Petition to remove Wasabi from recommendations of bitcoin.org

[Medusah]

Wasabi team has announced the default coordinator will implement blacklisting in coinjoin^[1], and will refuse to let some coins from being mixed, which completely goes against the fungibility they argue they enhance^[2] and to the privacy being preserved at all times as they represent^[3].  Due to this update, I find it very hypocritical of them to believe they are the ultimate solution to Bitcoin's privacy issues, while partnering with people who go against the fundamentals of privacy and fungibility in the first place. 

Wasabi is recommended in bitcoin.org^[4], the place where every beginner learns the first steps to start their Bitcoin journey.  I think that, in such crucial place, presenting Wasabi as privacy-focused and completely transparent project is wrong and should be not be recommended.

In this topic, I would like to gather petitions so we can send an email to Cobra (the bitcoin.org administrator) and explain our reasoning.

[1] https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update/
[2], [3] https://zksnacks.com/
[4] https://bitcoin.org/en/wallets/desktop/linux/wasabi/?step=5&platform=linux

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[Z-tight]

Bitcoin.org is a great place for people to get good information about BTC wallets, but it isn't BTC's "official" website. Because BTC is decentralized, there is no official website or place of information where you can be 100% certain that the info you get is directly from the BTC network, it's not possible because there is no central authority.

The admin of bitcoin.org is surely aware of Wasabi's latest mess and censorship, and if they decide to make a change it will be up to them, there's no need to email them in my honest opinion. People should do extra research about the wallet they want to use, it does not matter where they got the recommendation from, they should read up about the wallet, how they operate and their latest implementations before using it.

[DaveF]

Bitcoin.org is a great place for people to get good information about BTC, but it isn't BTC's "official" website, because BTC is decentralized, there is no official website or place of information where you can be 100% certain that the info you get is directly from the BTC network, it's not possible because there is no central authority.

The admin of bitcoin.org is surely aware of Wasabi's latest mess and censorship, and if they decide to make a change it will be up to them, there's no need to email them in my honest opinion. People should do extra research about the wallet they want to use, it does not matter where they got the recommendation from, they should read up about the wallet, how they operate and their latest implementations before using it.

Actually, it's they may or may not reading here and Reddit and twitter where it is being discussed. Could be 1000 reasons why we hear know about what they are doing but the bi7coin.org web people do not.

But, there is no reason for them not to list the wallet. It's no more or less of a choice for someone to use it without getting all the details as it is for them to use any other particular wallet.

If you're not using the coin joins you would never even know or care. As a wallet, it works. And it's probably secure. Anything beyond that it's really not their concern because they are telling you about what wallets are available not necessarily if the features the wallet is talking about are done well for the user. So long as they are not stealing your money like others wallets I have no issue with it staying there. With that being said, I would *never* ever use it.

-Dave

[mk4]

*snip*

Pretty much — the user should just be responsible enough to do at least a little bit of digging before using a certain wallet service/feature. Because if we'd like to delist every wallet that has some controversy, we'd probably run out of wallet to list besides Bitcoin Core.

[pooya87]

In this topic, I would like to gather petitions so we can send an email to Cobra (the bitcoin.org administrator) and explain our reasoning.

Bitcoin.org is also open source and the way to suggest changes is like any other open source software, it is by opening a new issue on their github page that can be found here:
https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/new/choose

Simply explain why it should be removed in that issue and try to get the discussion rolling there. You can also include a link to this topic.

If you're not using the coin joins you would never even know or care. As a wallet, it works.

I disagree because Wasabi is not a wallet, it is a privacy oriented wallet and the main purpose that it serves (which is also what it is known for and used for) is its CoinJoin feature. A privacy oriented wallet that is cooperating with anti-privacy organizations can not be trusted.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Completely agree it should be removed, or at the very least have its privacy rating downgraded from "Good" to "Caution". Under the Wasabi page (https://bitcoin.org/en/wallets/desktop/linux/wasabi/?step=5&platform=linux) it currently says "Prevents spying on your payments" which is just categorically not true - they pay Coinfirm to actively spy on your payments.

If you're not using the coin joins you would never even know or care.

Maybe worth pointing out that Wasabi now apparently automatically starts coinjoining everything, charging you a fee to be spied on, whether you want it to or not: https://nitter.net/DiracDel/status/1672294717193859074

[Medusah]

Because BTC is decentralized, there is no official website or place of information where you can be 100% certain that the info you get is directly from the BTC network, it's not possible because there is no central authority.

I never said there is an official website for Bitcoin.  I only said bitcoin.org is the place where most beginners learn what is Bitcoin and how to start using it.

The admin of bitcoin.org is surely aware of Wasabi's latest mess and censorship, and if they decide to make a change it will be up to them, there's no need to email them in my honest opinion.

I think they need to read some feedback from the Bitcoin community.  They may also have not done the same research as some users in this forum, me included.

But, there is no reason for them not to list the wallet.

There are reasons.

• Wasabi team have been caught lying frequently, which makes them not trustworthy.  I can point you to some examples if you want.
• They advertise themselves as the best solution to Bitcoin privacy issues, and simultaneously partner with a mass surveillance company, which is hypocritical for obvious reasons.
• They have been caught doxxing their competitors (Samurai team).
• Their software has also been caught to reusing addresses, which is unforgivable for a project that aims to preserve privacy.

Bitcoin.org is also open source and the way to suggest changes is like any other open source software, it is by opening a new issue on their github page that can be found here:
https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/new/choose

Thank you.  I will create an issue and/or pull a request.

Maybe worth pointing out that Wasabi now apparently automatically starts coinjoining everything, charging you a fee to be spied on, whether you want it to or not: https://nitter.net/DiracDel/status/1672294717193859074

Lol:

If people fail to use Bitcoin privately by default we have inadvertently created the most extensive mass surveillance system in history.

So, if people fail to use Wasabi which funds the operation of mass surveillance and which can prevent some people from coinjoining (as the top fungibility protocols do), we will have created the most extensive mass surveillance system in history.  

[ABCbits]

Bitcoin.org doesn't have very strict criteria[1], so i don't expect Wasabi would be removed anytime soon. Although i strongly agree the privacy section should be downgraded from "Good".

If you're not using the coin joins you would never even know or care.

Maybe worth pointing out that Wasabi now apparently automatically starts coinjoining everything, charging you a fee to be spied on, whether you want it to or not: https://nitter.net/DiracDel/status/1672294717193859074

In addition, it would make user's coin would be blacklisted on some centralized service. Last time i tried Wasabi Wallet 2, there's no such warning.

[1] https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/bitcoin.org/blob/master/docs/managing-wallets.md

[Yamane_Keto]

Many people may not like my opinion and they may disagree with me, but if I look at the Wasabi wallet, the conversation is about the privacy and not the security. There were no reports or complaints about hacking or seed bugs, and therefore there is no need to remove it.
the WalletScrutiny report, which proved that most of the existing wallets are closed source, have weak programming, or have currency security problems.

Code:

9 Reproducible 22 Build Error! 209 No Source! 652 Custodial! 75 No send/receive!

Those who visit bitcoin.org are newbies who will not be able to properly protect their privacy.

I know the approach is not true, but even electrum is not considered to be privacy wallet.

Therefore, I am against removing them, although they are very bad.

The best thing is to put a warning about privacy.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Those who visit bitcoin.org are newbies who will not be able to properly protect their privacy.

All the more reason not to recommend wallets which actively spy on their users, since newbies won't have the requisite knowledge to evaluate this information or act accordingly by choosing a different wallet.

Once your privacy is lost, it is extremely hard to recover it. There are plenty of users I've spoken to over the years who wished they knew more about privacy when they first started out, as they now find themselves in situations where they cannot get back that which was lost. By recommending newbies' first wallet to be one which actively funds blockchain analysis to spy on their UTXOs, you set them down a path they may never be able to recover from.

[pooya87]

I know the approach is not true, but even electrum is not considered to be privacy wallet.

To be fair Electrum was never introduced as a "privacy wallet" whereas Wasabi was and still is.
Electrum is always introduced as SPV client and it is a well known fact that SPV clients are weak when it comes to privacy.

We may argue that removing it is not the best approach but the page should definitely change the privacy from "Good" to "Caution" with a warning that instead of saying "Improved privacy" should say "it cooperates with chain-analysis aka anti-privacy agencies".

[Yamane_Keto]

All the more reason not to recommend wallets which actively spy on their users, since newbies won't have the requisite knowledge to evaluate this information or act accordingly by choosing a different wallet.

After seeing some who trust closed source wallets, poorly programmed that they don't know what caused users to lose their money, and here I mean A *Non-Custodial wallet*, Atomic Wallet, thinking about privacy is a luxury.

I agree it should make changes but removing them with limited open source options doesn't sound like a good thing.

We may argue that removing it is not the best approach but the page should definitely change the privacy from "Good" to "Caution" with a warning that instead of saying "Improved privacy" should say "it cooperates with chain-analysis aka anti-privacy agencies".

I totally agree.

[MusaMohamed]

To be fair Electrum was never introduced as a "privacy wallet" whereas Wasabi was and still is.

Wasabi wallet is like Brave browser.

The best privacy online is one of many phrases about privacy at the landing page of Brave.com.

They break their own words by KYC if users want to claim BRAVE token rewards.
What is "KYC" and how does it fit into Brave Rewards?

[20kevin20]

I agree it should be delisted or kept with a very visible warning about their cooperation with surveillance firms.

I also get why some of you wouldn’t censor them for what they’ve done. It’s true, they should still be out there for people who desire paying for inexistent privacy, but their constant lying and manipulation leads me to believe it’s better off without them than with them because a lot of users will be fooled otherwise.

You ask them whether they’re really the solution to privacy and they give you links to read text an average Joe wouldn’t even comprehend. Then the average Joe looks at you, anonymous account arguing with them, looks at Wasabi providing false proof (and I’m calling it false because you ask them about apples and they tell you about trees). In the end, it’s not that likely the average Joe gives up on them because Wasabi continues to fight for their case although they know they’re in the wrong.

Hence, I tend to believe they should either be delisted until they spread truth instead of manipulate and deceive, or they should be kept there with a big red flag for new users.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I'll right as well vote for removing it. The developers / contributors are frequently found lying, indeed. We've already talked a lot in a topic dedicated for Wasabi, and we're like 12 pages now arguing on semantics. The conclusion is that Wasabi is not pro-fungibility, nor pro-privacy organization / company.

Many people may not like my opinion and they may disagree with me, but if I look at the Wasabi wallet, the conversation is about the privacy and not the security. There were no reports or complaints about hacking or seed bugs, and therefore there is no need to remove it.

It's a wallet which presents itself as the solution to the privacy problems, while funding mass surveillance at the same time. Fish stinks from the head.

[20kevin20]

The conclusion is that Wasabi is not pro-fungibility, nor pro-privacy organization / company.

And the issue isn’t even that but the way they’re deceitfully trying to portray what Wasabi is. So many centralized exchanges and nobody gives a damn, we have a free choice, but situations like Freewallet and Wasabi need to be solved differently because they’re different in a very negative way to their customers, to newbies trying to learn and even to Bitcoin itself.

You can’t solve fungibility and privacy by working with surveillance. I’ll say this again, it’s an Orwellian style of doing business. We’re giving you privacy but first we need to check you out and put a tag on you is their way of conducting business. Disappointing, deceiving and last but not least, utterly immoral.

[dkbit98]

So you are fine with Bitcoin.org having other outdated wallets like Armory and Bither, or BitPay that is openly restricting usage to some regions and demand kyc for their payment processor, but you just want to remove Wasabi wallet?
I am fine with people not liking Wasabi (I dont like their new interface) and having issues with their coinjoin implementation, but this is still open source wallet and it works fine without that OPTIONAL coinjoin feature.
If you want to waste your time you can go for it and write email to Cobra that won't have any result whatsoever.
Much better suggestion for bitcoin.org is to add open source hardware wallets.

Many people may not like my opinion and they may disagree with me, but if I look at the Wasabi wallet, the conversation is about the privacy and not the security. There were no reports or complaints about hacking or seed bugs, and therefore there is no need to remove it.
the WalletScrutiny report, which proved that most of the existing wallets are closed source, have weak programming, or have currency security problems.

Yeah but some people like hating wasabi, and I think they are hoping someone will hack wasabi 
I agree that saying that something is open source is not enough for wallet to be good, and websites like Walletscrutiny and Bitcoinbinary are very good addition.

[Zoomic]

*snip*

Pretty much — the user should just be responsible enough to do at least a little bit of digging before using a certain wallet service/feature. Because if we'd like to delist every wallet that has some controversy, we'd probably run out of wallet to list besides Bitcoin Core.

Newbies seem to first be sure the reputation of where they are getting their information and once they discover that their source of information is reliable, they will believe whatever is emanating from there.
If there are other things wallets should compromise, it shouldn't be privacy.

[NotATether]

There's no reason to send an email about it, the entire site is hosted on Github https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org so just create an issue there instead.

Although I'm not too sure whether Cobra will reason with that considering that Bitcoin Core releases on bitcoin.org are terribly out of date.

A lot of websites link to Bitcoin.org whenever they want to promote Bitcoin, so whatever is on the website should be in our (the community's) interests.

[Lucius]

~snip~
A privacy oriented wallet that is cooperating with anti-privacy organizations can not be trusted.

It's unbelievable to me that we have to construct sentences like this because some people try to combine things that just can't go with each other by any logic. I'm just wondering what kind of new nonsense will appear tomorrow or the day after, because there are more and more people we can't trust, even though they keep trying to convince us that there's nothing controversial about it.


As for the removal, I think it might be too harsh, because in that case someone might say that we should remove Ledger, which in my opinion is a much bigger problem, and is also one of the recommendations. I agree with some that a warning might be more appropriate.

[Medusah]

So you are fine with Bitcoin.org having other outdated wallets like Armory and Bither, or BitPay that is openly restricting usage to some regions and demand kyc for their payment processor, but you just want to remove Wasabi wallet?

I am not into Armory and Bither, but I do not see any kind of misinformation in those two.  Armory is simply another full node implementation, just as Bitcoin Core and Bitcoin knots.  Bither is cautiously recommended.  As for BitPay, I agree that it is neither wise to have it there, but it is also the worst amongst all.  Just look at how many cautions and acceptable features it has.  Wasabi is clearly misrepresented.  You cannot seriously present it as completely transparent at the same time when they will not give any explanations on why they are blacklisting someone in a coinjoin round, which the feature their entire project relies on.  "Prevents spying on your payments" is also not true, as they actively fund a company that is surveilling the blockchain.

I agree that a warning is more appropriate, but isn't it ironic to warn about potential spying of users' coins in a privacy focused wallet?

[Yamane_Keto]

I agree that a warning is more appropriate, but isn't it ironic to warn about potential spying of users' coins in a privacy focused wallet?

I got frustrated with the amount of nonsense they were talking about privacy and suddenly they were publicly announcing a collaboration with Chainalysis, I think it's because the developers are well known, have families and may fear any legal repercussions from continuing to provide services that might seem like a gray area to governments. The development of privacy programs must be from anonymous developers.

there is no reason to use Wasabi with better options, but removing it will not change anything. Many services still do not respect privacy like Trezor/ledger.

[NotATether]

I agree that a warning is more appropriate, but isn't it ironic to warn about potential spying of users' coins in a privacy focused wallet?

I got frustrated with the amount of nonsense they were talking about privacy and suddenly they were publicly announcing a collaboration with Chainalysis -

Coinfirm, not Chainalysis.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I'm just wondering what kind of new nonsense will appear tomorrow or the day after, because there are more and more people we can't trust, even though they keep trying to convince us that there's nothing controversial about it.

The latest stupidity I heard was CeDeFi - centralized decentralized finance. Apparently the term was first used by CZ in 2020 in relation to Binance Smart Chain. So, in other words, 100% centralized trash.

Just like CZ pretends his centralized bullshit is decentralized, Wasabi pretend that their pro-surveillance bullshit is private.

I think it's because the developers are well known, have families and may fear any legal repercussions from continuing to provide services that might seem like a gray area to governments.

Then shut down your service. Selling out your users and directly funding entities which actively undermine bitcoin and attack everything it stands for just so you can continue to make profit for yourself is disgusting.

[Lucius]

The latest stupidity I heard was CeDeFi - centralized decentralized finance.
~snip~

Although the news is really from 2020, I have to admit that this is the first time I've heard of this expression, and it really sounds amazing that someone could think of something like that. It's really a shame that so many people still have confidence in someone who has such crazy ideas, even though I would even call them dangerous.

[NotATether]

I'm just wondering what kind of new nonsense will appear tomorrow or the day after, because there are more and more people we can't trust, even though they keep trying to convince us that there's nothing controversial about it.

The latest stupidity I heard was CeDeFi - centralized decentralized finance. Apparently the term was first used by CZ in 2020 in relation to Binance Smart Chain. So, in other words, 100% centralized trash.

"The crypto community" (actually just developers coding for bread) will perpetually rush to create the next big technology on some Ethereum or Binance chain and all these innovations are going to fall flat on their faces, because almost nobody will use them successfully for their intended purposes, and will be used as quick cash grabs instead and get exposed on YouTube, all because they don't consider the economics part of money.

Because ultimately, whatever you build on top of Bitcoin or another chain, is also treated as money.

[logfiles]

Which begs the question, Shouldn't this include the Trezor wallets that are under the Hardware wallet category, since they also decided to collaborate with Wasabi over the coinjoin feature?

Under privacy section I see the label “Not Applicable” but I think this need to be changed to maybe “caution”

The quick changing tides with the creators and owners of some of these projects makes me so hesitant to buy/use some of their products. Today, you buy it, and it's a very excellent product, within two weeks, they decide to go complete opposite of their initial vision, and you regret having bought the device in the first place.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Which begs the question, Shouldn't this include the Trezor wallets that are under the Hardware wallet category, since they also decided to collaborate with Wasabi over the coinjoin feature?

Yes. They should also have the same privacy warning applied regarding cooperating with blockchain analysis and surveilling all their users.

The quick changing tides with the creators and owners of some of these projects makes me so hesitant to buy/use some of their products. Today, you buy it, and it's a very excellent product, within two weeks, they decide to go complete opposite of their initial vision, and you regret having bought the device in the first place.

This is part of the reason I now almost exclusively use self built airgapped, encrypted, cold storage. No third parties to suddenly start cooperating with blockchain analysis or extract my seed phrase via a so called recovery feature.

[BlackHatCoiner]

This is part of the reason I now almost exclusively use self built airgapped, encrypted, cold storage.

Which is where bitcoin seems to originate from; being free (as in freedom) software and trusting none. It is turned out multiple times that following profit isn't a cast of mind which respects the core principles of bitcoin. Focusing on protecting users' privacy can have collective benefit for the network, but it's most likely not going to be as profitable for a company as going to the opposite direction.

This is just my perception. We can't expect from the corporate sector to be incentivized to adopt and promote bitcoin, and respect those principles at the same time for the simplest reason that many of their benefits are in opposition with the collective benefit of the network.

[Wind_FURY]

Isn't BitcoinTalk being "a Karen" about the Wasabi issue? It's probably better for the admin of Bitcoin.org to make a footnote saying that Wasabi is blocking UTXOs from "nefarious sources according to chain analytics companies".

Plus Cobra currently has his own problems right now because he was ordered to appear in court and reveal his real identity. I don't know all of the details, but it's a case involving Craig Wright and the "infringement" of his rights for posting the white paper in Bitcoin.org.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Isn't BitcoinTalk being "a Karen" about the Wasabi issue?

If we took that line of thinking with every issue then CSW would currently reign supreme and bitcoin would have died a long time ago. Bullshit needs to be called out as bullshit whenever and wherever it comes from. A wallet directly funding blockchain analysis while styling themselves as the ultimate privacy solution is a prime example of such bullshit.

It's probably better for the admin of Bitcoin.org to make a footnote saying that Wasabi is blocking UTXOs from "nefarious sources according to chain analytics companies".

We don't know the criteria involved in the blacklists Wasabi implements, because they won't tell us. (They may not even know themselves, and just do what their blockchain analysis buddies Coinfirm tell them to.) Who gets to decide what is classified as a "nefarious source"? Certainly not us. Lots of people think bitcoin itself is nefarious. What about porn sites? Gambling/casinos/sportsbooks? What about peer to peer loans? What about non KYCed coins? What about peer to peer transactions not involving a centralized third party which can automatically track and report everything to your government? All of these things are classed as "nefarious" by various governments.

I really hope I don't need to point out on bitcointalk of all places why implementing government blacklists is antithetical to the very purpose of bitcoin.

Plus Cobra currently has his own problems right now because he was ordered to appear in court and reveal his real identity. I don't know all of the details, but it's a case involving Craig Wright and the "infringement" of his rights for posting the white paper in Bitcoin.org.

That case is long finished. Cobra refused to dox himself and so the whitepaper is no longer available via bitcoin.org if you are in the UK.

[Wind_FURY]

Isn't BitcoinTalk being "a Karen" about the Wasabi issue?

If we took that line of thinking with every issue then CSW would currently reign supreme and bitcoin would have died a long time ago.

No it won't because we're not taking the same line of thinking with each and every issue.

Bullshit needs to be called out as bullshit whenever and wherever it comes from. A wallet directly funding blockchain analysis while styling themselves as the ultimate privacy solution is a prime example of such bullshit.

OK, but everything in context. It's almost like everyone wants nopara73 to burn on the stake for the design decisions they made with their wallet. What else should happen? Banish Wasabi from the community?

Bitcoin.org already warns users that Wasabi relies on a centralized service by default, https://bitcoin.org/en/wallets/desktop/windows/wasabi/?step=5&platform=windows&user=experienced&important=privacy&features=bech32

Isn't that enough?

It's probably better for the admin of Bitcoin.org to make a footnote saying that Wasabi is blocking UTXOs from "nefarious sources according to chain analytics companies".

We don't know the criteria involved in the blacklists Wasabi implements, because they won't tell us. (They may not even know themselves, and just do what their blockchain analysis buddies Coinfirm tell them to.) Who gets to decide what is classified as a "nefarious source"? Certainly not us. Lots of people think bitcoin itself is nefarious. What about porn sites? Gambling/casinos/sportsbooks? What about peer to peer loans? What about non KYCed coins? What about peer to peer transactions not involving a centralized third party which can automatically track and report everything to your government? All of these things are classed as "nefarious" by various governments.

I really hope I don't need to point out on bitcointalk of all places why implementing government blacklists is antithetical to the very purpose of bitcoin.

It's a centralized service. It's either accept the trade-offs themselves and comply, or the government puts a big FBI/DOJ badge in their site and nopara73 leaves his house in handcuffs.

[BlackHatCoiner]

What else should happen? Banish Wasabi from the community?

Wasabi has already been prosecuted by the community. They have already lost lots of clients, me included. Their decision is simply insane.

Isn't that enough?

Complete transparency is indeed misinforming, so I'll agree with OP that there should be a warning there.

It's a centralized service. It's either accept the trade-offs themselves and comply, or the government puts a big FBI/DOJ badge in their site and nopara73 leaves his house in handcuffs.

Or they:

• switch to developing a decentralized alternative.
• shut down their coordinator with the excuse that they feel in danger.

Funding a mass surveillance firm? Nah. Really disgraceful. But sure, as company they have every right to deny service in some clients. Just as we have every right to judge this attitude. I mean, how can you leave this unchallenged?  

By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet's non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology.

[Z-tight]

OK, but everything in context. It's almost like everyone wants nopara73 to burn on the stake for the design decisions they made with their wallet. What else should happen? Banish Wasabi from the community?

To 'banish' or censor isn't part of what BTC stands for, so nobody is talking about banishing Wasabi nor can anybody do that, it is a free market, imagine that many people in the community still hold their funds in centralized exchanges and lending and earning platforms, but yet we can't stop warning them of how dangerous it is; that's the same with the Wasabi case, the community has to know that they do not support privacy as they claim; it is about setting the records straight, especially for the unsuspecting bitcoiners, whoever still decides to use Wasabi can go ahead, that's the beauty of a permissionless network.

[o_e_l_e_o]

What else should happen? Banish Wasabi from the community?

The Wasabi team are obviously free to continue to create and promote their anti-privacy, pro-surveillance, and pro-censorship wallet. And we are similarly free to call them out for being anti-privacy, pro-surveillance, and pro-censorship. That includes amending recommendations such as that on bitcoin.org which were written before Wasabi started funding blockchain analysis.

Isn't that enough?

Relying on a third party to sync your wallet and your wallet actively paying blockchain analysis firms to spy on you are entirely different issues. If bitcoin.org can warn about the former, then they should also warn about the latter.

It's a centralized service. It's either accept the trade-offs themselves and comply, or the government puts a big FBI/DOJ badge in their site and nopara73 leaves his house in handcuffs.

As I said above: "Then shut down your service. Selling out your users and directly funding entities which actively undermine bitcoin and attack everything it stands for just so you can continue to make profit for yourself is disgusting."

