Petition to remove Wasabi from recommendations of bitcoin.org

[dkbit98]

Github issue created: https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4097.  Voting with thumbs up from your github account would help.

It's interesting to see that discussion continues even on github with one of wasabi contributors, propagandist, and probably team member.
However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.
Maybe someone should fork or create alternative for bitcoin.org website, and remove wasabi wallet.
I liked wasabi v1 but this version is awful and it has very bad interface.

[Pmalek]

It's interesting to see that discussion continues even on github with one of wasabi contributors, propagandist, and probably team member.

Yeah, Kruwed on GitHub is surely the Kruw we have learned to love here on Bitcointalk.

However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

Maybe someone should fork or create alternative for bitcoin.org website, and remove wasabi wallet.

We should then create a petition to have everyone abandon bitcoin.org and move over to the new and forked website.

[Kruw]

However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

[Medusah]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

First of all they should be warned that Wasabi automatically uses user's coins to do coinjoins and second, they should warn the users that they might have their coinjoin rejected as the default coordinator now requests from a chain analysis company to approve coins if they are "clean" and disapprove if they are "naughty".  It also pays that company using coinjoin fees, which indirectly helps in the development of public surveillance.

Let's see what your next post will be.  It will probably have to do with running a separate coordinator as Wasabi is 100% decentralized. 

[Kruw]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

First of all they should be warned that Wasabi automatically uses user's coins to do coinjoins and second, they should warn the users that they might have their coinjoin rejected

Is the warning that users funds will be coinjoined automatically or is the warning that users funds will not be coinjoined automatically?  You seem to be confused since these warnings are direct contradictions of each other.

Let's see what your next post will be.  It will probably have to do with running a separate coordinator as Wasabi is 100% decentralized.  

Since you already know you can run a Wasabi coinjoin coordinator and there's nothing zkSNACKs can do to stop you since they made their code open source, then why did you make this petition?  Why aren't you just running your own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator instead?

[pooya87]

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

The problem with these ratings and categories is that they are not well designed and the criteria in some cases doesn't make any sense. For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.
And they just give it "acceptable" rating because of things like that (+rotating address and using TOR)!
That is not enough to determine whether a light wallet is good for privacy or not.

[Kruw]

For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.

You are confused, Wasabi connects to P2P nodes when it downloads blocks, and it does not disclose information when doing so.

[pooya87]

For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.

You are confused, Wasabi connects to P2P nodes when it downloads blocks, and it does not disclose information when doing so.

That has nothing to do with what I said. Wasabi after connecting to P2P nodes has a client-sever relations with those nodes not a peer to peer relation. In other words Wasabi is on a different and lower level as the full nodes it connects to.

[Pmalek]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?
Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

Because each UTXO will be checked by blockchain analysis for dirtiness according to rules and standards no one knows about and which they make up as they go. Because selective privacy isn't privacy. And because spying and investigating on my UTXOs to be allowed to coinjoin is the equivalent of having me strip naked and sticking a finger you know where to see if I am hiding anything illegal every time I want to enter the mall. 

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

There is no threat to someone losing their coins, but there is a threat to being surveilled for using a tool that was supposed to increase ones privacy. You can stick your we are open-source and thus don't do anything unethical propaganda where the sun doesn't shine. 

[Medusah]

Is the warning that users funds will be coinjoined automatically or is the warning that users funds will not be coinjoined automatically?  You seem to be confused since these warnings are direct contradictions of each other.

No I am not.  You are just playing it dumb.  The user must be warned that they might have their coins disapproved for coinjoining, but if they do have their coins approved by the chain analysis company, the user must be warned that the coordinator will automatically use their coins to coinjoin.  These are just things the user must be aware of.  Do you believe that Wasabi should make use of the user's coins without their knowledge?

Since you already know you can run a Wasabi coinjoin coordinator and there's nothing zkSNACKs can do to stop you since they made their code open source, then why did you make this petition?  Why aren't you just running your own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator instead?

I am not going to argue why the user will not run their own coordinator unless they are a Wasabi shill (most of the times).  That will not be a constructive discussion to have with you.  I already know that you can do that, you have repeated it like a zillion times.  But the user has to know what the default coordinator is doing with their money.

[Kruw]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?
Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

Because each UTXO will be checked by blockchain analysis for dirtiness according to rules and standards no one knows about and which they make up as they go.

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

There is no threat to someone losing their coins, but there is a threat to being surveilled for using a tool that was supposed to increase ones privacy.

Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

The user must be warned that they might have their coins disapproved for coinjoining

Why must they be warned?  Nothing happens to users whose coins are disapproved for coinjoining.

I am not going to argue why the user will not run their own coordinator

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

[Medusah]

Nothing happens

That is what they should know it will happen.  Nothing.

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

Will the user be warned about the default coordinator?  Until they are, thread remains unlocked.

[Kruw]

Nothing happens

That is what they should know it will happen.  Nothing.

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

Will the user be warned about the default coordinator?  Until they are, thread remains unlocked.

I don't mean to repeat myself, but if nothing happens, why is a warning necessary?  A warning implies there is some risk incurred if it is ignored, but there is no such risk posed to users of the software.

[Pmalek]

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.
...
Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

What kind of arguments are that? Those other wallets don't call themselves privacy wallets and promise "privacy by default" like Wasabi wallet does. When I use my Electrum wallet, I don't expect any gains in privacy, but that shouldn't be the case with Wasabi. You used to have privacy in mind in the past, but by cooperating with chain analysis, you are effectively handing over your users as canon fodder and lab rats to be experimented on.

And you obviously don't mind it because the same or similar things happen elsewhere. If they do, then you should be better than them. You should try to make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about your users, not strike up a partnership with them voluntarily.

