Something is wrong when you can't trust your hardware wallet.
To ensure the security of your crypto assets, should always assume that your HW-device is potentially compromised. Before using it, verify that this is not the case by conducting both an external and an internal analysis. An external check involves looking for signs of tampering, unauthorized physical intervention, or the presence of foreign components (while such inspection is still possible). An internal check involves generating a new seed phrase on the HW-device (ensuring that no seed phrase was pre-generated) and then sending a test transaction to the wallet to see if the assets are subsequently stolen.
Even when I order it directly from the manufacturer, there are other parties involved to deliver the device to me. The commonly not well paid people in the delivery service chain can become an attack/bribe target, too.
That is precisely why I believe all HW-devices should be considered "conditionally compromised". The presence of any intermediary between the seller and the buyer constitutes a potential threat.
How can a customer be sure, no tampering is happening there?
Buy it straight off the assembly line at the HW manufacturer’s assembly plant.

(Would at least need an individual device serial no. that is securely communicated between manufacturer and customer but not to the delivery chain.)
It’s an intriguing idea, at least until the next data breach occurs. Once that happens, it effectively becomes a system for tracking individuals (akin to a KYC), as the user’s data would be "hard-linked" to the specific HW-device and its serial number.
As a potential solution, the serial number could be made temporary: once the buyer receives the device and verifies the serial number, that number, along with any associated information, would be deleted from the HW manufacturer’s records (with the understanding that, throughout the interim period, the data was stored in an encrypted format).