[Pmalek]

I don't think Wasabi will be removed as a recommended wallet on bitcoin.org. Therefore, I think it's a waste of time to suggest that. It's not a waste of time to put up warnings of their most recent activities. Hard facts only, no subjective interpretations and emotional statements. Wasabi is a software that allows partial privacy if you pass the tests their blockchain analysis partner puts you through. That alone is a privacy invasion. If you don't pass the tests (for reasons unknown), you have also had your privacy invaded and declared unfit to participate.   

[ABCbits]

Bitcoin.org already warns users that Wasabi relies on a centralized service by default, https://bitcoin.org/en/wallets/desktop/windows/wasabi/?step=5&platform=windows&user=experienced&important=privacy&features=bech32

Isn't that enough?

You misunderstood what Bitcoin.org said. "Centralized service" in that context only refer to service which provide wallet with relevant Bitcoin transaction. In addition, Bitcoin.org never state any details about it's CoinJoin feature. So IMO warning about privacy issue when using CoinJoin should be mentioned.

[DaveF]

Just throwing this out there. Blindly using the recommendations from bitcoin.org for wallets is also a bit problematic at best.

For those of you that don't remember bitcoin developer and the creator of bitcoinknots lukedashjr was hacked https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5432665.0
On the bitcoinknots page there is actually a warning that the downloads may be compromised: http://bitcoinknots.org/

This server may be compromised at present. Do not blindly trust downloads - always verify both the SHA256 hash and the OpenPGP signatures match. Luke Dashjr's OpenPGP key is likely to be compromised, so his signatures have been removed and replaced with other developers' signatures. There is no evidence of a tampered download ever having been offered, but if you have downloaded Bitcoin Knots after 2022 December 1st, it is recommended you re-verify the files you previously downloaded to be sure.  

At no point in time did the webmaster / people or person controlling bitcoin.org take that software off the recommended list.
Nor, did they even bother putting up a notice about what happened on the chance that someone may see it.

So, with that happening do you really think they are going to jump up and rush to take Wasabi off.

-Dave

[pooya87]

OK, but everything in context. It's almost like everyone wants nopara73 to burn on the stake for the design decisions they made with their wallet. What else should happen? Banish Wasabi from the community?

People want clarity and honesty. When they see conflicts they act this way and it is very well justified. Why do you think people hate bcash so much? It is not because they created an altcoin, otherwise there has been over a ten thousand altcoin at this point. It is because they were dishonest and scammed people by selling it to newbies as "real bitcoin".

It's the same with Wasabi. People aren't bashing it because it lacks privacy, they do it because it promises high privacy but delivers a "spyware".

[Wind_FURY]

It's like Brian Armstrong and Coinbase. Doesn't Coinbase employ the services of a blockchain analytics company to filter which UTXOs are allowed to enter the exchange? I don't see anyone persecuting Brian Armstrong, who, truly deserves it more for being one of the signatories who supported the New York Agreement.

If the response is "Coinbase a centralized service, it's in their right to block what goes in the exchange". Wasabi's coordinator is centralized too, and like Coinbase, we can warn users about the pros and cons, but we can't have an attitude like what the social justice warriors do today.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Doesn't Coinbase employ the services of a blockchain analytics company to filter which UTXOs are allowed to enter the exchange?

As do all centralized exchanges. However, these exchanges don't promote themselves as the ultimate privacy solution at the same time.

Wasabi's coordinator is centralized too, and like Coinbase, we can warn users about the pros and cons

Great. So let's warn them by putting a big "Caution" heading and explanation in the privacy section for the Wasabi listing.

[pooya87]

It's like Brian Armstrong and Coinbase. Doesn't Coinbase employ the services of a blockchain analytics company to filter which UTXOs are allowed to enter the exchange? I don't see anyone persecuting Brian Armstrong, who, truly deserves it more for being one of the signatories who supported the New York Agreement.

If the response is "Coinbase a centralized service, it's in their right to block what goes in the exchange". Wasabi's coordinator is centralized too, and like Coinbase, we can warn users about the pros and cons, but we can't have an attitude like what the social justice warriors do today.

You are still not understanding the clear distinction between being an honest centralized service and a dishonest one. Someone who uses Coinbase knows well that they have zero control since they don't even have access to their own keys. Not to mention the KYC they enforce. They are not advertised as KYC-less custodial wallet, they are advertised and known as a centralized KYC-enforcing privacy invading necessary evil.
This is both honest and OK.

You can't say the same thing about Wasabi. This tool is being advertised as and is known as a tool to improve your privacy. Which is clearly not true since the  company is working with the blockchain analysis organizations that nullify any privacy users of this wallet had.
In other words Wasabi is a honeypot which is worse.

[BlackHatCoiner]

It's like Brian Armstrong and Coinbase.

Aside from Brian not portraying Coinbase as the ultimate privacy-oriented, non-KYC centralized exchange, how often do you observe the Bitcoin community expressing favor towards Coinbase? Because all I witness is criticism directed at them, branding them as one of the worst companies in their field. There have been sudden closures of customer accounts, allegations of insider trading, numerous technical problems, and an astonishingly anti-privacy and anti-Bitcoin stance.

[Wind_FURY]

I'm merely saying that we should avoid being too much of a Karen, because if we're successful in cancelling Wasabi and nopara37, who knows where it ends? Who does the community attack next for the trade-offs taken by some developers? It's a dangerous path, and I'm just asking for a little care and empathy, and a little understanding on why some developers make unpopular decisions.

It's not as if nopara73 is attacking the network like what the NYA signatories did, so let's breathe deeply and relax.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I'm merely saying that we should avoid being too much of a Karen, because if we're successful in cancelling Wasabi and nopara37, who knows where it ends?

It ends when there's no entity that violates basic principles.

Who does the community attack next for the trade-offs taken by some developers?

We're not attacking anyone. We're merely trying to defend. When someone provably malicious tries to manipulate newcomers, the least we can do is warn for their behavior.

It's not as if nopara73 is attacking the network like what the NYA signatories did, so let's breathe deeply and relax.

Manipulating newcomers and portraying yourself as the ultimate privacy solution, at the same time when you're cooperating with mass surveillance firm, lying and failing to provide those levels of privacy is an attack to part of the Bitcoin network.

[aysg76]

You are still not understanding the clear distinction between being an honest centralized service and a dishonest one. Someone who uses Coinbase knows well that they have zero control since they don't even have access to their own keys. Not to mention the KYC they enforce. They are not advertised as KYC-less custodial wallet, they are advertised and known as a centralized KYC-enforcing privacy invading necessary evil.
This is both honest and OK.

They are clear on that agenda like they have specified in their SEC filing also that if any case they go bankrupt the users funds will be used to pay off any liabilities although not too much advertising about it but still better then claiming like your funds are yours.They are also among those platforms who doesn't care about your privacy putting restrictions on withdrawal but when we talk about Wasabi then it seems like decent options who are not cheating with the users trying to scam them.

[20kevin20]

I'm merely saying that we should avoid being too much of a Karen, because if we're successful in cancelling Wasabi and nopara37, who knows where it ends? Who does the community attack next for the trade-offs taken by some developers? It's a dangerous path, and I'm just asking for a little care and empathy, and a little understanding on why some developers make unpopular decisions.

Then they should shut up and stop mocking their previous customers and attacking them. They're taking the wrong road, not us. I don't think we're "Karens". They received a ton of support and love from us back when they were telling the truth (hopefully). I used to strongly suggest and support their Docs, which at the time were extremely useful to anyone who wanted to know more about Bitcoin privacy, with or without being interested in Wasabi's product.

But it's a bad ending anyway. We shut up and Wasabi and everyone else gets the "empathy" and by the end of the day everyone's gonna just accept this as Bitcoin's fate, every company will have no more respect for their clients' privacy, we introduce taint as if it ever was a thing, governments are happy, Wasabi's devs are happy with their fulfilled pockets and we, the customers, are the ones to suffer. But this is a domino in the making. Look at CEX's! Nobody said a thing about KYC and now how many CEX's still allow you to trade without KYC? Pretty much none! This is a war that began more than 6 years ago, I will never forget the day Bittrex suddenly changed their policy to being able to withdraw only if KYC is fulfilled. Robbers! Now they're under bankruptcy and I received an e-mail that I can withdraw my coins. Jokes on you, they're still impossible to withdraw unless.. you guessed it, unless I send my KYC info. Look at ATMs in the US! How many of them have no KYC for purchases and sells? That's arrived in the EU as well now, it's getting less and less free and they're taking our privacy away entirely. Look at Ledger! They're turning their "your seed never leaves the hardware" into a "pay to get the seed to a safe place"! Empathy and care for what? I'm sick of this all!! I challenge you: take a break of at least half an year from crypto and come back. You'll be surprised to see how quickly privacy is being demolished. I'm sick of liars, I'm sick of pretending everything's fine, because it's not! I'm literally looking at the people I used to admire with disgust and feeling betrayed. They've done what I thought they'll always fight against. Work with Coinfirm, deceive new customers into believing you're the ultimate solution to privacy and argue with those blaming you for what you're doing. I'm sick of it!! Does it look like showing empathy really works as a solution?

[yhiaali3]

I've been hearing a lot of complaints about Wasabi lately, I've read in more than one place about some negative things about Wasabi wallet that made me wonder what's going on? I remember Wasabi being among the good privacy wallets, but maybe they seem to be hypocritical to get government approval.

Sending an email to bitcoin.org explaining your dissatisfaction with Wasabi might help a bit, but it's better to spread awareness in the Bitcoin community about the downsides of a wallet and ultimately everyone gets to decide which wallet is right for keeping their coins and privacy.

[Yamane_Keto]

I've been hearing a lot of complaints about Wasabi lately, I've read in more than one place about some negative things about Wasabi wallet that made me wonder what's going on? I remember Wasabi being among the good privacy wallets, but maybe they seem to be hypocritical to get government approval.

In fact, Wasabi is a software that works as a wallet and allows direct interaction with a mixing protocol, meaning that they are not a mixing protocol or a mixer. If any of the existing mixers were combined with any wallet, we would get similar results, exactly as it happened with the Samurai wallet.

Most mixers will not do this because they are forced to release open source software and a wallet that many people trust, which is a headache compared to creating online website.

A middle option is to make Coinjoin Electrum plugin So far, I wonder why no mixer has worked in such implementation even CM was a dead one.

[20kevin20]

I've been hearing a lot of complaints about Wasabi lately, I've read in more than one place about some negative things about Wasabi wallet that made me wonder what's going on?

Long story short: Wasabi likely got warned by governments and 3-letter agencies so they had to either join the opposition or stop their Wasabi business entirely. They chose the former, went public about it and they’re now trying to convince us that their partnership with blockchain analysis corps is the ultimate solution to Bitcoin’s privacy. They basically sold themselves and they’re trying to manipulate everyone else into thinking it’s the best thing that’s ever happened.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Most mixers will not do this because they are forced to release open source software and a wallet that many people trust, which is a headache compared to creating online website.

Coinjoining with whirlpool is the next option you're looking for.

They basically sold themselves and they’re trying to manipulate everyone else into thinking it’s the best thing that’s ever happened.

You forgot the part where they're lying about it. They don't even believe how dumb that is, so it's quite difficult to support that "update" and be honest simultaneously. Have a look at zkSNACKs' official website: https://zksnacks.com/. "Privacy for everyone in the digital age". Apparently, not for those you dislike. 

[Medusah]

Github issue created: https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4097.  Voting with thumbs up from your github account would help.

[Pmalek]

Sorry, I don't think it's going to happen. I have had my share of problems with their representative Kruw in the Wasabi thread like some other members here, and have a very bad opinion of him. Still, I don't see Wasabi as a malicious entity that would require it be removed from bitcoin.org. Proper warnings about their activities and partnership with blockchain analysis should be posted though, and I would support that any day of the week. Any time they call themselves a privacy tool should be corrected that they aren't, etc. 

[Wind_FURY]

Sorry, I don't think it's going to happen. I have had my share of problems with their representative Kruw in the Wasabi thread like some other members here, and have a very bad opinion of him. Still, I don't see Wasabi as a malicious entity that would require it be removed from bitcoin.org. Proper warnings about their activities and partnership with blockchain analysis should be posted though, and I would support that any day of the week. Any time they call themselves a privacy tool should be corrected that they aren't, etc.
  

THAT'S IT! That's why I believe we're becoming Crypto-Karens because of our insistence of this issue. Cobra won't remove WasabiWallet unless they're confirmed to be nefarious people who are there to co-opt Bitcoin. They're actually not. Wasabi developers merely accepted the trade-off and hired the services of some Blockchain Intelligence Agency, the B.I.A. to protect zkSNACKS and themselves from the authorities.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Cobra won't remove WasabiWallet unless they're confirmed to be nefarious people who are there to co-opt Bitcoin. They're actually not.

They are directly funding blockchain analysis companies, which are the exact same companies providing flawed evidence to the government to prosecute privacy devs for writing code. They are enforcing government sanctioned blacklists and censoring their users. They are enforcing the concept that bitcoin is not fungible. In what way is any of that not nefarious?

[Pmalek]

They are directly funding blockchain analysis companies, which are the exact same companies providing flawed evidence to the government to prosecute privacy devs for writing code. They are enforcing government sanctioned blacklists and censoring their users. They are enforcing the concept that bitcoin is not fungible. In what way is any of that not nefarious?

I have no objections to what you are saying and agree with every word. However, those are mainly privacy-related problems. Being spied on by blockchain analysis and having your UTXOs checked for naughtiness. You can't force people to be privacy-conscious or force them to act according to what you believe is the proper way in terms of privacy. Not you personally, I am just saying.

Since this is supposed to be a privacy-software, but isn't, I'd like to see the right warnings and banners informing unsuspecting users of what they are doing behind the stage. If the wallet had poor security, which results in coins miraculously disappearing and getting stuck and becoming unobtainable, I would vote to get rid of it from the recommendations.

Having said all this, I am really curious of what actions (if any) Cobra will take. 

[Kruw]

Since this is supposed to be a privacy-software, but isn't.

Your privacy is completely protected when using Wasabi.  By default, it uses Tor to mask your IP address for all network connections and compact block filters to mask your xpub address when discovering the balance in your wallet's addresses.

[Wind_FURY]

Cobra won't remove WasabiWallet unless they're confirmed to be nefarious people who are there to co-opt Bitcoin. They're actually not.

They are directly funding blockchain analysis companies, which are the exact same companies providing flawed evidence to the government to prosecute privacy devs for writing code. They are enforcing government sanctioned blacklists and censoring their users. They are enforcing the concept that bitcoin is not fungible. In what way is any of that not nefarious?

What I define as nefarious in this context are anti-Bitcoin entites either open or in secret which their goal is to co-opt Bitcoin and compromise it. It's not what I see in WasabiWallet. They are simply too small because their market demograpic is too small. We can always tell our fellow plebs to avoid using their centralized coordinator.

Plus what I see in Wasabi is a group of developers who believe that there's more incentives for them financially and for their security if they filter out "questionable" UTXOs.

"Enforcing government sanctioned blacklists", no they can't and "censoring their users", no they're not. They're merely filtering UTXOs that enter THEIR centralized service.

I'm not saying that the community shouldn't inform the public, in fact I believe we should, but avoid drama. It was good during the first few moments, but currently it's making us look like a group of Karens.

[Pmalek]

Your privacy is completely protected when using Wasabi.  By default, it uses Tor to mask your IP address for all network connections and compact block filters to mask your xpub address when discovering the balance in your wallet's addresses.

Just stop it with your propaganda and sweeping the issue under the carpet. You know what I am talking about. Multiple people have said it in many different ways in the Wasabi thread. Do we really have to talk about it here as well? Fine.

Many users, me included, don't consider Wasabi a privacy tool anymore because your default and most popular Wasabi coordinator allows a malicious entity (blockchain analysis company) to tag UTXOs and put them in different categories based on their level of naughty. It matters not one bit whether you do it personally, or you listen to what your blockchain analysis buddies say. The fact remains that if my coins are considered dirty enough, I am not going to get any privacy from you. And who knows what your malicious blockchain partners will do with that information. I doubt they will just put it on file and do nothing when it can be sold or shared with government agencies for profit or favors.

It's time you stopped playing naive and trying to divert the attention from that. I will not grow tired mentioning it unless you stop trying to hide it by highlighting other features of your software. And me not supporting Wasabi to be removed from bitcoin.org does not affect my opinion about what you deem to be the ultimate bitcoin privacy software.       

[Kruw]

Many users, me included, don't consider Wasabi a privacy tool anymore because your default and most popular Wasabi coordinator allows a malicious entity (blockchain analysis company) to tag UTXOs and put them in different categories based on their level of naughty.

Wasabi does not stop being privacy software just because a business does not want to accept your money.  You can use any coordinator with Wasabi, including your own.  The signers of this petition can simply coordinate coinjoins among themselves since they are all united in their decision not to use the default coordinator, and no one could stop you:

Peter Todd crushing the critics:  "I can do my own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator... If someone's complaining about this, go start your own damn coordinator."

https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=297

[dkbit98]

Github issue created: https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4097.  Voting with thumbs up from your github account would help.

It's interesting to see that discussion continues even on github with one of wasabi contributors, propagandist, and probably team member.
However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.
Maybe someone should fork or create alternative for bitcoin.org website, and remove wasabi wallet.
I liked wasabi v1 but this version is awful and it has very bad interface.

[Pmalek]

It's interesting to see that discussion continues even on github with one of wasabi contributors, propagandist, and probably team member.

Yeah, Kruwed on GitHub is surely the Kruw we have learned to love here on Bitcointalk.

However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

Maybe someone should fork or create alternative for bitcoin.org website, and remove wasabi wallet.

We should then create a petition to have everyone abandon bitcoin.org and move over to the new and forked website.

[Kruw]

However, I don't expect to see wasabi removed from recommended wallets in bitcoin.org website, but maybe they should add some type of warning.

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

[Medusah]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

First of all they should be warned that Wasabi automatically uses user's coins to do coinjoins and second, they should warn the users that they might have their coinjoin rejected as the default coordinator now requests from a chain analysis company to approve coins if they are "clean" and disapprove if they are "naughty".  It also pays that company using coinjoin fees, which indirectly helps in the development of public surveillance.

Let's see what your next post will be.  It will probably have to do with running a separate coordinator as Wasabi is 100% decentralized. 

[Kruw]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?

First of all they should be warned that Wasabi automatically uses user's coins to do coinjoins and second, they should warn the users that they might have their coinjoin rejected

Is the warning that users funds will be coinjoined automatically or is the warning that users funds will not be coinjoined automatically?  You seem to be confused since these warnings are direct contradictions of each other.

Let's see what your next post will be.  It will probably have to do with running a separate coordinator as Wasabi is 100% decentralized.  

Since you already know you can run a Wasabi coinjoin coordinator and there's nothing zkSNACKs can do to stop you since they made their code open source, then why did you make this petition?  Why aren't you just running your own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator instead?

[pooya87]

It shouldn't have a 'Good' rating in the privacy category. If it was up to me, I would take it down to 'Acceptable', maybe even 'Caution'.

The problem with these ratings and categories is that they are not well designed and the criteria in some cases doesn't make any sense. For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.
And they just give it "acceptable" rating because of things like that (+rotating address and using TOR)!
That is not enough to determine whether a light wallet is good for privacy or not.

[Kruw]

For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.

You are confused, Wasabi connects to P2P nodes when it downloads blocks, and it does not disclose information when doing so.

[pooya87]

For example in case of Wasabi the second term in the privacy section (not disclose information to peers) is not even applicable to a client-server relationship that Wasabi has, it belongs to full node implementations where there is peer-to-peer relationship.

You are confused, Wasabi connects to P2P nodes when it downloads blocks, and it does not disclose information when doing so.

That has nothing to do with what I said. Wasabi after connecting to P2P nodes has a client-sever relations with those nodes not a peer to peer relation. In other words Wasabi is on a different and lower level as the full nodes it connects to.

[Pmalek]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?
Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

Because each UTXO will be checked by blockchain analysis for dirtiness according to rules and standards no one knows about and which they make up as they go. Because selective privacy isn't privacy. And because spying and investigating on my UTXOs to be allowed to coinjoin is the equivalent of having me strip naked and sticking a finger you know where to see if I am hiding anything illegal every time I want to enter the mall. 

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

There is no threat to someone losing their coins, but there is a threat to being surveilled for using a tool that was supposed to increase ones privacy. You can stick your we are open-source and thus don't do anything unethical propaganda where the sun doesn't shine. 

[Medusah]

Is the warning that users funds will be coinjoined automatically or is the warning that users funds will not be coinjoined automatically?  You seem to be confused since these warnings are direct contradictions of each other.

No I am not.  You are just playing it dumb.  The user must be warned that they might have their coins disapproved for coinjoining, but if they do have their coins approved by the chain analysis company, the user must be warned that the coordinator will automatically use their coins to coinjoin.  These are just things the user must be aware of.  Do you believe that Wasabi should make use of the user's coins without their knowledge?

Since you already know you can run a Wasabi coinjoin coordinator and there's nothing zkSNACKs can do to stop you since they made their code open source, then why did you make this petition?  Why aren't you just running your own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator instead?

I am not going to argue why the user will not run their own coordinator unless they are a Wasabi shill (most of the times).  That will not be a constructive discussion to have with you.  I already know that you can do that, you have repeated it like a zillion times.  But the user has to know what the default coordinator is doing with their money.

[Kruw]

Why should a user be warned about using Wasabi?
Why should a user be cautioned about using Wasabi?

Because each UTXO will be checked by blockchain analysis for dirtiness according to rules and standards no one knows about and which they make up as they go.

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.

You are fabricating the existence of some sort of threat to users of the software when there is not, which everyone can verify for themselves since it is entirely open source.

There is no threat to someone losing their coins, but there is a threat to being surveilled for using a tool that was supposed to increase ones privacy.

Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

The user must be warned that they might have their coins disapproved for coinjoining

Why must they be warned?  Nothing happens to users whose coins are disapproved for coinjoining.

I am not going to argue why the user will not run their own coordinator

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

[Medusah]

Nothing happens

That is what they should know it will happen.  Nothing.

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

Will the user be warned about the default coordinator?  Until they are, thread remains unlocked.

[Kruw]

Nothing happens

That is what they should know it will happen.  Nothing.

If you don't want to argue it, then go ahead and close this thread since your problem has already been solved by the code being open source.

Will the user be warned about the default coordinator?  Until they are, thread remains unlocked.

I don't mean to repeat myself, but if nothing happens, why is a warning necessary?  A warning implies there is some risk incurred if it is ignored, but there is no such risk posed to users of the software.

[Pmalek]

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.
...
Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

What kind of arguments are that? Those other wallets don't call themselves privacy wallets and promise "privacy by default" like Wasabi wallet does. When I use my Electrum wallet, I don't expect any gains in privacy, but that shouldn't be the case with Wasabi. You used to have privacy in mind in the past, but by cooperating with chain analysis, you are effectively handing over your users as canon fodder and lab rats to be experimented on.

And you obviously don't mind it because the same or similar things happen elsewhere. If they do, then you should be better than them. You should try to make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about your users, not strike up a partnership with them voluntarily.

[Kruw]

Those UTXOs will be checked by blockchain analysis companies for dirtiness no matter which wallet someone uses, so your warning would need to be added on every Bitcoin wallet.
...
Are you under the impression that there is no threat that chain analysis companies surveil the transactions you send with other Bitcoin wallets?

What kind of arguments are that? Those other wallets don't call themselves privacy wallets and promise "privacy by default" like Wasabi wallet does. When I use my Electrum wallet, I don't expect any gains in privacy, but that shouldn't be the case with Wasabi.

You are correct that isn't the case with Wasabi:  Since Wasabi is a "privacy by default" wallet, it protects your xpub address with compact block filters and protects your IP address with Tor automatically.  By default, Electrum wallet links your wallet addresses together with your IP address and sends that to public servers.

You used to have privacy in mind in the past, but by cooperating with chain analysis, you are effectively handing over your users as canon fodder and lab rats to be experimented on.

You are wrong.  No cooperation with chain analysis companies is possible because the Wasabi client never reveals any user information to third parties thanks to its use of Tor and compact block filters.

And you obviously don't mind it because the same or similar things happen elsewhere. If they do, then you should be better than them. You should try to make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about your users, not strike up a partnership with them voluntarily.

You are correct, Wasabi does make it as difficult as possible for blockchain analysis companies to analyze and discover anything about its users since it masks your IP address with Tor and masks your xpub address with compact block filters.

[Pmalek]

<Snip>

Then explain to me the logic behind Wasabi's cooperation with a blockchain analysis firm? A voluntary cooperation according to what Wasabi says. No one twisted their arm and forced them into it. In every partnership or cooperation, both parties profit and get something positive out of that deal. As someone obviously close to Wasabi, what is the company gaining from that partnership?

Masked with TOR or not, the blockchain analysis company gains data they can analyze from people who want privacy. Governments don't want you to be private, independent, or free, so the role of blockchain analysis is clear here. What is Wasabi's role exactly?     