[Kruw]

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.
...
Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

What kind of arguments are that? Those other wallets don't call themselves privacy wallets and promise "privacy by default" like Wasabi wallet does. When I use my Electrum wallet, I don't expect any gains in privacy, but that shouldn't be the case with Wasabi.

You are correct that isn't the case with Wasabi:  Since Wasabi is a "privacy by default" wallet, it protects your xpub address with compact block filters and protects your IP address with Tor automatically.  By default, Electrum wallet links your wallet addresses together with your IP address and sends that to public servers.

You used to have privacy in mind in the past, but by cooperating with chain analysis, you are effectively handing over your users as canon fodder and lab rats to be experimented on.

You are wrong.  No cooperation with chain analysis companies is possible because the Wasabi client never reveals any user information to third parties thanks to its use of Tor and compact block filters.

And you obviously don't mind it because the same or similar things happen elsewhere. If they do, then you should be better than them. You should try to make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about your users, not strike up a partnership with them voluntarily.

You are correct, Wasabi does make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about its users since it masks your IP address with Tor and masks your xpub address with compact block filters.

[Pmalek]

<Snip>

Then explain to me the logic behind Wasabi's cooperation with a blockchain analysis firm? A voluntary cooperation according to what Wasabi says. No one twisted their arm and forced them into it. In every partnership or cooperation, both parties profit and get something positive out of that deal. As someone obviously close to Wasabi, what is the company gaining from that partnership?

Masked with TOR or not, the blockchain analysis company gains data they can analyze from people who want privacy. Governments don't want you to be private, independent, or free, so the role of blockchain analysis is clear here. What is Wasabi's role exactly?     

[Kruw]

<Snip>

Then explain to me the logic behind Wasabi's cooperation with a blockchain analysis firm? A voluntary cooperation according to what Wasabi says. No one twisted their arm and forced them into it. In every partnership or cooperation, both parties profit and get something positive out of that deal. As someone obviously close to Wasabi, what is the company gaining from that partnership?

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

If you want to know what sort of cooperation and partnerships zkSNACKs is involved with, here's a short list:

- $2,500 monthly donation to the Tor project (https://zksnacks.com/)
- 1 BTC donation to the Human Rights Foundation Bitcoin Development Fund (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/06/25/summer-2020-is-funding-season-for-open-source-bitcoin-development/)
- .86 BTC donation (along with Bull Bitcoin) to Bitcoin Knots developer Luke Dashjr (https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/bitcoin-knots-donation/)
- 1.11 BTC grant for privacy research on the Lightning Network (https://lightningprivacy.com)
- 3.4 million sats (so far) to the best bruteforcer in the community (https://www.huntingsats.com/)
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin educational podcasts such as What Bitcoin Did, Bitcoin Takeover, and What Is Money?
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin events such as BTCPrague, Bitcoin Amsterdam, Baltic Honeybadger (and others I'm sure I'm missing)

Masked with TOR or not, the blockchain analysis company gains data they can analyze from people who want privacy. Governments don't want you to be private, independent, or free, so the role of blockchain analysis is clear here. What is Wasabi's role exactly?    

I already told you:  Blockchain analysis companies cannot gain any data from Wasabi users because your IP address and xpub address are protected by the power of cryptography.  You can verify this for yourself since Wasabi Wallet is completely open source, just like Bitcoin itself.

[Pmalek]

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

Wasabi or zkSNACKs aren't private customers, though. They are businesses using the services of other business entities (blockchain analysis) whose version of the truth and estimation affects their own operations. In other words, you accept the decision of the blockchain analysis company's views regarding the cleanliness of my UTXOs. My participation in your coinjoins depends on the truth the blockchain analysis firm serves to you. I call that a partnership and cooperation. You are free to use any other terms you like.

How do you know stolen coins are getting rejected? You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly?
According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?
Who made that list and in whose name? What entity or government agency is responsible to maintain it, make changes, and decide what's good and what's bad?
Who do I get in touch with if my UTXOs were rejected for reasons unknown to me?

Being in possession of stolen money or other means of payments doesn't necessarily make the owner a thief. You do understand that money and crypto circulate. As someone involved in the crypto business, you should know that those rules your blockchain partners present to you can't be applied to cash and fiat, otherwise a lot of it would have to be confiscated and taken out of circulation because many bills had contact or were used in illegal actions at one point in their past.    

[Wind_FURY]

Because these government-favored CoinJoins are a threat to Bitcoin's fungibility, and therefore might make UTXOs that went through them "more valuable", what the user could do before using Wasabi's coordinator is like what Peter Todd said in the video. Use layers.

If you have "low value", "tainted" UTXOs from the Dark Markets, you could use JoinMarket, and use those UTXOs in Lightning, then send them to yourself. Convert them to onchain Bitcoin then use Wasabi CoinJoin. You now have "government-friendly" UTXOs ready for cold storage. Thanks Wasabi!

[BlackHatCoiner]

what the user could do before using Wasabi's coordinator is like what Peter Todd said in the video. Use layers.

Here's another idea if we're about to utilize layers: exchange BTC for XMR and XMR for BTC a little while later. Leaves no traces, much better than Wasabi + lightning altogether. You could then coinjoin the bitcoin, just to minimize the blockchain connection with the previous owner.

If you have "low value", "tainted" UTXOs from the Dark Markets, you could use JoinMarket, and use those UTXOs in Lightning, then send them to yourself. Convert them to onchain Bitcoin then use Wasabi CoinJoin. You now have "government-friendly" UTXOs ready for cold storage. Thanks Wasabi!

See, that's the problem. You think Wasabi implemented blacklisting and now their coinjoined coins are government friendly. We have absolutely no clue with what factors their chain analysis works. We only know that chain analysis is evidently not scientific; what Coinfirm deems as "clean" coins does not necessarily imply the same for other firms.