Do miners really think destroying Bitcoin will make them rich?

[Haladay]

i REALLY dont think people understand how mining works..

for one, its NOT THE MINERS that set the fee.. or choose to mine a certain fee, or really do anything..

everyone in this thread is saying MINERS this and MINERS that.. but, they should be saying MINING POOLS..

its the POOLS that set everything up.. and YES YOU CAN START YOUR OWN MINING POOL.. if you get enough miners on it, you can set it do mine zero fee tx's

Antpool should hear from you! They want to make a separation (fork) in bitcoin just to gain the certain control of that. For this purpose, they create delays and high fees which totally are not fair for the bitcoin community.

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[deisik]

If I were a miner (too expensive for my taste) then I would configure my mining software to mine only 0-fee transactions unless it didn't fill a block in which case then I would include the lowest fee transactions until it filled a block up to the limit allowed.  I am not most people.

If the developers would develop a less expensive way to be a miner then I would appreciate it.  Perhaps they could let miners like me win ever so often (every tenth block?) if we produce a block full of 0-fee transactions?

Mining is expensive because the concept behind mining is severely flawed

We just should accept this fact and search for alternative ways of setting up mining that wouldn't lead to monopolization of the whole process. If mining was cheap and available to anyone, there would be enough nodes eager to include all transactions (with or without any fees altogether). Wtf, there are over 30 thousand Bitcoin full nodes running out there which don't get a satoshi apart from supporting the network (indirect benefit), and that's what the pay should be and how the concept behind mining should work. You buy foods to support your life but taken as such feeding is economically unsustainable since it incurs direct expenses and doesn't bring direct profits

[Pettuh4]

i REALLY dont think people understand how mining works..

for one, its NOT THE MINERS that set the fee.. or choose to mine a certain fee, or really do anything..

everyone in this thread is saying MINERS this and MINERS that.. but, they should be saying MINING POOLS..

its the POOLS that set everything up.. and YES YOU CAN START YOUR OWN MINING POOL.. if you get enough miners on it, you can set it do mine zero fee tx's

Antpool should hear from you! They want to make a separation (fork) in bitcoin just to gain the certain control of that. For this purpose, they create delays and high fees which totally are not fair for the bitcoin community.

This is no news and we've heard similar stories about antpool and other miners but the question will always remain that are they doing this to strengthen or weaken Bitcoin? I think it's not in Bitcoin's interest.

[deisik]

everyone in this thread is saying MINERS this and MINERS that.. but, they should be saying MINING POOLS

This distinction is inconsequential to the matter in question

Mining pools act on their own even if they consist of many individual miners. Apart from that, I have strong suspicions that the largest mining pools are actually disguising huge mining farms which belong to a certain figure, and, at least, a few of noteworthy mining pools actually belong to the same person (we all know him). If so, we should understand that it is likely not even a matter of mining pools but of their owners to who possess the most of hashing power in these pools, and their number seems to be less that the number of pools themselves out there

[dinofelis]

If I were a miner (too expensive for my taste) then I would configure my mining software to mine only 0-fee transactions unless it didn't fill a block in which case then I would include the lowest fee transactions until it filled a block up to the limit allowed.  I am not most people.

If the developers would develop a less expensive way to be a miner then I would appreciate it.  Perhaps they could let miners like me win ever so often (every tenth block?) if we produce a block full of 0-fee transactions?

i REALLY dont think people understand how mining works..

for one, its NOT THE MINERS that set the fee.. or choose to mine a certain fee, or really do anything..

everyone in this thread is saying MINERS this and MINERS that.. but, they should be saying MINING POOLS..

Yes.  Mining pools are the deciders.  I guess that what you call "miners" is in fact sellers of hash rate with their devices.  The only thing these hash rate sellers decide, is to whom they sell their hash rate (usually one of the biggest pools, because they have the smoothest rewards).

[dinofelis]

We just should accept this fact and search for alternative ways of setting up mining that wouldn't lead to monopolization of the whole process.

Absolutely.  I fully agree with you. 

