The obvious attack vector?

[Este Nuno]

As evidenced by miners clearly being influenced by their short term economic gain it seems a bad actor could launch a >50% attack much more easily than actually hashing the majority of the network themselves. All it would require is a pool run by a bad actor that simply offered economic incentive sufficient to attract miners away from Ghash et al. If miners as individuals are incapable of ignoring the lure of immediate gain, the bad actor could simply operate a pool at a loss for a short period of time and gain control of the network. This would be much cheaper than any other way of mounting this sort of attack.

This is the main issue as I see it. Thoughts?

[pawel7777]

Unrealistic. GHash has 0% fees, so hard to beat that. On top of that, a huge part of cex.io power is their own mining hardware.
You wouldn't go anywhere near 50% by just attracting greedy miners.

[Este Nuno]

Unrealistic. GHash has 0% fees, so hard to beat that. On top of that, a huge part of cex.io power is their own mining hardware.
You wouldn't go anywhere near 50% by just attracting greedy miners.

I'm saying a pool could easily beat that by paying negative fees or other incentives that provide enough of a reason for miners to switch. They say cex.io is 25% of their hashing power. Even so that would mean you would only need 12.5% of the hashing power to meet or exceed Ghash.