Hardware Implants found in Trezor safe 5

[Meuserna]

I really hope that this is an isolated incident, because most likely, during the excitement with Ledgers, conscientious Trezor holders should have checked the structure of their hardware wallets.

Not just Trezor users.

Anyone who uses a commercial hardware wallet should check their devices. Every commercial hardware wallet is a target for supply chain attacks.

I don't think it's happened yet, but we have to assume counterfeit devices will be the next wave, because components are cheap and thieves only need to figure out how to trick the firmware into thinking the components are legit. And while that's probably too challenging for 2026 hackers, with AI reverse engineering everything, it's only a matter of time before it becomes a real threat.

All of this makes me more and more glad I switched to DIY (ShieldSigner & Krux, and I plan on trying Kern next year).

[decodx]

I don't get it, why is this from only CryptoBilis and not from a different reseller. It shows that an insider CryptoBilis is either tampering with the wallet or someone from outside is taking advantage of the company to implant chips in the hardware wallets in their possession. I hope no one using Trezor Safe 5 will be affected because the losses are too much this year.

 I think other hardware wallets that company that CryptoBilis is dealing should check all their hardware wallet in CryptoBilis company. Who knows if there will be an implant on a different brand of hardware wallet in CryptoBilis.

This is obviously not a coincidence. I think that Cryptobilis knows exactly what they are doing. What are the chances that one reseller suddenly has two products tampered with? Especially after the first one, there should have been a quality check. So there is not much doubt in my mind this is happening on purpose and Cryptobilis is knowingly involved in it.

There is something funky going on....

This doesn't automatically imply they're directly involved. From what I've seen, they stopped ALL hardware wallet sales, both online and physical stores, as soon as reports first surfaced about the Ledger HW wallets. Reportedly, this Trezor wallet was purchased in August 2026—that is, before the Ledger incident.

CryptoBilis could very well be innocent, and some other party in the supply chain could be responsible for the malicious tampering. I'd avoid jumping to conclusions until an investigation is completed and the facts are clear. But yeah, if you are one of those who purchased a hardware wallet from them, you should consider it insecure and move your funds asap.

[PrivacyG]

So can we go back to recommending stripping an old laptop from any wireless conectivity and using that as a Wallet now, just like we used to years ago?

[Meuserna]

So can we go back to recommending stripping an old laptop from any wireless conectivity and using that as a Wallet now, just like we used to years ago?

No, because that's reckless. The threats are much greater than they used to be because thieves aren't going after $5 Bitcoin. They're going after (checks current price) $77k Bitcoin.

Get a Raspberry Pi Zero. It has no wifi. It has no bluetooth. It has no software at all. It's just a development board. And because it isn't designed for any specific purpose, thieves and scammers aren't going to be hacking them in hopes of finding one intended to be used as a hardware wallet. They'd have to hack tens of thousands of devices just in hopes of finding one wallet.

Get a camera and LCD hat for the Pi. Install SeedSigner. Better yet, install ShieldSigner.

This isn't hard, and it provides better Bitcoin security than any commercially available hardware wallet at any price.

Stateless? Check. By not saving your seed or wallet on the device, you're in no danger if somebody finds the device, because there's nothing on it.

Airgapped? Check. Internet hackers can't reach it. No wifi. No bluetooth. No worries.

Encrypted Seed QR? Check. Even if somebody finds your seed QR, all they found is a weird thing that won't scan. It could be a link to your favorite porn website for all they know.

Passphrase QR? Check. This enables the use of strong passphrases. Weak passphrases are hackable, and having to enter the passphrase manually every time encourages the use of weak passphrases. Passphrase QR solves this.

Off the shelf parts? Check. This solves the threat of supply chain attacks.

Fully open source? Check. You can verify every line of code to prove it's safe. Not a coder? Use AI. You can also contact the devs or any others who use it. Bitcoin itself is open source. Your hardware wallet should be too.

None of what I just listed is hard, but it's a different way of working. It's also much safer.

[ABCbits]

If it's true, then Trezor is being very generous. Last time i checked, Ledger never offered this kind of compensation from anyone who buy their device from CryptoBills.

We don't know that for sure. Maybe those who contact them get free replacements. I remember years ago that people reported that Ledger gave free replacement devices even to customers with expired warranties if their hardware wallets broke.

That's possible. But with how Ledger have more aggressive marketing these days, surely they would already publicly announce that they offer replacement for whoever buy their device from CryptoBills.

CryptoBilis could very well be innocent, and some other party in the supply chain could be responsible for the malicious tampering. I'd avoid jumping to conclusions until an investigation is completed and the facts are clear. But yeah, if you are one of those who purchased a hardware wallet from them, you should consider it insecure and move your funds asap.

