Since anyone can download and read the code how would they do this?
They could've modified the downloadable binary and force a dev to sign the compiled binary so that it looks legit. Not sure how fast a slight modification would've been noticed this way.
Checking the code and diffing it with previous releases would show nothing nefarious, and compiling from source and comparing it to the released binary might as well not work very well, as I guess different environments have different build environments and builds will be slightly different unless environments are duplicated exactly?
So the change in the binary might for instance allow siphoning of private keys to an adversary. And if the adversary was careful, stealing of coins could go on slowly as not to raise too much suspicion, or it could be used to just control bitcoin addresses, and then freeze them once it's necessary. Ie. 'freezing' it by transferring coins using the stolen private keys.
I don't know if there currently is any process whereby the binaries released are checked by several parties before they're ok'ed. The Sha256 checksums and pgp signature only proves that the holder of that signature has vouched for those checksums.
There should ideally be some 'paranoid bitcoin' project, or better yet several of them serving as watchdogs alerting the larger community once something nefarious happens.
Ideally to stay safe, one should always diff a new release against a previous release by checking what code is added, then understand this code and ensure nothing nefarious has been added, and then compile it yourself.
But how could one be sure that eventually sometime some distributor of a linux system doesn't distribute it with a compiler that will insert some nefarious code once it discovers that a bitcoin binary is being made.
There's a lot of trust we need to place in other people - and if you become too paranoid, you could worry about details all day long.