Firstly, that address is perfectly valid.
Secondly, you sign a message using the private key associated with an address, not the address itself.

I mean, they tweeted months ago that they had lost significant amounts of money to FTX:


And then a week later, they suspended all loan activities:

If those weren't enough red flags to make you withdraw all your money and you've now lost coins due to this bankruptcy filing, then I don't really know what to tell you. I have a bridge to sell you?

Also note that CoinDesk, another subsidiary of DCG, is also being put up for sale. Maybe this might wake up some of the people who bleat on about Coinbase or Binance being safe because they are large exchanges. Well, DCG is huge, and currently two of its subsidiaries are on the brink of collapse.

A thief who knows what he is looking for is highly unlikely to just start manually opening random directories in your OS's file explorer to hunt for a wallet. Rather they will just perform an automated search for wallet files, or the Electrum software, or strings which appear in Electrum wallets files, or so on, which will find your wallets almost immediately.

Hiding files like this is false sense of security - security through obscurity, which is a bad idea. A much better idea is to add a strong password to all your wallet files which will encrypt them and keep them safe from attackers. If you want to hide the fact you even have Electrum installed altogether, then either use whole disk encryption or run Electrum directly from a removable USB drive or on a live OS.

Your posts are become more and more confused and less and less plausible.

BIP125 is to do with RBF. BIP150 is to do with peer authentication. Neither having anything to do with private keys.

The first version of the Bitcoin software in 2009 was 0.1. Version 0.7 wasn't released until 2012.

The genesis block was not mined in 2008.

The 4 addresses generated by this private key are empty and unused.

The public key from this signature is also empty and unused.

No, they didn't. They had some benefit from the placebo effect, at most. The homeopathy did nothing. Water does not have a memory, and it is insane to suggest otherwise.

Brain wallets are never secure. And if you are planning on displaying a QR code of the seed phrase, then the security of your wallet is reduced to only that of your weak human generated password. A recipe for disaster.

Further, if you want to have a QR code on display, then you should use the QR code of the address. This lets people scan it to see that it is a bitcoin address without risking the funds. You should instead create a seed phrase or key pair securely and give the written down seed phrase or private key to your mother to store securely. Then print the QR code of the address on to an object as you desire.

You should download and verify the source code from Github rather than save the website from your browser, since you don't know if the website is actually running the published source code.

Disconnecting your computer temporarily is completely insufficient in terms of security. There is nothing stopping malware already on your device from altering what Ian Coleman will display, or saving anything you enter to file and transmitting it to an attacker next time you connect to the internet. At a bare minimum, you should use a live and amnesic OS such as Tails as Loyce has described above. Better still is to use it only on a permanently airgapped device which has been formatted and had a clean Linux OS installed.

I would also note that in general using any website which relies on Javascript is a bad idea for generating entropy. Ian Coleman (airgapped!) is useful for exploring a pre-existing seed phrase, checking different derivation paths, etc., but I would never suggest using it (or any other website, even if airgapped) for generating a wallet.

No disease can be brought under control by homeopathy. Homeopathy is a scam.

Agreed. So I never use them.

Also correct. Which is why cash is a popular peer to peer trading method.

Again, this is solved by using cold, hard cash, which obviously can't be charged back. There is also the other party's account reputation to consider. Is someone going to risk their account with 1000+ positive feedback to scam you out of a few hundred bucks?

Exactly. Start small, choose reputable trading partners, trade with the same person multiple times to build further trust, and don't use methods which are easily reversible.

It's not about differing ideas; it's about facts and math. No computer, even one which has the same computing power as every device in the world and is ran for a billion years on unlimited free electricity without any degradation of hardware will find an address collision by random. Advising OP to try is simply a waste of time.

All addresses always exist. They are simply an encoding of a public key, and all public keys already exist. Just because an address has not yet received any transaction does not mean the address cannot exist or be generated by someone. I have hundreds of addresses across multiple cold storage wallets which will sit dormant for years or even decades before I ever decide to use them.

You are saying you mined block 100, just a few days after bitcoin was released? I'm skeptical.

Regardless, the 50 BTC there are a P2PK output, not P2PKH, so you can easily see the public key is:

That doesn't make it any easier for you to brute force the private key, though. If it were in any way possible, those coins would have been stolen at some point in the last 14 years.

There is nothing in a raw transaction which will allow you to calculate a private key (excluding some very rare cases where you have made multiple transactions spending coins from the same address with very flawed software). But since you say your address has only received coins and not spent them, a raw transaction won't even let you figure out your address's public key, let alone anything actually useful to you.

By all means share them if you want, but it's another dead end I'm afraid.