But with how hardware wallet from 2 different brand affected, IMO the possiblity they're being innocent become lower. It makes me wonder if there's rouge CryptoBills's workers or contractors that tamper the device and CryptoBills never notice it.

[Pmalek]

But with how hardware wallet from 2 different brand affected, IMO the possiblity they're being innocent become lower. It makes me wonder if there's rouge CryptoBills's workers or contractors that tamper the device and CryptoBills never notice it.

Whoever is modifying these devices, it's got to be a big operation. "Big" can mean a lot of things. Let's say it's more than one or two individuals installing these implants in devices in their garage. I don't believe these are devices that were initially bought by scammers, manipulated and then returned with the idea of being resold. It's more probable that it's an inside job, involving people who can grab 10/50/100 hardware wallets somewhere in the supply chain, modify them, and put them back, without anyone noticing or not wanting to notice.

[FinneysTrueVision]

But with how hardware wallet from 2 different brand affected, IMO the possiblity they're being innocent become lower. It makes me wonder if there's rouge CryptoBills's workers or contractors that tamper the device and CryptoBills never notice it.

And they had also secretly sold the company to foreign buyers who made them sign an NDA. That’s as big of a red flag as you can get.

[PrivacyG]

No, because that's reckless. The threats are much greater than they used to be because thieves aren't going after $5 Bitcoin. They're going after (checks current price) $77k Bitcoin.

Get a Raspberry Pi Zero.

Do you see an airgapped computer as a reckless recommendation because in a Bitcoin 'wrench attack' the attacker would look for laptops, phones and Hardware Wallets that may contain Bitcoin?

I do have all the components I need to build my own Seed Signer.  I am tempted to create one but I keep postponing it.  I seem to have a preference for 'the old ways', which is an encrypted Linux install I run Electrum on.

This was after many years of trying so many Hardware and Software Wallets that just come and go all the time, get hacked, have hidden concerning vulnerabilities et cetera.  I am sick of testing out new things, and the ONLY build that seems to last for an eternity with zero head aches at all was this simple Electrum setup.

I am really curious about your opinion why this would be reckless.  Pre built Hardware Wallets are definitely not the solution any more considering the risks of getting one that was tampered with.  Or.  One that has an option to extract the Seed out of it all of a sudden, after it was thought to be impossible for years.  Building one piece by piece with your own hands is clearly a much safer way, you know where every thing came from and what was installed on it.  But I do not really see how an airgapped Electrum install is reckless?

[Meuserna]

No, because that's reckless. The threats are much greater than they used to be because thieves aren't going after $5 Bitcoin. They're going after (checks current price) $77k Bitcoin.

Get a Raspberry Pi Zero.

Do you see an airgapped computer as a reckless recommendation because in a Bitcoin 'wrench attack' the attacker would look for laptops, phones and Hardware Wallets that may contain Bitcoin?

How do you prove it can't be reached by wifi? Turning wifi off doesn't prove wifi cannot be used by an attacker via some sort of exploit.

How do you prove it can't be reached by bluetooth? Turning bluetooth off doesn't prove bluetooth cannot be used by an attacker via some sort of exploit.

How do you prove every line of code running on that computer is safe and cannot be used by an attacker to steal your coins? Not just every line of code in the app. Every line of code on that machine, period, including the OS.

A Raspberry Pi Zero has no wifi. No bluetooth. No OS. No apps. The only thing it has is whatever code you've installed on the micro SD card you inserted into it.

Part of the point of hardware wallets like Trezor is that a single-purpose device helps keep you safe by removing security risks introduced by other uses, such as wifi, bluetooth, apps, extraneous code, etc (this is also why I'd never use a Trezor model with bluetooth. Why add that risk?).

Trezor's code can be proven safe because it's open source... but supply chain attacks are a risk, and mailing address leaks are a risk. Using a Raspberry Pi instead eliminates those risks because a would-be attacker can't go after Raspberry Pis unless he has some way of knowing a specific Pi will be used for a hardware wallet. Pis have nearly unlimited other uses. I'm using one as an Airplay streamer and another as a home automation hub.

[PrivacyG]

How do you prove it can't be reached by wifi? Turning wifi off doesn't prove wifi cannot be used by an attacker via some sort of exploit.

How do you prove it can't be reached by bluetooth? Turning bluetooth off doesn't prove bluetooth cannot be used by an attacker via some sort of exploit.

