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701  Bitcoin / Bitcoin Discussion / Re: Destroying bitcoins... Possible? on: June 04, 2014, 04:34:35 AM
In particular, you can use OP_RETURN to create an output that can never be spent.  This script OP code is used specifically to mark an output as "invalid".  As such, it can immediately be removed from the UTXO, and can be considered "destroyed".
Out of curiosity, is there any web service which keeps tabs on how many coins are proved to be destroyed? Compared to the number of "de facto" unspendable coins, it must be insignificant, but it's still something to look at.

I don't know of any and it is very small %.  Most are probably due to mistakes they just happen to be mistakes where we can definitively say the output can't be spent.  The "normal" usage of OP RETURN is to encode up to 40 bytes of data in an output with zero value so the output is unspendable but not coins are lost.  As Danny pointed out it could be used to provably destroy coins (and there are a number of other methods) but I don't believe it has been used intentionally that way for anything other than a few tests.
702  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Fee discovery on: June 03, 2014, 11:38:02 PM
If you dot want to buy the guarantee to be mined withing in the next block, use your system; set you fee to ten times less and pray...

I think we are done here and clearly posting was a waste of time.
703  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Spin-offs: bootstrap an altcoin with a btc-blockchain-based initial distribution on: June 03, 2014, 07:04:17 PM

In doing some research on merge mining an idea occurred to me that could potentially make claims easier by creating an OP_RETURN output on the Bitcoin network.  The spinoff could operate in a manner that would be best described as a SPV node when it comes to validating claims and thus would not need to know anything about Bitcoin scripting language.  Like a SPV node the "proof" that a claim is valid would be that it is sufficiently deep in the bitcoin primary chain.  This really would make the most sense for coins which are planning to adopt merge mining and intend to implement a claim window.  If you prefer we can discuss it by PM or in a new thread.
704  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Spin-offs: bootstrap an altcoin with a btc-blockchain-based initial distribution on: June 03, 2014, 05:42:53 PM
2. There are limits to the inflation of Bitcoin, but no limits to the inflation of Bitcoin spin offs. If the first one becomes popular, next week you will see "Bitcoin-spinoff shitcoin 5.0 with PoS, Dark Send, Ethereum, Ring Signatures, and ZeroCoin", and it will simply be the next platform of pump and dumps.

I doubt it.  What makes a pump & dump possible is
a) a very limited supply/float
b) very thinly traded markets (often heavily controlled by the developer)
c) a dubious (but real) fear among altcoin users that they may be missing the train.  

On c I think this is probably like trying to catch lightning in a bottle a second time but I can at least recognize the human psychology behind it.   No doubt some people will try to use a spinoff to support "yet another altcoin" but critics can and should exercise their economic power given to them by the spinoff to "vote" against it by selling off their stake.  Pumps are very difficult to accomplish in the face of large order book on the sell side and as you point out critics have nothing to lose by selling their spinoff stake if the coin ultimately ends up a failure.  Getting even 1 satoshi per xCoin is better than getting nothing (if you feel the ultimately value is 0).

Nobody can prevent the creation of a shallow clone for the purpose of fleecing idiots from their hard earned money.  However an instamine, premine solely for the devs benefit, or "IPO" all are superior choices for trying to perform a pump and dump.  A spinoff in essence is a premine where the developer has no control over who gets a "piece" of the initial supply.  Unlike other choices where the other holders are either fellow conspirators or bagholders, a spinoff gives critics a stake at no cost.  They can act as a contrary force and source of liquidity.

I hold more Bitcoin than any Alt, but when these come out I look forward to dumping them for yet more Bitcoins.

If you feel there is no value or merit to the spinoff you certainly should.  In doing so your economic interests will align with the "greater good" helping the market to determine the appropriate price for the asset which if you are correct is zero.  Even if the spinoff is pointless the the market is more efficient as it has more participants.  Many of those would be critical, and willing to sell for any price (if you are convinced something is worthless then getting 1 satoshi on the Bitcoin is a net gain).  This leads to a faster price discover for spinoffs regardless of their value.   In comparison in an "IPO coin" the initial stake holders are only those who were willing to buy some coins.  There is significant selection bias as those who believe the coin has no merit wouldn't buy into the IPO.  Only the "believers" hold the stake and they are reluctant to sell (especially for a loss) this distorts the market, reduces liquidity and is how you see altcoins explode 5000% in a short period of time on essentially no volume.  Eventually price will follow value but the distorted market, lack of effective shorting mechanism, and very tiny float ends up delaying price discovery leading to short term spikes before it finally circles the drain.
705  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Spin-offs: bootstrap an altcoin with a btc-blockchain-based initial distribution on: June 03, 2014, 05:35:46 PM
i like your original plan Peter of making the claim unlimited.

