DASH Collapsing Monero UP

[skeet]

Gloarious!   

Luckily, I sold my stash of DASH a week ago then bought some Monero and ETH. 

[smoothie]

It was a planned instamine. And it wasn't mentioned before launch, so in my books, that's a scam. Please don't ignore the facts:
2013-12-29: http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development%40lists.sourceforge.net/msg03557.html
2 guys from Hawk Financial Group, Evan & Kyle, are asking on the Bitcoin Dev mailing list for "1 or 2 really good C++ programmer that is familiar with the bitcoin internals to help with a for-profit startup". They are planning to build a unique coin that is "not just a clone of the original Bitcoin code" but in stead "a merge-mined altcoin that will provide a very useful service to the whole crypto-coin ecosystem". They claim to have "detailed plans on how to implement it".


2014-01-18: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg4596809#msg4596809
There were some issues at launch, so Evan said he would postpone the launch and would "definitely not" launch it in the next hours. But he did launch it a few hours later.


2014-01-19: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/block.dws?000007d91d1254d60e2dd1ae580383070a4ddffa4c64c2eeb4a2f9ecc0414343.htm
Xcoin was launched. This was the emission in the first 72 hours of the coins existence: https://i.gyazo.com/fef5818649a839bb091c29e8b3722b7e.png This was the emission of the first 100 days: https://i.gyazo.com/3acc6ea5d90db13e51d95dac0e4b8fa2.png
At the moment, there are about 6 million DASH in circulation. There would be 84 million Xcoins eventually. (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg4588082#msg4588082) Note that in the first hour, 500k Xcoins were mined. Due to the "quick fix" of the bug, not many people expected to launch a few hours after Evan said he would "definitely not" launch in the next hours.


2014-01-19: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg4594074#msg4594074
Right after the launch, there were problems with the window binaries. Evan clearly was mining right from the start, as he offered 5000 Xcoin as a bounty for compiling the binaries.


2014-01-20: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg4629218#msg4629218
After the emission of almost 2 million coins, Evan said that "now that everything is stable, I'll be posting later about the vision of this project and milestones!". Up until this point, only the "X11 hashing algoritm" was a known feature. According to him, it was "time to move on to actually implementing what I set out to do".


**2014-01-22//: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg4654183#msg4654183
Evan releases his plans for XCoin. At this point, more than 2 million coins were mined.
Xcoin rebranded to Darkcoin and eventually to DASH later on.
Later on, some contradictions surfaced:
The emission schedule changed multiple times. The latest we heard is that the number of coins would be somewhere between 14 million and like 16 million DASH. (https://youtu.be/wIvcQIdSbIY?t=9m)
Evan said that this project was just a hobby he started while working on a full time job and coded Xcoin in a weekend. (https://youtu.be/wIvcQIdSbIY?t=9m17s)
Evan claims there were hundreds of miners if not thousands when Xcoin launched. (https://youtu.be/x5sNx7SMTP8?t=3m39s) Recent investigation showed that there were 124 IP addreses that were mining at the start. 115 of those addresses where Cloudhosting and Dedicated Servers, 9 of them seem to be private/users.106 of them were at Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure cloud instances. (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1220064.msg12781520#msg12781520)


Conclusions:
Evan isn't acting alone, he had/has a team behind him right from the start. It wasn't a hobby. he had a plan to make a profit.
Evan had plans for his coin right from the start, but didn't release them until after the instamine
1.5 million coins were mined in the first 8 hours. Most of these coin ended up in his (and his friends) hands. It's very likely the 500k in the first hour were only mined by him with cloudhosting services.
He lowered the emission later on, to make his relative share of coins bigger.
How can this be all an accident (like Evan is always saying) and NOT be intentional?
Evan was looking for c++ devs for a "for profit startup" at the end of 2013 for the launch of an altcoin. How can you make a profit by launching an altcoin (and be sure to be able to pay your devs)? Answer: by premining and/or instamining. How he did it is pretty easy: * telling people the release would definitely not be in the next couple of hours and after that do launch it a few hours later * buggy windows binaries * a "code error" creating 500k coins in the first hour, >1.5 million in the first 8 hours.
=> DASH was clearly a planned premine/instamine.

[DrkLvr_]

Just watched the videos of Evan answering questions about the instamine at Bitcoin Wednesday... his body language is looking quite uncomfortable. How unfortunate for him that there will only be more and more scrutiny into his fraudulent instamine. Should have thought about that before scamming  

Props to the guy who showed up and asked the tough questions.. well done

[smoothie]

Just watched the videos of Evan answering questions about the instamine at Bitcoin Wednesday... his body language is looking quite uncomfortable. How unfortunate for him that there will only be more and more scrutiny into his fraudulent instamine. Should have thought about that before scamming  

Props to the guy who showed up and asked the tough questions.. well done

I came to the same conclusion he seemed very uncomfortable answering those questions.

[illodin]

After a very careful and thorough inspection of the said video footage a conclusion was made that he looked more like he was amused for finally seeing a real forum troll in real life.

[smoothie]

After a very careful and thorough inspection of the said video footage a conclusion was made that he looked more like he was amused for finally seeing a real forum troll in real life.

Based on your stance and how you carry yourself on this forum I can't take anything you say seriously.

Dash is no different than Solidcoin with CoinHunter/RealSolid as its developer.

Dash is essentially Solidcoin 2.0 and a much more successful Solidcoin version.

[obit33]

Hah,

this is funny, Evan admitting masternode-system sucks and is not anonymous while all his minions are defending it here on the forum...