Then turn it off. Or better yet, stop using Chrome since it is literally spyware.

Removing you seed phrase from a password manager is not enough. If the seed phrase is in the password manager in the first place, then it has been stored electronically on a computer with an internet connection. You should therefore assume it is already compromised. Instead you should set up a brand new wallet with its seed phrase only backed up via pen and paper and move all your coins over to this new wallet.

Rather than it being impossible to rule out that these devices are listening to you, it has been widely confirmed multiple times that they are listening to you at all times, and what you say is being transferred to centralized servers for storage and analysis. Anything you say in the vicinity of one of these devices is on a third party server somewhere, and you have no idea who has access to it.

Google were caught storing users' password in plain text for over a decade. I wouldn't trust them with a single satoshi.

I would suggest using KeePassXC or Bitwarden.

Not quite. As explained above, you can't just insert the public key or the output locking script on their own. You need to include additional OP codes which tell the software what to do with the data.

For including the public key in the signature, you need to include a byte saying how long that public key is. For a 33 byte compressed public key, you would prefix it with 0x21 (with 21 being the hex representation of 33). So that becomes 34 bytes in total.

For the output locking script, you need to prefix with a byte saying how long the script is, followed by OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH (20 bytes), then the 20 byte pubkey hash, then OP_EQUALVERIFY and OP_CHECKSIG. This would look like this:

So instead of just 20 bytes, the whole thing becomes 26 bytes.

It will never be done. The only thing you will achieve with this is burnt out hardware and an electricity bill.

I'm fairly certain Satoshi never said anything like this. Perhaps you are thinking of someone else, or an early bitcoin faucet? Regardless, any such offer that you see these days is 100% a scam.

So was the address you are trying to recover created from a brain wallet as you said before, or was it created by blockchain.com? I believe they first offered a wallet service in 2012.

If it is a brain wallet, then I'm afraid that if you didn't make any back ups and you can't remember the brain wallet then your coins are irretrievable.

I don't think the lending platform itself is a scam by any means. But from a quick look it seems to be that you can only lend or borrow various stablecoins or wrapped/tokenized bitcoin. All of these tokens/coins are entirely centralized, in many cases not backed up fully and running fractional reserve, and also there are no guarantees whatsoever that their price is pegged to USD/bitcoin/whatever. So although HodlHodl's platform is perfectly legit, the coins they are supporting are pretty much scams, as far as I am concerned.

I would work under the assumption that anything you do on a KYCed platform, be that a crypto exchange or fiat service like PayPal, is easily viewable by your government or tax authority should they want.

Or maybe they just want a bit of financial privacy and not to have their bitcoin under the control of third parties. Which was the entire reason bitcoin was created in the first place. I would point out that I have traded on various peer to peer platforms extensively and have never once been scammed. A few misunderstandings which have been fairly easily resolved, sure, but never an active scam.

It also encourages sloppy behavior. If you are copying and pasting a brand new address you have never used before, you are far more likely to double check it properly than you are if you are copying an address you've used dozens of times before. "This address has always worked fine before, so I don't need to bother double checking it this time." And then clipboard malware means you send the coins to an attacker.

I prefer using separate wallets entirely to prevent the risk of accidental combination of UTXOs I want to keep separate. Easily done by just incrementing the account number in the derivation path or using multiple different passphrases, meaning you don't have to go through the process of generating and backing up a new seed phrase each time.

The terms are more precise, yes, but the advice is still misleading I think. As I mentioned above, I don't think 99% of users should ever be handling raw private keys, as it is completely unnecessary for them to do so and it just opens them up to additional risk. Even fewer users should be handling their chain codes for any reason.

Just back up and protect your seed phrase and be done with it. Everything you ever need (private keys, chain codes, extended keys, etc.) can be derived from that seed phrase.

This is clearly affecting your mental health. As BlackHatCoiner says, step back, get some rest, and approach things with a clear head. What you are trying at the moment is serving no purpose except to stress you out more and dial up your anxiety levels.

Once you've got some rest, then this is what you should focus on. So you think the passphrase for this brain wallet had 90 characters? Or 90 words? What else can you remember about it? Did you just select random words, or did you take words from a book, a movie quote, a song lyric, etc? What about the paper back ups? Did you only make one copy of each? Where did you store them? Any chance of finding them? If you printed the back up rather than write it by hand, could the file still be saved electronically somewhere? This is your only possible route to accessing your coins. All the reverse engineering you are trying on your phone will get you nowhere. Even with the most powerful supercomputer in the world, attempting to reverse engineer a private key is a futile task.

I am not OK with this.