[Kruw]

<Snip>

Then explain to me the logic behind Wasabi's cooperation with a blockchain analysis firm? A voluntary cooperation according to what Wasabi says. No one twisted their arm and forced them into it. In every partnership or cooperation, both parties profit and get something positive out of that deal. As someone obviously close to Wasabi, what is the company gaining from that partnership?

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

If you want to know what sort of cooperation and partnerships zkSNACKs is involved with, here's a short list:

- $2,500 monthly donation to the Tor project (https://zksnacks.com/)
- 1 BTC donation to the Human Rights Foundation Bitcoin Development Fund (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/06/25/summer-2020-is-funding-season-for-open-source-bitcoin-development/)
- .86 BTC donation (along with Bull Bitcoin) to Bitcoin Knots developer Luke Dashjr (https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/bitcoin-knots-donation/)
- 1.11 BTC grant for privacy research on the Lightning Network (https://lightningprivacy.com)
- 3.4 million sats (so far) to the best bruteforcer in the community (https://www.huntingsats.com/)
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin educational podcasts such as What Bitcoin Did, Bitcoin Takeover, and What Is Money?
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin events such as BTCPrague, Bitcoin Amsterdam, Baltic Honeybadger (and others I'm sure I'm missing)

Masked with TOR or not, the blockchain analysis company gains data they can analyze from people who want privacy. Governments don't want you to be private, independent, or free, so the role of blockchain analysis is clear here. What is Wasabi's role exactly?    

I already told you:  Blockchain analysis companies cannot gain any data from Wasabi users because your IP address and xpub address are protected by the power of cryptography.  You can verify this for yourself since Wasabi Wallet is completely open source, just like Bitcoin itself.

[Pmalek]

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

Wasabi or zkSNACKs aren't private customers, though. They are businesses using the services of other business entities (blockchain analysis) whose version of the truth and estimation affects their own operations. In other words, you accept the decision of the blockchain analysis company's views regarding the cleanliness of my UTXOs. My participation in your coinjoins depends on the truth the blockchain analysis firm serves to you. I call that a partnership and cooperation. You are free to use any other terms you like.

How do you know stolen coins are getting rejected? You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly?
According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?
Who made that list and in whose name? What entity or government agency is responsible to maintain it, make changes, and decide what's good and what's bad?
Who do I get in touch with if my UTXOs were rejected for reasons unknown to me?

Being in possession of stolen money or other means of payments doesn't necessarily make the owner a thief. You do understand that money and crypto circulate. As someone involved in the crypto business, you should know that those rules your blockchain partners present to you can't be applied to cash and fiat, otherwise a lot of it would have to be confiscated and taken out of circulation because many bills had contact or were used in illegal actions at one point in their past.    

[Wind_FURY]

Because these government-favored CoinJoins are a threat to Bitcoin's fungibility, and therefore might make UTXOs that went through them "more valuable", what the user could do before using Wasabi's coordinator is like what Peter Todd said in the video. Use layers.

If you have "low value", "tainted" UTXOs from the Dark Markets, you could use JoinMarket, and use those UTXOs in Lightning, then send them to yourself. Convert them to onchain Bitcoin then use Wasabi CoinJoin. You now have "government-friendly" UTXOs ready for cold storage. Thanks Wasabi!

[BlackHatCoiner]

what the user could do before using Wasabi's coordinator is like what Peter Todd said in the video. Use layers.

Here's another idea if we're about to utilize layers: exchange BTC for XMR and XMR for BTC a little while later. Leaves no traces, much better than Wasabi + lightning altogether. You could then coinjoin the bitcoin, just to minimize the blockchain connection with the previous owner.

If you have "low value", "tainted" UTXOs from the Dark Markets, you could use JoinMarket, and use those UTXOs in Lightning, then send them to yourself. Convert them to onchain Bitcoin then use Wasabi CoinJoin. You now have "government-friendly" UTXOs ready for cold storage. Thanks Wasabi!

See, that's the problem. You think Wasabi implemented blacklisting and now their coinjoined coins are government friendly. We have absolutely no clue with what factors their chain analysis works. We only know that chain analysis is evidently not scientific; what Coinfirm deems as "clean" coins does not necessarily imply the same for other firms.

[Kruw]

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

Wasabi or zkSNACKs aren't private customers, though. They are businesses using the services of other business entities (blockchain analysis) whose version of the truth and estimation affects their own operations. In other words, you accept the decision of the blockchain analysis company's views regarding the cleanliness of my UTXOs. My participation in your coinjoins depends on the truth the blockchain analysis firm serves to you. I call that a partnership and cooperation. You are free to use any other terms you like.

As I already pointed out with my McDonald's example, purchasing a business's product does not constitute a "partnership". Here is the list of zkSNACKs' partners:

- $2,500 monthly donation to the Tor project (https://zksnacks.com/)
- 1 BTC donation to the Human Rights Foundation Bitcoin Development Fund (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/06/25/summer-2020-is-funding-season-for-open-source-bitcoin-development/)
- .86 BTC donation (along with Bull Bitcoin) to Bitcoin Knots developer Luke Dashjr (https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/bitcoin-knots-donation/)
- 1.11 BTC grant for privacy research on the Lightning Network (https://lightningprivacy.com)
- 3.4 million sats (so far) to the best bruteforcer in the community (https://www.huntingsats.com/)
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin educational podcasts such as What Bitcoin Did, Bitcoin Takeover, and What Is Money?
- Sponsorships of Bitcoin events such as BTCPrague, Bitcoin Amsterdam, Baltic Honeybadger (and others I'm sure I'm missing)

You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly? According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?

Since the coordinator code is all open source, you get to decide your own criteria yourself.

Here's another idea if we're about to utilize layers: exchange BTC for XMR and XMR for BTC a little while later. Leaves no traces, much better than Wasabi + lightning altogether. You could then coinjoin the bitcoin, just to minimize the blockchain connection with the previous owner.

This doesn't provide you additional privacy since you leave a trace at step 1 when you send your non private BTC to your XMR counterparty.

[pooya87]

You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly? According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?

Since the coordinator code is all open source, you get to decide your own criteria yourself.

Being open source means absolutely nothing here because nobody has any way of knowing what the actual source code the centralized default coordinator is running.

Here's another idea if we're about to utilize layers: exchange BTC for XMR and XMR for BTC a little while later. Leaves no traces, much better than Wasabi + lightning altogether. You could then coinjoin the bitcoin, just to minimize the blockchain connection with the previous owner.

This doesn't provide you additional privacy since you leave a trace at step 1 when you send your non private BTC to your XMR counterparty.

It does as it successfully breaks the link between the bitcoins you convert to XMR and the bitcoins you get after selling XMR because of the way Monero is implemented.

[BlackHatCoiner]

As I already pointed out with my McDonald's example, purchasing a business's product does not constitute a "partnership". Here is the list of zkSNACKs' partners

Do we have more information about what zkSNACKs purchases from the chain analysis company? Because as far as I'm aware, we aren't even sure what's the business they purchase "product" from.

Since the coordinator code is all open source, you get to decide your own criteria yourself.

I'm a little confused by the terms the user agrees on when using the backend software, so please enlighten me. The backend is released under the MIT License, which gives the people the right to use the software with no limitations. However, in your legal documents, it says the following:

The client application (“Client Application”) is software, with the sole purpose of allowing You access to the Bitcoin network and our Services (as defined below)

Then, it defines the Services as:

The CoinJoin Coordinator Service is an online service that implements trustless CoinJoin to prevent third parties from spying on the Blockchain.

Later on, it continuously uses terms such as "our Services" and "Service provider", signaling that there is just one such provider.

For instance:

You agree that You will not use the Services to perform any type of illegal activity of any sort or to take any action that adversely affects the performance of or the provision by the Service Provider of the Services. Furthermore, You agree that You will not use the Services on Bitcoin that is created, received or given in exchange for, or as a result of, any type of illegal activity.

If I get to decide the criteria all by myself, then how can I accept these terms?

This doesn't provide you additional privacy since you leave a trace at step 1 when you send your non private BTC to your XMR counterparty.

I leave no trace other than the information that person with UTXO(s) x, y, z wants to trade them for either some cryptocurrency or fiat (specifically for what, is an information only known by the other person). Just as with coinjoin, I signal that I want UTXO(s) x, y, z to be mixed.

[Wind_FURY]

what the user could do before using Wasabi's coordinator is like what Peter Todd said in the video. Use layers.

Here's another idea if we're about to utilize layers: exchange BTC for XMR and XMR for BTC a little while later. Leaves no traces, much better than Wasabi + lightning altogether. You could then coinjoin the bitcoin, just to minimize the blockchain connection with the previous owner.

But but I want my UTXOs to go through a government-approved CoinJoin to get the highest value on those UTXOs. The government could force exchanges to make that a requirement before they can accept deposits, so I want to teach as much people to use their "tainted" UTXOs to go through JoinMarket -> Lightning Network -> Back to Bitcoin blockchain -> To Wasabi CoinJoin.

Let's give thanks to WasabiWallet for giving us this wonderful opportunity.

 

If you have "low value", "tainted" UTXOs from the Dark Markets, you could use JoinMarket, and use those UTXOs in Lightning, then send them to yourself. Convert them to onchain Bitcoin then use Wasabi CoinJoin. You now have "government-friendly" UTXOs ready for cold storage. Thanks Wasabi!

See, that's the problem. You think Wasabi implemented blacklisting and now their coinjoined coins are government friendly. We have absolutely no clue with what factors their chain analysis works. We only know that chain analysis is evidently not scientific; what Coinfirm deems as "clean" coins does not necessarily imply the same for other firms.

Are you saying that we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if our Wasabi CoinJoined UTXOs are blocked, locked, and confiscated?

 

[Kruw]

Being open source means absolutely nothing here because nobody has any way of knowing what the actual source code the centralized default coordinator is running.

Being open source means you can run your own coordinator.

It does as it successfully breaks the link between the bitcoins you convert to XMR and the bitcoins you get after selling XMR because of the way Monero is implemented.

I leave no trace other than the information that person with UTXO(s) x, y, z wants to trade them for either some cryptocurrency or fiat (specifically for what, is an information only known by the other person). Just as with coinjoin, I signal that I want UTXO(s) x, y, z to be mixed.

Monero is not the weak link in this equation, Bitcoin is.  Step 1 of "Exchange your BTC for Monero" is where the privacy is lost since your Bitcoin transaction history is revealed to your exchange counterparty (unless you coinjoin to do this exchange, in which case you have no need for Monero in the first place since you already have privacy on Bitcoin).

[Pmalek]

Since the coordinator code is all open source, you get to decide your own criteria yourself.

Are you going to go back to suggesting that we can run our own coordinators if we don't agree to what zkSNACKS is doing? Touching upon that subject again is a waste of time. We are now talking about your coordinator, as in the default coordinator. zkSNACKS accepts whatever assessment the blockchain analysis company makes about coin dirtiness and won't allow such coins to coinjoin. Right or wrong? 

And the open-source nature of Wasabi or your coordinator doesn't matter on the subject of taint. It's the blockchain analysis firm that determines taint according to their interpretations. The questions I asked and you didn't answer are about that. So, here they are again.

How do you know stolen coins are getting rejected? You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly?
According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?
Who made that list and in whose name? What entity or government agency is responsible to maintain it, make changes, and decide what's good and what's bad?
Who do I get in touch with if my UTXOs were rejected for reasons unknown to me?

[BlackHatCoiner]

Let's give thanks to WasabiWallet for giving us this wonderful opportunity.

Did Wasabi hire you too?

Are you saying that we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if our Wasabi CoinJoined UTXOs are blocked, locked, and confiscated?

When did zkSNACKs promise you government approved coins?

Step 1 of "Exchange your BTC for Monero" is where the privacy is lost since your Bitcoin transaction history is revealed to your exchange counterparty

Public ledger is public. My Bitcoin transaction history is already accessible by everyone. Exchanging for Monero is where the tracing stops, just as when you do coinjoins. To put it this way: arguing that, is like saying coinjoining is weak, because the coordinator knows the coins' history.

[Kruw]

Are you going to go back to suggesting that we can run our own coordinators if we don't agree to what zkSNACKS is doing?

Open source solves your problem which is why I keep suggesting it.  If your notes were censored by a Nostr relay, then I would tell you the same thing:  Run your own relay.  Your obsession about the reasons why some other Nostr relay isn't storing your notes is no longer your problem and not really interesting in the first place.  I do the same thing when opening Lightning channels:  Attempt a new peer if I am rejected by my first choice.  I don't open a petition against Lightning software development companies because they don't want to accept my channel, I can use simply use their software to connect to any node.

[philipma1957]

You are using the terms "partnership" and "cooperation" to describe a relationship between a customer and a business, which is misleading.  There are companies whose business model involves aggregating reports of coins being stolen, and zkSNACKs buys those reports in order to avoid accepting those stolen coins.  If zkSNACKs were to buy a McDonald's hamburger, that does not mean "zkSNACKs is partnering with McDonald's".

Wasabi or zkSNACKs aren't private customers, though. They are businesses using the services of other business entities (blockchain analysis) whose version of the truth and estimation affects their own operations. In other words, you accept the decision of the blockchain analysis company's views regarding the cleanliness of my UTXOs. My participation in your coinjoins depends on the truth the blockchain analysis firm serves to you. I call that a partnership and cooperation. You are free to use any other terms you like.

How do you know stolen coins are getting rejected? You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly?
According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?
Who made that list and in whose name? What entity or government agency is responsible to maintain it, make changes, and decide what's good and what's bad?
Who do I get in touch with if my UTXOs were rejected for reasons unknown to me?

Being in possession of stolen money or other means of payments doesn't necessarily make the owner a thief. You do understand that money and crypto circulate. As someone involved in the crypto business, you should know that those rules your blockchain partners present to you can't be applied to cash and fiat, otherwise a lot of it would have to be confiscated and taken out of circulation because many bills had contact or were used in illegal actions at one point in their past.    

This is a good point what prevents a 'coin' from bring blacklisted.
What allows one to fight the claim that a coin is tainted.

A block analysis company can say you have a tainted coin so how do you check its methodology.

I think the concern is wasabi will be providing a piece of the puzzle to blockchain analysts not all the info but a piece of info.

[Pmalek]

Open source solves your problem which is why I keep suggesting it.

No, you keep suggesting it because you are avoiding to answer the questions. Where are the answers to my questions? Every time a tricky subject comes up that makes Wasabi or your coordinator look bad, you immediately divert attention to something else. I asked you why you have partnered with a blockchain analysis company and accept their inputs and views of what and how bitcoin should work and which coin are good and bad, and your response to that is the equivalent of let's not talk about that, but look at how we are giving donations to the Human Rights Foundation. Let's see if you will answer the questions now.

[Wind_FURY]

Let's give thanks to WasabiWallet for giving us this wonderful opportunity.

Did Wasabi hire you too?

HIRE me? Is that an accusation? Or are you merely too stupid to recognize sarcasm?

How dare you.

Are you saying that we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if our Wasabi CoinJoined UTXOs are blocked, locked, and confiscated?

When did zkSNACKs promise you government approved coins?

Then according to that, we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if a government entity, or an exchange, blocks, locks, or confiscates our coins because they are "tainted" even after going through Wasabi-CoinJoin?

That question goes to you too, Kruw.

[Kruw]

Open source solves your problem which is why I keep suggesting it.

No, you keep suggesting it because you are avoiding to answer the questions. Where are the answers to my questions? Every time a tricky subject comes up that makes Wasabi or your coordinator look bad, you immediately divert attention to something else. I asked you why you have partnered with a blockchain analysis company and accept their inputs and views of what and how bitcoin should work and which coin are good and bad, and your response to that is the equivalent of let's not talk about that, but look at how we are giving donations to the Human Rights Foundation. Let's see if you will answer the questions now.

I thought it was obvious your questions were rhetorical... but I'll answer them since you won't move on to the topic of open source software until you hear from me:

How do you know stolen coins are getting rejected? You keep talking about open-source, where can we see these rules publicly?

I don't know.

According to whose criteria will certain UTXOs be added to whatever list is being used to determine naughtiness of coins?

I don't know.

Who made that list and in whose name? What entity or government agency is responsible to maintain it, make changes, and decide what's good and what's bad?

I don't know.

Who do I get in touch with if my UTXOs were rejected for reasons unknown to me?

I don't know.

Then according to that, we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if a government entity, or an exchange, blocks, locks, or confiscates our coins because they are "tainted" even after going through Wasabi-CoinJoin?

That question goes to you too, Kruw.

I don't know.

[BlackHatCoiner]

HIRE me? Is that an accusation? Or are you merely too stupid to recognize sarcasm?

Yes, I'm the one incapable of recognizing sarcasm...  

Then according to that, we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if a government entity, or an exchange, blocks, locks, or confiscates our coins because they are "tainted" even after going through Wasabi-CoinJoin?

Obviously no. What made you think so?

Where are the answers to my questions?

You're asking the wrong person. Here you go: https://www.coinfirm.com/contact/.

The default coordinator knows nothing as far as I can tell from the unit tests. As I have said before, the default coordinator initiates a requests for every coinjoin in Coinfirm, they get the input (which is the list of the wanna-be-mixed inputs) and with probably no questioning select which coin is "naughty", remove it from the array and return it to the coordinator. In fact, in that thread we've covered how a Sybil attack could be executed that way.

[Kruw]

In fact, in that thread we've covered how a Sybil attack could be executed that way.

Not with WabiSabi, you can detect this happening since you can register multiple inputs independently:

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol is uniquely resilient against the sort of Sybil attack you just described, I explain how a malicious coordinator can be detected by clients here: https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1643265823409143810

[BlackHatCoiner]

Not with WabiSabi, you can detect this happening since you can register multiple inputs independently

You register 10 (non-private) inputs, and 1 of them gets rejected, what is your conclusion? To me, absolutely none. Coinfirm might have deemed this one input as inappropriate, or it might be trying to get rid of some coinjoin inputs, so they can use theirs instead and de-anonymize the remaining registered inputs. Who knows. For instance, a 150-input long coinjoin can have its 75 inputs rejected, and replaced with 75 Coinfirm inputs. That leaves the firm with 50% less output set to account for.

[Wind_FURY]

HIRE me? Is that an accusation? Or are you merely too stupid to recognize sarcasm?

Yes, I'm the one incapable of recognizing sarcasm...  

OK, then I beg for forgiveness ser. Haha. But the same hypothesis, I want people to "clean" their UTXOs from "taint" and send "dirty" UTXOs from the Dark Markets through Wasabi's CoinJoin by first going through JoinMarket -> Lightning Network -> Bitcoin blockchain, then Wasabi. They could also add Samourai for another layer before Wasabi.

Then according to that, we can sue zkSNACKS for false advertising if a government entity, or an exchange, blocks, locks, or confiscates our coins because they are "tainted" even after going through Wasabi-CoinJoin?

That question goes to you too, Kruw.

I don't know.

You don't know? But a centralized entity making claims such as zkSNACKS should be regulated by an authority in case those claims aren't real, no? That's probably something to think about.

[Kruw]

Not with WabiSabi, you can detect this happening since you can register multiple inputs independently

You register 10 (non-private) inputs, and 1 of them gets rejected, what is your conclusion? To me, absolutely none.

Given that 9 out of the 10 inputs were accepted, you can conclude the round is not under attack since 9 out of 10 would have to be rejected for the attack to be effective.

[BlackHatCoiner]

But the same hypothesis, I want people to "clean" their UTXOs from "taint"

If by "taint", you mean the list of coins which are treated unequally by chain analysis firms (some of which do get funded by the US government), then we actually don't know what will happen, and probably neither any Wasabi developer knows. As I said, their coordinator makes a request to Coinfirm and will enforce that UTXO list to the coinjoin round. Your coins could be accepted even if you're wanted by the FBI, or could be refused even if you're innocent.

You don't know? But a centralized entity making claims such as zkSNACKS should be regulated by an authority in case those claims aren't real, no?

I still don't get where you're confused. Which claim by zkSNACKs is false if they approve a coin which is deemed as "naughty" by some chain analysis firm?

Given that 9 out of the 10 inputs were accepted, you can conclude the round is not under attack since 9 out of 10 would have to be rejected for the attack to be effective.

If random inputs are getting rejected, shouldn't that be a concern since the chain analysis company may be trying to weaken the coinjoin by replacing the rejected coins with theirs?

[Pmalek]

I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.

That's exactly what I wanted to hear, thank you. You don't know! You (as in Wasabi and zkSNACKs, not you personally) have no idea what are good and what are bad coins. You don't know the reason someone isn't allowed to improve their privacy. They don't tell you. You accept the decisions made by Coinfirm without asking, hey, what exactly is wrong with those UTXOs?

Why would a company that preaches openness accept unknown rules and requirements by someone that doesn't explain to them those same rules and requirements? If there is such a thing as dirty bitcoins, don't you think everyone should know what that is and not rely on some weird entity that presents that information to you for whatever reasons they think they should?   

[Kruw]

Given that 9 out of the 10 inputs were accepted, you can conclude the round is not under attack since 9 out of 10 would have to be rejected for the attack to be effective.

If random inputs are getting rejected, shouldn't that be a concern since the chain analysis company may be trying to weaken the coinjoin by replacing the rejected coins with theirs?

You should be concerned of an active Sybil attacker regardless of whether other inputs are rejected or not.  Mining fees prevent continuous attacks, large sized rounds prevent single attacks.

I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.
...
I don't know.

That's exactly what I wanted to hear, thank you. You don't know! You (as in Wasabi and zkSNACKs, not you personally) have no idea what are good and what are bad coins. You don't know the reason someone isn't allowed to improve their privacy. They don't tell you. You accept the decisions made by Coinfirm without asking, hey, what exactly is wrong with those UTXOs?

Why would a company that preaches openness accept unknown rules and requirements by someone that doesn't explain to them those same rules and requirements? If there is such a thing as dirty bitcoins, don't you think everyone should know what that is and not rely on some weird entity that presents that information to you for whatever reasons they think they should?  

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

[BlackHatCoiner]

You should be concerned of an active Sybil attacker regardless of whether other inputs are rejected or not.  Mining fees prevent continuous attacks, large sized rounds prevent single attacks.

Maybe you should be concerned a little more if you're voluntarily giving the power to a chain analysis company to decide to execute the Sybil attack more trivially?

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

Here you are, engaging in whataboutism for the billionth time. This isn't what Pmalek asked you. It's pretty simple to grasp, but apparently not as simple to ignore it: the company responsible for Wasabi is preaching about openness and transparency. Why would it let a chain analysis company, which is described by the lack of both openness and transparency, decide who isn't allowed to coinjoin?

[Kruw]

You should be concerned of an active Sybil attacker regardless of whether other inputs are rejected or not.  Mining fees prevent continuous attacks, large sized rounds prevent single attacks.

Maybe you should be concerned a little more if you're voluntarily giving the power to a chain analysis company to decide to execute the Sybil attack more trivially?

Coordinators do not have the power to execute Sybil attacks without being detected, so coordinators cannot delegate such a power to a chain analysis company.

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

Here you are, engaging in whataboutism for the billionth time. This isn't what Pmalek asked you. It's pretty simple to grasp, but apparently not as simple to ignore it: the company responsible for Wasabi is preaching about openness and transparency. Why would it let a chain analysis company, which is described by the lack of both openness and transparency, decide who isn't allowed to coinjoin?

BlackHatCoiner, why haven't you set up a WabiSabi coordinator yet?  Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Coordinators do not have the power to execute Sybil attacks without being detected, so coordinators cannot delegate such a power to a chain analysis company.

I mean, definitely a lie. A coordinator randomly rejecting inputs can do quite noticeable harm to the coinjoin.

BlackHatCoiner, why haven't you set up a WabiSabi coordinator yet?

Because I want to be as much detached from Wasabi as possible. You can call it dogma, but I just don't want to run their software, especially when there are better alternatives. There have been multiple accusations of it being flawed, and I don't have the liquidity to make an attractive coordinator, which is pretty much the same for the average coinjoin user. I'm also encouraged to work on more decentralized solutions, like Joinmarket which is by the way more Sybil resistant than Wasabi, as it utilizes fidelity bonds.

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Lol. As if there are no other solutions proposed? Just because we don't run our own Wasabi coordinators, it doesn't mean we don't get along other privacy options.

[ABCbits]

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Isn't it obvious most people doesn't have necessary skill or experience to run their own server (whether it's WabiSabi coordinator or something else)? For example, if i show people these repository and ask which one needed to run WasiSabi coordinator, i wonder how many of them could give correct answer.
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WabiSabi
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/NWabiSabi
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi

Most people is more likely to run different CoinJoin wallet/application or even using mixer (which is custodial by nature).

