It might be brought up during appeals, who knows. But this alone isn't grounds for appeals because any 3rd rate lawyer will just make the argument that the questionnaire this guy filled out was too vague and that he didn't "technically lie". Now of course, everybody knows for damn sure this guy wasn't impartial. And I'd go as far to say that anyone that believes the conviction was the right verdict would be forced to admit this guy wasn't impartial given this guy's statements on the trial thus far. The CNN article touches on this I think, but this article goes more in depth. https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/551624-chauvin-juror-on-attending-protest-i-just-thought-it-was-a-goodSo Brandon Mitchell attends a BLM related protest in t shirt that says "get your knee off our necks" with Dr. MLK. Hmmm, surely impartial, right? Well, look at the questionaire they gave out to every potential juror - https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20508712/jurorquestionnaire.pdfLook at page 8, question 12 - "Other than what you have already described above, have you, or anyone close to you, participated in protests about police use of force or police brutality?" Surely that March in D.C. was about police brutality, correct? Does this protest seem like something you ought to put on the questionnaire? Well, Brandon Mitchell would argue no. I wouldn't be so convinced. But I guess that's just a play on semantics. Is a BLM protest a police brutality protest? Are the two words interchangeable? I think so, yes. But there will be some bonehead that would say no. If he is wearing a tee-shirt that says "get your knee off our necks", he is protesting police brutality. The rally itself may or may not have been about police brutality, but the specific reason he was there was because of at least in part, police brutality. The tee-shirt also shows that he had already made up his mind prior to hearing the evidence. The tee-shirt is saying that the use of force was excessive and lead to Floyd's death. This was a point of contention during the trial. |
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This is going to get the case overturned on appeal. A single junior lying about being impartial means the defendant did not receive a fair trial as guaranteed by the US Consitution. In the case of this specific junior, I would not find it unreasonable to say that he intimidated other juniors inro voting for a guilty verdict. This guy should be locked up for contempt, and purgery. |
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I think in the future, it would be more common for channels to be funded via both parties sending coin in the same transaction. More inputs means higher total transaction fees. In your situation, there are two transactions, 1) tx from you to ACINQ, and from ACINQ that opens the LN channel. This is at a minimum, two inputs and two outputs, plus additional bytes that are required for each transaction. Two parties sending coin to fund a LN channel in the same transaction would involve a single transaction, and a minimum of one output and two inputs. The net effect is that less block space would be used. I can imagine a future in which for LN users don't open their own channels at all: you just buy LN balance at an exchange, the exchange opens large channels, and you use their channels for buying coffee.
I know some people won't like that level of centralization, and I'm not a huge fan of it myself, but if that's what it takes to reach mass adoption, I can live with it. And if you really want, you can always pay the additional on-chain fees to connect your own node.
If you are buying a LN 'balance you are buying a database entry. If the exchange has many customers and merchants, there would be no reason to use LN, you could simply pay another exchange customer, and the database could be updated. |
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multiple safe deposit boxes
This is one option. If someone were to get ahold of 1/2 or 1/4 of your seed, for all intents and purposes, the attacker will not be able to know your entire seed without additional knowledge. Most safety deposit boxes require two keys, one that is unique to the customer and one that is universal and that bank employees have possession of. Safety deposit boxes can be drilled/broken into, however, to do this requires a lot of paperwork, that multiple people agree that bank procedures are being followed, and notification of the customer. Safety deposit boxes can also be broken into during a heist, but this would result in notification to the customer. Safety deposit boxes are generally cheap, usually no more than $20-$30 per year for a minimum-sized box. If your threat model involves portions of your seed being stolen/compromised, you will want to keep multiple copies of each portion of your seed in different banks. So if your seed is split into 4 pieces, you will need 8, or possibly 12 safety deposit boxes. It is up to the individual to determine if this cost is worth the value of security. |
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I may have been unclear in my previous posts. A setup would be as follows:
*Someone is running a node on a public WiFi network -- this is potentially vulnerable to a Sybil
*Your computer on the public WiFi network connects to your home computer via an encrypted connection -- your home computer is running a full node and is vulnerable to a Sybil if an attacker is attempting to attack you specifically, although this type of Sybil is more difficult to pull off.
