edit: the key point is that last one. With no competition to mine, the network hash rate cannot be measured which implies that the time you need to wait to accept a transaction as confirmed is essentially unbounded. This is not acceptable in any currency.
Just another claim lacking a proof. Nope. That is a plain and obvious fact. |
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I'm quoting myself here; this is not a formal proof, its a wordy one. With no competition to mine, the maximum network hashing rate will be impossible to measure, since although transactions may be incoming at a high rate in a mature currency (and assuming a PoW must be submitted with the transaction) , this rate could still be vastly below that of even just one ASIC* such that any adversary looking to double spend would find the task relatively easy.
This also brings into question the entire way in which transaction acceptability can be bounded. In bitcoin the adversary's hashing power relative to the network as a whole is considered, yielding a probability of the best block being reversed, yet with no competition to mine, the maximum hashing rate of the network as a whole cannot be measured since adversaries have nothing to gain by participating in the network's nominal operations, instead they might chose to lie in wait. edit: the key point is that last one. With no competition to mine, the network hash rate cannot be measured which implies that the time you need to wait to accept a transaction as confirmed is essentially unbounded. This is not acceptable in any currency. |
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You cannot have a trustless concensus like bitcoin's without a mining reward - that is what creates convergence.
Great, now just prove this claim because the burden of proof is on you... Present your counter argument and lets talk about it. edit: for the interested reader, consider what it was that allowed satoshi to solve the double spend problem that had previously made p2p currencies unworkable. |
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This thread deserves a bump. Have IOTA or Byteball made any recent improvements to address Shelby Moore's concerns?
Neither byteball or Iota can be truly trustless or decentralised; they are flawed. Byteball requires witnesses which are trusted super users in order to form a consensus: Looking for a “reality test”, observe that some of the participants of our network
are non-anonymous reputable people or companies who might have a long
established reputation, or they are businesses interested in keeping the network
healthy. We’ll call them witnesses Iota requires what they used to refer to as checkpoints, now known as 'coordinators' in order to maintain consensus until the currency is 'bootstrapped', which is years to never. You cannot have a trustless concensus like bitcoin's without a mining reward - that is what creates convergence. |
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Complete decentralisation:
* Single transaction blocks
* Sending a transaction produces a block
* Only you can mine blocks you produce
There are a number of problems with this, but that is one way to have complete decentralisation.
this truly will be complete decentralization but achieving this far from reality but nothing is impossibly i would like to be part a team that tries to take this venture Read this paper (which discusses the technique), comment, lets talk about it: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1992827.0 |
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Excuse my ignorance. But is there truly any way a currency can be completely decentralized? Sure, maybe not central to a governement, but some central entity will always lay claim to any currency. It's further unrealistic to believe each government won't regulate cryptocurrency at some point. I have the same question about dapps and a dectralized internet. Again, I apologize if I'm missing a fundamental factor when asking this question. However, I'm not too proud to ask and be educated.
Decentralised currencies are unregulatable by nature, since there is no regulating body that governs them, except the built-in protocol which drives them; this is a bit more fuzzy when you start talking about DAPs, because they are run like companies. However, the underlying cryptocurrency must strictly adhere to it's ungovernable nature, or it will lose value due to loss of investor confidence. |
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Be very wary of anyone asking you what your old password was - they are likely trying to defraud you. |
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Still nothing. Does any other mod have power to restore accounts?
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I've contacted both Theymos and Cyrus a few days ago, but still nothing. Fingers crossed.
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I've PM'ed theymos yesterday with the correctly formatted proof - how long does he typically take to reply?
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I found evidence of an address I own, this message contains a sent payment link for address 18xbTjaFBNrUmD53WTrjiaZSETm64SN9x https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=596761.msg7086245#msg7086245address: 18xbTjaFBNrUmD53WTrjiaZSETm64SN9x message: "I confirm that my account 'monsterer' was hacked, and I would like to restore it" sig: "G9B5GqXos/SLXDG7tgpVNhvK3/8yS6OyZBpM3ywZh6SXdUkhY0oIsgD4gOglDCnTYDJz/Ze3BhlI/TFEL45tj84=" |
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Hi, I'm new to Bitcoin and had a couple questions that I've tried to research, but haven't been able to find a good answer that I could understand and accept.
