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Author Topic: A Bitcoin Core developer has proposed setting up traps for quantum hackers  (Read 263 times)
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November 06, 2026, 12:02:40 PM
Merited by vapourminer (1)
 #1

Corey Fields has proposed a draft of an idea in which he contemplates creating a mechanism that penalizes any attempt to steal funds using a quantum computer by paying a reward to whoever proves it. He proposes enabling new validation rules on Q-day. He suggests using a trap mechanism that can be set in advance to prevent a quantum thief. This involves transactions with hidden proof of ownership, which is revealed when a thief attempts to steal the coins. This would result in the thief losing their funds, making it clear that the owner of the trap is even interested in the thief being caught this way. The thief cannot detect the trap in advance, since before it is triggered, the trap appears to be a normal, small, secure UTXO.

https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/ARMwWdWcz9A?pli=1


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November 07, 2026, 12:01:18 AM
 #2

Corey Fields has proposed a draft of an idea in which he contemplates creating a mechanism that penalizes any attempt to steal funds using a quantum computer by paying a reward to whoever proves it. He proposes enabling new validation rules on Q-day. He suggests using a trap mechanism that can be set in advance to prevent a quantum thief. This involves transactions with hidden proof of ownership, which is revealed when a thief attempts to steal the coins. This would result in the thief losing their funds, making it clear that the owner of the trap is even interested in the thief being caught this way. The thief cannot detect the trap in advance, since before it is triggered, the trap appears to be a normal, small, secure UTXO.

Interesting - I hope this would not be added to the bitcoin protocol, as it just opens up another attack surface.   Bitcoin scammers aren't all independent - I don't know the specs of the new protocol (obviously), but if the protocol involves moving coin from person A to person B, it can be abused.

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November 07, 2026, 06:53:39 AM
Merited by LoyceV (4), ABCbits (2), vapourminer (1)
 #3

-snip- but if the protocol involves moving coin from person A to person B, it can be abused.
In quantum-landmine's case, the vulnerable UTXO aren't meant to be moved by anyone pre q-day.
The owner just have to create a "proof" that he can then use (post q-day) to spend the output of the transaction that attempted to spend his vulnerable UTXO.

The issue here is the collateral, even the owner needs to include a same-amount UTXO as a collateral.
This will probably be an issue with legacy UTXO with high amounts.

IDK about the versions of "Vulnerable Coin Auction" though, there might be a better way as the author implies.

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November 07, 2026, 01:11:19 PM
 #4

All these "solutions" create new problems, complicate things, and make Bitcoin less of censorship-resistant money, just for the sake of avoiding a "price crash".

In my opinion, we should just let the first quantum computer take them, and if he wishes to sell them on spot, so be it. People should be prepared for the scenario that Satoshi returns and sells them all.
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November 08, 2026, 07:18:57 AM
Merited by LoyceV (4)
 #5

It sounds like one of idea that sound interesting or cool in theory, but probably not practical enough. If someone bother to create TX that serve as collateralized legacy output, why don't they just just split their Bitcoin to many fresh/unused address as workaround? I say workaround, since i expect hacker with quantum computer less likely to target address with smaller amount of Bitcoin.

P.S. To OP, you're not asking for technical help/support, please move this thread to more appropriate board.

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November 09, 2026, 02:29:17 PM
Merited by vapourminer (1), ABCbits (1)
 #6

I would support the idea if it's strictly limited to outputs where the public key is already published in the "receiving" transaction, i.e. P2PK. I think that's also the idea behind it. P2PKH and friends has a much easier solution, just don't reuse Smiley

It sounds like one of idea that sound interesting or cool in theory, but probably not practical enough. If someone bother to create TX that serve as collateralized legacy output, why don't they just just split their Bitcoin to many fresh/unused address as workaround?
As far as I understand the proposal, the idea is to change the game theory for quantum attacks. This means, owners of P2PK and other "vulnerable" output types should deliberately resign to move their coins only to create these landmines and making quantum attacks riskier. I.e. "for themselves" it's of course easier to move their coins to fresh addresses, but they would set up these traps as a service "for the community".

I think that idea could work, because for the P2PK owners it is an interesting "game" to try, i.e. to speculate on an attacker trying to "take it" with a quantum computer. Anybody who owns an old P2PK output from the 2009/10 era could thus be speculating on additional income.

The only problem behind the proposal is that most coins of these types are believed to be lost (or difficult to recover), with Satoshi's coins being the most prominent ones. This means: Attacking the Patoshi coins will continue to be low-risk probably (if Satoshi isn't already creating these proofs secretly ...). In general, I think there will be very few old P2PK outputs where someone even is able and willing to set up such a landmine. And that probably reduces that risk to attack them to less than 1% or so.