There are essentially two fundamental problems.  The first is with Proof of Work.  Proof of Work needs to destroy value in order to be valuable.  Proof of work is perfect to kill seigniorage, but is a totally horrible way to have "cryptographic security", because there's no advantage for the "good guys".  The "good guys" are those that can waste most, not those that "posses a secret key" (which is the usual form of cryptographic protection).
The race to waste most leads to economies of scale (ASICS...) and hence to a concentration of producers of proof of work.
This leads to two problems: centralization, and the fact that those producing proof of work are not necessarily stake holders in the system.

But there's another problem, which is the fact that blocks are rewarded in the first place in "big lumps".  This makes that there is a fight to make blocks, and to deny others to make blocks.  As such, "making blocks" becomes a huge lottery with big rewards, where pooling together always pays against playing solo.  This is a second vector of centralization: pooling.

Finally, the fact that there ARE rewards to "secure" the chain means that strategies to obtain those rewards are more important than correctly securing the chain, and to correctly process transactions.  If fees are due, then there will be strategies to extract as many fees from the users as the market can bear, and not the optimal point of resource utilisation.

The whole system of blocks, that are rewarded, and that this reward is an incentive for people to "secure" the chain as by-product, leads to a dynamics that is centralizing, and far from optimal for the users and stake holders.

[Carlton Banks]

There are essentially two fundamental problems.  The first is with Proof of Work.  Proof of Work needs to destroy value in order to be valuable.  Proof of work is perfect to kill seigniorage, but is a totally horrible way to have "cryptographic security", because there's no advantage for the "good guys".  The "good guys" are those that can waste most, not those that "posses a secret key" (which is the usual form of cryptographic protection).
The race to waste most leads to economies of scale (ASICS...) and hence to a concentration of producers of proof of work.
This leads to two problems: centralization, and the fact that those producing proof of work are not necessarily stake holders in the system.

But there's another problem, which is the fact that blocks are rewarded in the first place in "big lumps".  This makes that there is a fight to make blocks, and to deny others to make blocks.  As such, "making blocks" becomes a huge lottery with big rewards, where pooling together always pays against playing solo.  This is a second vector of centralization: pooling.

Finally, the fact that there ARE rewards to "secure" the chain means that strategies to obtain those rewards are more important than correctly securing the chain, and to correctly process transactions.  If fees are due, then there will be strategies to extract as many fees from the users as the market can bear, and not the optimal point of resource utilisation.

The whole system of blocks, that are rewarded, and that this reward is an incentive for people to "secure" the chain as by-product, leads to a dynamics that is centralizing, and far from optimal for the users and stake holders.

1. You don't understand PoW's purpose in the Bitcoin system, at all

2. You don't understand the value conferred by cumulative hashes in the PoW scheme

3. As a result of points 1 & 2, you don't even understand the blockchain concept


So why should anyone be expected to read your overlong posts when you don't even understand some of the fundamental ideas behind Bitcoin?

[Xester]

If I were a miner (too expensive for my taste) then I would configure my mining software to mine only 0-fee transactions unless it didn't fill a block in which case then I would include the lowest fee transactions until it filled a block up to the limit allowed.  I am not most people.

If the developers would develop a less expensive way to be a miner then I would appreciate it.  Perhaps they could let miners like me win ever so often (every tenth block?) if we produce a block full of 0-fee transactions?

Mining is expensive because the concept behind mining is severely flawed

We just should accept this fact and search for alternative ways of setting up mining that wouldn't lead to monopolization of the whole process. If mining was cheap and available to anyone, there would be enough nodes eager to include all transactions (with or without any fees altogether). Wtf, there are over 30 thousand Bitcoin full nodes running out there which don't get a satoshi apart from supporting the network (indirect benefit), and that's what the pay should be and how the concept behind mining should work. You buy foods to support your life but taken as such feeding is economically unsustainable since it incurs direct expenses and doesn't bring direct profits

That is the other side of the coin. One of the reasons why the miners are setting much higher fees is because of the difficulty to mine bitcoins or to solve blocks at this point of time. If the miner fees are too low then they cannot pay for the electricity bill and also for the personnel and hardwares. Most of all they can no longer feed their family if they will not ask for higher fees. But hopefully some new mining hardwares will come in which is more powerful and more efficient and less cost so that the miner fees could somehow lessen for a bit.

