Do you think "iamnotback" really has the" Bitcoin killer"?

[IadixDev]

We have a good contact within independent music producer, but I dont have the feeling they are very fond of internet, and have used & abused by many system already, they dont have high amount of trust on Internet to sell music. But the conditions are also no that good for many of them, so I guess it can be tempting

There was the ODRL thing that was interesting, regarding the problematic of digital right, if a thing like this can be integrated as blockchain object, that could be convincing with labels & music producer


https://www.w3.org/community/odrl/

 The ODRL Policy Language provides a flexible and interoperable information model to support transparent and innovative use of digital assets in the publishing, distribution and consumption of content, applications, and services across all sectors and communities. The ODRL Policy model is targeted to support the business models of open, educational, government, and commercial communities through Profiles that enhance the model to align to their requirements whilst providing a common semantic layer for interoperability.


Need to find the good mocking Jay to start the revolution or with anonymous blockchain for them to cheat their producer with a vo coder

Maybe some would jump, like daft punk, or some other who understand technology and have good lawyer for internet right

I think Kim dot kom was on this too, and then he got arrested  

15 years ago we were going to see big producer to speak about internet music distribution, suddently their face turned like they are sit on a cactus. It looked very painful.  I think they d rather deal with terrorists than with internet hackers

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[iamnotback]

Also in my opinion, you are fundamentally responsible for being your own block emitter. If you want to spend a cryptocurrency you obtained, and your blocks have not propagated enough you may need to provide the store with a large packet containing all the blocks/chains necessary to fully trace the inputs to your transaction for validation.

...

Thank you for your input. I look forward to hearing your design.

Your design is not secure in terms of all nodes (users' chains) seeing a consistent ordering, because the set of possibilities is unbounded and you can't disprove a negative in an unbounded universe. It is covered in my whitepaper. Raiblocks already invented what you did, and they tried to arrive at consensus with voting but @monsterer and I explained why that was flawed.

[iamnotback]

There was the ODRL thing that was interesting, regarding the problematic of digital right, if a thing like this can be integrated as blockchain object, that could be convincing with labels & music producer


https://www.w3.org/community/odrl/

 The ODRL Policy Language provides a flexible and interoperable information model to support transparent and innovative use of digital assets in the publishing, distribution and consumption of content, applications, and services across all sectors and communities. The ODRL Policy model is targeted to support the business models of open, educational, government, and commercial communities through Profiles that enhance the model to align to their requirements whilst providing a common semantic layer for interoperability.


Need to find the good mocking Jay to start the revolution or with anonymous blockchain for them to cheat their producer with a vo coder

Maybe some would jump, like daft punk, or some other who understand technology and have good lawyer for internet right

I think Kim dot kom was on this too, and then he got arrested  

15 years ago we were going to see big producer to speak about internet music distribution, suddently their face turned like they are sit on a cactus. It looked very painful.  I think they d rather deal with terrorists than with internet hackers

Music is problematic, because if a song even has an element of another song it (such as a similar riff), the music industry can use their lawyers to force you to sell out to them. Decentralized paradigm it is more difficult for them, but they could scare the artists by making a few examples.

I think it would be better to not require artists to do anything. My idea is a clever integration.

It will never work the way you are thinking. Disrupting and stealing the popular musicians is war against the music industry and they will fight back with every dirty trick they can muster. They promoted them and created their popularity. That is in effect stealing their IP. The popular musician agreed to be in the music industry's system.

There isn't going to be any revolution like an overt protest and overturning of the music industry, because the artists are a captive audience of the industry in large part. It is a specialized industry with specialized needs. The best to hope for is developing indie niches within a broader scope of participation with the existing status quo in order to obtain the necessary economies-of-scale and side-step the hen-egg dilemma.

We can talk more detail on this later. It is premature now for me to state my specific idea.

I doubt music content is best priority. The synergies are weaker than other things we could prioritize, because there are so many hurdles, a fractured market, and there is not so much innovation that can be done (unlike for example software where there is unbounded innovation TBD).

[IadixDev]

But...

Michael Jackson said Sony kills the music.


The popular musician agreed to be in the music industry's system.