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November 09, 2026, 04:15:21 PM
 #7

It sounds like one of idea that sound interesting or cool in theory, but probably not practical enough. If someone bother to create TX that serve as collateralized legacy output, why don't they just just split their Bitcoin to many fresh/unused address as workaround? I say workaround, since i expect hacker with quantum computer less likely to target address with smaller amount of Bitcoin.

P.S. To OP, you're not asking for technical help/support, please move this thread to more appropriate board.
A mitigation could be to split the funds into multiple new addresses. This can be a valid mitigation option for hash-based scripts such as P2PKH and P2WPKH as the public key will only be exposed once the funds have been spent. This is not the case for P2PK and Taproot scripts. Another issue with this mitigation is if the addresses are reused you may expose further UTXO's that are related to the same key.

There is also an issue with this mitigation. In the collateral requirements of Cory’s proposal it is assumed that all legacy outputs will be fully collateralised. If you create lots of new legacy addresses with your BTC in then they will still be affected. Splitting the funds into new legacy addresses will not fully mitigate this issue. If you wanted to avoid this requirement you would need to move the funds to the new quantum safe script type.
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November 10, 2026, 07:05:07 AM
 #8

It sounds like one of idea that sound interesting or cool in theory, but probably not practical enough. If someone bother to create TX that serve as collateralized legacy output, why don't they just just split their Bitcoin to many fresh/unused address as workaround? I say workaround, since i expect hacker with quantum computer less likely to target address with smaller amount of Bitcoin.

P.S. To OP, you're not asking for technical help/support, please move this thread to more appropriate board.
A mitigation could be to split the funds into multiple new addresses. This can be a valid mitigation option for hash-based scripts such as P2PKH and P2WPKH as the public key will only be exposed once the funds have been spent. This is not the case for P2PK and Taproot scripts. Another issue with this mitigation is if the addresses are reused you may expose further UTXO's that are related to the same key.

There is also an issue with this mitigation. In the collateral requirements of Cory’s proposal it is assumed that all legacy outputs will be fully collateralised. If you create lots of new legacy addresses with your BTC in then they will still be affected. Splitting the funds into new legacy addresses will not fully mitigate this issue. If you wanted to avoid this requirement you would need to move the funds to the new quantum safe script type.

You're not wrong and that's why i use word "workaround" (not "mitigation").

workaround
noun

a way of dealing with a problem or making something work despite the problem, without completely solving it:

But i expect someone who bothered to do such workaround unlikely to make mistake of re-using address. And even if they make such mistake, the odds they're being targeted is lower than vulnerable address owned by exchange or other custodial service that usually have more balance.

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November 10, 2026, 08:07:18 AM
 #9


You're not wrong and that's why i use word "workaround" (not "mitigation").

workaround
noun

a way of dealing with a problem or making something work despite the problem, without completely solving it:

But i expect someone who bothered to do such workaround unlikely to make mistake of re-using address. And even if they make such mistake, the odds they're being targeted is lower than vulnerable address owned by exchange or other custodial service that usually have more balance.

Yes, it's a good point. While splitting would provide some mitigation by reducing the risk of attack on each individual output, if they have taken steps to mitigate it they will likely be very careful with address reuse.

The point I was trying to make was that whilst splitting would reduce the attractiveness of individual outputs to an attacker, they would still have to follow the rules in Cory's proposal to ensure collateral is included. This can help enforce the collateral requirement, however, it would not be a full replacement for migration to a quantum-safe output type.
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November 11, 2026, 09:33:50 AM
Merited by Quickseller (20)
 #10

I don't like the idea of setting landmines in the blockchain. It would be better if we could just secure our coins from quantum hackers without the need to have to perform all these sort of setups for them.

Although at this point I think that AI hackers are a much bigger immediate problem that we should deal with first.

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November 11, 2026, 05:05:26 PM
 #11

It would be better if we could just secure our coins from quantum hackers without the need to have to perform all these sort of setups for them.
But for P2PK that is probably not possible. The only way is to restrict movement (i.e. spending of the coins), like with Hourglass and similar ideas, and the "landmine" idea is particularly interesting because it also attachs a risk.

An alternative may be to require a long timelock for moving P2PK and similar vulnerable coins, 1 year minimum, or proportional to the time the UTXO wasn't moved. My favourite concept is to require a CSV timelock of 1 block for each 2 or 3 blocks the coins haven't moved. If someone hasn't moved his coins for e.g. 15 years (like Satoshi's coins) then it wouldn't make much of a difference to have to hodl them for 5 or 7 years more. But for attackers it would be extremely risky to attack an UTXO (using an extremely expensive bleeding edge technology) only to not be sure 1) how much it will be worth in 5+ years and 2) if the original owner doesn't find them and e.g. prosecute them legally.

