Be aware that what you are doing is not providing you with any additional safety. Creating multiple wallets using the same software on the same computer is pointless - every single one of those wallets is exposed to the exact same environment and the exact same risks. If one is compromised, they all are.

Electrum is good software, but on an internet connected computer then it is a hot wallet, and is therefore one of the least secure types of wallet. As mentioned above, your options for a more secure wallet are either to use Electrum on an airgapped device, or to purchase a good hardware wallet. Or potentially both of these options, if you wish to split your coins up to minimize risk of losing everything.

No, I don't, because I have no clue who is coinjoining their coins in the first place. You are starting from the position where you are already cooperating with blockchain analysis to learn as much as you can about every input which registers for coinjoin. As crazy as this might sound to you, blanket surveillance is not the default position.

I have no idea with whom I am coinjoining with when I use JoinMarket. I have no idea to whom I am providing liquidity. I neither care nor have any desire to find out. This seems to be a position you cannot understand.

I don't have a line to draw at all. Again, although you seem unable to grasp the concept, I'm not spying on anybody in the first place so I have no information to use to censor them.

Wow. Just wow. This should be eye opening for anybody even thinking of using Wasabi. If you do something that Wasabi devs disagree with, then they think you deserve no rights whatsoever. And these are the people we are supposed to trust to fight for our privacy and financial freedom? Absolutely laughable.

You sound like a mouthpiece of the government. Next you'll be telling us we have nothing to fear if we have nothing to hide.

So in general, hash functions are not particularly susceptible to being broken by quantum computers. Without getting too technical, the best known quantum attack against SHA256 would reduce the search space from 2²⁵⁶ to 2¹²⁸. 2¹²⁸ remains too large a number to attack (and indeed, all bitcoin private keys in the current system have 128 bits of security). Rather, it is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) which is susceptible to quantum computing. In simple terms, this is the bit that turns your private key in to your public key. Again, without getting too technical, the best known quantum attack against the ECDLP could result in only 128³ operations being required to turn a public key back in to a private key.

So it would remain impossible to break any hash functions, meaning you could not turn an address back in to a public key, but it would be possible if you knew the public key to calculate the corresponding private key.

Again it's not hash functions, but otherwise you are correct. If the ECDLP can be broken, then so too can almost all encryption that is currently used across the internet, including in all financial institutions and governments.

There are no guarantees, and as you point out, an adversary with access to such a computer would be incentivized to try to steal as many coins as possible before being discovered. The safety net is that there are hundreds (if not thousands) of different research teams around the world all working on quantum computers, and it is highly unlikely that one team in secret is decades ahead of everyone else.

Not at all. There already exist quantum resistant algorithms we could fork to today if we wanted to. The problem with such algorithms at the moment is that they are generally quite large and inefficient, which would significantly increase transaction size and pose a variety of other problems. But with constant development ongoing, then hopefully by the time it becomes necessary we will have  much better algorithms available to choose from.

Not at all. As I said above, we are decades away from such a scenario and we will fork to a quantum resistant algorithm well before it becomes a serious concern. All that is at risk will be old lost or abandoned coins with revealed public keys, which will eventually over time be stolen and re-enter circulation. The majority of coins will be safe and the network itself will continue without issue.

So there are potentially several million coins in either P2PK outputs or reused addresses which could be stolen in such a scenario. We have absolutely no idea how many of those coins are actually lost and how many are not lost at all and the owner simply has chosen not to move them for many years, but would move them to a new quantum resistant address when the time comes. My opinion is that the network should not lock or otherwise freeze any coins, and if some lost coins are stolen and re-enter circulation, then so be it.

Same principles, same answer (although I appreciate having principles that you stick to seems to be a foreign concept to Wasabi devs). If I ran a coinjoin coordinator, I still would not see myself as a moral, ethical, legal, or any other type of authority to start passing judgement on users and enforcing my own personal biases or opinions on users. Furthermore, I would be completely unable to do so since I wouldn't be paying mass surveillance entities for the information necessary to make such judgements in the first place.

You say you don't want to serve SBF. What about the Canadian truckers? What about Russian citizens? What about whistleblowers? What about journalists? What about opposition political parties, or political dissidents? What about the Tor project? What about bitcoin which isn't fully KYCed? I can provide endless examples. All of these people/entities/things have been targeted by various laws and sanctions in various jurisdictions. Which laws are you going to follow? Where do you draw your completely arbitrary line? How much pressure is required for you to move that completely arbitrary line? I suspect not very much since you willingly started to censor people of your own volition.

And by your logic, then SBF shouldn't be allowed to communicate privately either, since allowing him to do so allows him to continue to hide stolen money. So Tor better start asking for KYC before you are allowed to use it. And we better get a government approved backdoor in to WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Briar, and every other end to end encrypted messaging service. Backdoors in to emails, too. Oh, and definitely ban PGP!

Permissioned privacy is no privacy at all.