[Pmalek]

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

You have what it takes to one day make it in politics. You are excellent in avoiding to talk about problems and immediately attempting to switch attention to something or someone else. You answer questions with counter questions to avoid the answering of questions. I knew exactly what I wanted to hear when I asked you about your blockchain analysis partners (yes, I said partners) and what my next response would be like. And because you have no answers, you are left with only two cards. Play the we are open-source card or everyone can run their own coordinator card, again because the software is open-source. Despite you knowing that's not the issue, you insist on playing those cards. No one is falling for your bluffs.

Attacks on centralized mixing services incoming 

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies? Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?
I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not? How can they prove that? And I don't understand the meaning of dirt coins. What if someone sold something illegal, got bitcoins, called me to repair her dishwasher and directly paid me from his bitcoin wallet? If her coins are dirty, I know that my work was hard sweat and honest job. Can CA or Wasabi analyze and sort those differences? No, so that's bullshit.
The solution is simple, don't cooperate with Chain Analyzes companies and no one will ever complain Wasabi.

[Kruw]

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Lol. As if there are no other solutions proposed? Just because we don't run our own Wasabi coordinators, it doesn't mean we don't get along other privacy options.

^ More proof of the petitioners trying to harm the reputation of open source software.  BlackHatCoiner started a self moderated topic so he could lie about Wasabi without anyone being able to post to expose his lies.  This is truly cowardly behavior.

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Isn't it obvious most people doesn't have necessary skill or experience to run their own server (whether it's WabiSabi coordinator or something else)?

Saying "I don't want to run a node" isn't a good excuse for not using Bitcoin, we won the block size war so you don't have any reason not to.  If you don't have the necessary skill or experience to run your own node, you can continue to use Paypal just like the rest of the fiat slaves.

You have what it takes to one day make it in politics. You are excellent in avoiding to talk about problems and immediately attempting to switch attention to something or someone else. You answer questions with counter questions to avoid the answering of questions. I knew exactly what I wanted to hear when I asked you about your blockchain analysis partners (yes, I said partners) and what my next response would be like. And because you have no answers, you are left with only two cards. Play the we are open-source card or everyone can run their own coordinator card, again because the software is open-source. Despite you knowing that's not the issue, you insist on playing those cards. No one is falling for your bluffs.

I answered all your questions already so we could move this conversation forward:  Why would you participate in a petition to have open source privacy software removed from Bitcointalk since you can solve any problems of arbitrary censorship by running your own coordinator?

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

Correct, Tor and compact block filters prevent any two addresses from being linked together by network connections.  However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

[BlackHatCoiner]

As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right?

Chain analysis companies can't directly trace the activity of Wasabi users, but the particular firm that is funded by zkSNACKs is capable of directly harming the coinjoin anonymity set.

Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

According to their blog, that was necessary for their survival:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?

I mean, isn't it crystal clear already? But to detect dirty coins! If the full-transparency-and-privacy company won't cooperate with a chain analysis company in secret to ensure no stolen coins are being coinjoined, then how the hell will Bitcoin be fungible?  

I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not?

Chain analysis is fundamentally not accurate and evidently not scientific, so your concern is reasonable: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5464886.0

Can CA or Whirlwind analyze and sort those differences?

Umm... How's whirlwind relevant here?

[Wind_FURY]

But the same hypothesis, I want people to "clean" their UTXOs from "taint"

If by "taint", you mean the list of coins which are treated unequally by chain analysis firms (some of which do get funded by the US government), then we actually don't know what will happen, and probably neither any Wasabi developer knows.

That's the one. "Taint" enforced by "their" definition. Let's teach other plebs how to remove the "taint" by having them pass through Wasabi's CoinJoin.

 

As I said, their coordinator makes a request to Coinfirm and will enforce that UTXO list to the coinjoin round. Your coins could be accepted even if you're wanted by the FBI, or could be refused even if you're innocent.

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

You don't know? But a centralized entity making claims such as zkSNACKS should be regulated by an authority in case those claims aren't real, no?

I still don't get where you're confused. Which claim by zkSNACKs is false if they approve a coin which is deemed as "naughty" by some chain analysis firm?

I'm merely talking about a hypothetical situation.

From a user's viewpoint, zkSNACKs' coordinator checks if the UTXOs are tainted before they pass through, no? Then the user should assume that all UTXOs that CoinJoined through Wasabi are not tainted. BUT what if the user still had his UTXOs blocked or confiscated by another centralized entity because of claims that they were "tainted". Who would be responsible for this problem?

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

Correct, Tor and compact block filters prevent any two addresses from being linked together by network connections.  However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

I had more questions than that.

Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

According to their blog, that was necessary for their survival:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?

I mean, isn't it crystal clear already? But to detect dirty coins! If the full-transparency-and-privacy company won't cooperate with a chain analysis company in secret to ensure no stolen coins are being coinjoined, then how the hell will Bitcoin be fungible?  

According to their blog article, they had to cooperate with Chain Analyzes company in order to not close Wasabi wallet service but at the same time it was done proactively. That's understandable but by doing so, they simply destroyed what they built up.
So, as far as I understood, Wasabi analyzes who sends coins for coinjoin to prevent coins from so called 'blacklisted' addresses, this is where you are identified, right? But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not?

Chain analysis is fundamentally not accurate and evidently not scientific, so your concern is reasonable: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5464886.0

That's 100% right, chain analysis is not accurate, so I don't understand the point of their proactivity in this case.

Can CA or Whirlwind analyze and sort those differences?

Umm... How's whirlwind relevant here?

Sorry, that was a typo, I had to write Wasabi, already edited my post, thanks. I don't know why but I typed Whirlwind instead of Wasabi

[Kruw]

But as we know, most Bitcoiner doesn't bother run full node even when they have skill, experience or resource to do so. And i doubt running WabiSabi coordinator is as easy as running full node. For example, Bitcoin Core have GUI, various installer option and good default setting.

Stop doubting, start running: https://i.imgur.com/dA1YkUp.png

I had more questions than that.

I only know the answers about how Wasabi works, I do not know the answers for your questions about how chain analysis works.

But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

No.  Wasabi coinjoin coordinators cannot match outputs to inputs.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

If Coinfirm deems this "naughty", it will be rejected. The point of discriminating against some "naughty coins" is to create the perfect environment so that large corporations like Binance can justify requesting all that ton of KYC info when you make an account, which in addition is extremely useful for a surveillance state.

Quoting myself:

Blockchain analysis companies are the practice of "being guilty until proven innocent". Living under a state which can put me behind the bars because I might be involved with some activity, with absolutely no scientific evidence is totalitarian. Literally everyone in the blockchain is potentially involved in some illegal activity.

But it's just genius. They've convinced the world that it's needed. A weapon to intrude into people's liberty and having them voluntarily handing it over is just the ultimate weapon.

But as we know, most Bitcoiner doesn't bother run full node even when they have skill, experience or resource to do so.

Additionally, they don't even have a guide which would make setup easier for the average person. The only thing relevant with that in their documentation is this:

Is the Backend's (Coordinator) code open-source?

Yes, you can verify the code on GitHub

Extreme desire for decentralization there.

So, as far as I understood, Wasabi analyzes who sends coins for coinjoin to prevent coins from so called 'blacklisted' addresses, this is where you are identified, right? But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

Wasabi wallet (the software) doesn't know who you are, and in fact it uses pretty decent techniques to protect your privacy like block filtering. But, the company responsible for the vast majority of WabiSabi coinjoins (which as far as I'm aware of, runs the only public coordinator), uses coinjoin fees to fund the operation of a surveillance firm, which will indeed spy on you.

That's 100% right, chain analysis is not accurate, so I don't understand the point of their proactivity in this case.

Maybe. I say maybe, Wasabi team was offered some good amount of money for that. This is complete conspiracy, but I say maybe. 

User n0nce had sent them a letter, you can grab a snack and read their funny answers in here: Wasabi blacklisting update - open letter / 24 questions discussion thread.

[Kruw]

Start running, but how? Can you point me to any documentation or guide? That screenshot seems to be from Wasabi Wallet, but last time i tried it[1] such feature/option doesn't seem to exist.

[1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5402090.msg60506242#msg60506242

The screenshot I posted is of the WabiSabi plugin on my BTCPay Server, which easily allows anyone to run a coinjoin coordinator.

[Pmalek]

Why would you participate in a petition to have open source privacy software removed from Bitcointalk since you can solve any problems of arbitrary censorship by running your own coordinator?

Three things.

1. Your open-source software with its default settings working with the default coordinator isn't privacy software.
2. This petition concerns a request to have Wasabi removed from bitcoin.org, not Bitcointalk.
3. If you paid more attention to my previous posts instead of coming up with innovative ways to dodge questions, you would notice that I am not for removing the privacy-invasive Wasabi wallet from bitcoin.org. But I am for lowering its privacy ratings as I mentioned earlier. And since you are going to say that the code is open-source and I can run my own coordinator, I am still for lowering the wallet's privacy rating.

However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

You have no way to know that. You don't know if that is true. You are a trustless entity that relies on a blackbox to tell you what is acceptable and what is not with no way of verifying the accuracy of the information.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question. 

[NotATether]

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question. 

If zksnacks evaporates, then some whale will just create another coordinator that works with Wasabi. It's not rocket-science to bootstrap a coordinator, as there is an open-source repo with instructions somewhere on Github.

Wasabi Wallet has not quite become more unknown despite its popularity tanking over the last couple months. So in any case I find it highly unlikely that coinjoining will suddenly fail on Wasabi for whatever reason.

[BlackHatCoiner]

1. Your open-source software with its default settings working with the default coordinator isn't privacy software.

The funny part is that their legal document describes the terms of use in a way that you I assume there is one coordinator. It's as if there is no other coordinator, or desire to run a separate coordinator. The software is released under the MIT license, but there is a very strict list of terms you need to agree on to use it. And I still haven't got anything in response to that. (I genuinely don't know what's the legal approach for a person who isn't affiliated with Wasabi, but want to run their own instance of Wasabi backend)

You have no way to know that. You don't know if that is true. You are a trustless entity that relies on a blackbox to tell you what is acceptable and what is not with no way of verifying the accuracy of the information.

This is as simple as that. I really don't know why we've extended this discussion so far. They're like presenting themselves as transparent, but then pay someone to tell them who they believe is a criminal with no evidence? And also, how valuable can this information be for an entity that protects privacy? I just don't get it.

[Medusah]

I have closed the github issue.  I will pull a request correcting these:

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default. This means a third party must be trusted to not hide or simulate payments.

Prevents spying on your payments

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance and payments by rotating addresses. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

I think these descriptions are more accurate:

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default which blacklists certain coins if they come from illicit activities according to chain analysis.

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance using coinjoin, however with default settings, coordinator will use coinjoin fees to fund chain analysis. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

I want to read your feedback on this.  What do you think it would be more appropriate?

[Kruw]

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default which blacklists certain coins if they come from illicit activities according to chain analysis.

This is wrong, you do not rely on a centralized service that can blacklist your coins.

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance using coinjoin, however with default settings, coordinator will use coinjoin fees to fund chain analysis. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

This section is about Wasabi implementing BIP32, coinjoin functionality isn't mentioned.  What makes you think the most relevant information to educate users who are introduced to the coinjoin function is a single item on the expense side of the default coinjoin coordinator company's balance sheet?  Do you think that all wallets that do not offer coinjoin functionality at all should have their privacy downgraded or a warning attached since you think the concept of not using coinjoins is something the user be intimately aware of?

[goldkingcoiner]

*snip*

Pretty much — the user should just be responsible enough to do at least a little bit of digging before using a certain wallet service/feature. Because if we'd like to delist every wallet that has some controversy, we'd probably run out of wallet to list besides Bitcoin Core.

Plus Bitcoin.org is probably just following its own business model as an info-aggregation website. I do not see them removing anything from their current recommendations as they probably got a lot of money to list them in there in the first place. It's all about the money, I think.

Which I personally believe to be a good thing. Bitcoin promotion is very important, and as long as that profit goes towards expanding the adoption rate of Bitcoin, I am all for it.

[Wind_FURY]

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

If Coinfirm deems this "naughty", it will be rejected. The point of discriminating against some "naughty coins" is to create the perfect environment so that large corporations like Binance can justify requesting all that ton of KYC info when you make an account, which in addition is extremely useful for a surveillance state.

Then how can users be sure that centralized mixers themselves don't use Coinfirm or the services of blockchain analysis companies? To be frank, I believe it's merely a trade-off for mixers to protect themselves from the state, but like you posted it could be an attack vector.

Quoting myself:

Blockchain analysis companies are the practice of "being guilty until proven innocent". Living under a state which can put me behind the bars because I might be involved with some activity, with absolutely no scientific evidence is totalitarian. Literally everyone in the blockchain is potentially involved in some illegal activity.

But it's just genius. They've convinced the world that it's needed. A weapon to intrude into people's liberty and having them voluntarily handing it over is just the ultimate weapon.

The question is for Kruw and the developers of mixers that use the services of blockchain analysis companies. If all UTXOs are "guilty until proven innocent", how can users refute evaluations that are "false-positives"?

[NotATether]

The question is for Kruw and the developers of mixers that use the services of blockchain analysis companies. If all UTXOs are "guilty until proven innocent", how can users refute evaluations that are "false-positives"?

They can't, because you can't prove a negative.

[Pmalek]

If zksnacks evaporates, then some whale will just create another coordinator that works with Wasabi. It's not rocket-science to bootstrap a coordinator, as there is an open-source repo with instructions somewhere on Github.

I know. But that's not exactly what I wanted to hear from Kruw about Wasabi and the importance/nonimportance of zkSNACKs.He didn't reply, still I will keep my thoughts secret until/if he does say exactly what I want him to. He seems to be more careful this time around.   

[BlackHatCoiner]

I do not see them removing anything from their current recommendations as they probably got a lot of money to list them in there in the first place. It's all about the money, I think.

Do you have any evidence they're getting paid by all that open-source wallets? I'm pretty confident they don't. As far as I remember, bitcoin.org is living off donations.

Wasabi Wallet has not quite become more unknown despite its popularity tanking over the last couple months. So in any case I find it highly unlikely that coinjoining will suddenly fail on Wasabi for whatever reason.

In this forum we've prosecuted it, and to the best of my knowledge, I see an increasing number of people becoming frustrated with the recent blacklisting update. What data do we possess regarding coinjoin volume?

Edit: I found this from the Wasabi thread: https://stats.wasabiwallet.io/search/45/from2023-08-14/to2023-09-14. It does have quite large volume.

[Kruw]

If zksnacks evaporates, then some whale will just create another coordinator that works with Wasabi. It's not rocket-science to bootstrap a coordinator, as there is an open-source repo with instructions somewhere on Github.

I know. But that's not exactly what I wanted to hear from Kruw about Wasabi and the importance/nonimportance of zkSNACKs.He didn't reply, still I will keep my thoughts secret until/if he does say exactly what I want him to. He seems to be more careful this time around.   

Why do you keep asking me rhetorical questions?

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question. 

No one at any point suggested that Bitcoin would have problems if zkSNACKs disappeared.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Why do you keep asking me rhetorical questions?

Why do you keep ignoring the points everyone has made about zkSNACKs, the company responsible for the prosperity of Wasabi?

No one at any point suggested that Bitcoin would have problems if zkSNACKs disappeared.

I mean, aren't you tired lying yet? In the blacklisting blog post, it literally says that if zkSNACKs were discontinued, Bitcoin's privacy would be a lot worse.

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

They've literally meant that if the default coordinator is shut down, the Bitcoin's privacy, other coordinators included, will be set back for decades.

[Kruw]

Why do you keep ignoring the points everyone has made about zkSNACKs, the company responsible for the prosperity of Wasabi?

I've never ignored anyone's points, I've directly addressed everyone's points by offering an immediate solution:  Copy and paste zkSNACKs' open source coordinator code.  They literally did all the work for you, their business can be yours with CTRL + C, and instead, the losers on this thread are instructing people not to use Wasabi at all.

The reason you refuse to accept this solution is because you would not be able to steal anyone's coins if you ran a coordinator.  As you've already established from your collaborations with Chipmixer, Whirlwind.Money, and Betnomi, you understand that stealing users' coins is a crucial part of the business model that allows them to pay you such massive rates for luring new victims.

I mean, aren't you tired lying yet? In the blacklisting blog post, it literally says that if zkSNACKs were discontinued, Bitcoin's privacy would be a lot worse.

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

They've literally meant that if the default coordinator is shut down, the Bitcoin's privacy, other coordinators included, will be set back for decades.

I agree Bitcoin privacy would be worse given zkSNACKs' huge investments into it over the past 7 years.  But that wasn't the question Pmalek asked, was it?  Look closely:

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question.  

As you can see, he dropped the word "Privacy" from the claim and then smugly called his statement "bait" to see if I would notice.  I noticed, but apparently you did not.

[Pmalek]

Why do you keep asking me rhetorical questions?

Because I want you to say what I already knew. In my first bait attempt, I wanted to hear that you have no idea what your blockchain analysis partners blacklist, deem unfit for coinjoining, and also that you don't care. You, the advocates of privacy and openness care not one bit about the secrecy that the opponents of Bitcoin and your partners present to you. That part is done. Now I want to hear something else, but judging by one of your sentences in one of your previous replies, you either figured it out or you aren't going to contradict yourself.

No one at any point suggested that Bitcoin would have problems if zkSNACKs disappeared.

You did, as BlackHatCoiner showed.

The reason you refuse to accept this solution is because you would not be able to steal anyone's coins if you ran a coordinator.  As you've already established from your collaborations with Chipmixer, Whirlwind.Money, and Betnomi, you understand that stealing users' coins is a crucial part of the business model that allows them to pay you such massive rates for luring new victims.

Oh, did he hit a nerve? Is that frustration and anger I am sensing? What else could be the reason that you are going back to your 'BlackHatCoiner is a thief' card?

[Kruw]

Oh, did he hit a nerve? Is that frustration and anger I am sensing? What else could be the reason that you are going back to your 'BlackHatCoiner is a thief' card?

I don't understand the point of this trolling?  Are you suggesting you shouldn't be angry at BlackHatCoiner for partnering with these businesses to steal money from Bitcointalk users?

[BlackHatCoiner]

I've never ignored anyone's points, I've directly addressed everyone's points by offering an immediate solution:  Copy and paste zkSNACKs' open source coordinator code.

Lol. Rewriting the backend software from scratch is also an alternative. Can you provide us some guidance on how can this be done? Sort of like step by step. I've seen no one using a different coordinator, let alone to have the skill set to set it up themselves.

The reason you refuse to accept this solution is because you would not be able to steal anyone's coins if you ran a coordinator.

That's right. This is why I'm an advocate of Whirlpool and Monero.  

As you've already established from your collaborations with Chipmixer, Whirlwind.Money, and Betnomi, you understand that stealing users' coins is a crucial part of the business model that allows them to pay you such massive rates for luring new victims.

Alright, time to stop repeating this horseshit. ChipMixer did not steal coins. It got confiscated by the German authorities. Yes, people lost money, but by the German feds. As for whirlwind: the manager of their campaign paid out the victims using whirlwind's money. (Betnomi is a casino, and I find it irrelevant)

I agree Bitcoin privacy would be worse given zkSNACKs' huge investments into it over the past 7 years.  But that wasn't the question Pmalek asked, was it?

Pmalek literally asked you what's the problem with zkSNACKs suddenly disappearing, given that Wasabi can operate normally without them. Then you literally said nobody suggested Bitcoin would have problems with that. Then, I quoted the part where zkSNACKs literally said there would be.

Literally.

[Kruw]

Can you provide us some guidance on how can this be done? Sort of like step by step.

Go to your node and check the "Enable Coordinator" button on your BTCPay Server WabiSabi coinjoin plugin:

Stop doubting, start running: https://i.imgur.com/dA1YkUp.png

I've seen no one using a different coordinator

Yes you have:

Yep.  Anyone who feels brave enough to copy and paste the coordinator code can do so.  Others have already because they actually care about what they are saying: https://t.me/WasabiWallet/70611

Alright, time to stop repeating this horseshit. ChipMixer did not steal coins. It got confiscated by the German authorities. Yes, people lost money, but by the German feds. As for whirlwind: the manager of their campaign paid out the victims using whirlwind's money. (Betnomi is a casino, and I find it irrelevant)

Wow, are they still paying you to cover up for them?  Please stop trying to convince new victims that ChipMixer was not a scam after Bitcointalk users already confirmed they got their money stolen:

~snip~
Even my chips which I had in chipmixer service for which they claimed to "delete private" keys after 7 days or whatever, were seized/transfered.
and these transactions took place good 3 months ago.

It seems that you are right, whoever had vouchers or chips was left without them. I checked some old wallets older than 1 year that only contained chips from CM, and they were all emptied. Yes, it's a bit stupid that I didn't spend them, but honestly I forgot about a few $ in those old wallets. It's really strange that it wasn't all deleted, but now we at least know where even 7GB of data came from.

Can confirm, they stole a chip of mine a friend of mine that he hadn't yet spent. :/ Really fucking bad practice of ChipMixer to keep private keys, not gonna lie.

Pmalek literally asked you what's the problem with zkSNACKs suddenly disappearing, given that Wasabi can operate normally without them. Then you literally said nobody suggested Bitcoin would have problems with that. Then, I quoted the part where zkSNACKs literally said there would be.

Literally.

It appears you still haven't noticed that Pmalek used sleight of hand and dropped the word "Privacy" from his question.  I'll highlight it since you still didn't catch the trick:

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question.  

Which you can see does not match the narrow claim made in Wasabi's blog post about zkSNACKs' impact on Bitcoin privacy development:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Go to your node and check the "Enable Coordinator" button on your BTCPay Server WabiSabi coinjoin plugin

I am not running BTCPay Server. Does Wasabi have a step by step for coordinator only, or is it just more user friendly with BTCPay installed?

Yes you have

My bad then. There is some Kevin who's running their own coordinator. Anyone else? Is there an extended list with alternative coordinators?

Wow, are they still paying you to cover up for them?  Please stop trying to convince new victims that ChipMixer was not a scam after Bitcointalk users already confirmed they got their money stolen

Lol, man. You're just hilarious. n0nce's "they" refers to the German authorities. Not the ChipMixer "they". Stop spreading FUD, it isn't going to be left unchallenged in this place.

It appears you still haven't noticed that Pmalek used sleight of hand and dropped the word "Privacy" from his question.

I know you're in love with semantics, but allow me to consider lack of Bitcoin privacy (as zkSNACKs put it) a Bitcoin problem (as Pmalek puts it).

[Kruw]

Go to your node and check the "Enable Coordinator" button on your BTCPay Server WabiSabi coinjoin plugin

I am not running BTCPay Server. Does Wasabi have a step by step for coordinator only, or is it just more user friendly with BTCPay installed?

BTCPay is more user friendly, but there is the step by step guide from Wasabi (it's not updated though): https://pastebin.com/i1KVfRUG

My bad then. There is some Kevin who's running their own coordinator. Anyone else? Is there an extended list with alternative coordinators?

Yes, like JoinMarket, you can list or pick from the WabiSabi coordinator orderbook (except you use Nostr for discovery): https://i.imgur.com/mE3AoMT.png

Lol, man. You're just hilarious. n0nce's "they" refers to the German authorities. Not the ChipMixer "they". Stop spreading FUD, it isn't going to be left unchallenged in this place.

Please read the quotes again.  Bitcointalk users reported having money stolen from private keys that ChipMixer said they had deleted:

~snip~
Even my chips which I had in chipmixer service for which they claimed to "delete private" keys after 7 days or whatever, were seized/transfered.
and these transactions took place good 3 months ago.

It seems that you are right, whoever had vouchers or chips was left without them. I checked some old wallets older than 1 year that only contained chips from CM, and they were all emptied. Yes, it's a bit stupid that I didn't spend them, but honestly I forgot about a few $ in those old wallets. It's really strange that it wasn't all deleted, but now we at least know where even 7GB of data came from.

Can confirm, they stole a chip of mine a friend of mine that he hadn't yet spent. :/ Really fucking bad practice of ChipMixer to keep private keys, not gonna lie.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Bad practice = Theft. Very rational.

[goldkingcoiner]

I do not see them removing anything from their current recommendations as they probably got a lot of money to list them in there in the first place. It's all about the money, I think.

Do you have any evidence they're getting paid by all that open-source wallets? I'm pretty confident they don't. As far as I remember, bitcoin.org is living off donations.

That would be very disappointing, because they could be making a lot of Bitcoin and helping the Bitcoin economy as well as encouraging the Bitcoin community. But if they choose to "live off of donations" like some Indian mountain guru, instead of developing a business plan and boosting the adoption of Bitcoin, then whatever. I judge not. I know a lot of people in the forum would disagree with me because we are all part of the open-source, charitable Bitcoin community, but if spending money boosts the economy in the current fiat economy, would that not do the same for the Bitcoin economy? I mean they do not have to go full capitalist and accept only the highest bidders, but they could put a price tag for their advertising. All I'm saying.

[Wind_FURY]

The question is for Kruw and the developers of mixers that use the services of blockchain analysis companies. If all UTXOs are "guilty until proven innocent", how can users refute evaluations that are "false-positives"?