*Your home computer has an encrypted connection to a VPS (or other computer on a different network) via an encrypted connection that will relay block/transaction information to your laptop via software other than bitcoin software. An attacker trying to specifically attack you will have no way to know they need to Sybil the node running on the VPS.
Are you guarding against MITM attacks specifically? IMO Sybil or Eclipse attacks are not cheap nor that great of a concern. It should be better to make Bitcoin Core use Tor instead of complicating things by chaining multiple nodes and probably incur much more costs as well. If it is a targeted attack, then you're just reducing the probability of the attacker influencing the nodes which Bitcoin Core should connect to. The attacker has to figure out your onion address and the nodes for which you're connected to for a successful eclipse attack which could be quite difficult. There are safeguards against eclipse attack implemented in Bitcoin Core. Having a secure connection between your node and the other nodes would defeat MITM and the safeguards would do the rest. Using SSL would prevent any MTIM attack with the setup I describe. Using TOR is slow, and is not scalable for the entire network. TOR would also increase the chances of a successful Sybil attack, as an attacker could create many malicious nodes. Also, .onion addresses are subject to timing attacks that can lead to de-anonymization. Being on a public WiFi means the WiFi provider can impersonate any IP address or domain so long as SSL is not being used to authenticate. SSL is (very incrementally) slower than unencrypted communications, and the majority of nodes are not running on a potentially malicious ISP, so nodes will probably not be willing to connect via SSL on any large scale. |
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I don't quite understand this. It feels like I'm missing prerequisite knowledge about what validation is exactly. I wonder if these empty blocks become stale or are part of the official block chain, and why do miners do it. Where can I learn more so as to decipher the meaning of this?
The correct way of doing things is that the miner seeing the new block downloads that block and verifies it and updates its UTXO database. Then if it were valid the miner builds the next block on top of that valid block. Some miners try to save a tiny amount of time by "spying" on other miners. For example they connect a fake miner to the other mining pools and as the other pool finds a new block their fake miner receives that "hash" of that block which is small (32 bytes only) then the "spy" miner builds their next block based on that hash alone without verifying if the block that was found by the other pool was valid or not (which it may not be valid and during a upgrade/fork the chances of it are higher and that would create a longer stale chain with 2 blocks in it, if more miners do the same this stale chain can become longer). An indication of this type of mining is empty blocks because when the spy miner hasn't validated the previous block it can not update its UTXO database and doesn't know which transactions were in the previous block (and can't be in the block they mine) so they set their next block to be empty first until they update their UTXO database. I think in general, an empty block is probably the result of a miner not validating a block prior to building on top of it. However, updating the UTXO database will take precious seconds from a miner, so it is possible that a miner would have the following workflow: *Receive block *Validate block (2) *start building on top of the validated block that is empty (3) *update UTXO set *start building on top of the validated block that contains transactions that spend from the updated UTXO set. I also suspect that some miners may change the order of 2 and 3 depending on which pool mined the previous block.
In the past, miners have lost a lot of coin from mining on top of invalid blocks. I think most of them learned their lesson, especially considering the value of each block currently. I would expect all major pools to have Taproot rules added to their own logic, and will check Taproot rules against newly found blocks before building on top of newly found blocks, even if a miner were to decide to build on top of a block prior to validating it. |
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If the attacker knows of your connections, you do not have a secret node. The attacker knows of all the nodes you are using.
It is quite hard to prevent any leakage of the connections that you have. Getaddr does have privacy measures but if a person is determined enough, they can still achieve it though with much more difficulty. As I've mentioned in my previous post, without a MITM, it would be fairly hard for an adversary to execute a sybil attack that affects the security to that extent. Something like this would require a (relatively large) amount of resources with different IP ranges, and a huge number of nodes it to be even possible, not regarding the feasibility. Having a secret or a trusted node can be a solution but it is definitely not necessary or doable for most, unless the final node that you're connecting to is definitely not getting sybil'ed, then you're safe. If it isn't then you're just wasting your resources. The counter against such attacks is the cost and the features of Bitcoin Core. If you are using public wifi, you could connect to your home computer (that is also a node), which connects (not via a node) to another node on a VPS that only you are aware of. The attacker might be able to Sybil your home computer node, but would not be able to Sybil your VPS node, and you can be alerted of the attack and act accordingly.