don't forget that we have this uncertainty in Bitcoin in regards to Satoshi's BTC and other addresses that haven't been touched in years.  yet no one currently suggests we go cancel them out.  the uncertainty of these addresses doesn't seem to have affected the Bitcoin market.  don't forget that part of your plan for Spin Offs was to make it as easy as possible to code these things en masse if and when you get this process moving forward.  it should be just a simple matter of dropping in the issuance code w/o anything else.  the goal was to make it as similar to Bitcoin as possible. i suggest this economic uncertainty has already been financially encoded within the Bitcoin blockchain and any perturbations away from that might cause problems.

besides, we've had this debate before ad nauseum concerning re-mining addresses that have been inactive for years, the assumption being that the private keys have been lost.  the valid counter arguments to this have been that you never know for sure if the owner of those addresses just never bothered to come to the forum to monitor news of his coins being potentially snatched just b/c they haven't been moved.  who knows, ppl can go into a coma for years before they come out of it.

I was also seeing the parallel with the discussion of bitcoins on inactive addresses.  There's also the matter of physical coins and long-term, not-easily-accessible cold storage wallets.  As Peter says, it's not possible to stop people releasing spin-offs with a time deadline but the arguments can be presented here in such a way that a consensus may be reached by all other than those who want to cut out 'old money' and they are in my guess less likely to get involved with spin-offs in the first place hoping the idea will not catch on!

Despite the possibility that I am flogging a deceased equatine, there is a difference between reclaiming "inactive addresses" and a greenfield project which puts the requirements for a claim upfront.  Imagine Satoshi had decided originally designed Bitcoin (to provide a limit on blockchain growth) that an output is invalid for spending more than 1 million blocks from when it was confirmed.  I would see no problem with keeping it that way.  Anyone creating an address would be aware of the limits of the system in advance.  Changing Bitcoin now to reclaim "inactive addresses" is unethical as it is an ex post facto change.  A new coin however that uses the bootstrap as of Bitcoin block 300,000 and requires claims to be made before "newcoin" block X has no such ethical risk.  The rule is known at the point of launch (actually it probably will be known well in advance of launch).  Nobody is suggesting excluding valid unspent outputs  (except maybe very limited scenarios related to feasibility).  If Satoshi wanted to claim x coins in a spinoff he certainly could do so by creating the appropriate signatures.  If he doesn't and the claim window passes then he is making a choice to exclude himself.

The only reason I bring this up again is I feel there may be some confusion on what is being considered with a claim window.  The claim window would be on the spinoff (i.e. claim outputs are only valid before block X) it wouldn't exclude any particular bitcoin unspent output.
706  Bitcoin / Bitcoin Discussion / Re: And now a bank realizes bitcoin's potential finally!(citibank) on: June 03, 2014, 04:32:12 PM
nice to watch a bank write good about bitcoin, the very thing which is going to make banks extinct in future.

Looking at the people around me I find that very difficult to believe in no matter how disruptive the technology is.

big things start so small..

practically speaking why the hell would anyone need a bank if they can literally have a billion dollars in their pockets or in a piece of paper.

The same reason why people don't keep a billion (or hundred thousand) dollars in their pocket today.   Bitcoin may change how banks operate, on how much it changes the banks will depend on how widely it is adopted.  There will always be banks.  Banks predate fiat currency by a couple a couple hundred years.   There were banks (100% reserve) in the Roman Empire.  Banking concepts (letters of credit, loans, interest, etc) were used in Greece and China even before that although they didn't exist as banks as we understand them today. 
707  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Spin-offs: bootstrap an altcoin with a btc-blockchain-based initial distribution on: June 03, 2014, 03:04:51 PM
I pointed out that analyzing the blockchain for various "templates" would be a useful way to determine how common they are.  Someone has already performed a similar analysis as of block 290,000. Just to be clear it isn't exactly what we are looking for but it is an interesting datapoint.

The linked survey
* Based on all outputs (unspent, invalid, and spent).
* Shows the nominal # of each output template, not the value of the outputs.
* The template of the P2SH redeem scripts is unknown .