They can't, because you can't prove a negative.

Or "WE can't". Because from their viewpoint if it's a validated positive, then it's a good illustration of the effectiveness of blockchain analytics. But if a "tainted" UTXO passed through, then it's merely an illustration that the blockchain analysis company should set up more filters.

The hypothesis that there might be two different prices between KYC-Bitcoin and "tainted" non-KYC-Bitcoin might start being a real issue when BlackRock and the other institutions/asset managers truly come in, no? Perhaps in five years?

[BlackHatCoiner]

That would be very disappointing, because they could be making a lot of Bitcoin and helping the Bitcoin economy as well as encouraging the Bitcoin community.

How would bitcoin.org accepting payments for adding wallet software in their page, improve the Bitcoin economy?

But if they choose to "live off of donations" like some Indian mountain guru, instead of developing a business plan and boosting the adoption of Bitcoin, then whatever.

Why would an informative page like this be a business? What service does it provide? Also, how would them being a business boost the adoption of bitcoin?

I mean they do not have to go full capitalist and accept only the highest bidders, but they could put a price tag for their advertising. All I'm saying.

Good, open-source wallets live off donations. If bidding was a thing, then the recommended wallets would be Binance, Kraken and Coinbase.

But if a "tainted" UTXO passed through, then it's merely an illustration that the blockchain analysis company should set up more filters.

You don't get it yet. Taint can be defined by any entity. I can right as well say that coinbase rewards are tainted. If I make the disclaimer that I will provide absolutely no evidence for my claim, then you can't disprove it, no matter how many chain analysis companies argue it is or isn't tainted.

[Pmalek]

I don't understand the point of this trolling?  Are you suggesting you shouldn't be angry at BlackHatCoiner for partnering with these businesses to steal money from Bitcointalk users?

The one trolling and lying maliciously not only about the nature of the company he works for and the partners they cooperate with, but also about other forum members is you. I just hope the moderators won't delete your posts like in the Wasabi thread so that everyone can see how low you've fallen.

Bad practice = Theft. Very rational.

This is Kruw's logic.
You owe me money and we are about to meet so you can pay me back. On your way to the meeting point, the police stop you asking for ID. You act suspicious, so they search you. At that point they find 3 grand in your bag, a knife and some marihuana for personal use. They confiscate everything and bring you in for questioning and perhaps holding for 24 hours in a cell. The fact we didn't meet and I didn't get my money, makes you a thief. Your arrest and/or confiscation of your belongings apparently doesn't change that.

Chipmixer deserves criticism for their storing of private keys longer than they said they would and lying about it. But do you @Kruw understand the difference between getting everything confiscated and stealing from your users? The fact that nothing happened to those keys for one year (in that one example) until the German government took everything shows you the difference between the two terms.     

[Kruw]

Chipmixer deserves criticism for their storing of private keys longer than they said they would and lying about it. But do you @Kruw understand the difference between getting everything confiscated and stealing from your users?

No, I don't understand:  Please explain why it matters to n0nce, Lucius, and james3441 that their coins from the private keys ChipMixer said they deleted were "confiscated" instead of "stolen".

[Pmalek]

Please explain why it matters to n0nce, Lucius, and james3441 that their coins from the private keys ChipMixer said they deleted were "confiscated" instead of "stolen".

Why it matters? Are you talking about the final result? The final result is that they no longer have access to those coins whose keys were stored on the confiscated ChipMixer server. So yes, if you are only talking about the aftermath of the incident, the result is that the coins are gone.

But you know very well that is not the point. You are not a stupid person not to know the difference. But I am getting the feeling that you sometimes act like it with the way you represent the wrong arguments. You have written multiple times that ChipMixer has stolen people's bitcoins and that isn't true. They got everything taken from them by the feds and the German authorities. So that's a big difference. They shouldn't have had the keys that were recovered from the servers, but that's a different topic of discussion.

What's even worse is that you have accused the likes of BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o of stealing coins themselves and being scammers. And you are acting stupid in that regard as well. And when I started calling you out for it, I got added to the list of scammers and thieves. You are very well aware that it's a lie but you are hoping someone will believe you. It's not going to work because there will always be those who will point out the difference.

Stop the act, it's getting old.

[Kruw]

Please explain why it matters to n0nce, Lucius, and james3441 that their coins from the private keys ChipMixer said they deleted were "confiscated" instead of "stolen".

Why it matters? Are you talking about the final result? The final result is that they no longer have access to those coins whose keys were stored on the confiscated ChipMixer server. So yes, if you are only talking about the aftermath of the incident, the result is that the coins are gone.

Thanks for confirming there is no difference.

They shouldn't have had the keys that were recovered from the servers, but that's a different topic of discussion.

It's the same topic because the stored private keys prove ChipMixer was a premeditated scam the entire time.

What's even worse is that you have accused the likes of BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o of stealing coins themselves and being scammers.

Yes, I make sure to keep proof of everyone's collaboration with scamming sites.

[Wind_FURY]

But if a "tainted" UTXO passed through, then it's merely an illustration that the blockchain analysis company should set up more filters.

You don't get it yet. Taint can be defined by any entity. I can right as well say that coinbase rewards are tainted. If I make the disclaimer that I will provide absolutely no evidence for my claim, then you can't disprove it, no matter how many chain analysis companies argue it is or isn't tainted.

Read the whole post. I'm making the same illustration like you. If the blockchain analysis companies find a positive = it validates the blockchain analytics' "effectiveness". BUT if they make a false negative = they could merely say they need to set up more filters. They may have put themselves in an idisputable position.

- There should be an analysis company that scans the analysis of the blockchain analysis companies.

[Pmalek]

Yes, I make sure to keep proof of everyone's collaboration with scamming sites.

No you don't. ChipMixer probably had 60-70 participants at the time the site got seized and went offline. You never mentioned anyone besides those questioning your 'we are the ultimate privacy tool' claims. Only those not agreeing with you were called thieves who have stolen bitcoin from Bitcointalk users in the past and are now looking for new ways to steal again. You don't seem to understand how advertising works.

That's just your unsuccessful way of trying to divert the discussion away from Wasabi, zkSNACKs, and your blockchain analysis partners to your fan fiction theories.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Thanks for confirming there is no difference.

There is clearly a difference between being a scammer, and having your business confiscated. The result to the victims is the same, but there is clearly a difference. I agree that the potential to lose customers' coins is a very high price to pay, and might not worth it. Better use a trustless option, like coinjoin or swap XMR.  

It's the same topic because the stored private keys prove ChipMixer was a premeditated scam the entire time.

That is true if ChipMixer had said they weren't keeping the private keys. As far as I can recall, they never argued they were deleting the private keys after the end of the session. They were only deleting the logs:

How long do you keep logs?

Your session lasts for 7 days. After that, your session and all its data will be removed. You can also destroy your session before time is up. We keep statistical data ie. how much was donated.

I do agree that not deleting the private keys wasn't good practice.

[Medusah]

"Proposal: adding a chain analysis warning in Wasabi wallet page".

https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4125

[NotATether]

"Proposal: adding a chain analysis warning in Wasabi wallet page".

https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4125

Well, it's not exactly

By default this wallet uses a central coordinator to coinjoin, which funds a chain analysis company.

unless something happened that I missed within the last 2 months, but you should mention more about the central coordinator's decision to send inputs to a chain analysis company (which is different from receiving money from them, which AFAIK we have no knowledge of such a thing happening).

In the same way, if exchanges were listed on bitcoin.org, I would classify them - the KYC ones at least - as potentially submitting information to chain analysis companies, but you might find such a tag difficult to get merged, because Bitcoin.org doesn't really list privacy-unfriendly services like exchanges in the first place.

[o_e_l_e_o]

unless something happened that I missed within the last 2 months, but you should mention more about the central coordinator's decision to send inputs to a chain analysis company (which is different from receiving money from them, which AFAIK we have no knowledge of such a thing happening).

zkSNACKs don't receive money from a blockchain analysis company, but rather the other way around - they pay a blockchain analysis to analyze any UTXOs which are trying to be coinjoined. Various members of the Wasabi team have confirmed that this is happening.

It is entirely fair to warn users that if they use Wasabi, the fee they are paying is directly being used to fund a blockchain analysis company to investigate their UTXOs.

[NotATether]

zkSNACKs don't receive money from a blockchain analysis company, but rather the other way around - they pay a blockchain analysis to analyze any UTXOs which are trying to be coinjoined. Various members of the Wasabi team have confirmed that this is happening.

It is entirely fair to warn users that if they use Wasabi, the fee they are paying is directly being used to fund a blockchain analysis company to investigate their UTXOs.

Oh, I thought they were giving them the transactions and receiving the analysis for free. But you make sense though.

This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?

If that doesn't come from zksnacks' pockets, it's almost definitely being (as you said) funded by the Wasabi users.

[Pmalek]

This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?

They don't want users with illegally obtained bitcoin to participate in coinjoins. One of the problems is that no one (not even Wasabi or zkSNACKs) knows what isn't allowed and why. They simply trust the decisions of their blockchain analysis partner. And don't bother asking them why they do it. If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project. Seeing as you are wearing the signature of a mixing service, they will throw in a few sentences about you advertising a scam and/or that you are a thief or scammer yourself. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

One of the problems is that no one (not even Wasabi or zkSNACKs) knows what isn't allowed and why. They simply trust the decisions of their blockchain analysis partner.

The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that. I refuse to believe that there is not even one Wasabi developer who has passed adultescence and reads the current Bitcoin affairs. They have deliberately bought nonsense to not risk seemed "against the government", or whatever. Haven't they realized they ignored the risk to lose legitimate Bitcoin users as clients?

If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project.

They even fund the Bitcoin Core development. It's just sad how things turned out, but ignoring these little incidents like this one, means admitting defeat to blockchain scamalysis.

[DaveF]

The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that. I refuse to believe that there is not even one Wasabi developer who has passed adultescence and reads the current Bitcoin affairs. They have deliberately bought nonsense to not risk seemed "against the government", or whatever. Haven't they realized they ignored the risk to lose legitimate Bitcoin users as clients?

But....it's been discussed that they are not really targeting you and me as their clients. But rather large corporate clients. So they don't care if they loose you and me.
WE don't pay for the wallet or service. But, they are looking to or have SOLD their services to big business. Those are the paying customers. That is what they want.

Ignore everything else and just look at it as a for profit business and who they are trying to market to.
'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.
Then their attitude seems logical.

-Dave

[o_e_l_e_o]

If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project.

Absolute peak whataboutism stupidity. SBF made a bunch of charitable donations too. Should we therefore excuse his mass fraud? I tell you what - if you send me 10 BTC, I'll donate 1 BTC to the HRF and keep the other 9 for myself, and that will be totally fine and not at all shady.

But, they are looking to or have SOLD their services to big business. Those are the paying customers. That is what they want.

Not just sell their services, but potentially sell the entire company: https://nitter.cz/SamouraiWallet/status/1708068554208117028#m

'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.

Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed and numerous examples of centralized exchanges still discriminating against coins form Wasabi coinjoins despite their cooperation with blockchain analysis.

[Kruw]

Absolute peak whataboutism stupidity. SBF made a bunch of charitable donations too. Should we therefore excuse his mass fraud? I tell you what - if you send me 10 BTC, I'll donate 1 BTC to the HRF and keep the other 9 for myself, and that will be totally fine and not at all shady.

There's no way to commit mass fraud with coinjoining.  Coinjoins are completely non custodial.  Only "Mixing sites" are fraudulent since they are able to steal coins from their users.

Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed

You are confused, only WHIRLPOOL coinjoins can be demixed.  WabiSabi coinjoins do not reveal common ownership or leave unmixable toxic change like Whirlpool:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

[DaveF]

'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.

Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed and numerous examples of centralized exchanges still discriminating against coins form Wasabi coinjoins despite their cooperation with blockchain analysis.

And I see ads for beer that tell me that if I drink their beer women will adore me and I'll be a party animal.
It's marketing good / bad / true / not true it does not matter it's marketing and people will believe what they want.

And, following that thought. The people Wasabi are marketing to can then market to their customers with the same stuff.
'Look we do this with that use our service'

-Dave

[Medusah]

There's no way to commit mass fraud with coinjoining.

I neither thought that was possible, until Wasabi literally announced they will be funding a mass surveillance company for the.. benefit of knowing who to blacklist?  If that is not dishonest towards your people, I do not know what is.

[Kruw]

I neither thought that was possible, until Wasabi literally announced they will be funding a mass surveillance company for the.. benefit of knowing who to blacklist?  If that is not dishonest towards your people, I do not know what is.

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

[Pmalek]

Not just sell their services, but potentially sell the entire company: https://nitter.cz/SamouraiWallet/status/1708068554208117028#m

You have got to love the wording there. Rejecting UTXOs that "potentially come from questionable sources." Maybe they do, maybe not, but it's not like we care so we are just going to reject it to be safe and be government-friendly.

And I see ads for beer that tell me that if I drink their beer women will adore me and I'll be a party animal.

You probably forgot your AXE body spray. It doesn't work without it.

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

Of course it isn't. How can it be when you are open-source and donating to TOR? If you do that, then it's completely fine paying a blockchain analysis company to tell you who deserves privacy and who doesn't based on no standards at all.
Now you can tell me how mixing services steal coins and sell customer data. I think it's the perfect opportunity to play that card.

[Kruw]

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

Of course it isn't. How can it be when you are open-source and donating to TOR? If you do that, then it's completely fine paying a blockchain analysis company to tell you who deserves privacy and who doesn't based on no standards at all.
Now you can tell me how mixing services steal coins and sell customer data. I think it's the perfect opportunity to play that card.

Acting sarcastic doesn't answer my question.  It just makes you look bitter.

If your arguments are reduced to sarcasm, then I've made my point effectively.

[BlackHatCoiner]

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency. The same team is engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter, while their software having a wide range of issues that have been extensively discussed in the Wasabi thread, and which are ignored by the people in charge.

These are rhetorical questions.

Acting sarcastic doesn't answer my question.  It just makes you look bitter.

At the first time. At the 100th time, sarcasm is the most deserved response.

[Kruw]

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency. The same team is engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter, while their software having a wide range of issues that have been extensively discussed in the Wasabi thread, and which are ignored by the people in charge.

These are rhetorical questions.

Those aren't questions at all, you just made a bunch of blatantly false statements, you didn't even bother to be sarcastic. Wasabi does not have a "wide range of issues" and their team is not "engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter".

The coinjoin protocol you are thinking of that has a "wide range of issues" that was covered extensively in the Wasabi thread is WHIRLPOOL, which is used by Samourai Wallet and Sparrow Wallet:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

Wasabi upgraded to the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol so no unmixable change is ever produced and common input is not revealed.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense. I've debunked the same post he has copy and pasted above multiple times over the last several months:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62413682#msg62413682
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5465398.msg62800032#msg62800032

The fact that he continues to post it when it is blatantly false, means either he doesn't understand anything about coinjoins or he knows what he is posting is a complete lie. Either way, he is not interested in discussion and only in pushing his agenda.

I've had him on ignore for months; I suggest everyone else does the same:

It's been clear for some time now that Kruw is either incapable or unwilling to address the vast myriad of valid points made against Wasabi in this thread, and instead can only result to copious amounts of hand-waving and whataboutism. Furthermore, it's also clear that Kruw either does not understand how Whirlpool and JoinMarket work, or he does understand but deliberate lies about them to spread his narrative.

Either way, although I'll continue to point out to other users in this thread all the reasons they should avoid Wasabi, there is no point continuing to argue with Kruw.

Anyone who wants to see the truth about Wasabi coinjoins being demixed, Wasabi doxxing their competitors, and Wasabi funding mass surveillance, can simply read the Wasabi thread. Any time he copies and pastes the same old nonsense again, just reply with a link to this post.

Back on topic here: It is entirely fair to warn people that zkSNACKs are directly funding the enemy.

[Synchronice]

This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?

As they claim, in order to ensure the survival of the project, they had to partner with Blockchain Analysis companies, read this: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update/
To be honest, I understand this step of theirs but they should be frank with their customers, Wasabi is not a good choice for privacy and it's a lie to pretend it is.

The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that.

That's the BOLD truth!

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?

Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency.

There is no threat for bitcoin, there are only opportunities to improve and become stronger. Bitcoin is not fixed like a statue, we can change code, improve it and implement new features. If there is a support from the community, which will be if there is a threat, we will be able to fork bitcoin and make it more powerful and resistant to threats. I believe, every problem is temporary for bitcoin.

Back on topic here: It is entirely fair to warn people that zkSNACKs are directly funding the enemy.

That's another BOLD truth!

[Kruw]

I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense. I've debunked the same post he has copy and pasted above multiple times over the last several months:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62413682#msg62413682
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5465398.msg62800032#msg62800032

Where's this "debunking" you claim to have performed?  In the post you linked above, you admitted these Whirlpool coinjoins all produced unmixed change and input consolidation that could be tracked:

The post doesn't even demonstrate that. It only demonstrates unmixed change being consolidated with other unmixed change.

If this user had upgraded to the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol, this tracing I performed would have never been possible because there would have been no unmixed change produced or common input ownership revealed.

The fact that he continues to post it when it is blatantly false, means either he doesn't understand anything about coinjoins or he knows what he is posting is a complete lie. Either way, he is not interested in discussion and only in pushing his agenda.

I've provided the proof, you can verify it for yourself. You can't hide from deanonymization if you use Whirlpool:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da

Anyone who wants to see the truth about Wasabi coinjoins being demixed, Wasabi doxxing their competitors, and Wasabi funding mass surveillance, can simply read the Wasabi thread. Any time he copies and pastes the same old nonsense again, just reply with a link to this post.

The Wasabi thread proves that WHIRLPOOL coinjoins can be demixed, not WabiSabi coinjoins.  Stop confusing the traceable Whirlpool coinjoin protocol used by Samourai Wallet and Sparrow Wallet with the untraceable WabiSabi coinjoin protocol used by Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, and Trezor.

Wasabi is not a good choice for privacy and it's a lie to pretend it is.

Wasabi is completely private: It protects your IP from being leaked with Tor, it prevents your xpub address from being leaked with block filters, and it protects your addresses from being linked together on chain with coinjoin.

[Pmalek]

I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense.

He is not going to get tired of sweeping the problems under the carpet and taking the attention away from those problems to other Wasabi features or explaining how other competitors are much worse, so please don't get tired of pointing out how full of shit he is. If you do, only his views and comments will remain and be taken as the truth because no one is contradicting them.

[Kruw]

He is not going to get tired of sweeping the problems under the carpet and taking the attention away from those problems to other Wasabi features or explaining how other competitors are much worse, so please don't get tired of pointing out how full of shit he is. If you do, only his views and comments will remain and be taken as the truth because no one is contradicting them.

No one is contradicting my claims because they are true.  That's why everyone just responds with sarcasm because they can't actually prove my claims to be untrue.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I've had him on ignore for months; I suggest everyone else does the same

I rarely put someone on ignore, but my patience has its limits. We have shown him evidence of Wasabi being flawed so many times that it has become tiresome. Every single time he ignores it and blames his competitors.

He's welcomed in my ignored list, but I suggest everyone to keep a gentle warning when encountering a wasabi shill in a random thread. Newbies should be informed about both sides of this drama, and make an informed decision based on compelling arguments.

[Synchronice]

Wasabi is not a good choice for privacy and it's a lie to pretend it is.

Wasabi is completely private: It protects your IP from being leaked with Tor, it prevents your xpub address from being leaked with block filters, and it protects your addresses from being linked together on chain with coinjoin.

I would love to take your side but I just can't. A company, that focuses on privacy, funds blockchain analyses company that focuses on destroying privacy. I would still close my eyes and say that's okay if blockchain analysis companies could really filter transactions well and would only block transactions involved in illegal activities but BA companies are a complete failure, they don't work as intended and to be honest, they are bullshit. Then, I think for a minute and understand that we are here because of privacy and that is the fundamental of bitcoin, so, there is a big no again to BAs.

[Kruw]

We have shown him evidence of Wasabi being flawed so many times that it has become tiresome.

You don't have any evidence Wasabi is flawed.  You are bluffing.

[Pmalek]

You don't have any evidence Wasabi is flawed.  You are bluffing.

Synchronice, the person who posted just before you and whose post you didn't comment on, offered a good explanation of why Wasabi together with your main coordinator (which is Wasabi all over again) is flawed. You are a supposed bitcoin privacy tool that funds a blockchain analysis company whose objective is to remove privacy. It's the equivalent of fighting against illegal drug trafficking, but holding regular business meetings with Mexican drug kings. They are interested in getting rid of the drugs as much as your blockchain analysis company is interested in helping people maintain their privacy.       

[Kruw]

Synchronice, the person who posted just before you and whose post you didn't comment on, offered a good explanation of why Wasabi together with your main coordinator (which is Wasabi all over again) is flawed. You are a supposed bitcoin privacy tool that funds a blockchain analysis company whose objective is to remove privacy. It's the equivalent of fighting against illegal drug trafficking, but holding regular business meetings with Mexican drug kings. They are interested in getting rid of the drugs as much as your blockchain analysis company is interested in helping people maintain their privacy.      

Would you call Nostr "flawed" if a relay doesn't store your notes?  Would you call Lightning "flawed" if a node doesn't accept your channel? If you think there's a "flaw" in Wasabi because another coordinator won't accept your coins, then why don't you run your own coordinator?  All the code is open source, you just don't seem to care enough about privacy to run it

Are you going to go back to suggesting that we can run our own coordinators if we don't agree to what zkSNACKS is doing?

Open source solves your problem which is why I keep suggesting it.  If your notes were censored by a Nostr relay, then I would tell you the same thing:  Run your own relay.  Your obsession about the reasons why some other Nostr relay isn't storing your notes is no longer your problem and not really interesting in the first place.  I do the same thing when opening Lightning channels:  Attempt a new peer if I am rejected by my first choice.  I don't open a petition against Lightning software development companies because they don't want to accept my channel, I can use simply use their software to connect to any node.

[Pmalek]

If you think there's a "flaw" in Wasabi because another coordinator won't accept your coins, then why don't you run your own coordinator?  All the code is open source...

Ah, yes, the good old you should run your own coordinator trick. You haven't used that in a while, I almost forgot that it's on your list. I wouldn't run my own coordinator for the reasons mentioned to you every time you brought it up in this and the other discussions you are active in. Remember, you have mentioned it at least 15-20 times? To be fair, we don't hear it as often as we are open-source, mixers are a scam, or the many variants of look at how flawed these other implementations are.

To sum up. You, the prophet of Bitcoin's ultimate privacy tool, suggests not using the software together with the default coordinator, the coordinator that Wasabi runs, making Wasabi and zkSNACKS the same. And because it's such a good privacy tool, it should be avoided and people should move away from zkSNACKS, Wasabi's main coordinator. If that isn't excellent advertising for your company, I don't know what is.   

[Kruw]

Ah, yes, the good old you should run your own coordinator trick. You haven't used that in a while, I almost forgot that it's on your list. I wouldn't run my own coordinator for the reasons mentioned to you every time you brought it up in this and the other discussions you are active in. Remember, you have mentioned it at least 15-20 times? To be fair, we don't hear it as often as we are open-source, mixers are a scam, or the many variants of look at how flawed these other implementations are.

To sum up. You, the prophet of Bitcoin's ultimate privacy tool, suggests not using the software together with the default coordinator, the coordinator that Wasabi runs, making Wasabi and zkSNACKS the same. And because it's such a good privacy tool, it should be avoided and people should move away from zkSNACKS, Wasabi's main coordinator. If that isn't excellent advertising for your company, I don't know what is.  

What are "the reasons mentioned to me every time I brought it up"?  You never responded at all when I told you to run your own coordinator, remember? 

Many users, me included, don't consider Wasabi a privacy tool anymore because your default and most popular Wasabi coordinator allows a malicious entity (blockchain analysis company) to tag UTXOs and put them in different categories based on their level of naughty.

Wasabi does not stop being privacy software just because a business does not want to accept your money.  You can use any coordinator with Wasabi, including your own.  The signers of this petition can simply coordinate coinjoins among themselves since they are all united in their decision not to use the default coordinator, and no one could stop you:

Peter Todd crushing the critics:  "I can do my own Wasabi coinjoin coordinator... If someone's complaining about this, go start your own damn coordinator."

https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=297

You didn't respond to me and Peter Todd with any reasons why you aren't running your own coordinator because there obviously aren't any reasons not to run your own coordinator.  Wasabi is free and open source software.

[Pmalek]

<Snip>

Stop acting stupid. You are not, so it doesn't suit you. Do a CTRL + F + "your own coordinator" or better yet, just "coordinator" and read through the responses of users when you brought it up. Not only in this thread, but all the others where you have been actively advertising Wasabi. I hope your next question won't be where else have I been writing about Wasabi?