My airgapped laptops had the wireless components physically removed for both Bluetooth if there was any, and for the Wi-Fi.  My airgapped computers always had motherboards with no wireless connectivity at all.  I agree, if it is simply an 'Airplane Mode' switch on a screen then it is useless.

I saw this Software Wallet designed for turning old Smart phones in to 'Hardware Wallets'.  I would never use that.  A Smart phone has a SIM card, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, what not.  So many ways it can transfer information to the external World, which should be a concern.

How do you prove every line of code running on that computer is safe and cannot be used by an attacker to steal your coins? Not just every line of code in the app. Every line of code on that machine, period, including the OS.

I can not really prove much as I do not have the knowledge to audit a code on my own.  I could use 'AI', but that would be less trust worthy than humans who audit the code and even if it was just as reliable, to me it would be just like trusting a human audit of the same code.

However.  Installing an encrypted Open Source Linux distribution and pairing it with an Electrum install, how can an attacker realistically steal my Bitcoin?

I am talking particularly about average users, not about people who are stalked by the CIA, NSA or which ever other Three Letter Agency.  For that threat level you would need hell of a lot more paranoia.

If plausible deniability is a worry, a gigantic 15 inch laptop or an enormous computer case with an encrypted Linux install would be one quick way to get your first bat to the face by the attacker.  But then you can always have a normal Linux install with normal Open Source software and files on it so if the attacker opens it up there is no thing to get out of it, and then you can have a small, hidden, encrypted USB Linux install that you plug in when ever you want to boot in to the Electrum install.

Part of the point of hardware wallets like Trezor is that a single-purpose device helps keep you safe by removing security risks introduced by other uses, such as wifi, bluetooth, apps, extraneous code, etc (this is also why I'd never use a Trezor model with bluetooth. Why add that risk?).

I agree.  These 'modern designs' with wireless connectivity have been a big worry for me for a long time.  I believe Ledger was first with their Nano X, and then it became a competition for who can bring most wireless features and the best design while still being able to offer the same level of security.  It defeated the purpose of a Hardware Wallet.  If I can back up my Seed in a cloud service and I can transfer Bitcoin using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, I could as well simply carry all my Bitcoin on a Hot Wallet.  It would be the same!

Trezor at least kept two separate paths for people who prefer wireless connectivity and people who prefer the classic way.  I lost my interest in Hardware Wallets many years ago however as I always simply went back to my Electrum setup instead.

-----

I do hope you do not understand me wrong.  By the way it looks, you are about as paranoid as me when it comes to this technology.  I do not deny that a Seed Signer is a solution for people who want top notch security for their Bitcoin, particularly now when even devices like Trezor are found with implants.  It is really bad and uncertain times we are living.  I however feel like an airgapped setup is also a great solution, for multiple reasons.

A lot of people have old technology in their home, which means all they need for this setup is to get one of their old laptops or computers, identify each component and remove any wireless one physically from it, install an encrypted Open Source Linux distribution and then install Electrum.

Satoshi created an alternative to Fiat, to Banks, a way for the unbanked to be their own Bank.  I see my approach as a way to fulfill that, by making it possible for people who already own the older technology in their home to build their own Bank from scratch with no extra investment other than time.  You recycle an old device, giving it great use.

I know many people who still own computers or laptops from before Bitcoin even existed.  The oldest computer I tried to airgap was a pre 2005 build.  It took about two to three minutes from pushing the Power button to loading Electrum but after that it would work with no problems at all.  While a Seed Signer does seem to have a lot of cool features and is a viable, affordable solution to secure your Bitcoin, is it not wrong to spread the word that an airgapped Electrum install is 'reckless' in comparison to it?

[Ashawowo(OS)]

Not surprising... they have access to a lot of hardware wallets; why stop at one egg when you can crack a whole tray.  
At this point, anybody who purchased whatever hardware wallet from that reseller should just stop using it and move their funds immediately. Better to be safe than sorry.

Sure that's the best thing to do now, and every Hardware wallet manufacturer is expected to remove them or any other reseller which it was confirmed that wallets purchased from them was tampered as an official reseller. This fraudulent practice is enough for them all to loose credibility forever.

[Lucius]

~snip~
Get a Raspberry Pi Zero. It has no wifi. It has no bluetooth. It has no software at all. It's just a development board. And because it isn't designed for any specific purpose, thieves and scammers aren't going to be hacking them in hopes of finding one intended to be used as a hardware wallet. They'd have to hack tens of thousands of devices just in hopes of finding one wallet.

It's not disputed that theoretically such a situation is possible, but what is the attack vector on the Raspberry Pi if the device is not online at all? Are we talking here about an exclusively physical attack on the device or about such devices being modified in some way without the user being aware of it?