[paul gatt]

The bitcoin destroyers, a way to call, are accurate. The miners were too greedy, so they headed for the bitcoin unlimit, which was an experimental option and risked great repercussions; however, they did not see that, they assumed they would. Become wealthy if that comes true. I believe they will not do this, the minority can not resist the majority, the market always wins the greedy. They refuse to work steadily each day, and to an unprofitable source of income, they are destroying the bitcoin, and everyone is suffering the consequences. This is not allowed.

[zimmah]

It's not the miners that are destroying bitcoin. It's the imbeciles that still believe we should keep 1MB blocks forever.       
   
the miners are trying to protect the network, but they are being hindered by powerful propaganda and the ignorance that comes with it.

[dinofelis]

There are essentially two fundamental problems.  The first is with Proof of Work.  Proof of Work needs to destroy value in order to be valuable.  Proof of work is perfect to kill seigniorage, but is a totally horrible way to have "cryptographic security", because there's no advantage for the "good guys".  The "good guys" are those that can waste most, not those that "posses a secret key" (which is the usual form of cryptographic protection).
The race to waste most leads to economies of scale (ASICS...) and hence to a concentration of producers of proof of work.
This leads to two problems: centralization, and the fact that those producing proof of work are not necessarily stake holders in the system.

But there's another problem, which is the fact that blocks are rewarded in the first place in "big lumps".  This makes that there is a fight to make blocks, and to deny others to make blocks.  As such, "making blocks" becomes a huge lottery with big rewards, where pooling together always pays against playing solo.  This is a second vector of centralization: pooling.

Finally, the fact that there ARE rewards to "secure" the chain means that strategies to obtain those rewards are more important than correctly securing the chain, and to correctly process transactions.  If fees are due, then there will be strategies to extract as many fees from the users as the market can bear, and not the optimal point of resource utilisation.

The whole system of blocks, that are rewarded, and that this reward is an incentive for people to "secure" the chain as by-product, leads to a dynamics that is centralizing, and far from optimal for the users and stake holders.

1. You don't understand PoW's purpose in the Bitcoin system, at all

2. You don't understand the value conferred by cumulative hashes in the PoW scheme

3. As a result of points 1 & 2, you don't even understand the blockchain concept


So why should anyone be expected to read your overlong posts when you don't even understand some of the fundamental ideas behind Bitcoin?

Because they contain valuable logical arguments, that go against some religious dogma that doesn't stand up to logical analysis by "bitcoiners".  

Of course I understand the "value of cumulative hashes in a PoW scheme".  It is a cryptographic securing ("signing") of a specific chain over another one ; the only way to make a "false copy" is to spend more hashes on the false copy.

Note that most cryptographic systems introduce an asymmetry in the difficulty for the "good guy" and the "bad buy".  If I provide a signature of an original document, the making of that signature doesn't cost me a lot of effort, but for the one trying to make a false document with my signature, he has to essentially brute force my public key, which is an infeasible amount of work.  This is why a digital signature is an efficient way of securing a given document.

If I were to "sign my document" with PoW, then I would have to spend JUST AS MUCH effort on making the signature, than the attacker.  In fact, the one with more hash power would win: perfect symmetry between the "good guy" and the "bad guy".  This is the problem with PoW.   The "security" comes from the fact that we assume that the good guys wasted most.

If I have two block chains, in order to decide which one is the right one, I have to find out which one has most PoW.  That is then the "right" one.  With digital signatures, this is totally different: I check the digital signature against the public key of the signer, and if it fits, I know that the signer is the owner of the right secret key OR that the attacker has spend an IMMENSE amount of work to brute-force the key pair.  With a block chain, I only know that the "good" one has wasted more heat than the "bad one".