If we ever reached a point where quantum computers posed a realistic threat to the elliptic curve cryptography that bitcoin uses, then we would fork to a different quantum resistant algorithm to allow bitcoin to continue to move forward. Ideally this would be several years before any real threat from quantum computing, allowing everyone plenty of time to move their coins to these new safe address types. There would be a question to be answered at that point about what would happen to all the so called "lost" coins which weren't moved in time, and whether they were somehow locked to prevent them from being stolen or whether we just let them re-enter circulation.

Certainly.

The theoretical current circulating supply is as follows:

(210,000 * 50) + (210,000 * 25) + (210,000 * 12.5) + ((784,963-629,999) * 6.25) = 19,343,525 BTC

Using the command gettxoutsetinfo on a node will tell you exactly how much bitcoin is within the set of spendable UTXOs. Anything which is unspendable (such as coins which have been sent to OP_RETURN outputs, or coins which miners failed to claim in the first place) will be excluded from this number. This command on my node currently gives the following: 19,343,305.70780786 BTC

Subtract those two numbers and you get 219.29219214 BTC which is not in the UTXO set and therefore is not spendable.

However, there are also some bitcoin which are in the UTXO set but are still provably unspendable. The main example of this is this transaction: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/s-272edf45031dd498e7b3ae89e11ff21b. 2,609.36304319 BTC have been sent to an invalid script which cannot be unlocked, and so these coins cannot be spent.

Add those two numbers together and you arrive at the 2,828 BTC figure I gave above.

For easier tracking, you can use this site (https://bitcoin-supply.com/), which monitors all burned or otherwise provably unspendable bitcoin with a delay of just a few blocks.

Because I'm not so arrogant nor so ignorant to try to appoint myself the sole arbiter of who is and is not allowed to use bitcoin.

Absolutely not. I don't believe in censoring anyone. I believe in free speech, and I believe bitcoin should be freely transacted without requiring permission from any third party.

If you honestly don't see the problem with censorship and the slippery slope which follows, I really don't know what to say. Perhaps once Wasabi stops paying you to sell out bitcoin you could get a job with the NSA.

Aluminum is a poor choice. As far as metals go, it has very low strength and durability, it is highly malleable, it has a melting point well below temperatures reached in an average house fire, and it is very prone to corrosion. It offers very little over just using paper.

You can easily pick up stainless steel at a hardware store. Use this instead.

Let me guess. They are trying to send you some bitcoin but they need you to either:

A) Deposit some bitcoin first to "unlock" or "activate" your account
B) Download some specific piece of software in order to receive your transaction

It's almost certainly a scam.

Not at the moment, but reversing a public key to a private key could certainly be possible far enough in the future with quantum computers. If such an event occurred, then the several million coins in early P2PK outputs as well as any coins in outputs with a revealed public key (which includes all addresses which have previously spent bitcoin) could potentially have their private keys reverse engineered and therefore re-enter circulation, unless the community consensus is to fork to somehow lock all these coins.

Just because coins have not moved in a long time, or even if someone claims they have lost the private keys/seed phrase/wallet/whatever, it is wrong to assume those coins are permanently lost and can't be recovered.

We can prove that the number of provably lost bitcoin is 2,828.654 BTC, and this number can be safely removed from both the total and the circulating supplies. Anything which is not provably lost should not be considered removed from the supply.

Hell, why stop there? If your blockchain analysis buddies don't want to provide services to SBF, then why not petition miners to blacklist his transactions altogether? There has been more than one mining pool in the past which has selectively censored transactions based on a blockchain analysis blacklist, OFAC blacklist, or other such bullshit. Only approved people should be allowed to use bitcoin at all! Congrats, you've just invented a CBDC.

After all, if you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear, right? Everyone who doesn't comply is a target.

You can fuck right off with your malignant permissioned privacy bullshit.

You are using coinjoin fees to pay mass surveillance firms to analyze your users' UTXOs and then grant their permission to allow those UTXOs to be conjoined. That's what. You are directly funding mass surveillance. You are pro-surveillance, you are pro-censorship, you are anti-privacy, you are anti-fungibility, and all the hand waving in the world about Samourai doesn't change any of that.

I realize you are deliberately trying to shift the goalposts, but xpubs are irrelevant here. Every time you register a UTXO with the Wasabi coordinator, they pay a blockchain analysis for information about that UTXO.

Right. So when a Samourai user spends their change, that's Samourai's fault, but when the Wasabi software reuses addresses resulting in users being doxxed, that's working as intended. Lmfao.

Exactly my point. 4 BTC is not a whale by any reasonable standard. Your definition of a "whale" is completely variable and depends entirely on the other users in the coinjoin.

Great job proving my point. You have again completely ignored the blockchain evidence of Wasabi coinjoins being broken.

Hey guys! Don't look at those cars of ours on the news which are on fire! Look at these 1,000 new ones we just made. Ohhh, shiny!

I wouldn't say frequently, but I certainly use it from time to time. It is great at just how easy it is to run from your own node. Unlike Electrum, you don't have to run an Electrum server on top your node. You can just point Sparrow directly at your node, and off it goes. I have never used its BIP47/PayNym function beyond spending coinjoin outputs.

