purpose, then using multisig is not necessary.
Use a standard wallet, keep your keys and passphrase safe and protected and you should be good to go..

[standardnepo]

After this coldcard incident happened recently, I think adding a passphrase is enough, although I haven’t done it yet (because I’m lazy). Adding more things is both confusing and tiring. Ofc techie people can do whatever they want, like rolling dice etc. But it’s too much for a random person. I (who am not good with tech) already have a hardware wallet with seed phrase, and I try to keep it safe. Now I will add a passphrase, and that should be enough for me. Doing things more than this scares me. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

Multi-sig makes sense if you value your holdings security more than your setup's complexity. In other words, it makes sense if the value from the gained security outweighs the downside of having a more complex setup which you might "forget" or get locked out of. 

Securing assets using multi-signature is great, but I find it complicated because the process requires a strong memory.

Why would you need a strong memory? You should never rely on your memory for remembering the seed phrase.

[Aanuoluwatofunmi]

One thing I’ve been thinking about lately is how much responsibility comes with owning Bitcoin.

Self-custody gives you control, but that control also means protecting your keys and having a plan if something goes wrong.

That’s why I find multisig interesting. You don’t have to rely on a single private key, so losing or compromising one key doesn’t necessarily mean losing your Bitcoin.

It does add some complexity, though.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Considering what is happening of recent how wallet are being hacked and funds are being transferred from one wallet to the other by the hackers, it is more wise and safe to consider the use of a multi-sig wallet, even in such a way that if your private key gets compromised, hackers won't be able to penetrate through your wallet and perform a transaction successfully because they will need a cosigner which is very obvious that they cannot have access to sign the transaction, it is also recommended that one should consider the use of passphrase, and wallets that support this are also good for use.

[SilverCryptoBullet]

Multi-sig makes sense if you value your holdings security more than your setup's complexity. In other words, it makes sense if the value from the gained security outweighs the downside of having a more complex setup which you might "forget" or get locked out of.  

Security of the fund is most important so if complexity can help to improve the fund security, it's good. It's just not always adding more complexity will bring better security.

Practically, people must use a method that they can master how to use it properly and don't try a method that is too complex for them.

We already know why we are creating seed backups - to protect against loss of whatever devices (if any) we are storing the keys on for regular use. But what do we need to worry about protecting the backups themselves against?

    Loss due to destruction
    Loss due to complexity / not being able to restore from backup
    Loss to an attacker

Why would you need a strong memory? You should never rely on your memory for remembering the seed phrase.

Memory is never recommended as the only or main wallet backup method.

What about memorizing your backups? Well, I can only think of one situation in which I'd ever consider that - if I'm fleeing from some calamity without much time to prepare and I'm worried about physical attackers accosting me during the journey or at border crossings. That is to say - I only think memorization is a good strategy for temporary emergency use. As a long term storage strategy it creates single points of failure:

    You may forget the seed phrase.
    You could be injured and unable to recall it.
    You could die and your heirs would be unable to access it.
    You could have seed phrase coerced out of you.

[crwth]

Hmm. I don't think it's worth it unless you are an organization, as the other members have said.

Personally, I would approach this as Shamir Secret Sharing. ^{(Having one seed but split into pieces)}
Maybe this is the approach some people are looking for?

[KiaKia]

One thing I’ve been thinking about lately is how much responsibility comes with owning Bitcoin.

Self-custody gives you control, but that control also means protecting your keys and having a plan if something goes wrong.

That’s why I find multisig interesting. You don’t have to rely on a single private key, so losing or compromising one key doesn’t necessarily mean losing your Bitcoin.

It does add some complexity, though.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Yes and no, it depends on who you are, and what you really want, I know that multisig is the most secured of them all but for single person it's better to rely on recovery seed like 12 or 24 words combined with passphrase.

Even with that ColdCard attack, few people managed to stay undrained because they used passphrase, some people got lucky because they moved their funds faster once the news got to them.

If extra security is what you want I advice you go with Passphrase instead of the top complexed multisig..

[Cookdata]

That’s why I find multisig interesting. You don’t have to rely on a single private key, so losing or compromising one key doesn’t necessarily mean losing your Bitcoin.

It does add some complexity, though.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Securing assets using multi-signature is great, but I find it complicated because the process requires a strong memory.
Multi-signature is typically used by organizations that require multiple signatures to authorize transactions. If you have a strong memory and are prepared to handle everything, I don't think it's a bad idea to use it to secure your Bitcoin assets.
So far, I haven't needed multi-signature to secure my Bitcoin.

Multi-sig doesn't require a strong memory, it just has a complex set-up and signature requirement for signing transactions that makes it discouraging, but I prefer it for long term storage since I wouldn't be doing much transactions frequently on the wallet address. If you are a regular user that spend Bitcoin every time, a single signature wallet should be able to give you the best security at any time, and if you wish to add a passphrase you can remember, then that's better.

