I wouldn't. I'm somewhat invested in Bitcoin.


We don't. What we do know is that there are scads of alts that are hungry for any portion of Bitcoin's current market share, and are likely to implement anything seen as a competitive advantage.


I personally don't believe that upping the block size by some low integer value is going to be problematic. As long as max block size stays behind the rate of Moore's Postulate, this should cause no issues. If it does get ahead, I trust miners to not fuck up the system.


This discussion has been going on for years. Core's obstinance to not address it in time for the intercept of:
    a) the max block size over time curve; and
    b) the actual block size over time curve,
demonstrates a failure of leadership.

Your refusal to consider what they are saying seems myopic. They are not complaining about another 3-4 cents. They are complaining about unknowable transaction inclusion times.


You seem to believe that the only route in and out of alts -- and all use cases of alts -- involve Bitcoin. I submit to you that this is likely to be false. Over time, should Bitcoin keep ostracizing more and more use cases, this presumed partial dependency is likely to become less and less.

Point taken. But did they used to pay out in Bitcoin? If so, it is one valid data point.

Even in a great upheaval, the movement happens at the margins. Best stay alert.

This just in: hdbuck, despite spending untold hours toiling away upon BCT, reveals himself bereft of belief in The Bitcoin Experiment:

Sure there can. Maybe not for you, as I believe that what you desire for the definition of spam is 'any transaction of which I disapprove'.


In my mind, this may be the best definition we can muster. If one trusts the unseen hand of the marketplace, this should be necessary and sufficient. Absent artificial restrictions, IMNSHO.


They are not burdening everyone else with these costs. The block reward is what it is, and it will continue being emitted regardless of the number of 'spam transactions'. Indeed, such low value transactions only amortizes this cost over more transactions, thereby reducing the sunk block reward cost of making a single transaction. Additionally, this is not a part of the problem that need be solved for the long term. As halvings go on, this part of the problem solves itself.

Agreed. For better or worse, the experiment is now being run. I would have rather run the other experiment (increasing the block size), but we are where we are - at least for the time being.


Nirvana fallacy. As long as the max block size stays suitably larger than the time-averaged demand, we don't need to be at Visa levels. How long until we do need to be at Visa levels? We don't know. Will Moore's Postulate get us there in time? We don't know. But even many smallblockers believe we can do larger right now  - as just one example, Adam Back publicly proclaimed '4MB no problem' a day or two ago.

Another part of the experiment underway (it is not separable) is the postulate that consistently full blocks will forestall adoption of Bitcoin, driving away potential users. I think this is likely to be proven true, but admittedly, I don't know.

Thanks for trying. But your definition seems to be bereft of any ability to classify transactions as spam or legitimate. It is situational dependent. Changing by the moment. Under your definition,  a transaction that would be spam at one point in time may not be spam at another point in time, and vice versa.

It may be that you wish to classify something as either: a) below some level of satoshis per byte; or b) above some level of satoshis per byte. Which might be meaningful in our system. But that is not spam vs legitimate. Further, your fellow travelers are distinctly attaching a value of 'bad' to those transactions they deem 'spam', and 'not bad' to those transactions they deem 'legitimate'. Even if your metric was not variable from moment to moment, it does not fit into this framework.

Until recently, a transaction with zero transaction fees attached would have been privileged if it destroyed a sufficient number of bitcoin-days. Under your definition, such a transaction is spam, regardless of the economic value of the transaction - even Satoshi moving his fabled nut. I submit to you that such a definition is at least pejorative.

But hey - its 'a' definition.

While I'm with you, it doesn't really fit the bill. According to AlexGR, blocks are overwhelmingly full of spam. Yet if the spam makes it into a block, it does not meet your rational definition.

Plus, it offers no way of looking at a transaction in isolation, and classifying it as swipe left or swipe right.

Thanks anyhoo.

What are the objective criteria by which any given transaction can be classified as being either: a) spam; or b) legitimate?

I have been asking this for months of many who like to kick around the term 'spam'. Many of them repeatedly. Perhaps even you? But to date, I have received exactly zero responsive replies.

Certainly, it is within your power and within your right to refrain from forwarding any transactions as you desire. But that does not really answer the question.

If you have no criteria for objectively determining whether a given transaction was originated by a Classic or an XT node, you'll still be forwarding these that were forwarded to you by intervening Core nodes. Accordingly, how is it that you believe your action to be anything other than impotent?

