[RFC] New TX fee: 0.0005 BTC

[caveden]

Please, just abolish this minimum fee. (If you remove this standard fee policy altogether it would be great too )

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[Matt Corallo]

Please, just abolish this minimum fee. (If you remove this standard fee policy altogether it would be great too )

Oh god no, in-discriminant transaction relaying means DDoSing becomes way too easy.

[Cusipzzz]

Please, just abolish this minimum fee. (If you remove this standard fee policy altogether it would be great too )

Oh god no, in-discriminant transaction relaying means DDoSing becomes way too easy.

Agreed. .0005 sounds about right, maybe a little low. But if it appreciates more then should be just right.

[caveden]

There should be better ways to identify a spam attempt and deny relaying them. But I see the point, it's much quicker to just reduce the limit.

[BitterTea]

There should be better ways to identify a spam attempt and deny relaying them. But I see the point, it's much quicker to just reduce the limit.

That got me thinking. If we can come up with a list of likely attributes of spam transactions, perhaps the client could identify the likelyhood of a transaction being spam. Then, if that likelyhood (expressed as a number between 0 and 254) is greater than a random number between 0 and 254, the transaction is thrown out as spam.

[eof]

There should be better ways to identify a spam attempt and deny relaying them. But I see the point, it's much quicker to just reduce the limit.

That got me thinking. If we can come up with a list of likely attributes of spam transactions, perhaps the client could identify the likelyhood of a transaction being spam. Then, if that likelyhood (expressed as a number between 0 and 254) is greater than a random number between 0 and 254, the transaction is thrown out as spam.

but what if it isn't spam?

[mewantsbitcoins]

but what if it isn't spam?

If in doubt, client could display a capcha 

[BitterTea]

There should be better ways to identify a spam attempt and deny relaying them. But I see the point, it's much quicker to just reduce the limit.

That got me thinking. If we can come up with a list of likely attributes of spam transactions, perhaps the client could identify the likelyhood of a transaction being spam. Then, if that likelyhood (expressed as a number between 0 and 254) is greater than a random number between 0 and 254, the transaction is thrown out as spam.

but what if it isn't spam?

Since it's not deterministic, it's likely that unless it's almost certainly spam, some nodes would relay the transaction. They could take into account transaction fees, the size of the transaction, the number of recently seen transactions, etc.

[Ian Maxwell]

0.0005 sounds about right to me. At any rate 0.01 is now too high and it should be at most 0.001. (Of course in the long run fees should be a matter of individual policy, but there's nothing wrong with defaults.)

[Steve]

This is just the default ruleset.

Miners are free to choose their own rules.  I believe luke-jr's pool requires all TX's to have a fee, if an extremely minimal one.

I disagree with his policy, but it illustrates the free market already at work.

If the Mining Majority wants a different ruleset, then the default ruleset won't be worth the paper it isn't printed on 

I'm not sure what conclusion you can really draw from luke-jr only accepting transactions with fees.  When there are no longer any generation rewards for a block, miners would all clearly benefit if they all only allow transactions with a certain minimum fee, however for any individual miner, they would have an incentive to accept any transaction so long as there is some fee...no matter how small that fee is.  This will drive transaction fees down to the point where miners start shutting down and the network becomes more vulnerable to a powerful miner.  Despite there being a strong collective reason for miners to charge some minimum fee and despite the clear benefit to all users to pay a fee to ensure a sufficiently robust network of miners, I think there is a real risk that miners will want to scoop up all transactions paying anything and for users to pay the bare minimum fee (a satoshi I guess).  This is the tragedy of commons argument people make.

[theymos]

That got me thinking. If we can come up with a list of likely attributes of spam transactions, perhaps the client could identify the likelyhood of a transaction being spam. Then, if that likelyhood (expressed as a number between 0 and 254) is greater than a random number between 0 and 254, the transaction is thrown out as spam.

This is also how I think the spam problem should be solved for relaying. A drop probability should be weighted by fees and priority. If the transaction is important, it will be resent.

[MoonShadow]

This is just the default ruleset.

Miners are free to choose their own rules.  I believe luke-jr's pool requires all TX's to have a fee, if an extremely minimal one.

I disagree with his policy, but it illustrates the free market already at work.

If the Mining Majority wants a different ruleset, then the default ruleset won't be worth the paper it isn't printed on 

I'm not sure what conclusion you can really draw from luke-jr only accepting transactions with fees.  When there are no longer any generation rewards for a block, miners would all clearly benefit if they all only allow transactions with a certain minimum fee, however for any individual miner, they would have an incentive to accept any transaction so long as there is some fee...no matter how small that fee is.  This will drive transaction fees down to the point where miners start shutting down and the network becomes more vulnerable to a powerful miner.  Despite there being a strong collective reason for miners to charge some minimum fee and despite the clear benefit to all users to pay a fee to ensure a sufficiently robust network of miners, I think there is a real risk that miners will want to scoop up all transactions paying anything and for users to pay the bare minimum fee (a satoshi I guess).  This is the tragedy of commons argument people make.

Why does this keep coming up?

