I think its better to have the network vote about it instead.
So either the sender gets the cash back or the receiver gets the cash. Like a "real" escrow.
I wrote a thread about it:
http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4856.0Then its not possible to use the money as a "threat tool" either:
For example:
A sells a laptop without power adapter because A needs the power adapter to a new laptop.
B buys this laptop and in the business deal, its specific that power adapter is NOT included.
B then says "If you dont send the power adapter I will never release the money."
Now B is forced to send a power adapter to get the money for the laptop at all.
B will still lose the money even if A don't send any power adapter, but he still can force many extras from the seller for same money. And in this way fraud the seller.
With my solution with secure chargeback, it will never happen. B buys something from A. A sends the freight number as a reply to the transaction. If B now protest, everyone will be able to check at the freight'ers website that the parcel has really been sent and vote the transaction to A's favor. If the weight of the package seem illocigal, like a laser printer that weights 0,1 g, of course people will vote the transaction to B's favor.
Neat idea but, in the end, it doesn't matter how you implement it, what matters is what the end properties are. In this case, as I understand it, you are proposing that an escrow transaction specify a number of "voters" who will arbitrate any dispute by voting for or against either side.
The incentive to vote with all the other voters is a bit of a perverse incentive, since, its not so much an agreement to do right, but to do what others do. There is actually a penalty for voting your conscience if you believe that that vote will be a losing vote. Whats the value in that?
Now it just comes down to he said vs she said. Bob can't prove that he gave Alice a laptop. He can show serial numbers, he can prove he bought one, he can even show video of him putting it in a box, putting her address on the box, and dropping it off at a shipping store front. Any of that could be faked, and none of it proves the full end to end transaction. For most transactions, this is simply not possible.
What I find nice about this 2 party escrow is the more level playing field. It puts the seller at a slight disadvantage, but, without putting the buyer at an advantage since they still have to spend the coins in the first place.
I wonder if a two way escrow makes sense... where one party escrows both to the seller and back to themselves, both of which can be verified, but you would have to have the second "insurance" escrow be at the seller's command to confirm.
Of course, that just opens up for the seller to scam, and pressure his victim to release the funds in order to cut his losses and at least get his secondary escrow returned.... but in the end, I don't think there is a true technological solution to the problem of cheats.