Guess I oughta check it out. Anonymint is obviously a very bright person. But very troubled. I gave up on him (her?) a couple years back. Always with the plan for the anonymous crypto that will bury all other cryptos. Yet somehow ... ... ... nothing ever delivered. Medical issues, you know.

I'm on board with your main point, but I need to stop you right here.

Waco, anyone? How soon we forget.

I got one as soon as they became available in my state. Happy. Usable everywhere. Almost free. What's not to like?

Yes.

I think we can distill the core of our argument -- both of our walls of text -- to this single snippet:


For some reason,it seems that you think that a miner who has solved a block is unable to get his solved block to whichever miner will ultimately solve the next block, without intervening independent nodes. I say that he can -- if only by the fact that this miner also operates a node. If the solved block gets to other miners, and one of those miners builds the next block on top of it, there is absolutely nothing that independent nodes can do about it. Period.


No - not in a system-wide sense. If the block makes it to other miners, and those miners consider the block valid, they will build a new block atop it. The only power an independent node has is to choose not to participate in forwarding the block to other nodes or other miners. No independent node can have any effect upon any path in the connectivity graph, of which it is not a part.


No. Miners enforce the longest valid chain. If a chain makes it to a miner, and that miner considers it the longest valid chain, that miner will attempt to build the next block on top of it. The only power an independent node has is to choose not to participate in forwarding the chain to other nodes or other miners.

Move goalposts much? As long as there is the _ability_ for anyone to run a node (i.e. no regulatory or exclusionary barrier), I am unconcerned about any amount of node centralization. After all, independent nodes add zero value. They can always be routed around by any other network entities. They are essentially non-entities as far as the network is concerned.

Perhaps you can explain to me -- in detailed fashion -- exactly what value you think it is that independent nodes provide? What task do they perform that cannot be countered? How exactly does their presence prevent nefarious action?


It doesn't matter whether or not we trust this small set. Any other nodes can be routed around.

But to answer your implied question, as long as transaction originators (i.e. exchanges, merchants, and wallets) are necessary nodes on the network, I expect their users will keep them honest. This does not omit the majority of the userbase, these entities are representative of the userbase.


Why don't you first explain to me why you think independent nodes provide any sort of protection from Sybil attacks? Actually, first, why don't you describe to me exactly what form of Sybil attack you are concerned about here?


Agreed. However, the Core SegWit Omnibus Changeset requires as much or more data transfer and storage by each fully validating node than does a simple 2MB bump. The necessary consequence of this is that using 'ZOMG centralization of the poor nodes' as a reason for Core SegWit Omnibus Changeset over simple 2MB is absolute twaddle.


Well, duh. We already have a solution for not-fully-validating wallets. Explain what you mean by 'externalizing the cost to all nodes' -- sounds an awful lot like 'trusting others to do the validation'. Care to explain how it differs?


I see you cite no evidence as well.


Waah. Where's your rationale?

Whatevs. Anyone running a node today is quite evidently interested in bitcoin. After all, they've devoted more than three dollars worth of disk space to the activity. And enough bandwith to (almost) carry on a Skype conversation. I don't think such a person is going to be deterred from running a node just because the cost rises to six bux and change in disk, and a bit more bandwidth than a Skype conversation. That's my rationale.

But it really doesn't matter, as independent nodes add no value to the network (see above).


If there's a point there, you're not making it. Coincidence does not imply causality. And your correlation is poor. Need more rigor if you're trying to claim causality here.


Before I can either disagree or agree with your proposition, you are going to first have to define the characteristics of this Sybil attack of which you speak. Then you are going to have to explain to me why you think any independent node might prevent such an attack. Care to do so?

Or more germane, which part of my statement are you trying to refute, by ignoring it in favor of your own proposition? Do you disagree that any miner could implement their own forwarding node? Do you disagree that said miner could connect explicitly to specific nodes? Do you disagree that these other nodes might be owned by other miners? Do you disagree that these other miners might plausibly have the same game intent as others? Or that the cost of such node be essentially noise to an industrial mining operation? What else in my assertion could you possibly be disagreeing with?


Bullshit. But I'll first answer your questions - because it is not in their rational self interest. Now to your points...

