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January 19, 2015, 04:50:53 PM Last edit: January 19, 2015, 08:21:22 PM by trout |
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Short description:
Problem: declining BTC price makes escrowed markets too risky for vendors.
Imperfect/ broken solution: Hedging. The escrow (usually the market maker) sells the escrowed BTC on an exchange for USD. When the escrowed funds are to be released, he exchanges USD back to BTC.
Proposed solution: A BTC - BUSD exchange, where BUSD is a virtual unit tethered to USD as follows. To create a unit of BUSD the market maker must provably destroy either 1 USD bill (burn it on cam) or the corresponding amount of BTC. The escrow is then hedged on this exchange.
Long description: Problem Anonymous markets (the infamous SilkRoad and its lookalikes) rely on escrow heavily. The reason is that sellers are anonymous and thus it would be too easy for them to scam buyers. The escrow is released when the buyer has received the goods, which may be days or even weeks after the transaction. During this time, the BTC price may change significantly. If BTC declines, as has been happening a lot lately, the seller suffers a damage. In reality they either have to make prices a lot higher, which cripples the market.
Hedge: An imperfect solution, that was actually implemented by the original Silk Road, is hedging on an exchange. Thus the seller has an option to hedge his BTC for USD. The market owner has an account on an exchange, where he sells the BTC escrowed. When the escrow is released, he exchanges these USD back to BTC and give these to the seller, charging a small hedging fee. The problem - for dark markets - is that this exposes the market maker to a huge risk. In fact it is hard to imagine a large market operating like this without a possibility to be detected; whichever way they try to hide their activity, it'd be too different from a typical trader, and would stand out.
Proposed solution: What if there was a completely virtual exchange, but for fiat currency? While this is impossible, it is possible to get close enough to this for the hedging purposes. The market maker simply creates a virtual unit, let's call it BUSD, and opens an exchange BTC for USD. Like USD, BUSD is a centralized currency, which is issued by the market maker. However, unlike the USD issuer, we want the BUSD issuer not to be able to print as much BUSD as he wants, since otherwise it'd be hard for the market participants to trust him to keep the supply in check. In order to constrain the supply, the BUSD issuer is required to provably destroy a unit of USD for each unit of BUSD he issues on the market. This can be done either by burning the bills or by sending the corresponding amount (using the exchange rate at the time of sending) to a black-hole BTC address. He then creates as much as needed this way and sells it on the market for BTC. There will be buyers, since there is a need for the escrow hedging, and the supply can be as small as needed to keep the price in check. The price of BUSD will then be kept close (slightly above) to 1 USD for BUSD by the market: shall BUSD become too expensive, the market maker can issue more and sell (for a profit). Shall the price decline, he can buy back some with the BTC he has in reserve from having sold the BUSD. Clearly he can also charge fees
What remains to construct is a mechanism for auditing the exchange, that is, to proving that it is not selling more BUSD than he had issued. The simple way is what is already used in the BTC world: the market owner publishes the list of all balances. This should add up to the amount burnt (for which there's proof). If any participant notices that his balance amount is not in the list, he will shout out loudly, denouncing the fractional reserve.
Finally, several markets can unite to create a "burnt dollar" exchange, using colored bitcoins as a token for BUSD, and making the exchange independent from each individual market, thereby protecting the hedged funds from any of the markets getting shut.
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