Ah, but what if I lose the new password? My password from 2017 is securely backed up. Backups are trouble.
Here is a handy solution: I’ll encrypt my new credentials with PGP, and store them in a forum post!
So now your backup comes down to backing up your PGP credentials. Isn't that just moving one problem into another problem?
Indeed. I thought to myself almost exactly those words when I wrote OP.

Encrypted copies of my old Bitcoin Forum password from 29 March 2017 had fanned out through many backups, over the course of almost a decade. How could I instantly back up a new password, so I don’t lose my account if my computer catches fire an hour after the password change? This thread reduced that problem to the (hopefully!) solved problem of my PGP key.
In the Lauda memorial thread, I wasn’t trying to make
the puzzle impossible for humans—to the contrary...
I'm still hoping for the day you'll reveal the answer (after sweeping the coins of course).
LOL, funny you should say that. I actually need the money enough that before I “woke up” here, I tried to solve some other puzzles for fast cash. I mean the think-it-through puzzles, not the computational grinding challenges. Well, it seems there’s a reason why those puzzles remain unsolved for years.

I said in the puzzle post:
If the puzzle is unsolved for a very long time, [...] I reserve the right to end this by sweeping away the prize.
But,
whoops—I didn’t foresee that other people, some completely anonymous, would top it up with >20x the prize that I originally put into it! Who? It seems icopress contributed, but I guess probably not all of it? I even wonder if Lauda secretly watches the thread, wherever she may be, and chips in some more money from time to time.
It’s now mostly money that others gave to the kitty-puzzle. I don’t want Lauda’s forum-ghost to give me red trust, or even raise a flag on me.
So, I’m still hoping for the day that someone else solves it—and
doesn’t reveal the answer.

If you solve the puzzle, I would appreciate if you would post here with appropriate proofs that you’re the one who got it, and contact me to let me know how you figured it out; but please keep the solution private. Be cruel. Leave everyone in suspense. It is a special way of hiding information in plain sight, for
those who love their
privacy. 😼
Welcome back!
Thanks.
I store mine on YubiKey 5. In fact, I have three of these dongles, so I have three copies.
The relevant PGP code for doing this is shown
in this thread, which describes the way to store sensitive information on digital media.
@nullius, I also use it to store my Bitcointalk credentials, among other things. You seem to be a PGP's OG, so I’d appreciate your opinion on my method for keeping sensitive information.
Interesting. NeuroticFish already raised most of the concerns that came to my mind, and you answered them. If I think of anything that hasn’t been said, I hope you don’t mind if I bump your thread.
I agree with this:
It is never recommended to store your seed phrases in any form of digital media, not even using PGP encryption.
Mantra.
People tend to have a superstition about these things. Although there’s sometimes
some justification for using old-fashioned methods, it’s ultimately just another tool in your toolbox.
Use the right tool for the job. For my particular needs, the digital tools that I have are much better than the more tangible tools that I have. If I cargo-culted a rote rule like “never store seed phrases digitally”, I’d be shooting myself in the foot.
I don’t know much about hardware devices. It’s partly a matter of availability; there are some open-source USB security keys I’d like to play with, but I can’t find an adequate way to get them anonymously (or even at all). So, I play to my own strengths: I’m weak with hardware, but strong in software. You seem adept with hardware, so you’re also playing to your own strengths.
I have an airgap machine with custom code in the boot process, which obfuscates even how to enter the passphrase to decrypt the disk; an adversary would need to reverse-engineer what I did, before they can even start to attack my long Diceware passphrase stretched with Argon2 on ridiculous settings. (To be clear, the security by obscurity is for defense-in-depth: Primary security is the passphrase and the Argon2.) The machine itself is as generic as possible, obtained as safely as is feasible to me.
I used to buy such things only off-the-shelf in brick-and-mortar stores, only for cash—to foreclose any possibility of targeted shipment interdiction, and to leave no record of what kit I have. Unfortunately, I’ve had to give up on that as decent supplies have pretty much become online-only.
The airgap machine handles what I think of as master keys, which I then use to help manage things on the online machine. Sorry, I don’t want to be more specific.

Before post-quantum crypto was standardized, I also wrote on the airgap machine my own homebrew protocol for storing secrets that need long-term security. I could then export only the post-quantum encrypted copy across the airgap, and upload it somewhere untrusted for off-site backup. For disaster recovery, I’d need to rely on my ability to rewrite the software. Nowadays, of course, I would recommend using GnuPG’s PQC, which it has had since 2024.
(Per LoyceV, yes, there needs to be a better way to back up PGP private keys.)