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March 03, 2015, 07:00:00 PM |
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In the end, the cost of securing the network has to be paid somehow or other to miners and maybe nodes. If you're concerned about a scenario where transaction fees are not enough and yet transaction fees also cannot be raised without making Bitcoin uncompetitive with other systems, that is a scenario that doesn't really make sense. After all, the idea of securing the network against a 51% attack is that the attacker would have to expend too many resources to make the attack worth it. Whatever that magic number is at any given time, that's what users will pay.
Bitcoin users will always pay roughly the right amount for security, whether by fees or whatever. This may require fee floors or even changes to the block reward, though the latter is held more sacred even though they aren't much different in terms of store of value (all savers eventually spend; likewise, all spenders are savers for some amount of time), but by hook or crook the network will be secured.
Someone still might wonder if the magic number of "cost to attack" might fall below "maximum fee rates that would enable Bitcoin to remain competitive with other systems." It certainly would not for the fiat money system, but some might still wonder about proof of stake and other schemes. People can cook up all the schemes they want, but at the end of the day a full open-participation network that is cheap to secure is cheap to attack. In other words, if no user is given preferential treatment in the eyes of the network - meaning the network is dumb/neutral - it cannot be both cheap to run and expensive to attack, since there's no central authority deciding who's a good guy that should be given a cheap way to vote for what the truth is, and who is a bad guy who should be made to pay a lot to have their say over the network.
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