No, not all miners have the same incentives, and not all will be motivated solely by direct profit (i.e. mining fees).  Some will have an indirect motive to mine, making transaction fees a secondary revenue stream.  You can search for my "Wal-Mart" posts related to this subject.

[asdf]

This is just the default ruleset.

Miners are free to choose their own rules.  I believe luke-jr's pool requires all TX's to have a fee, if an extremely minimal one.

I disagree with his policy, but it illustrates the free market already at work.

If the Mining Majority wants a different ruleset, then the default ruleset won't be worth the paper it isn't printed on 

I'm not sure what conclusion you can really draw from luke-jr only accepting transactions with fees.  When there are no longer any generation rewards for a block, miners would all clearly benefit if they all only allow transactions with a certain minimum fee, however for any individual miner, they would have an incentive to accept any transaction so long as there is some fee...no matter how small that fee is.  This will drive transaction fees down to the point where miners start shutting down and the network becomes more vulnerable to a powerful miner.  Despite there being a strong collective reason for miners to charge some minimum fee and despite the clear benefit to all users to pay a fee to ensure a sufficiently robust network of miners, I think there is a real risk that miners will want to scoop up all transactions paying anything and for users to pay the bare minimum fee (a satoshi I guess).  This is the tragedy of commons argument people make.

Why does this keep coming up?

No, not all miners have the same incentives, and not all will be motivated solely by direct profit (i.e. mining fees).  Some will have an indirect motive to mine, making transaction fees a secondary revenue stream.  You can search for my "Wal-Mart" posts related to this subject.

Because it's actually a problem.

You think that miners with not for profit motives are going to be able to maintain a robust, attack resistant network. Others disagree.

I can see this working if people voluntarily pay tx fees. If there are millions of users then they each wouldn't need to pay much to incentivise a strong network of block generators, and indeed, a culture of this sort may emerge. But is is a tragedy of the commons like situation.

In another post, you highlighted the fact that there is a transaction acceptance policy encoded in the main client which prioritieses transactions with fees, forcing fees out of merchants needing speedy confirmations, but there is no reason to believe that the mining pools of the future will maintain such a policy when there are fee paying transactions going un-harvested. Luke-Jr, to me, exemplifies the natural dynamic of transaction acceptance policy: accept txs with fees, don't accept txs without fees.

I know you understand this dynamic, however, you haven't made a compelling case as to why bitcoin will work anyway. In any case, I hope you're right. Although, I wish intelligent people on this forum would acknowledge this problem instead of stifling debate.

[MoonShadow]

You think that miners with not for profit motives are going to be able to maintain a robust, attack resistant network. Others disagree.

Others are wrong.   

I can see this working if people voluntarily pay tx fees. If there are millions of users then they each wouldn't need to pay much to incentivise a strong network of block generators, and indeed, a culture of this sort may emerge. But is is a tragedy of the commons like situation.

No, this is where this error keeps coming up.  It's a commons, but not a 'tragedy of the commons'.  The collective security of the blockchain is the commons, but the incentives for senders to add a fee are different from the commons resource incentive.  The fees are competing for a time limited resource, inclusion in the next available block; while miners are competing for those fees.  Those are not commons.

In another post, you highlighted the fact that there is a transaction acceptance policy encoded in the main client which prioritieses transactions with fees, forcing fees out of merchants needing speedy confirmations, but there is no reason to believe that the mining pools of the future will maintain such a policy when there are fee paying transactions going un-harvested. Luke-Jr, to me, exemplifies the natural dynamic of transaction acceptance policy: accept txs with fees, don't accept txs without fees.

I know you understand this dynamic, however, you haven't made a compelling case as to why bitcoin will work anyway. In any case, I hope you're right. Although, I wish intelligent people on this forum would acknowledge this problem instead of stifling debate.

I have made such a case, it's the 'Wal-Mart' post.

[db]

The collective security of the blockchain is the commons

That's the user common. There is also a miner common.

The fees are competing for a time limited resource, inclusion in the next available block;

The space in a block will/should be unlimited and the cost of inclusion negligible.

while miners are competing for those fees.  Those are not commons.

And nobody claims they are. Which brings us to the miner common: the willingness of users to pay substantial fees.

[BitterTea]

And nobody claims they are. Which brings us to the miner common: the willingness of users to pay substantial fees.

Seems like a bit of a stretch to claim that a state of mind is a public good.

[db]

Seems like a bit of a stretch to claim that a state of mind is a public good.

Why? It translates to the payment of actual fees. If miners self-interestedly accept all profitable transactions that willingness will fall through the floor and with it the actual fees. That's normal competition and how all market prices work.

[db]

But call it "the transaction fee level" if you like. Same thing. Cartels are hard to create and maintain.

[Garrett Burgwardt]

The space in a block will/should be unlimited and the cost of inclusion negligible.

Negative. The last thing we need is blockchain spam.

[BitterTea]

Seems like a bit of a stretch to claim that a state of mind is a public good.

Why? It translates to the payment of actual fees. If miners self-interestedly accept all profitable transactions that willingness will fall through the floor and with it the actual fees. That's normal competition and how all market prices work.

If fees fall, mining will become less profitable, some miners will stop mining, difficulty will decrease, and mining will become more profitable. So?