 

Even with that ColdCard attack, few people managed to stay undrained because they used passphrase, some people got lucky because they moved their funds faster once the news got to them.

The wallet attack happened for almost 2 days before many people were aware, some were lucky because the attacker focus on defualt wallet derivation of first accounts on Coldcard. Some people kept their Bitcoin Acoount 2 and other different accounts without passphrase and later moved their coins before the hackers.

[bitcoin-shark]

As far as I’m concerned, I believe that using a single key or a complex passphrase is more than sufficient to ensure a good level of security, while also allowing for quick and easy access or transfers.

[MisFoxie]

In my opinion using only 4 or 6 random words for example (silver mango forest tunnel) can provide a lot of entropy because of which you can protect yourself from brute force attacks.

If a good hacker or I get hold of your seed phrase with 4 to 6 random words, just know that your bitcoin is gone because I will be able to access the bitcoin. A hacker can steal the cryptocurrencies of the seed phrase within minutes. For someone like me, just know that it is not really different than not using passphrase. Make sure that you use a long characters, add numbers and other characters to it. Use at least 15 characters.

First of all no one can access my seed phrase. Okey let's think you access my seed phrase how will you bruteforce my passphrase?
6 truly random words from a dictionary (like the EFF Diceware list of 7776 words) provides over 77 bits of entropy (7776^6). If your or hackers device can check 1 trillion times/sec approximately
~8,700 years will take to get to my original passphrase.

[lionheart78]

What's the point of using multisig waller when all the access key is held by you (one person) unless you set it up right and access can't be obtained by another from you then it's safe. Same way if you can carefully save your 12/24 words seed phrase your funds are going to be protected and safe.

The safety lies on how the person protects the access key.

If we think deeply, a multi-sig can save us from losing our funds if we somehow lose one of the signing keys.  Setting up 3 keys and storing them at different places can save us a lot of trouble.  For example, if we keep the 3 keys on different computers or gadgets, and one of the three gadgets is infected by malware, the perpetrator won't have access to the Bitcoin that is under a multi-sig address, even if he got the private key stored on that device, because he needs another one to approve the transfer, assuming that the approval just needs 2 signatures.

[Cryptomultiplier]

One thing I’ve been thinking about lately is how much responsibility comes with owning Bitcoin.

Self-custody gives you control, but that control also means protecting your keys and having a plan if something goes wrong.

That’s why I find multisig interesting. You don’t have to rely on a single private key, so losing or compromising one key doesn’t necessarily mean losing your Bitcoin.

It does add some complexity, though.

Would you consider multisig necessary for personal holdings, or is a well-secured single wallet still enough?

Yes and no, it depends on who you are, and what you really want, I know that multisig is the most secured of them all but for single person it's better to rely on recovery seed like 12 or 24 words combined with passphrase.

Even with that ColdCard attack, few people managed to stay undrained because they used passphrase, some people got lucky because they moved their funds faster once the news got to them.

If extra security is what you want I advice you go with Passphrase instead of the top complexed multisig..

Multi sig is quite complex to use because you would always need your seed phrases and the wallet descriptor file in order to recover you funds and if the descriptor is lost, then that's a whole headache altogether and that's why using single sig plus passphrase is simpler and better for management of small portfolio and passing on portfolio inheritance to another person in case of maybe death or a very critical condition.

Still, I can't dispell how important using multi-sig is because, when one has accumulated enough Bitcoin or other crypto currencies over the years that amounts to much, hardware flaws or theft could easily occur while using a single sig plus passphrase and that's where I consider multi sig setup most efficient for larger portfolio holdings.

[d5000]

There is one scenario where for me 2-of-2 or even 3-of-3 multisig would make sense: if I want to re-use an address (e.g. because I'm getting paid by a recurring customer) and at the same time am worried about quantum computers.

"Hacking" 2 keys with a quantum computer takes double the computing power than a single key, and thus it's a little bit safer. At least, a quantum hacker will probably first try to hack a key with the same amount of BTC on it, but a single public key hash.

This however rather a niche scenario. If I only want to store my key in different locations, I could also store simply the passphrase "in parts" (first half in one place, second half in another ...).

[Alvin_talk]

There is one scenario where for me 2-of-2 or even 3-of-3 multisig would make sense: if I want to re-use an address (e.g. because I'm getting paid by a recurring customer) and at the same time am worried about quantum computers.

"Hacking" 2 keys with a quantum computer takes double the computing power than a single key, and thus it's a little bit safer.

Ok, I get it. But I still think this can be true in 2 of 2 multisig if only both public keys have not been exposed yet. But if it has been exposed, don't you think an attacker can brute force the public keys independently and maybe in parallel ( that is at the same time with two different quantum computers) to derive the private keys.

Yeah, your suggestion provides additional layer of security because it will cost more resources to execute but I think the attacker can spend such resources provided that the amount of coins at stake is worth it.