Optimal bootstrap survey
* Based on only valid, unspent outputs
* Show % of value by template type
* Break down P2SH based on known redeem scripts (spent outputs as a proxy)

The linked article breaks the outputs out into 24 templates however for our purposes many of these can be combined.  The article drops any template which has less than 10 occurrences however by my math the outputs not cataloged represent less than 0.01% of all outputs.  I computed that by looking at the difference between the # of cataloged outputs and the total # of outputs confirmed by my own tool (uncategorized = total - sum of 24 reported templates).  There may be a small difference as I was looking at total outputs at a later block but 0.01% would be an upper bound.


Pay2PubKeyHash (1 form)           86,380,556 98.91%
Pay2PubKey (2 forms)                 904,300 1.04%
Native Multisig (10 forms)      27,217 0.03%
Pay2ScriptHash (1 form*)      19,451 0.02%
Unknown, bug, or OP_RETURN (11 forms)  2,216 0.00% (unspendable can be dropped from bootstrap)
Not categorized (>100 forms)                   < 0.01%

* P2SH only has one format for the output script, the actual redemption is based on the redeem script which is hashed to the scripthash in the output.  
A similar analysis of the actual redeem scripts would need to be done (my assumption is that most outputs conform to one of a few templates).  

To simplify the bootstrap the Pay2PubKey (and obsolete output) outputs could be converted into Pay2PubKeyHash by hashing the PubKey.
The known unspendable outputs (bugs, possibly intentional unspendable outputs, testing, and OP_Return can just be dropped from the bootstrap.
This would mean that supporting just Pay2PubKeyHash, Native Multisig and P2SH (with only the most common forms) would provide support for at least 99.6% of outputs and possibly as much as 99.9%.  

Remember this is based on just the # of outputs not the value of the unspent outputs although I do not think the distribution will change significantly.

708  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: (non-ultimate) blockchain compression? on: June 03, 2014, 02:09:20 PM
I can not ask this transaction from N1, because N1 already removed it from memory pool

As pointed out 5 times now ... this would require a change in protocol.

yes, the spec. needs to be changed. repeating my question from another reply - should I start a BIP if I want to implement this?

No.  From this thread it is very clear you lack the basic knowledge and logic skills necessary to implement a BIP.  I mean we just played a 14 post game of "who's on first" because you couldn't grasp the concept that in an changed protocol the protocol would be changed and thus referencing the current protocol would be pointless.

Of course that would be my opinion.  You don't need to ask permission to write up a BIP or make a pull request.
709  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: (non-ultimate) blockchain compression? on: June 03, 2014, 04:35:45 AM
But the protocol layer can fix that. A block that is just header + coinbase + txid list would be pretty short.
Yes, but what if I do not have one or more transactions in my mempool to assemble a block from this template?
This situation occures when a transaction comes to a miner, miner accepts it into a block and solve block immideately after.
Or miner takes very old (month or year) transaction from mempool
So, no one node on network has this transaction in mempool.

Ok, first node receives "template", and have to ask for missing transaction its peer.

The point is that most of the time, most of the full nodes know about 90%+ of the txs.  The current protocol relays them tx they already know about.  It is a very simplistic and not optimized protocol.  In time it will almost certainly be changed to header + coinbase + tx hashes.   If a node doesn't know about a particular tx it will request that from its peers.  That is still far less bandwidth then all nodes relaying full tx list to peers most of which already know about most or all of them who then relay the full list to their peers most of which know about most or all of them.
710  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Which Proof of Stake System is the Most Viable on: June 03, 2014, 01:24:11 AM
I think you confuse linear with exponential.   y = 2^x is exponential.   y = 2x is linear.
711  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why are new coins distributed to miners? on: June 02, 2014, 09:39:46 PM
Yes, this will be the most difficult challenge to solve. You could make the lottery-reward decrease exponentially with the number of transactions in the block, making it unprofitable for miners to add extra fake transactions. Since they will have the chance to loose all the high fees for a slim chance on a small reward. In other words: each extra fake transaction will mean they pay more to win less.

The miner could add just a single high fee transaction and be guaranteed the lottery.  In game theory this would be the optimal choice unless the fees were worth more than that.  So it puts a minimum economical fee on tx at higher than what a miner can simply game for himself.  The higher the fee the lower the utility of the network.