As compared to a proof of stake system for instance, PoW is pretty lousy cryptography.

But it is a great system to waste seigniorage, and to allow newcomers without any interaction with the originators of the system to obtain coins.  

It is a horrible system to "secure" something.  Just any outsider can totally overrule the system, if he spends, say, 50 billion on it.  The day the Chinese government wants to fuck up bitcoin, it generates 20 different block chains, that will cost them 50 or 100 billion dollar, and that's it.  In a PoS system, that is cryptographically impossible.

The current Core threat is BTW funny.  If they would switch to another PoW system, then bitcoin's chain would become MIGHTILY INSECURE, because there's not yet much hardware available for the other PoW system.  So for a while, the amount of PoW (the amount of wasted effort) on the PoW on the new chain would be ridiculously small as compared to what bitcoin was used to, and with relatively small capital, one would easily 51% attack such a meager chain protection.

However, if bitcoin switched to a PoS system, the security would be entirely guaranteed.  There would be no way to FAKE a PoS fork, because they are done by digital signatures of stake holders, not by having somewhat more hash power.

[deisik]

If I were a miner (too expensive for my taste) then I would configure my mining software to mine only 0-fee transactions unless it didn't fill a block in which case then I would include the lowest fee transactions until it filled a block up to the limit allowed.  I am not most people.

If the developers would develop a less expensive way to be a miner then I would appreciate it.  Perhaps they could let miners like me win ever so often (every tenth block?) if we produce a block full of 0-fee transactions?

Mining is expensive because the concept behind mining is severely flawed

We just should accept this fact and search for alternative ways of setting up mining that wouldn't lead to monopolization of the whole process. If mining was cheap and available to anyone, there would be enough nodes eager to include all transactions (with or without any fees altogether). Wtf, there are over 30 thousand Bitcoin full nodes running out there which don't get a satoshi apart from supporting the network (indirect benefit), and that's what the pay should be and how the concept behind mining should work. You buy foods to support your life but taken as such feeding is economically unsustainable since it incurs direct expenses and doesn't bring direct profits

That is the other side of the coin. One of the reasons why the miners are setting much higher fees is because of the difficulty to mine bitcoins or to solve blocks at this point of time. If the miner fees are too low then they cannot pay for the electricity bill and also for the personnel and hardwares. Most of all they can no longer feed their family if they will not ask for higher fees. But hopefully some new mining hardwares will come in which is more powerful and more efficient and less cost so that the miner fees could somehow lessen for a bit

This coin should not be there in the first place

And then you wouldn't have to deal with its other, ugly side. Miners are going for profits, even if bitcoins they happen to mine didn't cost them anything, we would still be where we are today (maybe, a little bit later). In other words, greed has no limits. More specifically, the whole system is corrupt conceptually. So you cannot justify miners (as a system) on the assumption that they have to pay the bills and things like that. If we accept the truth, we should find a solution but there is an old wisdom which says that in solving a problem you can't rely on people (miners) which create this problem

[Carlton Banks]

Of course I understand the "value of cumulative hashes in a PoW scheme".  It is a cryptographic securing ("signing") of a specific chain over another one ; the only way to make a "false copy" is to spend more hashes on the false copy.

Note that most cryptographic systems introduce an asymmetry in the difficulty for the "good guy" and the "bad buy".  If I provide a signature of an original document, the making of that signature doesn't cost me a lot of effort, but for the one trying to make a false document with my signature, he has to essentially brute force my public key, which is an infeasible amount of work.  This is why a digital signature is an efficient way of securing a given document.

If I were to "sign my document" with PoW, then I would have to spend JUST AS MUCH effort on making the signature, than the attacker.  In fact, the one with more hash power would win: perfect symmetry between the "good guy" and the "bad guy".  This is the problem with PoW.   The "security" comes from the fact that we assume that the good guys wasted most.

As I said, you don't get it

1. The hashing stops the whole blockchain being recomputed and the ledger being entirely altered. Signatures have nothing to do with that. Zero.