If Wasabi with zkSNACKS was such an unbelievable privacy tool, you wouldn't have to suggest that people run their own coordinators. An excellent privacy tool wouldn't need people to make such changes to it. The reason they should is because you are asking the enemy of everything that bitcoin is if this person deserves coinjoins or not. And no, it's got nothing to do with your open-source wallet, since you won't forget to mention that either. 

[Kruw]

<Snip>

Stop acting stupid. You are not, so it doesn't suit you. Do a CTRL + F + "your own coordinator" or better yet, just "coordinator" and read through the responses of users when you brought it up. Not only in this thread, but all the others where you have been actively advertising Wasabi. I hope your next question won't be where else have I been writing about Wasabi?

I am not being rhetorical, stop dodging the question over and over and over:  WHY DON'T YOU RUN YOUR OWN COORDINATOR?  

Anyone petitioning in this thread at any point could have single-handedly circumvented all bans applied by zkSNACKs with the click of a button. Since you have the opportunity to directly solve the problem you claim exists, why don't you do it? The reason you never came up with any explanation as to why you aren't coordinating coinjoins is because you want the problem more than you want the solution. Stop virtue signalling and run the code.  It's free and open source, no one can stop you.

[o_e_l_e_o]

The reason you never came up with any explanation

Except the dozens of times I've explained this to you over the last six months:

Still, why would I go through the effort of setting up a coordinator, having zero volume, trying to entice people to my coordinator, all so I can run inferior coinjoins with suffer from address reuse and identifiable outputs, when I can just run JoinMarket instead?

Because as I've shown above, the Wasabi wallet software itself is deeply flawed and reuses addresses on both sides of coinjoin transactions. Why fork flawed software in order to launch your own coordinator to bypass the anti-fungibility and anti-privacy ethos of Wasabi/zkSNACKs, when I can just use JoinMarket or Samourai with my own node which avoid all these issues in the first place.

And why would anyone waste time launching such a coordinator on software which links mixed outputs with toxic unmixed change outputs?

And sure, you can spin up your own, but if it is only you and one or two other people using it, then the anonymity it provides is easily broken. People who are using Wasabi aren't generally going to bother changing coordinator, because anyone who actually cares about privacy and not having their details fed directly to a blockchain analysis firm isn't using Wasabi in the first place.

Because, as I've given you evidence of at least a dozen times and you have completely ignored at least a dozen times, Wasabi coinjoins are deeply flawed and result in outputs being linked to inputs due to various factors such as UTXO sizes and address reuse. Why would I want to run an inferior coinjoin coordinator when I can just use a much superior product such as JoinMarket or Whirlpool?

As I've mentioned before, why would anyone waste their time, money, and resources to set up their own coordinator, spend weeks or months advertising it and enticing people to use it, all so they can run flawed coinjoins, when they can just set up and use JoinMarket in a fraction of the time.

Running your own coordinator is outside the skill set of 99.9% of users and you know it, so maybe ease off on repeating that stupid soundbite.

But you know, keep proving my point that you are not here to learn or discuss in any capacity, and are only here to copy and paste endlessly debunked and utterly moronic soundbites at the behest of your puppet masters.

[Kruw]

The reason you never came up with any explanation

Except the dozens of times I've explained this to you over the last six months:

Still, why would I go through the effort of setting up a coordinator, having zero volume, trying to entice people to my coordinator, all so I can run inferior coinjoins with suffer from address reuse and identifiable outputs, when I can just run JoinMarket instead?

When you were challenged to prove your claim that Wasabi's coinjoins were inferior and created "identifiable outputs", you were exposed as a liar because you failed to trace anything at all:

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

You mean apart from the address reuse and the identifiable outputs? Probably something to do with them not being run by a company which supports mass surveillance of all their users.

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

You don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

[Pmalek]

WHY DON'T YOU RUN YOUR OWN COORDINATOR?

And do what, participate in coinjoins with myself? My coordinator would need to be used by other people. It needs traffic and liquidity to make sense and justify its existence. It doesn't do me or anyone any good to have this coordinator if the majority is stuck and using your flawed one. You know, the open-source one that funds a blockchain analysis company, remember?

[Kruw]

And do what, participate in coinjoins with myself? My coordinator would need to be used by other people. It needs traffic and liquidity to make sense and justify its existence. It doesn't do me or anyone any good to have this coordinator if the majority is stuck and using your flawed one. You know, the open-source one that funds a blockchain analysis company, remember?

You don't create coinjoins with yourself, other people can use your coordinator.  People are not stuck using the zkSNACKs coordinator.

[BlackHatCoiner]

o_e_l_e_o - Wasabi coinjoins are flawed.
Kruw - Show me the evidence.
o_e_l_e_o - Here's a bunch of flawed coinjoins.
Kruw - Bu-bu-but, here's a coinjoin which you cannot de-anonymize.

Extreme reasoning there. Wasabi team must be proud of you. Lol, I am now starting to get why Samourai puts their "competitor" in quotation marks every time.

[Kruw]

o_e_l_e_o - Wasabi coinjoins are flawed.
Kruw - Show me the evidence.
o_e_l_e_o - Here's a bunch of flawed coinjoins.
Kruw - Bu-bu-but, here's a coinjoin which you cannot de-anonymize.

Extreme reasoning there. Wasabi team must be proud of you. Lol, I now starting to get why Samourai puts their "competitor" in quotation marks every time.

Where are the flawed coinjoins?  Still waiting for evidence.  o_e_l_e_o never produced any. You never produced any.  You both got caught bluffing.

This is what proof of tracing a coinjoin looks like, you can see how I linked multiple addresses together from Whirlpool:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

When you use WabiSabi coinjoins, your addresses are not linked together.  You gain full privacy for every payment with no leftovers.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Where are the flawed coinjoins?  Still waiting for evidence.  o_e_l_e_o never produced any.

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8
Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

[Kruw]

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

That transaction isn't even a WabiSabi coinjoin, did you bother to click the link?  Stop falling for o_e_l_e_o's bluffs, he'll say absolutely any lie in order to deceive people into trusting custodians with their Bitcoins and data.

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

[BlackHatCoiner]

Back to ignore.

[Kruw]

Back to ignore.

You got caught spreading lies. You never had proof of any flaws.  Stop hiding from your own falsified claims and take accountability for the damage you caused to Bitcoin's privacy with your deception.

[Wind_FURY]

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I like Peter Todd, and I believe he should be included in a group of Trusted Stewards that should maintain and oversee Bitcoin's development and progress, BUT I believe that's still a very grave accusation there and one that we should probably take with a grain of salt. Stop using it as some sort of marketing material.

What would probably make a good market material for WasabiWallet is a pleb/ELI-5 guide on how to start/boot-strap your own CoinJoin. That would truly help with Bitcoin's privacy and fungibility, no?

[Kruw]

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I like Peter Todd, and I believe he should be included in a group of Trusted Stewards that should maintain and oversee Bitcoin's development and progress, BUT I believe that's still a very grave accusation there and one that we should probably take with a grain of salt. Stop using it as some sort of marketing material.

It's not a "very grave accusation", it's simply how BIP32 hierarchical deterministic address generation works.  If you use the same seed on two devices, you will generate the exact same addresses: https://bips.xyz/32

It's fortunate we have Bitcoin experts like Peter Todd to prove custodial shills like o_e_l_e_o and BlackHatCoiner wrong about "flaws" they claim exist in Wasabi coinjoins.  The problem is that o_e_l_e_o and BlackHatCoiner are duplicating their lies on every topic about privacy they find on this forum, so I have to continually use Peter Todd's clip to expose them as frauds on multiple threads, which is why you must think I'm using it as "some sort of marketing material".

[Pmalek]

You don't create coinjoins with yourself, other people can use your coordinator.

Yes, they can. But 'can' isn't the same as 'will', so they must most probably will not because they will stick with the default one, which is zkSNACKs. You aren't advertising the negatives of zkSNACKs and who they are in bed with, and people not reading this discussion and similar ones wouldn't know why they should abandon zkSNACKs

People are not stuck using the zkSNACKs coordinator.

Not in the literal sense of the world, obviously. Check the reply above.

[Kruw]

Yes, they can. But 'can' isn't the same as 'will', so they must probably will not because they will stick with the default one, which is zkSNACKs. You aren't advertising the negatives of zkSNACKs and who they are in bed with, and people not reading this discussion and similar ones wouldn't know why they should abandon zkSNACKs

Why do you think that "they most probably will not" switch to your coordinator?

[Pmalek]

Why do you think that "they most probably will not" switch to your coordinator?

It was a typo, but I see you edited your post as well after I did it to mine. Because they are not familiar with it. They won't know what's the difference between zkSNACKs, mine, and any other coordinators there are. Before you say that they can check the code, I am sure you know that most people don't know how to read and understand code.

When we are on the subject of alternative coordinators, can you tell us how many there are currently? Also, how does their traffic look like compared to the default one?

[Kruw]

Because they are not familiar with it. They won't know what's the difference between zkSNACKs, mine, and any other coordinators there are.

If a user was blacklisted by zkSNACKs then they would recognize the difference because they would not be allowed to participate. Since everyone seems convinced blockchain analysis is a scam that doesn't produce accurate results, you assume there are many of these users who are banned that will switch to your coordinator, right?

Besides, you can always outcompete zkSNACKs by charging lower coordinator fees or by offering different round parameters that better fit to certain use cases.

When we are on the subject of alternative coordinators, can you tell us how many there are currently? Also, how does their traffic look like compared to the default one?

I don't know.

[BlackHatCoiner]

- Me getting paid for advertising a mixer: Shill.
- Peter Todd being partners with Wasabi: Not a shill.

I'm talking really freely by the way. I don't hide the fact that I prefer coinjoining over using a mixer. In fact, I'm pretty much recommending doing Whirlpool coinjoins and using Monero as much as possible, and whenever reviewing a mixer I'm very strict due to the competition of decentralized mixing. And guess what, I'm not getting paid by neither Samourai nor Monero devs.

[Kruw]

- Me getting paid for advertising a mixer: Shill.
- Peter Todd being partners with Wasabi: Not a shill.

Wow, after your claims of Wasabi having flaws were exposed as lies by Peter Todd, you falsely accuse him of being "a partner with Wasabi".  Peter Todd is not a partner with Wasabi, he is a user of Wasabi.

In fact, I'm pretty much recommending doing Whirlpool coinjoins and using Monero as much as possible, and whenever reviewing a mixer I'm very strict due to the competition of decentralized mixing. And guess what, I'm not getting paid by neither Samourai nor Monero devs.

You shouldn't recommend Whirlpool coinjoins.  Unlike WabiSabi coinjoins, Whirlpool coinjoins are traceable:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

When you use WabiSabi coinjoins, your addresses are not linked together.  You gain full privacy for every payment with no leftovers.

[Pmalek]

...you assume there are many of these users who are banned that will switch to your coordinator, right?

Who knows how many there are. Wasabi and zkSNACKs doesn't keep records, blockchain analysis isn't going to publish anything, and those who got banned from participating in a coinjoin, for whatever reason, aren't going to complain publicly in great numbers.

Besides, you can always outcompete zkSNACKs by charging lower coordinator fees or by offering different round parameters that better fit to certain use cases.

Why don't you do it for example? Are you personally happy with the route zkSNACKs has taken with the censorship? Do you think there should be censorship like this?

[Medusah]

Displaying developers' revenue spending is impractical according to crwatkins:  https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4125#issuecomment-1793827490.

I would argue that this particular information is more than just "revenue spending".  Dropping your 2 cents to this discussion would be helpful. 

[Kruw]

Why don't you do it for example?

I have coordinated my own WabiSabi coinjoin before.

[Wind_FURY]

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I like Peter Todd, and I believe he should be included in a group of Trusted Stewards that should maintain and oversee Bitcoin's development and progress, BUT I believe that's still a very grave accusation there and one that we should probably take with a grain of salt. Stop using it as some sort of marketing material.

It's not a "very grave accusation", it's simply how BIP32 hierarchical deterministic address generation works.  If you use the same seed on two devices, you will generate the exact same addresses: https://bips.xyz/32

It's fortunate we have Bitcoin experts like Peter Todd to prove custodial shills like o_e_l_e_o and BlackHatCoiner wrong about "flaws" they claim exist in Wasabi coinjoins.  The problem is that o_e_l_e_o and BlackHatCoiner are duplicating their lies on every topic about privacy they find on this forum, so I have to continually use Peter Todd's clip to expose them as frauds on multiple threads, which is why you must think I'm using it as "some sort of marketing material".

I'm not talking about the technical flaws in the design, if they are there. I'm not a very technical person, I can't speak for/against it. I'm merely questioning what he said when he mentioned that the team behind SamouraiWallet is an entity that might be working for a State-Sponsored-Actor who's looking into de-anonymizing CoinJoins. That ser, is a grave accusation.

Why don't you do it for example?

I have coordinated my own WabiSabi coinjoin before.

Make an ELI-5 guide, make it educational. Users need to run their own coordinators.

[Kruw]

I'm merely questioning what he said when he mentioned that the team behind SamouraiWallet is an entity that might be working for a State-Sponsored-Actor who's looking into de-anonymizing CoinJoins. That ser, is a grave accusation.

Yes, that is a grave accusation, but there's really no other way to explain Samourai deceiving their users by telling them that their mobile light wallet (which spies on the complete financial history of their users, including the coinjoins they pay Samourai for) is a "full node wallet" and "always has been" when asked why they have not implemented BIP157 block filters: https://twitter.com/SamouraiWallet/status/1576923638846005248

Only politicians lie that boldly, and Samourai is lying boldly because they have something valuable to gain if you believe them: Your data.  Samourai's dishonesty has been exposed by not only Peter Todd and the Wasabi team, but also by Greg Maxwell:

Repeated dishonesty from Samourai have barred them from ever receiving a payout from the bounty as far as I am concerned: I will not be signing a transaction paying them. Evaluating the privacy of systems is difficult even when the involved parties are honest and easy to work with, it is far too difficult when they are actively misleading.  Personally, I would urge my friends to not use that wallet.

Make an ELI-5 guide, make it educational. Users need to run their own coordinators.

I already showed BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o how to click the single button needed to run a WabiSabi coordinator:

Can you provide us some guidance on how can this be done? Sort of like step by step.

Go to your node and check the "Enable Coordinator" button on your BTCPay Server WabiSabi coinjoin plugin:

Stop doubting, start running: https://i.imgur.com/dA1YkUp.png

I'm confused by what you mean

He means a one click installer for a coordinator.

Refer to the BTCPay Server installation video I posted already, you can see the 1 click installer for coordinators there.  It's the "coordinator runner" tab.

The reason they don't want to run a coordinator is because WabiSabi coinjoin coordination is completely non custodial and completely private.  If they were coordinating WabiSabi coinjoins, then they wouldn't be able to keep stealing people's Bitcoins and keep spying on people's data using their "mixing sites".

[PrivacyG]

Extreme reasoning there. Wasabi team must be proud of you. Lol, I am now starting to get why Samourai puts their "competitor" in quotation marks every time.

It feels more and more like talking to a child or a BSV cult member every time Kruw writes a response.  Recently the BSV cult member feeling dominates a little bit.  Kruw has an ego at levels never seen before.  He now refers to Wasabi as Bitcoin,

You misunderstand how Bitcoin works: A coinjoin coordinator .....

-----

Only politicians lie that boldly, and Samourai is lying boldly because they have something valuable to gain if you believe them: Your data.

Kruw.  I think you should stop.  You are starting to see yourself through others and it is not good for Wasabis image.  I know I gave you a mirror in the other topic but be careful how you use it.

-----

Stop hiding from your own falsified claims and take accountability for the damage you caused to Bitcoin's privacy with your deception.

Do not worry Kruw.  All the damage we dealt to Bitcoins Privacy has now been fixed by Wasabi using Blockchain Analysis.  And every time more damage is dealt, Blockchain Analysis will do their job at healing it again.

-----

The reason they don't want to run a coordinator is because WabiSabi coinjoin coordination is completely non custodial and completely private.  If they were coordinating WabiSabi coinjoins, then they wouldn't be able to keep stealing people's Bitcoins and keep spying on people's data using their "mixing sites".

Are you a magician or how do you nail these every single time?  It is impressive!  You would do insanely good as a crime investigator.  I wonder how the FBI has not arrested all of us yet after all this much stolen money.  We deserve to sit right next to Ruja Ignatova on their watch list after the damages done by our gang of Bitcoin goons.

[Kruw]

Are you a magician or how do you nail these every single time?  It is impressive!  You would do insanely good as a crime investigator.  I wonder how the FBI has not arrested all of us yet after all this much stolen money.  We deserve to sit right next to Ruja Ignatova on their watch list after the damages done by our gang of Bitcoin goons.

If you can't come up with anything to contribute to the topic that isn't sarcasm, then I've made my point effectively.

If your arguments are reduced to sarcasm, then I've made my point effectively.

No one is contradicting my claims because they are true.  That's why everyone just responds with sarcasm because they can't actually prove my claims to be untrue.

[Pmalek]

I have coordinated my own WabiSabi coinjoin before.

So, that's a thing of the past then? Why did you stop? You suggested a few posts above that I could run my own coordinator and outperform zkSNACKs by charging lower fees. Did that not work when you tried it?

If they were coordinating WabiSabi coinjoins, then they wouldn't be able to keep stealing people's Bitcoins and keep spying on people's data using their "mixing sites".

Are you claiming they are the owners of the mixing services they advertise? You do realize there is a difference between advertising something any owning a certain company or brand. So even if the thing they advertised was doing everything you said it does, it's not the people wearing the signatures that are stealing the coins or data. If the CEO of Nike was arrested for fraud, would you arrest everyone on the street wearing Nike sneakers for being criminals? 

[Kruw]

So, that's a thing of the past then? Why did you stop? You suggested a few posts above that I could run my own coordinator and outperform zkSNACKs by charging lower fees. Did that not work when you tried it?

I mean it's technically still running, I only used it for coordinating my own coinjoin one time.

Are you claiming they are the owners of the mixing services they advertise? You do realize there is a difference between advertising something any owning a certain company or brand. So even if the thing they advertised was doing everything you said it does, it's not the people wearing the signatures that are stealing the coins or data. If the CEO of Nike was arrested for fraud, would you arrest everyone on the street wearing Nike sneakers for being criminals? 

They are paid to promote custodians, it's not like they don't obviously know they are accepting fractionally reserved funds. And they have no excuse that they didn't see it coming because once the previous custodian finished taking all the money from their customers, they switched to advertise a new custodian. Can you guess what happened with the new custodian?

[Pmalek]

I mean it's technically still running, I only used it for coordinating my own coinjoin one time.

Based on that, can we conclude that you weren't satisfied with the zkSNACKs coordinator for some reason, and that made you run your own despite suffering from liquidity and traffic issues because I am guessing there weren't many other parties coinjoining with you? Why would a pro-Wasabi and zkSNACKs individual run a different coordinator? Just testing it out? 

[PrivacyG]

If you can't come up with anything to contribute to the topic that isn't sarcasm, then I've made my point effectively.

Your point being?  We are using sarcasm because of how ironical and funny the B S you are saying is.  Do you ever read your own posts to realize how silly they sound?

I have some serious non sarcastic questions you never answer to.  They are a contribution to both topics I answered to and I have not seen an answer to those yet. Oh.  Wait.  Maybe because you only answer to the fragments of our posts that are convenient to you and to non serious replies.

They are paid to promote custodians, it's not like they don't obviously know they are accepting fractionally reserved funds. And they have no excuse that they didn't see it coming because once the previous custodian finished taking all the money from their customers, they switched to advertise a new custodian. Can you guess what happened with the new custodian?

Who are you even talking about?  Name and shame.  Which scammer did I support, besides you?

You took all my Wasabi Coin Join fees back when Wasabi pretended to be the Privacy protecting party of Bitcoin and are using it for Blockchain Analysis tools.  You are pretty much using the fees I paid against me, attacking the privileges I was paying you for.  Any body with two brain cells would understand using Blockchain Analysis on their own Privacy advocate customers would be a move against the customers.  Let alone Wasabi who I have no doubt knew this.  And you call out Mixers and Samourai?

Then Wasabi completely ignored the backlash and further more even started promoting their surveillance partnered Wallet on Bitcoin Talk for the first time.  I wonder why.

I have been using Mixers for many years.  Got scammed precisely zero times.  Zero BTC stolen from me.  With the way you are using my fees which were pretty hefty, I can comfortably say I got scammed.

-----

How come the only partners we have heard about from Wasabi are Blockchain Analysis and Trezor, out of which one is the most hated in the Bitcoin Talk community and the other has a history like this,

They were also a big supporter of AOPP, which was a protocol designed to make you KYC your own addresses to centralized exchanges before being allowed to withdraw.

?

-----

There is only a single thing I get out of this whole situation.  Wasabi was pressured and cornered by some authority and it was a disappear or comply type of situation.  I get Wasabi wanted from a business perspective to continue as earnings I suppose were not negligible.

But then it would have made sense to act in a different manner.  If I had to choose between obeying and disappearing out of the Market and I was depending on the earnings from Wasabi I do not know what I would have done.  Mentally I would say disappear but I have not been there to know.

What I know is if my choice was to comply I would have said the unfortunate truth.  There would have been so much more for you to gain by doing so.  Imagine Wasabi came out telling the truth and apologizing by explaining there was nothing else they could have done but to obey.  Imagine they did not continue to deceive their users.  I would have continued to respect Wasabi knowing this is a tough time to try to rebel against the rules because by protesting you know they will try to take you out.

I in fact believe some of us would have even continued to stay and support.  You could have worked with us rather than go against us.  We could have helped you find a way to make it better for every body while not risking the safety of Wasabis team.  You could have said something along the lines of 'We are sorry this is happening.  It is inconvenient to all of us.  Particularly to our customers.  We want to let you know that even if we had no choice but to obey, this does not mean your Coins will ever get to any authority.  It does not mean we have switched sides.  We will strive to find a better way for every body to be happy'.

Instead.  You chose to fully switch sides, lie, deceive and act as a Bitcoin hero.  Recently turning into pretending that Wasabi is in fact Bitcoin.  Guess the only missing piece of the puzzle is some body from Wasabis team partnering with CSW or pretending to be Satoshi themselves.

More over.  What I would have done is fund competitors who continue to do what I wanted to do.  Such as Join Market.  I would have funded others who are trying to continue doing what my dream was.  Building a way to create close to perfect Privacy for Bitcoin users.  That would have shown respect to my customers and respect to those who are brave enough to continue what I have been warned to stop doing.

Trying to overlook Join Market with superiority only makes you seem even worse.  As I said.  It is understandable to break down mentally and choose the safer way for you.  But if you then IMMEDIATELY transition to spitting on all the rest who are choosing the riskier side.  Then it means you were a pathological liar pretending all along.

But what did I expect really.  Superheroes are only real in the movies.

[Kruw]

Just testing it out? 

Yes, I was just testing it out.

[PrivacyG]

Yes, I was just testing it out.

Now that I posted something with no sarcasm after your complain you resort to avoidance again.  This makes the situation no better for you, I hope you do understand that.

Replying to this post while avoiding my previous one does not count by the way.

[Medusah]

If some competitor treats you with sarcasm at the first response, then your point is made.  Indeed.

But, if everyone is being sarcastic after you evade their counter arguments for like a hundred times, then.. chances are you are the problem.

[pooya87]

I don't know when and how this very simple matter got too complicated!

A centralized company that is behind Wasabi wallet, a tool that was supposed to be improving privacy, has been working with blockchain analysis companies that are doing the exact opposite to censor transactions.

It's just that simple!
Arguing about coordinators, fees, bringing up other tools like Samurai, etc. is just evading the real problem which is Wasabi devs being pro-censorship and anti-privacy while claiming otherwise!

[NotATether]

There is only a single thing I get out of this whole situation.  Wasabi was pressured and cornered by some authority and it was a disappear or comply type of situation.  I get Wasabi wanted from a business perspective to continue as earnings I suppose were not negligible.

That's actually true:

18. You already said this isn't the case; so you don't have to confirm or deny if this happened; but if we're being skeptic, we have to consider the idea that you were pressured by authorities after all, with an extra clause that you're not allowed to say anything about it. Did you ever consider that a privacy-enhancing service would sooner or later be targeted and pressured by authorities? Other similar services explicitly made sure from the beginning that the creators and developers are anonymous, pseudonymous or generally unknown, to make sure such pressure can't be exterted on the project. Actually, satoshi himself may have left Bitcoin to remove such a central point of failure (through pressure on the creator).

Answer: Information about pressures will be posted later. Satoshi is one of the few people who have actually stayed anonymous and left the project. Otherwise, I’m not sure who you mean. Working on a privacy project in today's day and age is very risky. If the project succeeds and grows, it’s only a matter of time before the people involved get harassed. This is expected and that’s why it’s important that we build as much as we can before the worst comes. Even though there’s not necessarily a law forbidding a privacy focused business, it’s only a matter of time before regulators find a way to try to shut the project down. We want to try to distance ourselves from these problems as much as possible, by avoiding unnecessary negative attention.