Connections between nodes are not encrypted. Packets can be dropped by the adversary and there is simply no way to detect something like this happening if the attacker can intercept the packets. If you are using a secret node, you could wait for an affirmative response from the secret node before accepting the transaction. I may have been unclear in my previous posts. A setup would be as follows: *Someone is running a node on a public WiFi network -- this is potentially vulnerable to a Sybil *Your computer on the public WiFi network connects to your home computer via an encrypted connection -- your home computer is running a full node and is vulnerable to a Sybil if an attacker is attempting to attack you specifically, although this type of Sybil is more difficult to pull off. *Your home computer has an encrypted connection to a VPS (or other computer on a different network) via an encrypted connection that will relay block/transaction information to your laptop via software other than bitcoin software. An attacker trying to specifically attack you will have no way to know they need to Sybil the node running on the VPS. |
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You have made 16 posts. If you want to change your display name, I would recommend that you create a new account. In order to have permissions to change your display name, you need to be a VIP account, and in order to get a VIP account, you need to donate 50BTC, or about $2.6 million at current prices (when this was first offered the price of bitcoin was much lower). Sometimes the forum administration will change your display name at the request of a forum member if they have a compelling reason. I believe that in the past, compelling reasons would include being potentially doxed based on your current display name, being a prominent forum member, making substantial contributions to the community, and similar.
Instead of abandoning the account and creating a new one, why no find a lasting solution to resolved this? To save mod from all the stress of having to change name request, why not make it open for everyone to be able to change theirs name at their will. Something like a user will only have access to change name once in 365days! In addition to DdmrDdmr's comment above, changing the display name opens up the possibility that someone could scam someone under one name, and immediately change their display name to something new. With some research, the culprit could be found, however, it would cause confusion, and may lead to some people giving up and not reporting a scam when dealing with modest amounts. |
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The best way to prevent a Sybil attack is to have at least one node whose identity is not public. In order to execute a Sybil attack, the attacker needs to know about all of your nodes and cut them off from the rest of the network accordingly. If you have one node that is secret, the attacker has no way to know to cut off that node, and you can be aware of the attack attempt.
Not exactly. It does nothing if the attacker is actively listening to your connections, ie. a public wifi of some sorts. I'm not sure if this is the case but it wouldn't work if Bitcoin Core will tell the peers about the nodes you know about upon receiving a getaddr message. Trying to connect through another type of network or using some form of secure communication would reduce the chances of a successful MITM. If the attacker knows of your connections, you do not have a secret node. The attacker knows of all the nodes you are using. If you are using public wifi, you could connect to your home computer (that is also a node), which connects (not via a node) to another node on a VPS that only you are aware of. The attacker might be able to Sybil your home computer node, but would not be able to Sybil your VPS node, and you can be alerted of the attack and act accordingly. |
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The only type of attack that one can perform by controlling a large number of nodes (not necessarily 51% of them but juts a large number) is Sybil attack. In this attack the attacker fills the network with their own nodes and could connect to your node and fill all its connection slots to effectively cut it off from the rest of the network. Then they can prevent your node from broadcasting transactions, seeing new blocks, etc.
The worst thing that can happen is if Sybil attack is combined with some mining power. The attacker, after isolating the victim's node, could perform a double spend while cutting that node off from seeing the double spent transaction and mine a block to contain an invalid tx (already spent) that pays that node's operator.