Another solution could be that the network rejects blocks of which a certain percentage of the transactions is not in their memory pool. That means the miner has to broadcast those TX's first, and if another miner mines the block, the miner who created the fake TX's looses a lot of money.

This is a non-starter.  It is an unsolved problem on a non-deterministic system.  It is fairly easy for attackers to game in order to orphan blocks of legit miners.  Still lets assume you succeed and the system can't be gamed in any way.   New coins subsidies users not miners and miners receive only tx fees of legit transactions.  The network remains far less secure or tx fees need to be excessively high.  Neither of which would make the network attractive relative to Bitcoin.   What problem are you trying to solve other than "I don't mine so I don't like it that other people get subsidized coins"?  The primary purpose of mining is to secure the network.  Any system that discourages mining is working against the basic interests of the network.  A network that is more secured is worth more than one which has inferior security.  

The new coins are a subsidy.  The purpose of a subsidy is to encourage a specific activity.  In the case of Bitcoin that activity is securing the network. 
712  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why are new coins distributed to miners? on: June 02, 2014, 09:35:01 PM
Call it "proof of use" and make an alt based on it. 

Good luck motivating miners to secure the network before the transaction volume skyrockets.  Oh, and don't expect transactions to skyrocket without a network secured by miners.  See the point?

This is the chicken and egg scenario Satoshi attempted to resolve by "bootstrapping" the network via the subsidy.  The end game is always the same all coins are distributed and network relies on tx fees.   The question is how to get there.  There are two problems with a network consisting of just a single node and a genesis block.  The first problem is how to fairly perform the initial distribution (key word is initial as the current distribution and future distribution has little in common with the initial distribution).  The second is how to subsidize the cost of the network until such time (tens of millions of users, millions of merchants, billions of transactions annually) as the network is self sufficient.  Satoshi attempted to kill two birds with one stone.
713  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why are new coins distributed to miners? on: June 02, 2014, 08:44:53 PM
It will not be 25 BTC fixed, it will vary depending on the fees. And the lottery is not ment to prevent sybil attacks, since it doesnt replace mining. And the selection of the random addresses can be done using the blockhash fairly simple. If you want I can give you a technical implementation of it, but it goes out of the scope of the topic I guess.

The miners will just game this by filling blocks with txs back to themselves with high fees.  If the tx in the block are 99.9% belonging to the miner then they have a 99.9% chance of winning the lottery.   If anything you just created a disincentive for a miner to ever include a legit tx unless it has an extremely high fee (as it would serve no purpose except to lower the miners chance of winning).  Since miners recover the fees paid on their own spam, there is no cost to the miner and they can make the block reward as large as they want.   This will put upward pressure of fees such that blocks will be mostly filled with miner spam and crowd out legitimate tx volume.  It is a minor issue but it would also greater incentivise selfish mining as optimally a miner would want to be 1 block ahead of the network to ensure it doesn't lose fees paid to itself in the event of losing a race.
714  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why are new coins distributed to miners? on: June 02, 2014, 08:16:49 PM
Basically no one would mine then.

They would mine for the fees.

Ok then 99.5% won't mine.  Network security would fall massively and it would be trivial to double spend the network.  The "coins" only have value because they have utility (impossible to counterfeit, and very difficult to "reverse" once confirmed).  No utility = no value and the price rapidly crashes to zero (this would have a compounding effect as not only would the compensation paid to miners drop 99% in BTC terms the falling exchange rate would mean in USD/EUR terms the compensation would fall 99.99%+).

Satoshi always intended "minting" to not only solve the initial distribution problem but to acts as a subsidy.  The subsidy keeps fees low while the network grows.  Another way to look at it is right now fees make up about 1% of total miner compensation.  This means everything else being equal to purchase the same amount of security tx volume would either need to be 100x as high or the average fee per tx would need to be 100x as high.   Neither of those are realistic.  Even with rapid organic growth we are probably many years from such tx volume, and raising fees to be $5 to $10 per tx would cripple utility and adoption.  The (declining) subsidy gives the network time to grow the the volume levels where fees would make it self sufficient.  The subsidy "buys" 99%+ of the security that is available today.  You can't remove 99% of the compensation to miners and expect anything other than security falling 99% (or more).

That way the initial distribution of coins is garantueed to be fair for everyone, since the coins are going to the actual users of the network (which includes also 'the poor'), instead of the big guys.