In what way are you looking to avoid sanctions? If your addresses/UTXOs are already sanctioned, or the addresses you are sending to are sanctioned, then it does not matter what wallet you use to make the transaction. The obvious option is simply not to interact with any service which employs blockchain analysis, treats some UTXOs as tainted, and is anti-fungibility and pro-censorship. Unless you mean about using Whirlpool via Sparrow to remove any "taint" or other such nonsense from your UTXOs? It's certainly a very easy option. As I said, it is incredibly easy to run Sparrow from your own node and also incredibly easy to route any external traffic via Tor, which means you can use Whirlpool completely anonymously and completely trustlessly. And of course there is no risk of being censored with Whirlpool like there is with Wasabi.

If you want the best coinjoining method out there then JoinMarket is where you should go, but it remains harder to set up and use than Samourai/Sparrow.

OP PMed me asking to communicate on Telegram. I would reiterate that for the reasons above, you should keep all communication public. If you message random forum users privately there is a high chance of being scammed. Also, I don't use Telegram.

I suggest you download btcrecover and give it a go yourself before enlisting the help of any third parties. The set up guide is fairly easy to follow: https://btcrecover.readthedocs.io/en/latest/INSTALL/

The main question is do you remember anything at all about the password? Length, character set, memorable words, etc? Is it likely to be a variation of some other passwords you use? If you have absolutely no idea what the password is, then you will only be able to brute force it if it was a fairly weak password.

Most phones will have a setting in them somewhere which allows you to either set the VPN to "Always On" so it does not disconnect, or to automatically block all traffic if the VPN is disconnected so you can't accidentally connect to somewhere without it.

I'm not saying he did. But publicly tweeting as he did undoubtedly started the bank run which very quickly led to FTX suspending all withdrawals.

I wouldn't say people are taking a side with regulators, rather that people simply do not care what happens to Binance. If regulations force Binance out of business, I don't think bitcoin will be any worse off for it.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Why would you assume users interested in privacy would not be running their own node? And even if all 4 are leaking the xpubs, I can just leave my UTXOs in the pool for unlimited free remixes.

You can instead just rest safe in the knowledge that your coordinator is willingly being used to spy against you, and you are paying for the privilege. Lol.

Cool, I never said that. What I said that Wasabi "hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to a blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval."

Can you make up your mind? First you say Wasabi doesn't reuse addresses, but then it's not your fault when Wasabi does reuse addresses?

Here's a lovely example of Wasabi reusing addresses, which led to the user in question being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

Perhaps try reading what I wrote again before just blurting out your sound bites.

The transaction I linked has an output of 6.46652537 BTC which could only be created by a single input. This output of 6.46652537 BTC is then coinjoined with Wasabi a second time (in this transaction https://mempool.space/tx/568e6cc87909648c58487a95729d2ba21c011da635323ab7a21d281a03ca705c), creating a 4.39250624 BTC output which again couldn't have come from anywhere else. Two Wasabi coinjoins in a row, zero privacy gained.

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

This just isn't true at all. If you willingly sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to going anywhere near a coinjoin, then that's on you. This has nothing to do with Samourai at all. You could quite easily sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to using Wasabi, or JoinMarket, or Bisq, or any other service.

Cool. So swap it for Monero or Lightning.

Good thing you can perform these swaps anonymously then. I mean, actually anonymously, not Wasabi "anonymously" which requires the permission of a surveillance company.

You can argue semantics all you like - saying it is unlikely that Whirlpool provides "any anonymity at all" is just plain false.

You seem to be confused about how burden of proof works. If you make a claim that all the inputs have leaked their xpub, then it's on you to prove that claim. You can't go around making wild claims and say "Disprove my unsubstantiated bullshit!"

And then hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval.

Right. So the entities which aren't working hand in hand with blockchain analysis companies are more susceptible to blockchain analysis than the entity literally using your coinjoin fees to pay blockchain analysis companies to analyse your UTXOs. Lmao. I'm sure even you don't believe that, but good job repeating the party line.

So I guess all the address reuse with blockchain evidence which I've linked to is just a figment of my imagination?

Good job ignoring my examples. That seems to be a recurring theme here.

So in summary, coinjoins that don't work, that you need to permission to join at all, provided by a company which uses your money to pay blockchain analysis companies to spy on you.

Lol, what? So it's Samourai's fault if users consolidate inputs together even before they go anywhere near Whirlpool in the first place?

You can absolutely spend it. If it's large enough, coinjoin it in a smaller denomination pool. If it's too small for that, swap it for Monero or for Lightning. Easy peasy.

That's not what you said. You said that Whirpool doesn't provide "any anonymity at all", which is clearly false.

But hands all your addresses and UTXOs directly to a blockchain analysis company.

Right. So address reuse is stupid, but when Wasabi reuses addresses, that's ok?

I really don't think you want to play the "cherry pick individual transactions" game, but since you started it, then how about this one: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

There is exactly one input which could have created the 6.46652537 BTC output. Zero privacy gained.
That 6.46652537 BTC output is then coinjoined a second time with Wasabi, and again, there is an output of 4.39250624 BTC which could only have come from that input. Zero privacy gained.
Great job Wasabi!