They are kidnapped as Kids in the getho and brainwashed by lawyer, it's not exactly the same  

But yeah I guess it's not completly good synergy for the moment, but the fruit might just need a little kick to fall down too even if some people seem to think they are entitled to the tree.



they will fight back with every dirty trick they can muster




Chicken :p

[iamnotback]

Chicken :p

Absolutely not. I just like to win. You are playing a strategy to lose by attempting to be strong where you are weak. I am playing to win by appearing to be weak where I am actually very strong. As I said, I have not explained my idea in detail for that yet. But I told you that we should integrate into the status quo and appear to be weak, while in reality we are building an indie market within it.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu

“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.”
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

[IadixDev]

Maybe I can appear strong for people to think im weak 

Some have less subtle approach

https://youtu.be/URybdpu_NhI

Not sure who is winning, everyone is cheating anyway :p

[tiaozhanziwo]

Byteball could be the killer of BTC. The end of BTC's dominant position.

[dinofelis]

Let's make a simple example with only 3 miners A, B and C who all have the same hash power 1/3 and the same orphan rate 0.01. The miners don't engage in any form of selfish mining strategies. It's easy to see that under these conditions every miner will build 1/3 of the blocks in the chain, as everybody has the exact same chances.

Now, let's assume that A starts building bigger blocks so that his orphan rate increases to 0.2, while B und C retain their orphan rates of 0.01. To determine the fraction of the blocks (in the chain) built by the respective miners, we can calculate:

A: (0.8*1/3) / (0.8*1/3 + 0.99*1/3 + 0.99*1/3) = 0.288
B and C: (0.99*1/3) / (0.8*1/3 + 0.99*1/3 + 0.99*1/3) = 0.356

And we see that B and C can now build more blocks of the chain than their relative hash rates.
According Peter R's equation (3), their success rate would be 0.99*1/3= 0.33, which is incorrect.

Mining is a relativistic game!

Yes, this is with block rewards constant.  Tail emission.  But in the case of rewards proportional to block length (fees), you have to multiply A's revenues with the fact that his blocks bring in more money.  He has a lower percentage of blocks on the chain, but these blocks bring him more rewards as they are bigger.

So if his big blocks bring him 20% more income per block, this is neutral.

However, the thing to keep in mind is to get an orphan rate of 0.2 by network propagation, it means that on average your blocks take 0.2 of the block period to get to the others.  0.2 of 10 minutes is 2 minutes.  If you have good links, in order for them to take 2 minutes, they must be mindbogglingly HUGE.
If it takes 2 minutes to pump a block to another miner with whom you are connected with a 10 Gb/s link, we are talking about 100 GB blocks or something.

As I said earlier, this kind of argument only starts to play a role when the network is already dead.  Because if a significant fraction of the block time (10 minutes in bitcoin) is what it takes for miners amongst themselves to propagate blocks and get them orphaned, no "normal node user" can ever obtain the block chain up to date, because normal users have a worse network connection to the miners (source of block chain) than miners amongst themselves.  Especially if network quality is impacting seriously on their revenues, miners will have the best possible links between them: mutually advantageous (and much less costly than the mining itself: a 10 Gb/s link to Joe MiningPool is less expensive than your mining gear).

If you really want a solution to this problem, then "block length" is not the right parameter, but block income is:

one should cap the "block reward + fee", to, say, 20 btc.  As such, miners can make all the blocks they want, long, short, but their TOTAL INCOME (reward + fees) is capped to 20 btc FOREVER (part of the protocol).   A block with a total reward larger than 20 btc is simply invalid.  

If you do that, you get consensus convergence: blocks will grow until the mem pool is empty, or until fees sum to 20 btc.
If fees sum to close to 20 btc, then users can lower their fees.  There is however a dangerous lock out spiral: if fees reach 20 btc, then there will be transactions that are excluded, and users could increase their fees in order to hope to get their transaction in.  But then, blocks would become even smaller !  The right action would be that all users stop putting large fees ; which they will, eventually.  So users should start LOWERING their fees from the moment that the block rewards start to approach 20 btc.

[dinofelis]

Chicken :p

Absolutely not. I just like to win. You are playing a strategy to lose by attempting to be strong where you are weak. I am playing to win by appearing to be weak where I am actually very strong. As I said, I have not explained my idea in detail for that yet. But I told you that we should integrate into the status quo and appear to be weak, while in reality we are building an indie market within it.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu

“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.”
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

Hahaha, when I was reading your first paragraph, Sun Tzu came to mind exactly as you wrote it 

[iamnotback]

Maybe I can appear strong for people to think im weak  

Some have less subtle approach

https://youtu.be/URybdpu_NhI

Not sure who is winning, everyone is cheating anyway :p

Let's do it! I just think maybe "we" will choose other apps as a priority instead of the music app. But I am also okay with doing a music app first too. I love music and would surely use the app myself! We'll brainstorm about it soon...

