my wallets were stolen just now, can any one help me?

[rumbitla]

Looks like your pc is compromised. Scan it .

Rather erase it and reinstall OS and software.
Scanning is useless for sophisticated malware.

[1714895216]

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[1714895216]

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[1714895216]

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[1714895216]

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[1714895216]

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[westkybitcoins]

So... can we all finally stop recommending blockchain.info as the easiest wallet?

It became obvious that problems were inevitable as soon as StrongCoin revealed the ease with which they redirected someone else's transactions. The model is compromised.

There's no way around it. All users, even new ones, need to keep the bulk of their bitcoins in cold storage. That means ON SOMETHING PHYSICAL AND INERT. Yes. Physical and inert, where it takes physical movement beyond a few keypresses to spend it. Paper. A text file burned to CD through a new OS. Whatever.

The rest would do well to be contained within a dedicated client app, ideally on a dedicated device. With the number of high-quality clients available today, there is little reason now to do your bitcoin finances through your browser. If you need to handle large amounts of bitcoins away from home, then you should probably spend the money for a laptop or a smartphone.

----------

To the OP: I hate to say it, but your coins are probably beyond hope. But at least the problem might be identified and prevented from recurring.

With that in mind, several more (admittedly basic) questions:

• What is your home computer's OS? If it's Windows or Mac OS, is it a bootleg copy?
• Do you have a bitcoin client on your home computer? Are there bitcoins in its wallet that have remained untouched?
• Have you accessed your wallet on computers other than your home computer?
• How many characters was your password? Was it in English? If it was in English, was the password all letters?
• Have you imported your keys from another wallet? Have you exported the keys to other wallets?
• Do any of the addresses in your wallet come from "brainwallets" (where a passphrase of some sort was used to create the address?)
• Had you tried to send 221.84 BTC to a different address, only to find that the bitcoins went elsewhere?

Every bit of information helps.

I actually consider Trezors about equal to keeping coins offline. That's why I'm so anxious for them. Most people won't bother with the complexity of learning how to keep and manage coins in cold storage. Not only do you have to learn how to do it, but then learn how to spend those coins as well as keep the physical storage medium safe. Trezor allows convenient access to spending coins while keeping them just as safe as cold storage. The task for users is reduced down to learning to use it and managing their backup seed.

For the cost of a (plastic) Trezor, one can purchase a cheap Android smartphone, install cyanogenmod if desired, then install Mycelium. While this arrangement has flaws compared to a Trezor, it also has advantages, and it's certainly good enough to produce paper wallets, or to keep turned off as a cold storage medium for modest funds. Anyone who has a lot of bitcoins should currently be using a paper or other cold-storage wallet, but if that's too cumbersome, at least they can go the dedicated-smartphone route rather than keep their bitcoins on a web wallet while waiting for Trezor.

[millsdmb]

So... can we all finally stop recommending blockchain.info as the easiest wallet?

It became obvious that problems were inevitable as soon as StrongCoin revealed the ease with which they redirected someone else's transactions. The model is compromised.

There's no way around it. All users, even new ones, need to keep the bulk of their bitcoins in cold storage. That means ON SOMETHING PHYSICAL AND INERT. Yes. Physical and inert, where it takes physical movement beyond a few keypresses to spend it. Paper. A text file burned to CD through a new OS. Whatever.

The rest would do well to be contained within a dedicated client app, ideally on a dedicated device. With the number of high-quality clients available today, there is little reason now to do your bitcoin finances through your browser. If you need to handle large amounts of bitcoins away from home, then you should probably spend the money for a laptop or a smartphone.

----------

To the OP: I hate to say it, but your coins are probably beyond hope. But at least the problem might be identified and prevented from recurring.

With that in mind, several more (admittedly basic) questions:

• What is your home computer's OS? If it's Windows or Mac OS, is it a bootleg copy?
• Do you have a bitcoin client on your home computer? Are there bitcoins in its wallet that have remained untouched?
• Have you accessed your wallet on computers other than your home computer?
• How many characters was your password? Was it in English? If it was in English, was the password all letters?
• Have you imported your keys from another wallet? Have you exported the keys to other wallets?
• Do any of the addresses in your wallet come from "brainwallets" (where a passphrase of some sort was used to create the address?)
• Had you tried to send 221.84 BTC to a different address, only to find that the bitcoins went elsewhere?