1. What's the incentive for peers to validate blocks? I figured miners wouldn't want to validate other miners' blocks in hopes they can get their own block validated instead and collect the reward.
2. I don't understand why you would need 51% or more mining power to alter a transaction? Why is it more secure for more than 50% of the nodes to be independent?
3. Why is the blockchain more secure each time a new block is mined? Why does hacking the blockchain require tremendous speed?
Also, does anyone know a Bitcoin expert who is willing to discuss more about some of these questions in detail over the phone perhaps?
Thanks in advance for any input you can provide.
Satoshi's genius is in solving the problem of trustless anonymous voting. When a miner produces a block, he will only get paid if that block is on the longest branch (most number of blocks) at the head of the blockchain (yes, it's not a chain, but a tree, with pruned branches), so all miners are compelled to make sure they're mining on the longest branch. Miners are essentially voting for their preferred branch when they place their newly mined block there. Each block has a reference to the previous block in the chain, so to replace a block which is 3 blocks back, you need to redo the work in all those previous blocks, which is 3 times the work. When an attacking miner wants to double spend, they face this problem - they must send their transaction to the victim, wait for them to accept it (it appears in a block) and deliver the goods/service. Then, the attacker must generate a new branch where he sends the money somewhere else, thus defrauding the victim, but this new branch will only be valid if it is longer in length than the main branch in which the victim's transaction lives. Thus he must now acquire enough hashing power to outpace the rest of the entire network in the competition to produce blocks on the longest chain. This is expensive because producing a block (on average) costs the network the same in electricity costs as they get back in the block reward, so the double spend needs to be sizable enough to compensate the attacker. This is why you should wait longer (for more blocks to bury your transaction) to accept transactions of bigger value n BTC. Hope that helps. Cheers, Paul. |
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I would say it's probably the most difficult job in software development.
Not only do you need to understand the language (predominately c++), you also need a deep understanding of networking, peer to peer applications, finance, cryptography (which is huge and complex in itself) and last but by a long shot the most important, you need to understand consensus design, for which there is no manual and no books cover the subject, because it is bleeding edge technology.
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Last year I finally got around to writing up the system I was alluding to in this old thread. It proposes creating a new consensus mechanism inspired by the core values of bitcoin but solving the major problems inherent in the current bitcoin concensus model: * centralisation of mining * transaction throughput * confirmation times The key to solving the problem is to create a trustless, total order for all transactions in a system where every user is the only person who can mine their own transactions. The paper is a draft with all the proofs missing and there is still an open question related to the claim that miners are incentivised to include uncle references. With that said, I think it could inspire some debate and maybe be useful in general. In any case, I think it's better to share this work even in it's current incomplete state than to let it vanish into obscurity. https://github.com/wildbunny/docs/blob/master/T.E.T.O-draft.pdfCheers, Paul. |
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Hi everyone, I'm posting this draft I worked on last year in the hope that it will inspire some debate. It's based on the work of Max Kaye ( https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1057342.0), and proposes a blockless consensus mechanism for achieving an eventual total ordering of all transactions in a DAG based cryptocurrency. The novel aspects are that it is the first system I am aware of that attempt to achieve a trustless, total ordering for all transactions. It's an incomplete draft, all of the proofs are missing and there is an open question related to the claim about miners being incentivised to reference uncle transactions in their own new transactions, which is somewhat key to overall convergence. https://github.com/wildbunny/docs/blob/master/T.E.T.O-draft.pdfedit: points of interest: * Permits a mining reward * Deterministic global state * Eliminates mining pools * Maximum possible decentralisation * Enables safe-to-accept-transaction-as-confirmed metric * Instant transactions Anyway, happy reading! Cheers, Paul. |
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