I will be very enthused about apps I will myself use, because I will have many ideas of how to innovate them. My million user successes in commercial software were the ones I created because I wanted to use them (and saw the market was lacking the specific features/capabilities that I wanted). For a music app, I want it to be my music player and also keep track of all my music so I never have to hassle with backing up my music, transcoding formats, etc... And I don't want it to tie me into any walled gardens, no adware, no bullshit, etc..

Yeah we'll be "cheating" also but copying for example the way others are already cheating:

http://www.listentoyoutube.com/ (get my idea yet?)

Have you ever noticed you can overlay and obscure the SoundCloud HTML player buttons? Instant library of songs without the 10,000 plays per day app limit. I have some (clever or out-of-the-box thinking?) ideas we can discuss.

Remember our apps need a social component. There needs to be sharing (likes), commenting, etc..

But the more important point is how you the app creator will get paid. And how much money you will be able to earn creating apps.

All you need to do is make apps that people will like to tell their Facebook friends to use.

I think from there, you can start to deduce what I have in mind, but I hold off on the details while I try to finish up getting the preliminaries of the scalable, decentralized blockchain for OpenShare into code. Then we will start to talk in earnest about collaborating, launching, and making a lot of money while shocking this community with our STICKY, VERIFIED adoption rate (into the millions I expect).

I am excited because now I see that real capable app developers are contacting me. So I only need to convince you that my blockchain technology and onboarding strategy is viable, then we can go change the world.

I am on the 2 drug treatment now. Let's hope my energy is ready roll now. I need go finish up on the proposed changes for the (optional proposed app) programming language and see if it realistic for me to write the transpiler in a matter of weeks. I am going to try to go wrap that up now after doing my forum communication now. Are you interested to help on the transpiler? Should I start a Github project for that? Which name is best Async, Copute, Lucid, or Next (Nxt)?

All app programmers please keep in touch. I want to make you wealthy. Let's have fun also.

I'll make an official thread and Slack once I get through the preliminaries and am confident that my production (in code!) is back up to normal.

[innergy]

Which name is best Async, Copute, Lucid, or Next (Nxt)?..

Nebula

[iamnotback]

Byteball could be the killer of BTC. The end of BTC's dominant position.

Unless Tony changed it since I discussed it with him in his official thread in Q4 2016, in my opinion Byteball has at least four major flaws:

1. Afair, the transaction fee mechanism doesn't scale properly with the appreciation in the price of bytes. I don't remember all the details, but this seemed to me at the time to totally break the design going forward.

2. My analysis is the 12 witnesses can't realistically be changed without a hard fork (the algorithm for doing so won't work in reality unless the whales coordinate to make it so, i.e. not decentralized) if 50% of them stop functioning or colluding. In other words, another CartelCoin or hardforking chaos in the making.

3. Afaik, the transaction confirmations are fast but not sub-second (because you have to wait for 7 of the 12 witnesses to sign a new stability point tip), thus not optimal for apps that need very low-latency for onchain actions. Steem's (Bitshares') Graphene (DPoS) has I believe faster 1-confirmations (due to ability of whales to monitor and replace witnesses at will and because each witness produces its own block) but also not sub-second (especially if security against orphans requires more confirmations). Graphene has no asynchrony, so I am not arguing it is better than Byteball. But neither of them met my stringent design requirements. Byteball is interesting, which is why I dedicated an entire section of my whitepaper to discuss its stability point algorithm. I applaud Tony on his clever DAG consensus algorithm.

4. Afaics, his distribution model totally ruined any chance for a funding model to onboard the app developers, content providers, and users. This is really the killer mistake.

Also I don't think the use of JSON as a smart contract language is any tremendous innovation. He appears to be putting a lot of energy into that, so that is an entirely different focus from mine. One of the experiments I am working on is I am trying to create a better programming language for programming apps (a statically typed derivative of JavaScript that transpiles initially to TypeScript), not just smart contracts.


You don't see me going around in every Byteball thread bashing it. I will not do that. Good luck with it.

Btw, the Byteball logo/avatar is quite unique. Spartan (a la Google) and grabs the eye (personally it makes me think of Hal's camera eye in Space Odyssey).

[iamnotback]

Which name is best Async, Copute, Lucid, or Next (Nxt)?..