Every bit of information helps.

I actually consider Trezors about equal to keeping coins offline. That's why I'm so anxious for them. Most people won't bother with the complexity of learning how to keep and manage coins in cold storage. Not only do you have to learn how to do it, but then learn how to spend those coins as well as keep the physical storage medium safe. Trezor allows convenient access to spending coins while keeping them just as safe as cold storage. The task for users is reduced down to learning to use it and managing their backup seed.

For the cost of a (plastic) Trezor, one can purchase a cheap Android smartphone, install cyanogenmod if desired, then install Mycelium. While this arrangement has flaws compared to a Trezor, it also has advantages, and it's certainly good enough to produce paper wallets, or to keep turned off as a cold storage medium for modest funds. Anyone who has a lot of bitcoins should currently be using a paper or other cold-storage wallet, but if that's too cumbersome, at least they can go the dedicated-smartphone route rather than keep their bitcoins on a web wallet while waiting for Trezor.

Thinking about https://www.casascius.com/ myself.

[millsdmb]

It would also be very helpful of the dice folks to provide some info in your assistance, given that it seems just about everywhere Bitcoin is valued as currency and a theft has occurred.

Not sure what the odds are tho.

[SatoshiDICE_Kat]

It would also be very helpful of the dice folks to provide some info in your assistance, given that it seems just about everywhere Bitcoin is valued as currency and a theft has occurred.

Not sure what the odds are tho.

Hi all - heartbroken to see this thread, and I do also see the offending address has played a lot on SD today.  Forwarding this on to our team to see what some logical steps might be; really appreciate you tipping me off in the thread that SD is involved.  By the way, I also run the Support email (support@satoshidice.com) - so anytime you know of any suspicious activity, alert me, I'm more than happy to help.  Want to keep the community safe and supported; that's first and foremost.

Thanks to all of you helping the victim track this down.

Kat at SatoshiDICE

[acoindr]

For the cost of a (plastic) Trezor, one can purchase a cheap Android smartphone, install cyanogenmod if desired, then install Mycelium. While this arrangement has flaws compared to a Trezor, it also has advantages, and it's certainly good enough to produce paper wallets, or to keep turned off as a cold storage medium for modest funds. Anyone who has a lot of bitcoins should currently be using a paper or other cold-storage wallet, but if that's too cumbersome, at least they can go the dedicated-smartphone route rather than keep their bitcoins on a web wallet while waiting for Trezor.

No, I don't like that idea. The problem is Android is still an operating system and therefore vulnerable to malware. It also wasn't built with Bitcoin in mind. You tell people it's safe for them to use as cold storage for 50K then the recent Android bug with random number generation can wipe them out. The Trezor is designed for security and Bitcoin specifically so it's far more unlikely to have such a glaring software flaw.

If people are storing substantial coins then they shouldn't mind spending either the time or money necessary to ensure their coins are safe. For about the same cost they can buy a simple dedicated laptop to use with Armory and be assured their coins are safe, including easy paper wallet backups.

Blockchain.info should be used as a convenient spending wallet, not storage wallet.

[Realpra]

I believe you are also incorrect here, DeathAndTaxes. The signature part actually consists out of two numbers: r which is a random number, and s, which is actual signature. Normally, if you have two transactions, you have:

Your post is mostly correct in that by trial and error you can find the private key if transactions exist having used the same random number "k".

However it is incorrect to say "... the signature consists of the random number r ...", the number "r" is not random but a result of k*G. This k IS random and may not be revealed.


Also on topic:
BitAddress.org can be downloaded to an offline USB key with Ubuntu AND you can change the private key MANUALLY under the wallet details tab.

This means: No RNG attack whether accidental or malicious, no password cracking, no trojans, no corrupted .DAT files and so on.

(Seriously though this is messed up, my grandmother can't take care of this level of security...)

[btcven]

Don't use Windows...

[runam0k]

Don't use Windows...

Which is absurd. What chance does bitcoin have if people can't use it on their home PC for fear of theft?

Online wallets and clients need 2FA and maybe online banking style "enter letters 3, 5 and 7 from your password" to help improve security.

For anyone moving coins around - buying and selling, day trading, etc - paper wallets or offline storage really isn't practical.