2. The cryptographic signatures (and the corresponding public and private keypairs) are a completely separate form of security. With an immutable blockchain of transactions (which point 1 provides), the keys and the signatures secure the rights to moving BTC funds between one public key and another. If a transaction between to public keys doesn't have a valid form of signature, it gets rejected.


If you're not capable of conflating very, very basic concepts into a total mess of an incomprehensible non-sensical "description", then please be quiet

[1ANHEQIAO]

Threats on both sides are apparent. Many sheep following their flock.

[dinofelis]

As I said, you don't get it

1. The hashing stops the whole blockchain being recomputed and the ledger being entirely altered. Signatures have nothing to do with that. Zero.

The amount of hashing is the clumsy equivalent of a "digital signature" on the "original" so that it cannot get modified, exactly like the digital signature of a document proves that it is the original and not a modified version.  That was the analogy which visibly you didn't understand.

However, the difference between PoW and a digital signature is that with PoW, the "security" is not larger than the effort (waste) put in by the "signer" (the miners that made the first, original chain) and can hence be redone by anyone wishing to put more effort into it ; while with a genuine digital signature, the effort to make the signature is negligible, and the effort needed to fake it, is astronomical.   You essentially have that the cryptographic "proof of authenticity" with PoW is 1:1  (original/modified copy) while with a digital signature it is close to 0 : infinity.  That was my point.

2. The cryptographic signatures (and the corresponding public and private keypairs) are a completely separate form of security. With an immutable blockchain of transactions (which point 1 provides), the keys and the signatures secure the rights to moving BTC funds between one public key and another. If a transaction between to public keys doesn't have a valid form of signature, it gets rejected.

I was not talking about the transaction signatures.  I was talking about the cryptographic function of PoW as a proof that it is the "original block chain".  PoW has the FUNCTION of a cryptographic signature, but a very bad one that is.
(it has other functions too, like resolving consensus by organizing a lottery and burning seigniorage).

How do you know that, amongst 3 different block chains, one is the "true" one ?  You check total PoW, and the largest number indicates you which one is the "true one". 

How do you know that, amongst 3 different digitally signed documents, one is the true one ?  You check the digital signature against my public key: only one will match. 

The certainty of the first (PoW) is only as good as your belief that an attacker will not have wasted MORE than the "good guys".  The certainty of the second (digital signature) is that an attacker couldn't have wasted an ASTRONOMICAL amount of work to brute force the key pair, while the true signer spend a millisecond of his PC effort on it.

You see the difference in security between a digital signature of a document, and PoW "signature" of a block chain ?  And do you see the difference in COST of that security between a digital signature (almost nothing) and PoW (400 million $ per year) ?

That's my point.  PoW as "security" signature of the "right" block chain is horrendously bad.

In PoS, the PoW is replaced by digital signatures by stake holders.   You can simply not fake a PoS chain, and its security is that of a digital signature.  PoS has a theoretical consensus problem (nothing at stake), but its cryptographic security, on the other hand, is total.  There is no way for an *external attacker* to do the PoS chain over.

[Carlton Banks]

Well, it was a terrible explanation. Using a cryptographic concept to metaphorically explain another is bound to confuse anyone reading


Please stop taking up so much space to say nothing, you're not a very good communicator, and it's a waste of everyone's time

[dinofelis]

Well, it was a terrible explanation. Using a cryptographic concept to metaphorically explain another is bound to confuse anyone reading

Not anyone.  Only those that are not very fluid in cryptographic notions.  Saying that "proof of work is a form of digital signature of the right block chain" is taking a perspective that maybe not everyone had immediately seen, and those understanding these notions may 1) have had that idea already by themselves or 2) have a Aha Erlebnis, in which case I opened their view on things.

Once you realize this function of PoW, you realize also that there must be better ways, and you are less bound to repeat "most secure block chain in the world" and other religious bitcoin nonsense.

It could also be that I've been overlooking something, and then maybe someone could make an *intelligent* comment that helps me in my own understanding.  That's why I am here: to test my understanding of crypto systems.