Someone might nit-pick here and say: "But he said 'it's only a matter of time before regulators ... shut the project'", but that's missing the point. Why would they be having these concerns after all these years of running without censorship, if somebody was not already harassing your company about it?

[Kruw]

I don't know when and how this very simple matter got too complicated!

A centralized company that is behind Wasabi wallet, a tool that was supposed to be improving privacy, has been working with blockchain analysis companies that are doing the exact opposite to censor transactions.

It seems you like can't tell the difference between open source software and people who use open source software.  The open source software improves privacy no matter who uses it, whether its you or a centralized company.  

If you don't like that a centralized company that uses Wasabi Wallet's open source software for coordinating coinjoins isn't accepting business from all customers, then why don't you solve the problem singlehandedly by using Wasabi Wallet's open source software to provide privacy to everyone?  

If you were using Nostr and you didn't like that one centralized company didn't store notes from everyone, then you should solve the problem by singlehandedly using Nostr's open source software to store everyone's notes.  If you were using Lightning and you didn't like that one centralized company didn't accept channels from everyone, then you should solve the problem singlehandedly by using Lightning's open source software to accept channels from everyone.

And yet, you would instead participate in a petition against Nostr and Lightning because you demand that someone else provide you services using their open source software instead of running your own copy.  This only damages the adoption of these incredibly useful open source softwares, but it doesn't solve your problem:  In fact, it makes your problem worse.

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
Just a question for you. Do you like the idea of Wasabi funding blockchain analysis companies? It looks like funding a country that manufactures weapons that are used to destroy your own country. I hope you don't like this and I hope you understand that Wasabi is funding an enemy. I clearly understand and analyze this step of yours, it's done for this business to survive and I appreciate the open-source of this project but I'm just frank here, Wasabi is not the best tool to protect privacy because of your partnership with BA and how you guys blacklist.

[o_e_l_e_o]

-snip-

I would clarify that Wasabi were not pressured or harassed in to implementing blacklists. There were no regulations at the time which forced them to do so, and currently regulations such as the FinCEN one are still in a proposal stage and not law. Wasabi preemptively started censoring their users in an attempt to cover their own backs.

Just to be clear, there is no regulation that would compel this, and I don’t think that there would be anytime soon

Although as we've just seen with Swan telling people not to use Wasabi, their preemptive censorship didn't actually achieve anything.

[Kruw]

@Kruw
Just a question for you. Do you like the idea of Wasabi funding blockchain analysis companies? It looks like funding a country that manufactures weapons that are used to destroy your own country. I hope you don't like this and I hope you understand that Wasabi is funding an enemy. I clearly understand and analyze this step of yours, it's done for this business to survive and I appreciate the open-source of this project but I'm just frank here, Wasabi is not the best tool to protect privacy because of your partnership with BA and how you guys blacklist.

Wasabi is the best tool to protect privacy.  That fact doesn't change no matter what people spend their money on.

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
Just a question for you. Do you like the idea of Wasabi funding blockchain analysis companies? It looks like funding a country that manufactures weapons that are used to destroy your own country. I hope you don't like this and I hope you understand that Wasabi is funding an enemy. I clearly understand and analyze this step of yours, it's done for this business to survive and I appreciate the open-source of this project but I'm just frank here, Wasabi is not the best tool to protect privacy because of your partnership with BA and how you guys blacklist.

Wasabi is the best tool to protect privacy.  That fact doesn't change no matter what people spend their money on.

Is it a patriotic act to fund a country that manufactures weapons that are used to destroy your own country? No, it is not. I prefer to live in a country that uses all the funds for its own development or betterment rather than to live in a country that funds it's opponent to destroy it.

I just don't understand why you aren't frank. Yes, Wasabi is better than nothing but it's not the best tool to protect privacy because you fund your own worst enemy. If you want to say it's still the best tool, yes, you can say but facts are facts.

[Kruw]

Is it a patriotic act to fund a country that manufactures weapons that are used to destroy your own country? No, it is not. I prefer to live in a country that uses all the funds for its own development or betterment rather than to live in a country that funds it's opponent to destroy it.

I don't understand your metaphor, Wasabi is open source software, there's no countries or weapons involved.

I just don't understand why you aren't frank. Yes, Wasabi is better than nothing but it's not the best tool to protect privacy because you fund your own worst enemy. If you want to say it's still the best tool, yes, you can say but facts are facts.

I am being as frank as possible: The fact is that Wasabi is the best tool to protect privacy and that fact does not change regardless of what anyone spends their money on.

[PrivacyG]

I am being as frank as possible: The fact is that Wasabi is the best tool to protect privacy and that fact does not change regardless of what anyone spends their money on.

How is it the best tool to protect Privacy if in a desperate, urgent attempt to Coin Join my funds there is a possibility my UTXO is banned?  The best tool to protect Privacy is a tool that allows any body to protect their Privacy.  Not a tool where only the selected participants will.  Because in that case it is not a tool to protect Privacy.  It could at any time turn into a pass only to those whose identity has already be unveiled.

I keep asking you a question you constantly avoid.  It is very related to this particular discussion.

It's harmless to rely on these reports even if they are inaccurate because there's no consequences for users who are mistakenly identified as "tainted".

Will they be able to enjoy private money?

[Medusah]

I don't understand your metaphor, Wasabi is open source software, there's no countries or weapons involved.

So?  Can't a company which works on open-source use their money to engage in morally bad activities? 

How is it the best tool to protect Privacy if in a desperate, urgent attempt to Coin Join my funds there is a possibility my UTXO is banned?

Forget about that.  Wasabi is flawed.  End of story.

I would clarify that Wasabi were not pressured or harassed in to implementing blacklists.

According to this tweet, they did have government pressure:  https://nitter.cz/btcdragonlord/status/1635521177400606720#m

[Kruw]

Forget about that.  Wasabi is flawed.  End of story.

You should know by now not to listen to o_e_l_e_o, he will say any lie necessary about open source privacy software in order to trick people into losing their money to a custodian instead.  There is no "flaw", stop FUDing and start verifying:

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

o_e_l_e_o, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

BlackHatCoiner, another custodial shill, was also spreading this same lie of Wasabi being "flawed":

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

The custodians are desperate to attack open source privacy software.  It's the only way they can get their hands on your Bitcoins and data.  Don't fall for their obvious lies.

[Medusah]

You should know by now not to listen to o_e_l_e_o, he will say any lie necessary about open source privacy software in order to trick people into losing their money to a custodian instead.

No, he does not lie.  You lie and ignore everything he has presented.  Even Hillebrand Max has accepted the fact that wasabi is flawed:  https://nitter.cz/LaurentMT/status/1585997168464351233#m.  Unless you think Max has lied too.

[o_e_l_e_o]

According to this tweet, they did have government pressure:  https://nitter.cz/btcdragonlord/status/1635521177400606720#m

To me, that doesn't read like government pressure:

After 2 months thing seems to have settled down but there came a message in March 12th from a journalist working for the Financial Times asking questions about the criminal money laundering activities done through its coordinator and the broader space.

Everybody was shocked, I guess @HillebrandMax was less shocked, but overall the argument started that the blacklisting must commence because now the regulators will be onto us in Gibraltar.

The lawyers were called up and were discussing the options during the day about it.

Sounds like journalists were asking questions, and there was a fear of future regulations, so they started blacklisting preemptively. At no point then or since has anyone from Wasabi ever pointed to a piece of legislation and said "This is why we are now pro-censorship". Indeed, such legislation is only now starting to come out, long after Wasabi started censoring their users (and hilariously, such legislation is discriminating against Wasabi all the same despite their censorship).

Here are a few quotes from Max Hillebrand in an interview a couple of weeks after they started censoring:

Just to be clear, there is no regulation that would compel this, and I don’t think that there would be anytime soon

This was just one preemptive move to help with the scaling of the company, because we think that now we can provide the service at a much larger scale while still having way less regulatory pressure than before

[Medusah]

Thanks for bringing this up.  I will definitely read it when I find time.

Not only did they not have pressure from government but as it turns out according to Max, they envision a network of coordinators with coinjoin risk factors shown in the client side:

If, on the client side, you could blacklist certain risk factors, for example—because there are people who would be super stringent. I want to go all the way down to only CoinJoin with risk factor 1—lowest risk possible—for example. Some clients would have this specific preference. And maybe it could be implemented in a nice way on the client-side so that if you don’t care, you just leave it all the way up to 10, and if you do care, you configure it. And maybe that would have led to a better outcome because you can still talk to one coordinator and all the risk factor coins can still talk to one coordinator, and then we just figure out on the client-side of how to allocate this—maybe.

If you want to curate the coins that you’re seeing in this proposed CoinJoin and you decide whether or not you want to CoinJoin based on the metadata risk factor, you need to ask the chain surveillance company and then you need to get an account and KYC, probably, in all of this. So—not that easy. In the meantime, just doing it top-down from the coordinator-side is a solution that—assuming that you want to do this—it is a solution that is cheaper, because only one person has to talk to the chain surveillance company compared to all the users who want to do it.

Not only they are not pro-fungibility, but they believe there is room for treating bitcoin as "tainted" in their software.  Wasabi is spreading the notion that 1 BTC != 1 BTC.  They should not to be trusted with anything. 

[Kruw]

No, he does not lie.  You lie and ignore everything he has presented.  Even Hillebrand Max has accepted the fact that wasabi is flawed:  https://nitter.cz/LaurentMT/status/1585997168464351233#m.  Unless you think Max has lied too.

Medusah, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

[o_e_l_e_o]

If you want to curate the coins that you’re seeing in this proposed CoinJoin and you decide whether or not you want to CoinJoin based on the metadata risk factor, you need to ask the chain surveillance company and then you need to get an account and KYC, probably, in all of this. So—not that easy. In the meantime, just doing it top-down from the coordinator-side is a solution that—assuming that you want to do this—it is a solution that is cheaper, because only one person has to talk to the chain surveillance company compared to all the users who want to do it.

Yeah, this quote is particularly hilarious. The future of privacy, according to Wasabi, is for every single bitcoin user to KYC themselves to a blockchain analysis company and then pay the blockchain analysis company for information on every UTXO they interact with. Much private! Such fungible! Wow!

[Medusah]

If people are not convinced yet that wasabi devs are incompetent clowns, here are a few notable assertions from the podcast:

You’re changing the acceptance of which coins do you consider valid—not on the Bitcoin consensus layer—that’s the other important thing. Bitcoin consensus is still permissionless and decentralized enough that you can make payments even if you are blacklisted: you can just either get hashrate yourself or bribe a miner to hash a block with your transaction in it—so Bitcoin works. But what we’re talking about here is: will you get access to someone else’s computer? Will someone else allow you to write stuff on his computer, basically? And in my opinion, ultimately it comes down to property rights. A coordinator is just someone else’s computer—and it’s not yours. So you ought to be quite thankful that someone actually provides you a service where you can use his computer for certain things like coordinating a round.

This guy just asserted that my decision to join my inputs with someone else is the same as taking control of his computer.  He also stated that blacklisting does not happen on Bitcoin because you could bribe a miner, which is not true.  The reason you do not get blacklisted is because it is censorship resistant.  A mining pool blacklisting transactions would directly attack their revenue and reputation, but even if it did not, then some other pool would mine it sooner or later.

By the way why doesn't the same apply on coinjoin?  "Coinjoin consensus is still permissionless and decentralized enough that you can make payments even if you are blacklisted: you can just leave Wasasi and use a censorship resistant alternative". 

But then the more pressing matter is it’s not always gonna be clear-cut, especially when you start making transactions, especially when you have things like CoinSwap, Lightning, PayJoin—we’re working really hard to make the life of chain surveillance miserable, and that means that they’re gonna have many more false positives.

This is the plan guys!  They are paying a blockchain analysis company so that they can verify beforehand that their product becomes less and less accurate!   

So they’re gonna say that this coin is owned by a criminal, even though it’s actually a peaceful individual. And they’re gonna have false negatives.

And we are going to censor the individual nonetheless because not only do we buy from blockchain analysis but we even allow them to reject any coins they dislike from the coinjoin!   

And I think technically how this is gonna work is that during input registration or at the end of input registration, an API request is made to the chain surveillance firm, and then you see which inputs are not allowed or blacklisted, and these then get a response from the coordinator with, Sorry, we could not allow your coin to be registered because of these reasons. But the cool thing is: your money never moved—this was all during the coordination of the PSBT.

Money never move because you are a criminal!  Cool! 

But if, on the other hand, only politicians and other violent criminals are getting blacklisted—well, you know, then I’m happy.

You do not deserve privacy if you are a bad boi!

There’s a lot of nuance here, but in general what we can say is: yes—that is another precedent that UTXOs are not fungible, that there is metadata associated to UTXOs that are outside of the consensus implementation. And that’s just super difficult because now you’re gonna have different surveillance companies that have different blacklists and different risk scores associated to it. And now you have competing soft forked clients, basically, that reach a different consensus of which coins are good and which coins are bad. And well—there’s no solution to it.

Blockchain analysis is flawed, different surveillance companies produce different "coin risk factors" so they are not to be trusted, but hey why not buying from one?

[PrivacyG]

But if, on the other hand, only politicians and other violent criminals are getting blacklisted—well, you know, then I’m happy.

You do not deserve privacy if you are a bad boi!

Of course.  Kruw loves this too.  He thinks only who deserves Privacy should get it.  But he also says Wasabi does not support Censorship.  If some body reads only ONE page of this topic and thinks Wasabi is part of the good guys and we are the bad guys then so be it.  They are lost causes.

I really think the only people who would STILL use Wasabi after all of this are the people who trade on Centralized Exchanges with Know Your Customer checked accounts. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

But he also says Wasabi does not support Censorship.

I mean another outright lie there; even Wasabi developers throw up their hands. They themselves admit they sacrifice censorship resistance:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology.

But what's censorship resistance worth if we take into account the "survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology"? Nothing!

If only there was a way to retain both... Oh wait there is: XMR swaps and other coinjoin implementations that aren't flawed!

[Kruw]

But what's censorship resistance worth if we take into account the "survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology"? Nothing!

If only there was a way to retain both... Oh wait there is: XMR swaps and other coinjoin implementations that aren't flawed!

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology", and WabiSabi solves the flaws of other coinjoin implementations.

[PrivacyG]

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology"

Prove a BTC > XMR > BTC Atomic Swap is less beneficial to Privacy than a Wasabi Coin Join.

-----

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

[BlackHatCoiner]

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology", and WabiSabi solves the flaws of other coinjoin implementations.

- I'd argue that atomic swaps is a kind of both Bitcoin and Monero.
- Wasabi coinjoins suffer from address reuse and other weaknesses which have been presented quite a few times already.

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

One less troll to account for. That's a blessing.

[Kruw]

- Wasabi coinjoins suffer from address reuse and other weaknesses which have been presented quite a few times already.

You haven't presented any weaknesses in WabiSabi coinjoins at all, you've merely repeated the lie over and over about "coinjoins suffering from address reuse" that Peter Todd already directly debunked:

Forget about that.  Wasabi is flawed.  End of story.

You should know by now not to listen to o_e_l_e_o, he will say any lie necessary about open source privacy software in order to trick people into losing their money to a custodian instead.  There is no "flaw", stop FUDing and start verifying:

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

o_e_l_e_o, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

BlackHatCoiner, another custodial shill, was also spreading this same lie of Wasabi being "flawed":

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

The custodians are desperate to attack open source privacy software.  It's the only way they can get their hands on your Bitcoins and data.  Don't fall for their obvious lies.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

Kruw ignores every question which he can't answer with a meaningless soundbite.

Still, remember that Kruw thinks Monero is a shitcoin, so clearly doesn't understand the first thing about Monero or indeed privacy in general:

Fuck off to the shitcoin subforum.

Even more lols. If you think Monero is a shitcoin, then your opinions on anything privacy related are worthless. Monero is pretty much the only coin other than Bitcoin that isn't a shitcoin.

[Kruw]

Still, remember that Kruw thinks Monero is a shitcoin, so clearly doesn't understand the first thing about Monero or indeed privacy in general:

Fuck off to the shitcoin subforum.

Even more lols. If you think Monero is a shitcoin, then your opinions on anything privacy related are worthless. Monero is pretty much the only coin other than Bitcoin that isn't a shitcoin.

I'm happy that you like Monero, but a thread for Bitcoin privacy technology is the absolute worst place you could be shilling it.  It shows you are more interested in hurting Bitcoin than promoting privacy because you can already be private on Bitcoin with WabiSabi coinjoins.

[apogio]

It shows you are more interested in hurting Bitcoin than promoting privacy.

If you say this to o_e_l_e_o then I can only imagine what you say about all the rest  

It's one of the worst accusations you could make.

When we say Monero is good for privacy, why do we hurt Bitcoin? Do you really suppose that Bitcoin has anything to fear? Apart from that, privacy in Bitcoin can be achieved with multiple coinjoin options, not only with the WabiSabi coinjoins. I use Jam (Joinmarket) and Whirlpool. I feel good and safe! I also do Monero swaps and I also feel good about it.

[Kruw]

When we say Monero is good for privacy, why do we hurt Bitcoin? Do you really suppose that Bitcoin has anything to fear?

The problem is that o_e_l_e_o's claim that Monero's privacy is good is attached to a false claim that privacy from WabiSabi coinjoins is bad.  Lying about weaknesses that Bitcoin doesn't have in order to promote a feature on your shitcoin is clearly Vitalik tier deception.  Of course, this sort of betrayal of Bitcoin is nothing new, o_e_l_e_o even partnered with custodian "mixing sites" that stole Bitcoins from people who were stupid enough to trust him with their data and funds.

Apart from that, privacy in Bitcoin can be achieved with multiple coinjoin options, not only with the WabiSabi coinjoins. I use Jam (Joinmarket) and Whirlpool. I feel good and safe! I also do Monero swaps and I also feel good about it.

If you feel "good and safe" when using Whirlpool, then you must not be aware of the privacy leaks:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

With WabiSabi coinjoins, every transaction you make has full privacy, so there's no need for "XMR Swaps".

[o_e_l_e_o]

Kruw ignores every question which he can't answer with a meaningless soundbite.

He just can't resist proving this point over and over again.

[BlackHatCoiner]

For the sake of the discussion, o_e_l_e_o has helped people care about their privacy and improve it more than anyone I know of in this board. He always seems to distinguish misinformation and cares to share his thoughts in a simple, yet comprehensible and constructive manner.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

The problem is that o_e_l_e_o's claim that Monero's privacy is good is attached to a false claim that privacy from WabiSabi coinjoins is bad.

No, it is not. They are two facts on their own.

- Yes, Monero's privacy is good, everyone should consider using that, and if they don't, then you can still retain your Bitcoin privacy by swapping your BTC with XMR back and forth.
- Yes, privacy from Wasabi coinjoins appears to be questionable, because there are lots of instances of people claiming they were de-anonymized, and there are crystal clear signs of address reuse.

[o_e_l_e_o]

If you say this to o_e_l_e_o then I can only imagine what you say about all the rest 

It's one of the worst accusations you could make.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

I appreciate the sentiments, but don't worry about it - I'm not going to lose a second of sleep over what a pro-censorship, pro-surveillance, anti-privacy Wasabi shill thinks of me.

[Kruw]

For the sake of the discussion, o_e_l_e_o has helped people care about their privacy and improve it more than anyone I know of in this board. He always seems to distinguish misinformation and cares to share his thoughts in a simple, yet comprehensible and constructive manner.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

o_e_l_e_o is intentionally miseducating people about Bitcoin privacy.  He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced? This sort of deception about Bitcoin's privacy properties is the absolute most harmful thing you could possibly spread:

Another example of a Wasabi coinjoin completely failing: https://nitter.cz/ErgoBTC/status/1723700744576971012#m

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi (wait, I thought their blacklisting was supposed to prevent that? ), and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account: https://nitter.cz/coinableS/status/1723806321441710412#m. You know, the same thing Kruw has been telling us is impossible with Wasabi.

I'm sure we'll be treated to the usual litany of excuses, but the bottom line is that Wasabi does not work.

As I've said before, blockchain analysis is based on guesswork.

Bitcoin, by design, is fungible. As soon as a transaction has more than one output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where. It cannot be done. Everyone who claims to be able to do it is guessing, lying, or both. All blockchain analysis companies, all centralized exchanges, and now Wasabi too (which is particularly hilarious considering they base their whole existence on coinjoins). They have made up a system based on guesswork, and have successfully marketed it for their own profit to large parts of this space as some infallible law. It is not, and the only way to get rid of it is for the community to agree to shun companies and entities which support and enforce this made up nonsense.

As soon as a transaction has been made, it is impossible to say that those coins haven't changed hands. As soon as a transaction has more than out output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where (and indeed, "which" bitcoin doesn't even exist at a protocol level). It is trivially easily to fool many of the heuristics blockchain analysis uses, such as script type matching to identify the change output, or inputs being spent together to identify co-ownership. And not just to fool them as in "they can't draw any conclusions", but to fool them as in "they actively draw the incorrect conclusion". And of course one incorrect conclusion leads them to build more and more incorrect conclusions on top, building an entire chain of nonsense which they then pass off as irrefutable fact.

I've said for a long time that blockchain analysis is provable nonsense with no scientific basis. It seems even the directors of blockchain analysis companies agree with that. But of course they will continue to peddle their nonsense to centralized exchanges and governments alike because it pays handsomely to do so.


I did a small experiment some time ago regarding blockchain analysis: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5395035.msg59905002#msg59905002

One particular piece of blockchain analysis software put a significant amount of coins in the wallet of various centralized exchanges in one of the categories of scams, hacks, or blacklists. Obviously the blockchain analysis software being used by these exchanges did not classify these coins in this manner, otherwise they wouldn't have accepted those coins. The fact that two different pieces of software can come to completely different conclusions about the exact same coins should be more than enough to tell you that blockchain analysis is made up trash.

One of the core principles of any piece of science is that its results are repeatable and independently verifiable. If I come up with a process to say, isolate gold from an alloy, then I publish my methods and other people perform the same steps, end up with the same results, and verify my process works. If I come up with a process to say some coins are tainted, and other people do the same thing and end up with completely different results, then my process is bullshit.

- Yes, privacy from Wasabi coinjoins appears to be questionable, because there are lots of instances of people claiming they were de-anonymized, and there are crystal clear signs of address reuse.

Privacy from Wasabi coinjoins is not questionable.  No one has provided proof of anyone being deanonymized.  Your misinformation about "address reuse" has already been completely debunked by Peter Todd:

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

[BlackHatCoiner]

He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced?

Your urge to twist his words is nearly impressive. Nowhere has he stated that "2 outputs" make you untraceable. What he's argued is that it's impossible to know if the bitcoin changes hands, so it is absolutely unacceptable to base evidence on blockchain analysis.

That doesn't mean that you're "untraceable" (nowhere has he stated that in the quoted post). He merely said that it is impossible to know with confidence if the money changes hands, because blockchain analysis (which you're proudly funding) is flawed.

Privacy from Wasabi coinjoins is not questionable.  No one has provided proof of anyone being deanonymized.  Your misinformation about "address reuse" has already been completely debunked by Peter Todd

- Lots of people in Twitter are reporting the opposite. So you're claiming they are all lying.
- I have heard Peter Todd, and I agree with allowing inputs to be reused (i.e., if they come from a donation address), but Wasabi has been caught to reusing outputs which is unacceptable, unless you think that every time that happened the user specifically attempted to donate (which as far as I know doesn't happen on the front end, the coinjoin process just starts automatically).

[Kruw]

He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced?

Your urge to twist his words is nearly impressive. Nowhere has he stated that "2 outputs" make you untraceable. What he's argued is that it's impossible to know if the bitcoin changes hands, so it is absolutely unacceptable to base evidence on blockchain analysis.

That doesn't mean that you're "untraceable" (nowhere has he stated that in the quoted post).

I have not "twisted his words" at all, read exactly what he said about 2 output transactions:

As soon as a transaction has more than one output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where. It cannot be done. Everyone who claims to be able to do it is guessing, lying, or both.

Now read exactly what he said about this 195 output coinjoin transaction:

Another example of a Wasabi coinjoin completely failing: https://nitter.cz/ErgoBTC/status/1723700744576971012#m

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi (wait, I thought their blacklisting was supposed to prevent that? ), and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account: https://nitter.cz/coinableS/status/1723806321441710412#m. You know, the same thing Kruw has been telling us is impossible with Wasabi.

I'm sure we'll be treated to the usual litany of excuses, but the bottom line is that Wasabi does not work.

The hypocrisy is off the charts.  No lie is too bold for someone who wants to funnel Bitcoins out of open source privacy wallets and into data collecting, coin stealing custodians.

- Lots of people in Twitter are reporting the opposite. So you're claiming they are all lying.

"Lots of people in Twitter" doesn't sound like proof to me.

