hackers can steal data wirelessly from pcs that arent even online

[jonald_fyookball]

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-19/hackers-can-steal-data-wirelessly-from-pcs-that-aren-t-even-online.html

This is something to be aware of when doing cold storage.

The gold standard of "use a machine that has never been connected to the internet and never will be"
will protect against this unless someone has physical access to the computer...
but are there other ways to also disable graphics card to prevent the attack described here?

[haploid23]

You realize that only works if someone has PHYSICAL access to the device with the cold storage? With physical access, it's easier for a thief to steal the wallet file, regardless if it had internet or not.

Cracking the password to the wallet is another story.

[xDan]

It's why using a USB stick to ferry data/transactions between your hot and cold machines is really a breach of the air-gap. Any transfer of data is. (And presumably if your hot machine is infected, any virus can just pass data back via the USB stick, it doesn't need any fancy radio transmissions.)

All input/output needs to be considered a potential conduit for viruses...

The ideal cold wallet wouldn't rely on any data from the outside world. I'm not sure that's possible though. Maybe by splitting the balance into many small amounts on separate private keys and just removing a single private key for a small amount at a time. So the data transfer is only ever *from* the cold machine to the hot machine, via paper wallet or photographing a QR code or something.

[dserrano5]

The malware can reprogram the PC's graphics card to transmit signals over the display cable that can be picked up by a nearby mobile device.

I'm wondering whether laptops qualify as having a "display cable".

It's why using a USB stick to ferry data/transactions between your hot and cold machines is really a breach of the air-gap.

Agreed, but:

Any transfer of data is.

Does this include the following?

- Reading some words/digits in the online computer.
- Walking to the airgapped one.
- Manually typing the memorized words/digits on the keyboard.

It's effectively a data transfer but the bad guys would have a really hard time trying to compromise the airgap through it. Of course it's inconvenient as hell but we all know that's the price you pay for security .

[Flashman]

The only safe machine for cold storage is an Altair, where you hand toggle the wallet program and keys in on the front panel. 

And never use a VDU with it, makes it harder to Van Eck.

And always do 3 pulses with a flashgun into each eye before you leave the secure area, just in case retina forensics can recover recently seen things.

[Beliathon]

The only safe machine for cold storage is an Altair

That and your brain. A key to an address is just information after all.

[Flashman]

And practise thinking in an unspoken language, now that brain scans can infer thoughts from nerve activity required to talk.

[dserrano5]

brain scans can infer thoughts from nerve activity required to talk.

Ouch. Could you give some reference to this?

[Flashman]

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429934.000?cmpid=NLC

[xDan]

Does this include the following?

- Reading some words/digits in the online computer.
- Walking to the airgapped one.
- Manually typing the memorized words/digits on the keyboard.

It's effectively a data transfer but the bad guys would have a really hard time trying to compromise the airgap through it. Of course it's inconvenient as hell but we all know that's the price you pay for security .

I guess you might get away with that...

But I don't think the risk is quite zero. Probably minuscule enough though.

[jbrnt]

This hack needs a virus, a receiver/transmitter near the video cable and a phone to download. If a hacker has so much access to the target machine, it is easier for him to actually steal the data when he plugs the usb drive in the computer.

I was expecting something like the "wirelessly steal data device" from Prison Break season 4

[Eisenhower34]

You realize that only works if someone has PHYSICAL access to the device with the cold storage? With physical access, it's easier for a thief to steal the wallet file, regardless if it had internet or not.

Cracking the password to the wallet is another story.

Right. If a hacker had physical access then they might as well make a copy of the hard drive and/or outright steal your computer in an attempt to steal your wallet files. This would make more sense then going through the hassle of taking data wirelessly as I would imagine that many people would tend to have somewhat easy to crack passwords on computers that hold cold storage wallets

[Stinky_Pete]

Anyone here want to buy a tin-foil hat? Made to measure. I accept bit-coin.

[Soros Shorts]

but are there other ways to also disable graphics card to prevent the attack described here?

The article didn't say what kind of graphics card and cable would be most susceptible to being used as an FM transmitter to leak the data - VGA, DVI, HDMI, RGB? I am willing to bet that it only works reasonably well on one of these types of cables, and not so well on the others. So find out which one and use that cable. It would also be reasonable to assume that using a laptop computer or some other type of computing device that does not have a long video cable would greatly mitigate this kind of attack.