[aquarius]

the only web wallet I would consider using as of today is inputs.io

[Andreas Schildbach]

The problem is Android is still an operating system and therefore vulnerable to malware. It also wasn't built with Bitcoin in mind. You tell people it's safe for them to use as cold storage for 50K then the recent Android bug with random number generation can wipe them out. The Trezor is designed for security and Bitcoin specifically so it's far more unlikely to have such a glaring software flaw.

AFAIK the Trezor has got no RNG at all. It is seeded with randomness by the host that it is connected to.

[Nubarius]

It seems that the web-based blockchain.info wallet was also affected by yet another problem with random number generation. This is likely to be what's happened to the OP. User piuk, who runs the site, has said in the technical thread that the problem has been fixed and that affected people will be refunded in full. See: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277595.msg2970668#msg2970668

[westkybitcoins]

It seems that the web-based blockchain.info wallet was also affected by yet another problem with random number generation. This is likely to be what's happened to the OP. User piuk, who runs the site, has said in the technical thread that the problem has been fixed and that affected people will be refunded in full. See: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277595.msg2970668#msg2970668

Good catch.

Still... in the particular case of what happened to the OP, it wouldn't explain why the thief would leave change (with both addresses.)

I'm betting that something similar to the StrongCoin shuffle occurred: the thief didn't actually have access to the keys, but rather had the ability to manipulate the transaction before signing.

[Rampion]

Funny vanity address to which the funds where sent, quite a lot of stolen money in very few days: 1HackerRpwYH7F6uGu8422dScNxaHAtWYz (https://blockchain.info/address/1HackerRpwYH7F6uGu8422dScNxaHAtWYz)

[BurtW]

I believe you are also incorrect here, DeathAndTaxes. The signature part actually consists out of two numbers: r which is a random number, and s, which is actual signature. Normally, if you have two transactions, you have:

Your post is mostly correct in that by trial and error you can find the private key if transactions exist having used the same random number "k".

However it is incorrect to say "... the signature consists of the random number r ...", the number "r" is not random but a result of k*G. This k IS random and may not be revealed.

Your post is mostly correct except there is no "trial and error" about it.  If the same random value is used in the creation of two different signatures then the private key can be directly and immediately calculated from the information publicly available in the block chain.

See my post here for the technical details:  

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=271486.msg2910339#msg2910339

To say that r is "not a random number" because it is derived from a random number is silly.  The mod of the x coordinate of k*G of a random number k is a random number.

BTW if anyone wants to calculate the private key the formula is:  private key = (z₁*s₂ - z₂*s₁)/(r*(s₁-s₂))

where r is the repeated random number.  Well, technically, the identical mod of the x coordinate of k*G of the repeated random number k.

[BurtW]

GOOD NEWS (maybe).  If it can be shown that you lost your BTC due to a bug in the blockchain.info wallet it looks like you may get your BTC back from the owner of blockchain.info (nice guy).  See:  

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277595.0

Specifically this post:

Jesse James has informed me of a problem with the rng used by blockchain.info javascript clients being poorly seeded when initialised in a background webworker task. In some browsers this could lead to duplicate R values being used when signing transactions (Firefox is likely to be particularly vulnerable). This issue effects the transaction signing code only, not the generation of private keys.

Patches have now been deployed, Please ensure you upgrade to the latest version of your Blockchain.info client.

Chrome extension - v2.85
Fixefox extension - v1.97
Mac client - v0.11

Users of the web interface should clear their browsers cache before next login.

Only a handful of addresses are known to be affected thus far. Likely if you have been affected by this problem your coins will have been taken already. All affected users will be refunded in full, please PM me or email help@blockchain.info.

[Valle]

It feels like android phones have the most secure random number generator even with the crippled 64 bits of entropy, compared to this case.

[faiza1990]

 I sure hope we can get to the bottom of this

[btcven]

Don't use Windows...

Which is absurd. What chance does bitcoin have if people can't use it on their home PC for fear of theft?

Online wallets and clients need 2FA and maybe online banking style "enter letters 3, 5 and 7 from your password" to help improve security.

For anyone moving coins around - buying and selling, day trading, etc - paper wallets or offline storage really isn't practical.

Yeah, there are a lot of idiots running the TOR project who recommend to stay away from Windows too http://threatpost.com/tor-urges-users-to-leave-windows

[BurtW]

I sure hope we can get to the bottom of this

I think they did.  See the link in post #57 above.