What proportion of miners do you think it is that does not broadcast to other miners? Do you understand that every hop in the chain adds latency, and thereby increases the chance that their block will be orphaned? In the light of this, why on earth would they trust the broadcast to some ad-hoc association of fly-by-night independent nodes, when they can broadcast directly to other miners? Or  to the (oddly centralized) relay network?

I'll await your description of the Sybil attack you so fear before addressing that.

I never said miners could control most nodes, I said that independent nodes are of no value in keeping miners in check.

Any given miner cannot truly censor any given transaction, when the next miner to solve a block might include the 'censored' transaction. No value in trying. And independent nodes would have no power to stop this anyhow. Each miner is the sole determinant of what transactions to include in any given block. What power does any node have to 'anti-censor'?

Any given miner attempting to double-spend will find his double-spent transactions (thereby blocks) ignored by the rest of the mining network. Thereby losing his entire block reward. And independent nodes would have no power to stop this anyhow. Explain why you think otherwise?


^FTFY. The miner that solves a block doesn't give a rat's ass about what other nodes think. His interest is to have the next miner to solve a block to build on the chain he already extended. Period. This is fundamental.


There you go moving the goalposts again. The proposition under discussion is not whether it is in the interest of any miner to bypass independent nodes, it is that independent nodes add no ability to the network to keep miners in check. I have demonstrated above that there is nothing that independent nodes can do that any given miner cannot route around.

A necessary corollary of this is that attempts to maximize independent node count is useless.



Good...


And I don't think you've provided a modicum of evidence against it. I agree, simple reasoning is weak in the face of contrary evidence. Yet, I have not seen any contrary evidence yet - from you or other.


We're not arguing about the incentive for an individual to run a node, we're arguing about whether or not independent nodes add any value to the network. I say no, and I think I've conclusively demonstrated so. I await your rebuttal.


You may be running a node because you want bitcoin to succeed. I think your reasoning is incorrect. As far as David Rabahy, I certainly got the impression that he agreed with me that independent nodes add no value to the network.


As for me, I run a node because I am not gonna trust my Bitcoin to any other -- no way, no how. But this benefits me, not the network.


While probably true, this is only relevant to #2, and I deny the assertion that doubling storage and bandwidth requirements provides a significant squeeze.

Not at all. Indeed, I am neither a miner, merchant, nor exchange, yet I run a full node. My claim is that the network would operate just fine without any but merchants, miners, and exchanges running a node. Independents add little to no value to the system. Further, as you acknowledge, there is no economic incentive for an independent to run a node.

Classic increases the block size in a honest manner. Core increases the block size as well through chicanery. A fully validating node still needs signatures, so it's actual Max block size is anywhere from 1MB to ~4MB, depending upon how much multisig is in that block.


Probably. Which makes it A Good Thing that anyone who is concerned about such centralization is free to run a full node.


Because core requires as much or more data transfer and storage as does classic, as per proportion of multisig.

Merely a rationally reasoned conclusion. Can you support an assertion to the contrary?.


No, they are not. It is trivial for any miner to implement their own forwarding node, connecting explicitly to other miners which share their philosophy, completely bypassing any set of independent nodes.

NWOTD! Thanks!

The answer to that is 'at any block size whatsoever, including as little as one transaction per 10 minutes'. There is absolutely no realizable direct positive incentive for any other then a miner, merchant, or exchange to operate a node. None. There is no renumeration for so doing. None. Nada. Bupkis.


That canard has no place in a 'core vs classic' comparison. Fact is, any fully validating core node with the SegWit Omnibus Changeset implemented will need the signatures in order to validate. The fact that they have been repartitioned into a separate chain means nothing to such a node - it still needs the signatures in order to validate. Accordingly, The SegWit Omnibus Changeset is as big a disincentive to operating a node than is classic.

But it's really kind of irrelevant - as has been pointed out, an insignificant proportion of current nodes will stop node-ing simply because the disk space required goes up from $3.09 worth to $6.18 worth, nor if they need to go from 10 MB upload every 10 min to 20 MB upload every 10 minutes.

But it is still really kind of irrelevant - the dirty little secret is that independent nodes essentially fulfill zero marginal utility. Sure, every node validates transactions. Guess what - so does every intelligent miner. They would not risk building a block that has a transaction included that would be rejected by the rest of the network.

Summary:

1) 'Node Centralization' is no reason to choose between 1MB Core and 2MB other
2) Doubling block size will have negligible impact upon node count
3) In the end, nodes are negligible marginal utility anyhow.