[TinaK]

Together with the entire computer were stolen?
Aha that's not a hacker, called a thief 

[Coin_Master]

You realize that only works if someone has PHYSICAL access to the device with the cold storage? With physical access, it's easier for a thief to steal the wallet file, regardless if it had internet or not.

Cracking the password to the wallet is another story.

Physical access is not required in many cases.  Since 2009 (32nm Sandybridge) all Intel CPUs have vPro AMT built in, allowing anyone to control the computer remotely using wireless 3G technology.  There are remote exploits in the wild and the technology cannot be disabled by the end user, the setting to disable AMT in the Bios is ignored.

"Currently, Intel AMT is available in desktops, servers, ultrabooks, tablets, and laptops with Intel Core vPro processor family, including Intel Core i3, i5, i7, and Intel Xeon processor E3-1200 product family"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology

"AMT is designed to help sys-admins remotely manage and secure PCs out-of-band when PC power is off"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_AMT_versions

Keywords are "out-of-band" and "when PC power is off".  The Intel CPUs are always on, even when they are off, provided the computer is plugged in to the power.  They can remotely access all your data anytime they wish, without permission and without anyway for the end user to disable this "feature".  It is well documented, so there should be no surprises here.

[turvarya]

You realize that only works if someone has PHYSICAL access to the device with the cold storage? With physical access, it's easier for a thief to steal the wallet file, regardless if it had internet or not.

Cracking the password to the wallet is another story.

Physical access is not required in many cases.  Since 2009 (32nm Sandybridge) all Intel CPUs have vPro AMT built in, allowing anyone to control the computer remotely using wireless 3G technology.  There are remote exploits in the wild and the technology cannot be disabled by the end user, the setting to disable AMT in the Bios is ignored.

"Currently, Intel AMT is available in desktops, servers, ultrabooks, tablets, and laptops with Intel Core vPro processor family, including Intel Core i3, i5, i7, and Intel Xeon processor E3-1200 product family"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology

"AMT is designed to help sys-admins remotely manage and secure PCs out-of-band when PC power is off"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_AMT_versions

Keywords are "out-of-band" and "when PC power is off".  The Intel CPUs are always on, even when they are off, provided the computer is plugged in to the power.  They can remotely access all your data anytime they wish, without permission and without anyway for the end user to disable this "feature".  It is well documented, so there should be no surprises here.

So, just plug it off, when you don't need it?
Doesn't sound that complicated to me ...

Btw. my computer is always unplugged, when I switch it off, since i just hit the button on my multi-plug.

[xDan]

Physical access is not required in many cases.  Since 2009 (32nm Sandybridge) all Intel CPUs have vPro AMT built in, allowing anyone to control the computer remotely using wireless 3G technology.  There are remote exploits in the wild and the technology cannot be disabled by the end user, the setting to disable AMT in the Bios is ignored.

"Currently, Intel AMT is available in desktops, servers, ultrabooks, tablets, and laptops with Intel Core vPro processor family, including Intel Core i3, i5, i7, and Intel Xeon processor E3-1200 product family"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology

"AMT is designed to help sys-admins remotely manage and secure PCs out-of-band when PC power is off"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_AMT_versions

Keywords are "out-of-band" and "when PC power is off".  The Intel CPUs are always on, even when they are off, provided the computer is plugged in to the power.  They can remotely access all your data anytime they wish, without permission and without anyway for the end user to disable this "feature".  It is well documented, so there should be no surprises here.

From my brief reading, it does require a 3G card of some kind. So as long as you remove any such thing from your offline machine you should be OK. But it's still scary of course.

I would be interesting in seeing any links to actual exploits/demonstrations. There seem to be a lot of FUD articles on that topic and not many actual facts.

[Lauda]

Completely useless article and un-related. How exactly would one be able to get this virus into a machine i.e. cold storage?
If my damn PC is in my attic, have fun making it's GPU transmit signals.  
Have fun siphoning data from an encrypted drive  

Also:

Setup and configuration is the process that makes Intel AMT features accessible to management applications. Intel AMT devices are by default delivered in an unconfigured state. Before management applications can access an Intel AMT device, the device must be populated with various settings such as network configuration and security parameters.

[jbrnt]

Keywords are "out-of-band" and "when PC power is off".  The Intel CPUs are always on, even when they are off, provided the computer is plugged in to the power.  They can remotely access all your data anytime they wish, without permission and without anyway for the end user to disable this "feature".  It is well documented, so there should be no surprises here.

This is scary stuff. If the power and network cable is plugged in and the cpu can connect to the internet and ping another ip, giving the location away. It can't access any data on harddisk though.