The best way to prevent a Sybil attack is to have at least one node whose identity is not public. In order to execute a Sybil attack, the attacker needs to know about all of your nodes and cut them off from the rest of the network accordingly. If you have one node that is secret, the attacker has no way to know to cut off that node, and you can be aware of the attack attempt. A Sybil attack also does not need to have mining power if the victim is willing to accept 0/conf transactions. |
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See, I apply this logic in the same way when I consider a bunch of Trump supporters armed with selfie sticks and MAGA hats. Did the capital riots really pose any threat to democracy? Was the US actually at risk? Was there a real national security threat? At the time, it could have felt like that. In hindsight, all it took was some man power and tear gas and they went home crying.
The Jan 6 riot at the Capital posed no threat to anyone. The Capital is normally open to the public, but it has been closed. If the Capital had been open, the rioters would have entered via the normal channels and made their voices be heard. Instead, two or three people breached the entrance into the Capital, and the rest of those who entered the capital were waived in by the police. There was a relatively minimal amount of damage done, and the majority of those in the capital were showing disrespect for those in power by doing things like sitting at Pelosi's desk or standing at the podium. |
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If you have an iPhone version 6 or newer, you can use the iPhone's built-in diction capabilities. The instructions can be found on this support article. It appears that android phones have similar capabilities. |
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NotATether's sollution works... If you want an easyer method that allows you to greatly simplify the backup procedure, you could also use electrum, let it generate a seed phrase, write down this seed, then go to electrum's console and do: wallet.change_gap_limit(10000) wallet.storage.write() listaddresses() Then you'll get a list you can import into a db.. Do prepare to wait a LOOOOOONG time... A 10.000 gap limit isn't small... TBH, my sollution isn't per defenition better than NotATether's, it's just differrent  I would say that using a deterministic wallet is superior to generating private keys individually. The resources to monitor transactions sent to the addresses is the same for both, however keeping backups and storing the private key is much easier with a deterministic wallet. millions of Bitcoin addresses worked for personal use for a project without mentioning what it is and linking addresses to a single wallet The only reason I can think of why someone would need millions of addresses is spam/scam/extortion email, where you'd like to keep track of who paid you. So I'm curious what your "personal project" involves. Running an exchange or service that accepts deposits would be another reason to need to generate many addresses. I would imagine that many bitcoin-related services have many addresses that never receive any amount of coin. |
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You should take care that nothing is transmitted to the air-gapped computer other than the unsigned transaction.
I have heard some cases that it is possible malware can transmit through the use of USB for transfering the unsigned transaction, though I do not know how true it is, but it should be a very good reason we should still make sure our air gapped wallet is not having malware. Though QR codes can be a difficult means or impossible means that malware can be transmitted which should be the best way of transfer unsigned transactions to a cold wallet for transaction signing. Transmitting malware via a USB drive/stick is fairly unusual, and if this happens, it probably means you are being specifically targeted. I think the risk of malware being transmitted via a USB stick is sufficiently low for most casual users that using a USB drive should be acceptable. I think using a hardware wallet is probably more desirable than an air-gapped computer unless you are handling the amount of coin that a major exchange would handle. |
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A little Update: UPDATE 1-Tesla says bitcoin investment worth $2.48 billionApril 28 (Reuters) - Tesla Inc said on Wednesday that the fair market value of bitcoin the electric carmaker held as of March 31 was $2.48 billion, suggesting it could stand to make around $1 billion dollars out of the investment were it to cash in the digital currency.