And he is sure distribution of the coin is fine, because he asked... LOL

Here's the link for the Q&A btw: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5sNx7SMTP8
good luck to the Dash-holders, you're gonna need it... Evan's answers on the question about overtaking more than half of the masternodes is exremely weak I think... He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

best regards,

[illodin]

He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

Attack is always possible against everything if you have infinite resources and motivation. Not admitting that would be delusional and should be concerning to investors.

[generalizethis]

He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

Attack is always possible against everything if you have infinite resources and motivation. Not admitting that would be delusional and should be concerning to investors.

But it's made even easier when you cram algos together like X11:

"If any one of the hashes in the chain of 11 hashes has a lower entropy then the entire chain does. Say you found this vulnerability and didn't announce it. Instead you could use it to amplify your hashrate. With that you could take unfair levels of mining rewards, or potentially launch double-spend attacks.

Fixing it after the fact also probably means the inability to unwind the damage already done if it had gone on a long time undetected.
So 11 hashes is 11 times more likely to have a vulnerability than 1 hash." Anonymint

And from noted cryptographers:

"The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part"

Gaëtan Leurent and Lei Wang

"Abstract: In this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)+H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M)||H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied.

The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted -- in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1+H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound.

In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512+Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2^5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant.

Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance.

Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings."

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070.pdf

[DrkLvr_]

After a very careful and thorough inspection of the said video footage a conclusion was made that he looked more like he was amused for finally seeing a real forum troll in real life.

Watch it again. He looks like a weasel who got caught with his hand in the cookie jar.. trying desperately to brush it off and failing miserably.  I really wonder what would have happened if the session moderator had not stepped in at that point, defusing a very tense and awkward moment for Evan, to reiterate how criticism was a good thing and welcomed.

I can't imagine anyone involved with DASH was pleased coming back from that meeting. In typical fashion they spun it as a huge success here on the forums  

Maybe the Dash bagholders will be interested in sponsering some acting classes for him so he can be more convincing in Miami

[illodin]

After a very careful and thorough inspection of the said video footage a conclusion was made that he looked more like he was amused for finally seeing a real forum troll in real life.

Watch it again. He looks like a weasel who got caught with his hand in the cookie jar.. trying desperately to brush it off and failing miserably.

What if I told you he actually knew the troll would be there, and was simply amused about it actually happening?

What I find funny is that the troll was sitting there in the conference listening to the presentation about Evolution where the anonymity is on the protocol level, and then proceeds to ask about NSA and masternodes without realizing his carefully planned FUD just became obsolete 10 minutes ago. Painfully awkward.

I really wonder what would have happened if the session moderator had not stepped in at that point, defusing a very tense and awkward moment for Evan, to reiterate how criticism was a good thing and welcomed.

Actually it looks like the troll walked away by himself without the moderator stepping in, but please spin it the way you want if that helps you sleep at night.

"But maybe you had like hundreds of miners..."

"No, sorry, didn't happen."

Walks away...

[obit33]

If he knew 'the troll' would be there he should have taken more time to prepare his answers... They are weak, with lots of open ends and speculation on his behalf...

• Masternodes: no problem, no one has enough money to do it...
• Instamine: no problem, i asked people and the distributionw as fair, because I say so

Both of the answers are extremely weak, especially if one's trustworthiness is already questionable...

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin, but you've lost your critical thinking on it... Everyone that watches the same Q&A can objectively state that Evan didn't come out well, especially not if he knew 'the troll' would be there and he would have to answer these questions. If that's the only reasoning Evan can come up with, it's a bit pathetic...

Good luck on you though,
best regards

[illodin]

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

[obit33]

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

Ah, that can happen, I feel for you... But for some comfort, these wallets would have become worthless anyway 

[DaveyJones]

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

If there only were cryptocurrencies that have mnemonic seeds to restore deleted wallets...

[generalizethis]

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

If there only were cryptocurrencies that have mnemonic seeds to restore deleted wallets...

And ones that had protocol level privacy already...

[DrkLvr_]

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

If there only were cryptocurrencies that have mnemonic seeds to restore deleted wallets...

[smoothie]

He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

Attack is always possible against everything if you have infinite resources and motivation. Not admitting that would be delusional and should be concerning to investors.

But it's made even easier when you cram algos together like X11:

"If any one of the hashes in the chain of 11 hashes has a lower entropy then the entire chain does. Say you found this vulnerability and didn't announce it. Instead you could use it to amplify your hashrate. With that you could take unfair levels of mining rewards, or potentially launch double-spend attacks.

Fixing it after the fact also probably means the inability to unwind the damage already done if it had gone on a long time undetected.
So 11 hashes is 11 times more likely to have a vulnerability than 1 hash." Anonymint

And from noted cryptographers:

"The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part"

Gaëtan Leurent and Lei Wang

"Abstract: In this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)+H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M)||H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied.

The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted -- in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1+H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound.

In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512+Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2^5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant.

Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance.

Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings."

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070.pdf

And it is funny how Evan sold X11 as this new "more secure" method of hashing not knowing that it is 11 times more insecure than just using scrypt etc.

It just goes to show how uninformed/ignorant Evan is on what he is working on when releasing code/software for Dash/Dark/whatever.

[illodin]

He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

Looks like also that aspect of the FUD has just been obsoleted:

Basically, something called masternode input age based quorum layering. Quorums are created using the age of the masternodes, 25% of the quorums are more than 1.5 years old, the next 25% is more than 1 year old, the next 25% is more than 6 months old, then the final 25% is any masternode that is newer than that. It guarantees, you can't control a quorum by just buying coins from an exchange to make new masternodes, there will always be masternodes that are really, really old.

[DrkLvr_]

For a guy who deleted his wallets illodin sure spends a lot of time defending a fraud instamine shitcoin 

Are you paid in Dash or Bitcoin for your shill service?