Petition to remove Wasabi from recommendations of bitcoin.org

[BlackHatCoiner]

You should be concerned of an active Sybil attacker regardless of whether other inputs are rejected or not.  Mining fees prevent continuous attacks, large sized rounds prevent single attacks.

Maybe you should be concerned a little more if you're voluntarily giving the power to a chain analysis company to decide to execute the Sybil attack more trivially?

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

Here you are, engaging in whataboutism for the billionth time. This isn't what Pmalek asked you. It's pretty simple to grasp, but apparently not as simple to ignore it: the company responsible for Wasabi is preaching about openness and transparency. Why would it let a chain analysis company, which is described by the lack of both openness and transparency, decide who isn't allowed to coinjoin?

[Kruw]

You should be concerned of an active Sybil attacker regardless of whether other inputs are rejected or not.  Mining fees prevent continuous attacks, large sized rounds prevent single attacks.

Maybe you should be concerned a little more if you're voluntarily giving the power to a chain analysis company to decide to execute the Sybil attack more trivially?

Coordinators do not have the power to execute Sybil attacks without being detected, so coordinators cannot delegate such a power to a chain analysis company.

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

Here you are, engaging in whataboutism for the billionth time. This isn't what Pmalek asked you. It's pretty simple to grasp, but apparently not as simple to ignore it: the company responsible for Wasabi is preaching about openness and transparency. Why would it let a chain analysis company, which is described by the lack of both openness and transparency, decide who isn't allowed to coinjoin?

BlackHatCoiner, why haven't you set up a WabiSabi coordinator yet?  Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Coordinators do not have the power to execute Sybil attacks without being detected, so coordinators cannot delegate such a power to a chain analysis company.

I mean, definitely a lie. A coordinator randomly rejecting inputs can do quite noticeable harm to the coinjoin.

BlackHatCoiner, why haven't you set up a WabiSabi coordinator yet?

Because I want to be as much detached from Wasabi as possible. You can call it dogma, but I just don't want to run their software, especially when there are better alternatives. There have been multiple accusations of it being flawed, and I don't have the liquidity to make an attractive coordinator, which is pretty much the same for the average coinjoin user. I'm also encouraged to work on more decentralized solutions, like Joinmarket which is by the way more Sybil resistant than Wasabi, as it utilizes fidelity bonds.

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Lol. As if there are no other solutions proposed? Just because we don't run our own Wasabi coordinators, it doesn't mean we don't get along other privacy options.

[ABCbits]

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Isn't it obvious most people doesn't have necessary skill or experience to run their own server (whether it's WabiSabi coordinator or something else)? For example, if i show people these repository and ask which one needed to run WasiSabi coordinator, i wonder how many of them could give correct answer.
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WabiSabi
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/NWabiSabi
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi

Most people is more likely to run different CoinJoin wallet/application or even using mixer (which is custodial by nature).

[Pmalek]

If rejections were arbitrary and commonplace then that would give you an eager customer base from which you could attract users to your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator.  Why haven't you set up your own WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator yet?

You have what it takes to one day make it in politics. You are excellent in avoiding to talk about problems and immediately attempting to switch attention to something or someone else. You answer questions with counter questions to avoid the answering of questions. I knew exactly what I wanted to hear when I asked you about your blockchain analysis partners (yes, I said partners) and what my next response would be like. And because you have no answers, you are left with only two cards. Play the we are open-source card or everyone can run their own coordinator card, again because the software is open-source. Despite you knowing that's not the issue, you insist on playing those cards. No one is falling for your bluffs.

Attacks on centralized mixing services incoming 

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies? Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?
I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not? How can they prove that? And I don't understand the meaning of dirt coins. What if someone sold something illegal, got bitcoins, called me to repair her dishwasher and directly paid me from his bitcoin wallet? If her coins are dirty, I know that my work was hard sweat and honest job. Can CA or Wasabi analyze and sort those differences? No, so that's bullshit.
The solution is simple, don't cooperate with Chain Analyzes companies and no one will ever complain Wasabi.

[Kruw]

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Lol. As if there are no other solutions proposed? Just because we don't run our own Wasabi coordinators, it doesn't mean we don't get along other privacy options.

^ More proof of the petitioners trying to harm the reputation of open source software.  BlackHatCoiner started a self moderated topic so he could lie about Wasabi without anyone being able to post to expose his lies.  This is truly cowardly behavior.