Actually as proposed it would be very easy to game.  The subsidy protects the network but it also serves the purpose of being hard to "game".  Please describe in exact details how you would distribute 25 BTC "randomly" in such a manner that it would be fair.  Hint: if you could solve that problem (sybil attack) you wouldn't need mining at all.  Using the same logic nodes would simply determine the fairest sequence of transactions (i.e. instant confirmations with no cost, delay, or fraud).

And to discourage users from spamming the chain with dummy transactions, the reward should be equal (or lower) than the total amount of fees paid in the block. This causes their EV (expected value) to stay the same, rendering spam useless.
This is an even worse "solution" security of the network would fall off massively or miners would simply demand much higher fees in compensation.  Miners could still game this by including all "real" high fee txs and then filling the block with tx back to addresses controlled by the miner (with high fees = going right back to miner anyways).  Miners could set the reward to be whatever they wanted possibly even higher than the current reward.  Of course lower fee and free tx would never be included in a block, you just created a penalty that punishes miners for including those txs (by directly lowering their gross revenue).
715  Bitcoin / Technical Support / Re: Master public key in another format? Desperate for help for an easy question! on: June 02, 2014, 06:58:55 PM
The first is a hex string, the second is a byte array.  Conversion between the two is a pretty standard programing task.  I would google "javascript convert hex to byte array".
716  Bitcoin / Technical Support / Re: Master public key in another format? Desperate for help for an easy question! on: June 02, 2014, 06:44:02 PM
They are the same exact value.

The sequence of integers each represent one byte (0-255) or 8 bits.  A Hex value is 4 bits.  So it takes two hex digits to represent one byte.

0x5b = 91
0x8d = 141
0xde = 222
717  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Which Proof of Stake System is the Most Viable on: June 02, 2014, 04:35:14 PM

Miner is the one who decides what transaction to include or exclude. In effect it is controlled by 10 or so miners. 55k or whatever running their machines is immaterial. I guess you can see the problem now.

Pooling won't happen with DPoS. Sure, somebody can set up multiple delegates and keep his identity hidden, but pooling as such directly is not possible.

Besides in DPoS, anybody transacting is playing is part in securing. So in effect the shareholders has a direct say. In PoW like Bitcoin, the users don't have any say.

You need just one miner to include the transaction in block.. You may wait more though...

Dont understand DPoS (I ll have a look) but the rest of PoS are flawed in the core idea and will be controlled by the rich of the coin always... Can the hard cap idea of DPoS fight the total control of the rich over the coin? What is the advantage?

You're missing the entire point. Effectively 10 people have the power to choose what types of transactions to include. For instance tomorrow Ghash and 2 others may decide to leave out all Counterparty transactions, which means they are screwed. Do you, as a Bitcoin user, have any say in it?

They aren't screwed.  The tx will still be included in blocks by other miners.   Also the excluding miners will lose the tx fees and that will make them less competitive relative to other pools and if the actual miners disagree with that loss they will leave and the pool (and pool operator's profits) will shrink.   Today fees are relatively small but as a % of total miner compensation they will only grow.
718  Economy / Service Discussion / Re: Lost 26.52 BTC from my wallet. Should blockchain compensate? on: June 01, 2014, 04:59:43 PM
It is also possible that someone accidentally created your private key. In that case, u have nothing to do...

It is also possible (but not probable) that he inadvertently jumped into a parallel dimension where he never owned those Bitcoins.  Jumping right to private key could be duplicated is just about as silly.
719  Economy / Economics / Re: Store of value and medium of exchange on: June 01, 2014, 12:39:22 AM
It's not a poor medium of exchange. It's suitable for high worth transactions. Silver for low worth.

Really?  Your average cashier can identify fraudulent coins with 99%+ accuracy?  Easy to weigh, validate purity, check dimensions?  Effective for use in eCommerce, mail/phone order transactions, and in money/value transfers to a different location?  Gold and silver and completely worthless as a medium of exchange.  They retain a high price because they are still effective as a store of value (for now).
720  Economy / Service Discussion / Re: BitSimple. A simpler way to buy and sell bitcoins. on: May 31, 2014, 01:44:33 AM
It is after 8PM Eastern so there is no active support at the current time, we don't have or promise 24/7 support.  I will however have someone contact you by email to make arrangements.  There was a delay which prevented the wire from going out the same day.  To give us a larger window to avoid this in the future I have changed the cutoff time from 5PM Eastern to 4PM Eastern.  If possible the wire will be cancelled and you can make an alternate withdraw request by PayPal.
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