Nebula

That sort of startled me, because it is catchy and it is in the vein of a "byteball" type of geekcool phonetics.

Amorphous was on my original brainstorming list (and I had thought of nebulous in the process of thinking of amorphous and mentioned nebulous as a negative 3 times on the page), but I think you are correct that Nebula is better than Amorphous or Nebulus.

But is that the meaning we want for a programming language? The language is targeted to programmers. Nebula does have a nice sound to it. Are you thinking the programming language is a feature marketed to the speculators also and thus the reason for the geekcool name?

[iamnotback]

@dinofelis, you are super smart but not a blockchain developer expert (yet)  

Yes, this is with block rewards constant.  Tail emission.  But in the case of rewards proportional to block length (fees), you have to multiply A's revenues with the fact that his blocks bring in more money.  He has a lower percentage of blocks on the chain, but these blocks bring him more rewards as they are bigger.

So if his big blocks bring him 20% more income per block, this is neutral.

You are correct that I had an error in my (discombobulated/delirium due to meds) thinking w.r.t. to the losses due to his relative orphan rate increasing proportionally as I showed in my original Poison process math post, because for example an increase in revenue by 20% is not offset by  a commensurate proportional increase of relative orphan rate e.g. from 0.1% to 0.12%.

Which is even more damning against @Peter R's thesis as you point out.

However, the thing to keep in mind is to get an orphan rate of 0.2 by network propagation, it means that on average your blocks take 0.2 of the block period to get to the others.  0.2 of 10 minutes is 2 minutes.  If you have good links, in order for them to take 2 minutes, they must be mindbogglingly HUGE.
If it takes 2 minutes to pump a block to another miner with whom you are connected with a 10 Gb/s link, we are talking about 100 GB blocks or something.

Per the research I already cited upthread, the current network diameter is around 6 seconds. But it does takes minutes to reach 95% of the network. You are not factoring in that not all nodes have links directly to all nodes, i.e. the peer network is not a fully connected mesh topology. And a node will not forward a block until it has completely verified it (so that it can't be leveraged for a spam amplification attack).

As I said earlier, this kind of argument only starts to play a role when the network is already dead.  Because if a significant fraction of the block time (10 minutes in bitcoin) is what it takes for miners amongst themselves to propagate blocks and get them orphaned, no "normal node user" can ever obtain the block chain up to date, because normal users have a worse network connection to the miners (source of block chain) than miners amongst themselves.  Especially if network quality is impacting seriously on their revenues, miners will have the best possible links between them: mutually advantageous (and much less costly than the mining itself: a 10 Gb/s link to Joe MiningPool is less expensive than your mining gear).

You are correct that as the network becomes centralized into a few pools, then a hub-and-spoke topology is sufficient, but then we don't have decentralization any more.

But the larger point you are not mentioning is that larger blocks are a weapon against decentralization. For the reason stated above, and because those with direct fast links (and collectively more than 33% of systemic hashrate) get disproportionately more reward than their hashrate portion. That is the famous selfish mining paper and more recently the optimal mining strategies paper which adds more strategies.

If you really want a solution to this problem, then "block length" is not the right parameter, but block income is:

one should cap the "block reward + fee", to, say, 20 btc.  As such, miners can make all the blocks they want, long, short, but their TOTAL INCOME (reward + fees) is capped to 20 btc FOREVER (part of the protocol).   A block with a total reward larger than 20 btc is simply invalid.  

Miners will simply take their fees as pseudo-anonymous transactions with 0 or low fee.  

None of all this is going to happen.  Miners want small blocks and a fighting fee market.  The cartel you are talking about with large blocks only sets in with such incredibly large blocks, that they are out of the question in the next few years ; if you want a mining cartel, the telephone between mining pool bosses is a much more useful device than multi-GB blocks that saturate small miner's network links and most of the user nodes.

You had a mistake in your concept of propagation through the network. You are thinking a decentralized network is a fully connected mesh topology.

You don't need that much larger blocks to cause an amplification of propagation delay to the smallest miners in order to destroy decentralization and take 51% control. Also it only requires a very small advantage in relative orphan rate in order to slowly accumulate more hashrate than the opposition, so don't require the 100GB blocks you are computing.

Bitcoin is already centralized

Yes in that case they don't need huge blocks to destroy decentralization because it is already destroyed. In that case, they need to be able increase blocks to whatever they think is the level of transaction fees that maximizes their revenue (volume x transaction fees).

