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Author Topic: Ecdsa Bitcoin wallet key  (Read 67 times)
youcan_Vx (OP)
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November 15, 2026, 03:34:05 AM
 #1

Is it possible to crack a Bitcoin wallet key that contains multiple addresses and has a leak issue involving duplicate 14-character and number portions of the Nonce code?

Share your thoughts! 👀
nc50lc
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November 15, 2026, 06:58:34 AM
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 #2

This is most likely an X/Y Problem.

The current description is all over the place, which currently doesn't make sense or at least without the necessary information about the client that generated it.
Please provide more information or at least link(s) of anything related to it.
And the actual goal why you're asking the question.

Once there's enough info,
You may move this to Technical Support board (or a Mod might) for better visibility to more tech-savvy users.

ABCbits
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November 15, 2026, 07:40:47 AM
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Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character, it's certainly possible. But the hard part is determining how likely it can be done in practice.

With naive assumption, 14 known hex character means possible combination reduced from 2^256 to 2^200. But amount of vulnerable signature and nature of the vulnerability could weaken the security even more.

MonNov16
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Today at 03:35:21 AM
 #4

Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character, it's certainly possible. But the hard part is determining how likely it can be done in practice.

With naive assumption, 14 known hex character means possible combination reduced from 2^256 to 2^200. But amount of vulnerable signature and nature of the vulnerability could weaken the security even more.

Main thing to take from this is that rather than trying to brute force the attack, it can be turned into lattice problem (Hidden Number Problem). If you know some bits of k across multiple signatures made with same key, it may be possible to recover whole private key using lattice reduction (LLL). It is well known type of attack that has been demonstrated before. Minerva and LadderLeak vulnerabilities have shown that attacks can be carried out against ECDSA by exploiting information leaked through tming and side channels. How many signatures you would need to do this would depend on how much information has been leaked.

This i just one possible attack scenario. If there was more of issue with poor RNG/nonce generation and side-channel leakage then lattice attack would be far more relevant.

As if we look at OP so I will say, if there are multiple address leaks involving different keys, you wont get any benefit from combining those leaks. Youll require multiple leaks per key.
nc50lc
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Today at 07:21:46 AM
 #5

Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) -snip-
Possible, I might have read some articles involving vulnerabilities that lead to reproducible PRNG, so the supposed-to-be random nonce might have reproducible portions.

Quote from: ABCbits
and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character
For me, it looks like this: "duplicate 14-character" and "number portions of the Nonce".

BTW, I found this thread in Bitcoin Discussion board but OP or a Mod moved it here without clarifying the OP.
I'm thinking that this could just be one of those common Bitcoin Discussion topic but tried to "step-up" to be technical that's why the OP contains technical jargons.

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