Please stop taking up so much space to say nothing, you're not a very good communicator, and it's a waste of everyone's time

Mileage can vary

I'm not saying nothing at all.  You may understand nothing of what I'm saying.  You're free to read or not to read my comments.  I don't care. If they are not helpful in your understanding, then simply don't read them.  Your answers are not very helpful to me, but they allow me to fathom the level of understanding (or lack thereof) of others although I don't know how representative they are.

[Carlton Banks]

I really mean it, you're a terrible communicator, like verbosity incarnate. Please work on using fewer words, and on presenting your thoughts clearly.

[deisik]

As I said, you don't get it

1. The hashing stops the whole blockchain being recomputed and the ledger being entirely altered. Signatures have nothing to do with that. Zero.

The amount of hashing is the clumsy equivalent of a "digital signature" on the "original" so that it cannot get modified, exactly like the digital signature of a document proves that it is the original and not a modified version.  That was the analogy which visibly you didn't understand.

However, the difference between PoW and a digital signature is that with PoW, the "security" is not larger than the effort (waste) put in by the "signer" (the miners that made the first, original chain) and can hence be redone by anyone wishing to put more effort into it ; while with a genuine digital signature, the effort to make the signature is negligible, and the effort needed to fake it, is astronomical.   You essentially have that the cryptographic "proof of authenticity" with PoW is 1:1  (original/modified copy) while with a digital signature it is close to 0 : infinity.  That was my point

I think your point should be weighed critically

While I certainly agree with your inference that with PoW the effort to undo something essentially equals the effort it took to do it in the first place but it is still more consistent overall. What I mean to say is that there cannot be a loophole or vulnerability to somehow not to do the required amount of work to undo what's been already done. You would still need to spend the same amount of work, no matter what. In this way, PoW is more reliable and bulletproof. On the other hand, with asymmetric encryption you can never be 100% certain that there is not some shortcut due to cryptographic vulnerability, by chance or by design

[dinofelis]

As I said, you don't get it

1. The hashing stops the whole blockchain being recomputed and the ledger being entirely altered. Signatures have nothing to do with that. Zero.

The amount of hashing is the clumsy equivalent of a "digital signature" on the "original" so that it cannot get modified, exactly like the digital signature of a document proves that it is the original and not a modified version.  That was the analogy which visibly you didn't understand.

However, the difference between PoW and a digital signature is that with PoW, the "security" is not larger than the effort (waste) put in by the "signer" (the miners that made the first, original chain) and can hence be redone by anyone wishing to put more effort into it ; while with a genuine digital signature, the effort to make the signature is negligible, and the effort needed to fake it, is astronomical.   You essentially have that the cryptographic "proof of authenticity" with PoW is 1:1  (original/modified copy) while with a digital signature it is close to 0 : infinity.  That was my point

I think your point should be weighed critically

While I certainly agree with your inference that with PoW the effort to undo something essentially equals the effort it took to do it in the first place but it is still more consistent overall. What I mean to say is that there cannot be a loophole or vulnerability to somehow not to do the required amount of work to undo what's been already done. You would still need to spend the same amount of work, no matter what.

Absolutely not.  If you can reverse the hash function (that is, if you succeed in cracking it), you can redo a "proof of work" block chain in half an hour on a PC (well, maybe half a day ).  A cracked hash function is not a proof of work any more.  Note moreover that you do not need to *fully* crack the hash function, but to find simply a way for it to find precedents with leading zeros without having to "brute force" it.  The whole proof of work resides on the assumption that brute-forcing is the only way to find hashes with leading zeros.  

In this way, PoW is more reliable and bulletproof. On the other hand, with asymmetric encryption you can never be 100% certain that there is not some shortcut due to cryptographic vulnerability, by chance or by design

Indeed, but that's just as well the case for a hash function.  And hell, if reversing a digital asymetric key pair is to be envisioned, then the *ownership* of coins is put severely to a test.  (ok, I agree that the hash protection of the public key until you spend the outcome, is a smart protection of that, but in fact, it just MODIFIES the asymetric key pair, it doesn't undo the fact that there is a key pair).