Although at this point I think that AI hackers are a much bigger immediate problem that we should deal with first.
Which kind of AI hackers are you referring to?

If you mean "mathematical shortcuts" that could make a calculation of a private key (having knowledge of the public key) faster, then this would only work if there's a vulnerability in the elliptic curve algorithm, but the consequences would be identical to those of quantum theft: you have to strictly avoid re-using coins, and protect P2PK in some way.

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November 12, 2026, 06:49:24 AM
 #12

It would be better if we could just secure our coins from quantum hackers without the need to have to perform all these sort of setups for them.
This is a good argument against Quantum Landmine (exc. Vulnerable Coin Auction).
Since the owner has to create a proof with its private key before the new standard/consensus spending rule of legacy UTXO (post-QC)
Then he might just as well spend it and create a new Quantum Secure output instead.

It depends on the timing when a QC-safe script will be implemented before or after it.
But as the concept suggests, QC-safe script should come first.

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November 12, 2026, 10:56:22 PM
 #13

An alternative may be to require a long timelock for moving P2PK and similar vulnerable coins, 1 year minimum, or proportional to the time the UTXO wasn't moved. My favourite concept is to require a CSV timelock of 1 block for each 2 or 3 blocks the coins haven't moved.

Would the CSV arrangement allow the original owner to recover or spend their coin differently from the attacker?
I can see that a timelock would make stealing less attractive to attackers as they might successfully derive the private keys but due to the timelock they won’t be able to move the funds immediately plus this gives time to the original owner to identify and pursue the attacker but wouldn’t the original owner also face the same delay??

The protocol doesn’t necessarily differentiate between the original owner who comes back after years of inactivity from an attacker that has been able to successfully derive the private keys. As for locating the attacker, that’s an off chain matter, so since the timelock doesn’t really distinguish who the coin belongs to, how will the mechanism handle the original owner who is returning after years of inactivity? Is it possible for it to preserve the protection it offers without making legitimate recovery and spending tedious or unnecessarily difficult?

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November 13, 2026, 07:04:49 PM
 #14

All these "solutions" create new problems, complicate things, and make Bitcoin less of censorship-resistant money, just for the sake of avoiding a "price crash".

For me, I still feel the fear of quantum computers is exaggerated a bit. I'm not saying it's not a threat, but not as much as people make it out to be.
Whoever has a quantum computer would know that stealing bitcoins from addresses will only crash the price, and what do they stand to gain from something that has no value when they steal it?
If one address with a million bitcoins gets stolen today through quantum computers, I'm sure before 7 am tomorrow morning, Bitcoin would be trading below $20k.
Yes, it's a problem, but I believe it's a problem that has a simpler solution intead of overcomplicating everything.

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November 13, 2026, 09:05:01 PM
Merited by vapourminer (1)
 #15

Would the CSV arrangement allow the original owner to recover or spend their coin differently from the attacker?
Yes, if he can provide an ownership proof, like in the original landmine idea, for example a message signed on the blockchain with the private key before Q-day.

After Q-day, it can't be distinguished if the original owner is the original one, or the hacker. The only way in this case is to pursue the hacker and try to find him (e.g. for legal action). But you'd have a lot of time for that. And once you recovered access to your coins, then you could use them as collateral for a loan for example, so you can benefit while they are still frozen. For a hacker this would be difficult because he would have to reveal his identity to the entity given out the loan.

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November 13, 2026, 09:22:06 PM
 #16

Yes, if he can provide an ownership proof, like in the original landmine idea, for example a message signed on the blockchain with the private key before Q-day.

After Q-day, it can't be distinguished if the original owner is the original one, or the hacker. The only way in this case is to pursue the hacker and try to find him (e.g. for legal action). But you'd have a lot of time for that. And once you recovered access to your coins, then you could use them as collateral for a loan for example, so you can benefit while they are still frozen. For a hacker this would be difficult because he would have to reveal his identity to the entity given out the loan.
This is a very nice escape for the owner, but my question is that, the frozen coin is within whose control and again after making it as collateral for the loan, paying back loan have to be from another source?

I think after bringing every proof that you are the real owner, what is the essence of pursuing the hacker? Instead I will use that to period to reclaim the possession of my assets meaning the coins.

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November 14, 2026, 06:02:49 AM
Merited by vapourminer (1)
 #17

I can see that a timelock would make stealing less attractive to attackers as they might successfully derive the private keys but due to the timelock they won’t be able to move the funds immediately plus this gives time to the original owner to identify and pursue the attacker but wouldn’t the original owner also face the same delay??
He wont have to wait for the timelock to expire, that's if he can provide the proof that he had created before qday.

The proposal's spending conditions states that it can be spent within that timelock if the user can provide the "proof".
The timelock is there for those who are trying to spend it without proof.

- If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend
- If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above proof
- If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual.

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