In either case, I am showing that big blocks are a cartelization paradigm. I am being thorough. Please don't fault me for being thorough, just because the network is already centralized.

[thejaytiesto]

BUcoin crashed last night to 200 nodes after the the new bug was discovered, and then the developers had the great idea of releasing a closed source patch. This thing is pretty much dead, nobody is running nodes except Roger Ver at this point and the couple brainwashed people that will run BU no matter what.

How can the miners hard fork after this? If they do, they are insane or paid to cause damage. I don't think the market will hold BU beyond an initial speculative pump before the big permadump just like ETC.

[dinofelis]

You are not factoring in that not all nodes have links directly to all nodes, i.e. the peer network is not a fully connected mesh topology. And a node will not forward a block until it has completely verified it (so that it can't be leveraged for a spam amplification attack).

My idea is that from the moment that network propagation delays between (important) miners matter, they will form a strong backbone network, because they have all mutual incentives to do so.  If you invest in millions of hardware, you can invest in a strong network link to another big mining pool, *and that pool has also an advantage to set up a strong link to yours*.

This is why I see a PoW system as a strong (almost) fully interconnected backbone of big mining pools (I don't know, 10, 20, 5, 50, whatever), and all the other nodes connecting to them : these back bone miner pool data centers are also interested to get directly the user's transactions (and maybe keep the most juicy ones for themselves unless the user also forwards it to others).

In other words, PoW doesn't favor a P2P network at all, but a big backbone of strongly interconnected miner data centers, serving directly the users ; those funny users that really want to, can use other user's nodes as P2P proxy servers instead of connecting directly to one of the miner pool data centers.

"decentralisation" then simply consists in hoping that the bosses of the miner pool data centers don't collude too much.  This is not impossible, if they are 15 or so, in different countries.

The strong backbone network between important pools is unavoidable, because it is mutually advantageous.  It also kills the idea of selfish mining, because selfish mining counts on your selfish block overtaking potentially the public block when you learn about it: on a strong fully connected back bone, that is impossible: by the time YOU learn about the public block, and you want to publish your selfish chain, all others ALSO received the public block (with their direct links) and your selfish block ALWAYS comes late.  So when network delays matter, automatically a strong backbone will emerge.

[iamnotback]

I don't think the market will hold BU beyond an initial speculative pump before the big permadump just like ETC.

Then we are fucked with a 1MB blocksize forever, because afaik the mining cartel will never softfork adopt SegWit?

Either way, Bitcoin is looking more and more clusterfucked.

[dinofelis]

I don't think the market will hold BU beyond an initial speculative pump before the big permadump just like ETC.

Then we are fucked with a 1MB blocksize forever, because afaik the mining cartel will never softfork adopt SegWit?

This is my intimate conviction.

Until bitcoin loses its brand name advantage, and forking becomes possible without fearing to lose the brand name.

[iamnotback]

In other words, PoW doesn't favor a P2P network at all

Bingo. The ultimate conclusion is PoW becomes centralized. Which is what I've been predicting since roughly late 2013 and early 2014. But the selfish mining paper was what really brought it into more focus for me. Then it became clear that propagation, unequal hashrate distribution, and thus relative orphan rate are a critical factor causing centralization.

[dinofelis]

In other words, PoW doesn't favor a P2P network at all

Bingo. The ultimate conclusion is PoW becomes centralized. Which is what I've been predicting since roughly late 2013 and early 2014. But the selfish mining paper was what really brought it into more focus for me. Then it became clear that propagation, unequal hashrate distribution, and thus relative orphan rate are a critical factor causing centralization.

I'm discussing in 2 threads now.  But in the other thread, I also pointed out the "Lottery" nature of rewards as a cause of pooling, and hence centralisation.  

If you don't want a larger fluctuation than 10% income in a week, then you need to win 100 times the lottery in a week (Poisson standard deviation square root rule).  There are 1000 lottery outcomes in a week in bitcoin.  So you need to be part of a 10% winner team to expect 100 wins in a week, needed for your 10% income fluctuation ; there can at most be 10 such teams.

--> pool centralization.  This is BTW the principal centralization factor: people pool, because solo miners have too great a sigma on their income.

Once you have a limited number of pools, you have a half-centralized system ; once you have that, there is great benefit for a back bone.  And you have bitcoin facebook.


(this is also why I think that there shouldn't be rewards...  The Poissonian reward lottery always makes you pool, which centralizes the system)