- I have heard Peter Todd, and I agree with allowing inputs to be reused (i.e., if they come from a donation address), but Wasabi has been caught to reusing outputs which is unacceptable, unless you think that every time that happened the user specifically attempted to donate (which as far as I know doesn't happen on the front end, the coinjoin process just starts automatically).

Peter Todd is talking about OUTPUTS being reused in coinjoins:

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

Your attempts to convince people that BIP32 deterministic address generation is a "flaw in coinjoins" is pure deception and you know it.  

[o_e_l_e_o]

Anyone with even a basic comprehension of the English language can clearly understand the context of those two statements - one is talking about bitcoin at a technical level (where there is no such thing as individual sats) while the other is talking about blockchain analysis heuristics. As I've pointed out before, your continual deliberate misrepresentations mean you are either deliberately lying to fuel your narrative, or you literally don't understand the first thing about what you are writing.

Good job diverting the topic away from the questions you repeatedly refuse to answer again though.

[Kruw]

Anyone with even a basic comprehension of the English language can clearly understand the context of those two statements - one is talking about bitcoin at a technical level (where there is no such thing as individual sats) while the other is talking about blockchain analysis heuristics. As I've pointed out before, your continual deliberate misrepresentations mean you are either deliberately lying to fuel your narrative, or you literally don't understand the first thing about what you are writing.

Good job diverting the topic away from the questions you repeatedly refuse to answer again though.

o_e_l_e_o, I did answer you:

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

o_e_l_e_o, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I want you to admit you heard Peter Todd tell you that address reuse is not Wasabi fucking up and then I want you to explain why you are still attacking open source Bitcoin privacy software by spreading the lie that there is "evidence" of "flawed coinjoins".

[BlackHatCoiner]

"Lots of people in Twitter" doesn't sound like proof to me.

What is acceptable as proof to you?

Peter Todd is talking about OUTPUTS being reused in coinjoins

He talks about both inputs and outputs. For the former gives an example of an entity which has received multiple donations in the same address (and which I agree with), and for the latter when an entity wants to make multiple donations to the same address (which besides unusual, is just not what the front end displays as an option). There are quite a few reports of Wasabi reusing receiving addresses when automatically coinjoining, and none of the victims wanted to donate (otherwise they wouldn't report it as a bug).

BTW, why do you keep posting this video? Peter is also okay with Wasabi censoring inputs as he says. Being a Bitcoin Core developer doesn't grant you any ethic superiority. He's sponsored by Wasabi, and is being paid by Wasabi. Why isn't he considered a "shill" like you claim us to be with mixers?

[Kruw]

What is acceptable as proof to you?

A deterministic way to link inputs to outputs for users who are not a "whale" relative to the other participants in the round.

He talks about both inputs and outputs. For the former gives an example of an entity which has received multiple donations in the same address (and which I agree with), and for the latter when an entity wants to make multiple donations to the same address (which besides unusual, is just not what the front end displays as an option). There are quite a few reports of Wasabi reusing receiving addresses when automatically coinjoining, and none of the victims wanted to donate (otherwise they wouldn't report it as a bug).

The quote I mentioned has nothing to do with inputs or donations, Peter Todd explains that when you use a deterministic seed on two different clients, they will each generate and use the same addresses:

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

Being a Bitcoin Core developer doesn't grant you any ethic superiority. He's sponsored by Wasabi, and is being paid by Wasabi. Why isn't he considered a "shill" like you claim us to be with mixers?

Peter Todd is not sponsored by Wasabi or paid by Wasabi.  Even if he was, it wouldn't make his statement any less true.  You are resorting to yet another lie in order to cover up your previous lie, it really makes you look pathetic and desperate to convince people to have their coins stolen again by another one of your "Mixing sites".

[BlackHatCoiner]

A deterministic way to link inputs to outputs for users who are not a "whale" relative to the other participants in the round.

There is KYCP which has analyzed quite a few Wasabi coinjoins and has found a bunch of weaknesses regarding collaboration and address reuse (in both inputs and outputs!), such as this one. What is your input on this?

The quote I mentioned has nothing to do with inputs or donations, Peter Todd explains that when you use a deterministic seed on two different clients, they will each generate and use the same addresses

How's that relevant with the coordinator allowing address reuse and the other weaknesses during coinjoin that are presented above?

Peter Todd is not sponsored by Wasabi or paid by Wasabi.

Wasabi funds a bunch of activities Peter Todd is involved in.

[Kruw]

There is KYCP which has analyzed quite a few Wasabi coinjoins and has found a bunch of weaknesses regarding collaboration and address reuse (in both inputs and outputs!), such as this one. What is your input on this?

BlackHatCoiner, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

How's that relevant with the coordinator allowing address reuse

Why would the coordinator disallow address reuse?...

and the other weaknesses during coinjoin that are presented above?

What "other weaknesses" are you talking about?

[BlackHatCoiner]

I see. Repeating the soundbites. Alright, I'll take this as a "I cannot answer any of your questions".

BlackHatCoiner, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

Wasabi users fucking up with their anonymity individually isn't Wasabi's fault. But, coordinator fucking up with users' anonymity is a Wasabi's fault. Wasabi transactions listed in KYCP (except the post-mix tx) are all coinjoin, ergo approved by the coordinator.

Why would the coordinator disallow address reuse?...

I mean, if you can't tell the problem with reusing addresses in both inputs and outputs during coinjoin, then I'll just leave it here. I give up. As it turns out, you can't beat an idiot.

[Kruw]

I see. Repeating the soundbites. Alright, I'll take this as a "I cannot answer any of your questions".

I answered your question over and over already: Someone reusing their addresses is not a "flaw in coinjoins".  A coinjoin makes it possible to move money privately from one address to another.  If someone moves money from one address to the same address, that's not a flaw in the coinjoin.

Bitcoin experts like Peter Todd recognize this, but for some reason you still are miseducating people by telling them the opposite and accusing Peter Todd of being paid off with no evidence.  You really ruined your reputation by attacking open source Bitcoin privacy software with accusations of being flawed and attacking open source Bitcoin Core developers with accusations of them being corrupt.  It's truly despicable that you resort to wrongfully accusing innocent people and innocent projects in order to get people to lose their money to your custodian sites.  Find a new way to make money besides stealing it.

Wasabi users fucking up with their anonymity individually isn't Wasabi's fault. But, coordinator fucking up with users' anonymity is a Wasabi's fault. Wasabi transactions listed in KYCP (except the post-mix tx) are all coinjoin, ergo approved by the coordinator.

If you think that the coordinator's service can be improved, then why don't you run your own coordinator?  All the software is open source.

and the other weaknesses during coinjoin that are presented above?

What "other weaknesses" are you talking about?

No response I see.  There are no weaknesses in WabiSabi coinjoins, you can't defeat total privacy: https://mempool.space/tx/d465033214fd2309dcce5a90c45fcaa788aa4394ee36debe07aad8d8a37907d2

[PrivacyG]

Your urge to twist his words is nearly impressive. Nowhere has he stated that "2 outputs" make you untraceable. What he's argued is that it's impossible to know if the bitcoin changes hands, so it is absolutely unacceptable to base evidence on blockchain analysis.

That doesn't mean that you're "untraceable" (nowhere has he stated that in the quoted post). He merely said that it is impossible to know with confidence if the money changes hands, because blockchain analysis (which you're proudly funding) is flawed.

Right.  But you forget something.  Kruw thinks Blockchain Analysis has God like properties and is somehow indisputable.  It does not matter that I and o_e_l_e_o can swap Private Keys privately and if o_e_l_e_o has done something dirty the Blockchain Analysis puts ME on the Black List thinking it was me who did it.

To Wasabi this is impossible to dispute.  It shows that only two Transactions ago my Address made a drug deal so it HAD to be me.  How dare you even think Blockchain Analysis gives inaccurate results and is only guess work!  You big Privacy enemy!

-----

I'm happy that you like Monero, but a thread for Bitcoin privacy technology is the absolute worst place you could be shilling it.  It shows you are more interested in hurting Bitcoin than promoting privacy because you can already be private on Bitcoin with WabiSabi coinjoins.

You are actively spitting in Moneros face denying that Monero <> Bitcoin Atomic Swaps are a way to Privacy even if it is one of the best options we have,

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology"

Just like spitting into Samourais face, into Join Markets face and into the face of every single Bitcoin Talk member who complains about your Surveillance supportive product.

Forget o_e_l_e_o has a long history of avidly supporting your product.  Forget pretty much every body here used to support it.  Now we are Privacy enemies.  Forget we all came here to constructively complain and help Wasabi return to their old track.

The Wasabi team is acting like some sort of Prophets.  We are all now enemies to Wasabi because they are our enemy.

To Wasabi team.  You are a disgrace.

-----

I want you to admit you heard Peter Todd tell you that address reuse is not Wasabi fucking up and then I want you to explain why you are still attacking open source Bitcoin privacy software by spreading the lie that there is "evidence" of "flawed coinjoins".

We also want you to answer all the unanswered questions.  But you never do.  Ironically, we could all start doing the same and skip every question.  This topic is already a hell hole.  Imagine what it would be like if every body acted the same way you do and dodged every single legitimate question and replied with deceiving statements and word twisting.

If you want an artsy discussion, some sort of contest of word twists and deception, then just fuck off straight to the Off Topic board.  Either we all have a legitimate discussion or act with maximum stupidity.

-----

Imagine Wasabi was a billion Dollar drink company and they acted this way about a hated change in their product line.  How dare you NOT like our new recipe!  Fuck off!  We are the BEST, you are all paid by competition!  Hmph!

[o_e_l_e_o]

So, just to clarify:

A user creates a small change output using Samourai. Samourai clearly displays this change output before the transaction is signed, and gives the user ample opportunity to change it if they want. The user is happy with the size of the change output and goes ahead with the transaction. This change output is deliberately segregated in to a different account and so no privacy is lost. According to Kruw, this is a critical flaw in Samourai: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5471645.msg63134894#msg63134894

A user reuses an address on both sides of a Wasabi coinjoin. Outputs from the coinjoin land on the exact same address as the inputs they came from, resulting in a complete and critical loss of privacy. According to Kruw, this is all the users fault and has nothing to do with Wasabi.

Lol. The double standards are off the charts.

You are actively spitting in Moneros face denying that Monero <> Bitcoin Atomic Swaps are a way to Privacy even if it is one of the best options we have

According to Kruw:
Samourai - doesn't work
Sparrow - doesn't work
Whirlpool - doesn't work
JoinMarket - doesn't work
Jam - doesn't work
Monero - doesn't work
Atomic swaps - don't work
P2P swaps/trades - don't work
Mixers - don't work

Wasabi - perfect, infallible

Isn't it amazing how thousands of developers of dozens of different privacy projects are all so incredibly wrong, and only the pro-surveillance, pro-censorship, pro-government sell outs are the ones who got it right.

To Wasabi team.  You are a disgrace.

By directly funding blockchain analysis, by directly supporting and spreading the concept of tainted coins, by attacking bitcoin's fungibility, and by censoring users, Wasabi are aiding and abetting the government take over of bitcoin. This kind of malicious behavior is now spreading to mining pools, which are using the exact same logic and methods as Wasabi to censor transactions from their blocks entirely. Soon enough, only government approved transactions will be allowed to me mined at all. We are marching down the road to bitcoin becoming a government permissioned network, and Wasabi are leading the charge.

Wasabi are enemies of bitcoin.

For this reason, bitcoin.org should completely scrub all traces of Wasabi from the site.

[Kruw]

So, just to clarify:

A user creates a small change output using Samourai. Samourai clearly displays this change output before the transaction is signed, and gives the user ample opportunity to change it if they want. The user is happy with the size of the change output and goes ahead with the transaction.

So, just to clarify:  

You do not create "change outputs" with WabiSabi, your entire balance is turned completely private so you do not ever reveal two addresses belong to you.

This change output is deliberately segregated in to a different account and so no privacy is lost.

You are lying.  Changing the derivation path of Whirlpool's change output doesn't improve its privacy.

A user reuses an address on both sides of a Wasabi coinjoin. Outputs from the coinjoin land on the exact same address as the inputs they came from, resulting in a complete and critical loss of privacy. According to Kruw, this is all the users fault and has nothing to do with Wasabi.

You mean "According to Peter Todd":  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

You continue to dodge the fact that Bitcoin experts have already debunked this false claim and continue to attack open source Bitcoin privacy software.

According to Kruw:
Samourai - doesn't work
Sparrow - doesn't work
Whirlpool - doesn't work
JoinMarket - doesn't work
Jam - doesn't work
Monero - doesn't work
Atomic swaps - don't work
P2P swaps/trades - don't work
Mixers - don't work

Wasabi - perfect, infallible

Isn't it amazing how thousands of developers of dozens of different privacy projects are all so incredibly wrong, and only the pro-surveillance, pro-censorship, pro-government sell outs are the ones who got it right.

Joinmarket, Jam, and Monero do work for privacy.  Stop trying to whitewash Samourai/Sparrow's Whirlpool and your "mixing site" scams by putting them alongside working privacy projects like Joinmarket, Jam, and Monero.

[o_e_l_e_o]

your entire balance is turned completely private so you do not ever reveal two addresses belong to you.

You only need to reveal one address when it used on both sides of the transaction.

You mean "According to Peter Todd":  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I still haven't figured out what you think you are achieving by constantly appealing to authority.

You continue to dodge the fact that Bitcoin experts have already debunked this false claim and continue to attack open source Bitcoin privacy software.

Argue semantics and evade the questions all you want. It's quite clear no one here is attacking open source software nor privacy software. They are attacking Wasabi, which is categorically not privacy software.

Joinmarket, Jam, and Monero do work for privacy.

Oh, so Monero isn't a shitcoin anymore? I just can't keep up with your goalposts.

[Kruw]

You mean "According to Peter Todd":  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I still haven't figured out what you think you are achieving by constantly appealing to authority.

I didn't need to appeal to authority the first time I explained to you that address reuse was caused by people using deterministic seeds on two different devices:

Because Wasabi wallet automatically picks addresses?

If a JoinMarket user picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to, that's their fault.
If a Wasabi client automatically picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to with zero input or even awareness from the user, that's Wasabi's fault.

And what exactly do you think happens when you use the same seed on multiple clients?  Here's your answer:

https://medium.com/@thepiratewhocantbenamed/samourai-wallet-address-reuse-bug-1d64d311983d
https://twitter.com/SamouraiWallet/status/1283145015124996098
https://twitter.com/brian_trollz/status/1559018534675644418

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

We just agreed that address reuse is not a "critical flaw" since it can be done in any implementation like my Joinmarket and Samourai examples, and it can't be avoided by a client if a user has the same seed generating addresses asynchronously on multiple clients.

I'm asking you directly: What is wrong with the WabiSabi coinjoin implementation?  I told you exactly what was wrong with the Whirlpool coinjoin implementation and then I deanonymized the very first Whirlpool transaction ID you provided using the flaws I described, why can't you deanonymize any WabiSabi coinjoins?

Now Peter Todd has given you the exact same explanation.  Didn't you hear him? Are you going to accuse Peter Todd of being corrupt and paid off like BlackHatCoiner did? Or, will you finally stop attacking open source Bitcoin privacy projects and admit there isn't a "flaw" like you claimed?

[o_e_l_e_o]

Or, will you finally stop attacking open source Bitcoin privacy projects and admit there isn't a "flaw" like you claimed?

Just lol.

You've had the same things explained to you dozens of times by multiple users over many months. Your continued lies and denial of facts is simply evidence of your malicious intent to drive bitcoin to a government controlled system.

Wasabi is the enemy.

[Kruw]

You've had the same things explained to you dozens of times by multiple users over many months.

Had what explained?  Provide quotes.  No one ever provided a single flaw in WabiSabi coinjoins, multiple users have merely been repeating your debunked report of "address reuse".

Your continued lies and denial of facts is simply evidence of your malicious intent to drive bitcoin to a government controlled system.

Fact:  If you use a deterministic seed on two different devices, they will generate and use the same exact addresses.

Fact:  Wasabi is open source software, it's not government controlled, it's user controlled.

Wasabi is the enemy.

It's clear you have no issue lying to defeat "the enemy" by making false claims about flaws existing in open source privacy software.  Fortunately, Bitcoin privacy experts such as Peter Todd directly addressed your lies about address reuse: https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

[Wind_FURY]

Or, will you finally stop attacking open source Bitcoin privacy projects and admit there isn't a "flaw" like you claimed?

Just lol.

You've had the same things explained to you dozens of times by multiple users over many months. Your continued lies and denial of facts is simply evidence of your malicious intent to drive bitcoin to a government controlled system.

Wasabi is the enemy.

If WasabiWallet is the enemy, then I believe all of those CoinJoin services could be the enemy.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

We can't point one finger to one entity without thinking that there are other entities that possibly could be working with them.

Isn't there an update for the Lightning Network that makes it impossible to distinguish between a regular Bitcoin transaction and a transaction that opens a Lightning channel? That could be a solution to help preserve Bitcoin's fungibility.

🤔

[BlackHatCoiner]

We can't point one finger to one entity without thinking that there are other entities that possibly could be working with them.

Um. What kind of twisted reasoning is this? Just because one such entity is funding blockchain analysis, it doesn't mean we have to treat everyone as guilty until proven otherwise. Everyone's innocent, until they are known to be working with the enemy.

Isn't there an update for the Lightning Network that makes it impossible to distinguish between a regular Bitcoin transaction and a transaction that opens a Lightning channel? That could be a solution to help preserve Bitcoin's fungibility.

There are a host variety of solutions for fungibility, from lightning and Schnorr signatures to not using coinjoin and mixing services which buy taint.

[o_e_l_e_o]

If WasabiWallet is the enemy, then I believe all of those CoinJoin services could be the enemy.

Anyone could be the enemy. The coinjoin service which is pro-government, pro-censorship, and pro-surveillance is the enemy.

We can't point one finger to one entity without thinking that there are other entities that possibly could be working with them.

You mean like Wasabi working with blockchain analysis companies? I would consider both of those enemies of bitcoin.

[Synchronice]

You should know by now not to listen to o_e_l_e_o, he will say any lie necessary about open source privacy software in order to trick people into losing their money to a custodian instead.  There is no "flaw", stop FUDing and start verifying:

He doesn't say that the code of Wasabi's open-source software is bad, he says that it's bad to use Wasabi's coordinator because you partner with BA companies. If I run my own coordinator without partnering BA analysis companies and won't filter transactions, then yes, problem will be solved. No one says that the open-source of project is bad. I think it's clear what's the issue here and why do you pretend like there doesn't exist any issue. Move away from BA companies and no one will complain anything about Wasabi if it remains open-source and transparent.

[Kruw]

He doesn't say that the code of Wasabi's open-source software is bad, he says that it's bad to use Wasabi's coordinator because you partner with BA companies. If I run my own coordinator without partnering BA analysis companies and won't filter transactions, then yes, problem will be solved. No one says that the open-source of project is bad. I think it's clear what's the issue here and why do you pretend like there doesn't exist any issue. Move away from BA companies and no one will complain anything about Wasabi if it remains open-source and transparent.

No, o_e_l_e_o has been lying about the privacy of Wasabi regardless of which coordinator you use:

I never said it was. I'm just pointing out that even without a coordinator which directly funds blockchain analysis, Wasabi is still useless.

Instead of telling them what to do, show them how it's done the right way. Why not fork the coordinator and have it accept all transactions.

Because as I've shown above, the Wasabi wallet software itself is deeply flawed and reuses addresses on both sides of coinjoin transactions. Why fork flawed software in order to launch your own coordinator to bypass the anti-fungibility and anti-privacy ethos of Wasabi/zkSNACKs, when I can just use JoinMarket or Samourai with my own node which avoid all these issues in the first place.

Still, why would I go through the effort of setting up a coordinator, having zero volume, trying to entice people to my coordinator, all so I can run inferior coinjoins with suffer from address reuse and identifiable outputs, when I can just run JoinMarket instead?

He's not just attacking Wasabi either, he's opposed to ANY open source software that allows you to coinjoin with full privacy:

Wasabi, BTCPay Server, or Trezor.

Thanks for alerting me that BTCPay is also now a supporter of mass surveillance and blockchain analysis. Another company to forever cross off my list of recommendations.

[PrivacyG]

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology"

() and Monero do work for privacy.  Stop trying to whitewash Samourai/Sparrow () by putting them alongside working privacy projects like () Monero.

WabiSabi solves the flaws of other coinjoin implementations.

Joinmarket, () and () do work for privacy.  Stop trying to whitewash Samourai/Sparrow () by putting them alongside working privacy projects like Joinmarket ()

What in the dystopia is this!

-----

If WasabiWallet is the enemy, then I believe all of those CoinJoin services could be the enemy.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

We can't point one finger to one entity without thinking that there are other entities that possibly could be working with them.

For all we know, you could be the biggest serial killer.  Why point one finger to one serial killer without thinking that there are other serial killers that possibly could be roaming free?

With this mind set we can all give up on every thing.  Including Bitcoin.  Who knows the REAL reason Bitcoin was invented for!  Maybe we will only live to find out and it will be too late by then!  But what if it was not.

-----

What we are doing now is trying to hold on to the entities who SEEM not to work with our enemies.  Many of them will give up.  Many of them will collaborate with the enemy.  All we have left is hope and a few who still did not give up or trait us.

Does any of us have 100 percent belief that any of the Mixers available today is 100 percent clean and working for the people and not against the people?  I do not.  And I think it is foolish to resort to trust.  I only think by combining the diverse ways of Privacy we do get to a point where it is almost impossible to assimilate enough information to link the Bitcoin I had before with the Mixed, Coin Joined, Atomic Swapped Bitcoin.  Maybe the Mixer we used was a honey pot.  Alright.  But then we have two more spoofing techniques that are strong and build strong Privacy for our Coins.

For all we know, our Privacy is ruined already no matter what we do.  We could be trying our hardest to gain Privacy while there could be publicly unknown technology ruining it even with the best Coin Joins available.  Maybe there is a server underground that records and transcribes every single word and sound I have ever made into an immense record.  That does not mean I will ever give up based on assumptions only.

Wasabi has proved us and our suspicions right.  They DO work with the biggest Bitcoin Privacy enemy.  We are witnessing an entity who is trying to convince us that our enemy is our friend.  Either we continue declining to work with entities like Wasabi or we start losing the battle.  If the supposedly largest Bitcoin Privacy supporter says there is good and bad Bitcoin and we agree then we are screwed!  So is Bitcoin!

It means from tomorrow on we can start separating the Bitcoins we have into two sides, one of them worth less than the other!  It means we are never going to have the freedom Bitcoin was to give us.  Because if Wasabi starts pushing a Tainted Bitcoin narrative giving false hope for real Privacy and the most Privacy oriented users agree with them, the average user of Bitcoin will be much easier to fool.

Do not give up and do not treat every fighter as a traitor.  Wasabi showed they are traitors.  Join Market has not yet.  Monero has not yet.  Who the hell knows who falls next, but as long as we have even ONE alternative there is still hope!

[BlackHatCoiner]

He doesn't say that the code of Wasabi's open-source software is bad, he says that it's bad to use Wasabi's coordinator because you partner with BA companies.

Both are true. Yes, Wasabi is partnering with blockchain analysis company and buying the notion that coins are unequal, so they cannot be trusted. And yes, their software is flawed. I don't know with certainty if it's more of a back end or front end issue (probably both), but we frequently notice coinjoin reusing addresses in both inputs and outputs.

Here's another reason for not trusting Wasabi folks: they are assholes. Kruw has accused nearly every participant of a mixer signature campaign as guilty for coin theft with absolutely no evidence. nopara73 is doxxing their competitors on Twitter. Max Hillebrand is one big of a hypocrite. Any sane person reading the open letter to Wasabi team can make out they're running a clown show.

[Kruw]

He doesn't say that the code of Wasabi's open-source software is bad, he says that it's bad to use Wasabi's coordinator because you partner with BA companies.

Both are true. Yes, Wasabi is partnering with blockchain analysis company and buying the notion that coins are unequal, so they cannot be trusted. And yes, their software is flawed. I don't know with certainty if it's more of a back end or front end issue (probably both), but we frequently notice coinjoin reusing addresses in both inputs and outputs.

You are lying, and this is not the first time you've been caught lying about address reuse being a "flaw" in the software.  Peter Todd explicitly debunked this accusation:

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

There is KYCP which has analyzed quite a few Wasabi coinjoins and has found a bunch of weaknesses regarding collaboration and address reuse (in both inputs and outputs!), such as this one. What is your input on this?

BlackHatCoiner, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

[PrivacyG]

To every body who has to say something against Wasabi,

But didn't you hear Peter Todd?

-----

Jokes aside.  Can any body enlighten me and briefly explain who in the world is this Peter Todd and why does Kruw feel the urgent need to mention him in over 50 percent of his recent posts?  I have been looking for over 20 minutes on both Bitcoin Talk and the Internet and all I can find is sexual misconduct allegations drama and that he was a Bitcoin Core / Tor developer who is now disgraced for the reason I just mentioned.

[achow101]

Y'all need to chill.