This is strange. According to my Spreadsheet and available information, TSLA owned 38,462 BTC. On March 31 the price was around 58,000. This would imply a Valuation of 2.2BLN To get to a 2.48 BLN valuation would imply a BTC quotation of almost 64,500 USD, close to the historical high. Am I missing something? Where do you see that Tesla has 38,462 BTC? The only reference to specific amounts of bitcoin I was able to locate was on Tesla's 10-K that says they updated their investment policy to purchase up to $1.5 billion worth of bitcoin in January 2021. If they were buying via the OTC market, they could have purchased that coin at a discount to the market rate by waiting for a large seller (or large sellers) to be willing to sell at a discount. |
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It is no secret that I have a Chase credit card, that I shop at Macy's, or that I like to eat Jimmy Johns. I am not hiding any of this information, and I don't mind seeing ads I might be interested in. This is where we disagree then, it seems. My email provider has absolutely no need to know which phone carrier I am with, where I am using my credit card, or what I am buying from Amazon. They certainly have no need to use that to build a profile on me which they can monetize by selling to any number of third parties and share around the world. I have all ads aggressive blocked everywhere (except bitcointalk, funnily enough), but it's not just marketing agencies who are interested in this data. This data is also very valuable to government agencies and companies such as Cambridge Analytica. That is fair enough of an opinion. The government has access to where you are using your credit card, and what you are buying at Amazon. Companies with significant resources will also have access to the above information, and companies with fewer resources can determine where you are using your credit card. As I mentioned, allowing Google, for example, to know a little bit of information about me that is more or less already public, allows them to serve me ads that are relevant to me. Bitcointalk keeps detailed information about your browsing history, which is probably similar to what other social media sites keep. Bitcointalk does not monetize it's data the same way that most other social media sites do. |
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The link cant be found ATM. On what blockchain will be the NFT coin? where it can be stored as well ololajulo Date Registered: October 07, 2016Have you completed KYC? To qualify for the NFT(fNFTs) KYC now requiredMaybe next year the April fools joke will be that theymos makes a thread announcing that he is changing his name to "thermos", but here is the catch, each person shows that their own display name is "thermos" and they have access to a fake admin pannel. The admin pannel shows a variety of fake PMs among various forum members talking about the "real" forum member. The admin pannel also allows for the user to edit any post, but doing so will only affect the user making the edit. |
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You can use Protonmail, but you should not rely on it to guarantee your privacy. Absolutely agree. I'm happy using ProtonMail over a product from the likes of Google, Microsoft, or Apple, for simple things like online shopping and paying bills where you cannot use PGP encryption for all your emails. I am fairly confident ProtonMail aren't reading the contents of my emails and selling this information to advertisers and a variety of other third parties like the big tech companies do. However, for any sensitive communication (or even better, at all times it is possible to do so) then PGP encryption is a must. I would be comfortable using a major tech company's advertising-based email service for things such as bill pay or generic retail business correspondence. It is no secret that I have a Chase credit card, that I shop at Macy's, or that I like to eat Jimmy Johns. I am not hiding any of this information, and I don't mind seeing ads I might be interested in. Personal correspondence however is different. I would generally prefer more privacy when having more personal conversations. Ultimately, if I am using any 3rd party to host my email, I am trusting them to not read what I am saying and what is being said to me (if I am not using some kind of encryption outside of the email provider). |
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1 - You need to create an unsigned transaction. This is typically done with a computer that is connected to the internet and has access to the blockchain.
2 - You need to transfer the unsigned transaction to your air-gapped computer via some medium. You can use a USB drive, QR codes, or some other medium of transmission. You should take care that nothing is transmitted to the air-gapped computer other than the unsigned transaction.
3 - You need to sign the transaction on your air-gapped computer. Prior to doing so, you should review the transaction on the air-gapped computer.
4 - You need to transfer the now-signed transaction back to your computer with internet access. This will typically be done via the same mechanism as #2. You should ensure that only the signed transaction is transmitted.
5 - Broadcast the transaction to the network. This can be done via your wallet software, or one of many websites that will broadcast transactions to the network.
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I have created another account, But when I log in it says "You are unable to post. How to enable posting." When I further research the issue and possible solution I have found that "Your IP address has previously been used for evil on this forum, or it is a known proxy/VPN/Tor exit node, so you are required to pay a small fee before you are able to post messages or send PMs. You can still use all of the read-only features without paying."
Here I need help from senior members
According to this; any forum staff member and some other notable members can manually whitelist me. Paying the fee is not a good option for me. Can you help me unban my profile?
My User name is Arif Wali Nago
Hopefully a staff member will agree to whitelist your new account. I reviewed your post history, and it appears you have a genuine interest in the topics you have posted in. Unfortunately, I do not have the ability to whitelist your account. |
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