Since no one on this thread is coordinating coinjoins themselves, it's proof that all the petitioners don't actually want to circumvent coinjoin censorship, they just want to harm the reputation of open source software.

Isn't it obvious most people doesn't have necessary skill or experience to run their own server (whether it's WabiSabi coordinator or something else)?

Saying "I don't want to run a node" isn't a good excuse for not using Bitcoin, we won the block size war so you don't have any reason not to.  If you don't have the necessary skill or experience to run your own node, you can continue to use Paypal just like the rest of the fiat slaves.

You have what it takes to one day make it in politics. You are excellent in avoiding to talk about problems and immediately attempting to switch attention to something or someone else. You answer questions with counter questions to avoid the answering of questions. I knew exactly what I wanted to hear when I asked you about your blockchain analysis partners (yes, I said partners) and what my next response would be like. And because you have no answers, you are left with only two cards. Play the we are open-source card or everyone can run their own coordinator card, again because the software is open-source. Despite you knowing that's not the issue, you insist on playing those cards. No one is falling for your bluffs.

I answered all your questions already so we could move this conversation forward:  Why would you participate in a petition to have open source privacy software removed from Bitcointalk since you can solve any problems of arbitrary censorship by running your own coordinator?

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

Correct, Tor and compact block filters prevent any two addresses from being linked together by network connections.  However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

[BlackHatCoiner]

As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right?

Chain analysis companies can't directly trace the activity of Wasabi users, but the particular firm that is funded by zkSNACKs is capable of directly harming the coinjoin anonymity set.

Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

According to their blog, that was necessary for their survival:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?

I mean, isn't it crystal clear already? But to detect dirty coins! If the full-transparency-and-privacy company won't cooperate with a chain analysis company in secret to ensure no stolen coins are being coinjoined, then how the hell will Bitcoin be fungible?  

I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not?

Chain analysis is fundamentally not accurate and evidently not scientific, so your concern is reasonable: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5464886.0

Can CA or Whirlwind analyze and sort those differences?

Umm... How's whirlwind relevant here?

[Wind_FURY]

But the same hypothesis, I want people to "clean" their UTXOs from "taint"

If by "taint", you mean the list of coins which are treated unequally by chain analysis firms (some of which do get funded by the US government), then we actually don't know what will happen, and probably neither any Wasabi developer knows.

That's the one. "Taint" enforced by "their" definition. Let's teach other plebs how to remove the "taint" by having them pass through Wasabi's CoinJoin.

 

As I said, their coordinator makes a request to Coinfirm and will enforce that UTXO list to the coinjoin round. Your coins could be accepted even if you're wanted by the FBI, or could be refused even if you're innocent.

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

You don't know? But a centralized entity making claims such as zkSNACKS should be regulated by an authority in case those claims aren't real, no?

I still don't get where you're confused. Which claim by zkSNACKs is false if they approve a coin which is deemed as "naughty" by some chain analysis firm?

I'm merely talking about a hypothetical situation.

From a user's viewpoint, zkSNACKs' coordinator checks if the UTXOs are tainted before they pass through, no? Then the user should assume that all UTXOs that CoinJoined through Wasabi are not tainted. BUT what if the user still had his UTXOs blocked or confiscated by another centralized entity because of claims that they were "tainted". Who would be responsible for this problem?

[Synchronice]

@Kruw
As far as I understand, because of Tor and compact block filters, chain analyzes companies aren't able to trace or spy on Wasabi users, right? Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

Correct, Tor and compact block filters prevent any two addresses from being linked together by network connections.  However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

I had more questions than that.

Then what's the point of paying money to Chain Analysis companies?

According to their blog, that was necessary for their survival:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology. In doing this, we are giving Bitcoin’s anonymity a chance to thrive. The alternative, discontinuing zkSNACKs would have set back Bitcoin privacy for decades.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Why is there such a cooperation between Wasabi and CA companies?

I mean, isn't it crystal clear already? But to detect dirty coins! If the full-transparency-and-privacy company won't cooperate with a chain analysis company in secret to ensure no stolen coins are being coinjoined, then how the hell will Bitcoin be fungible?  

According to their blog article, they had to cooperate with Chain Analyzes company in order to not close Wasabi wallet service but at the same time it was done proactively. That's understandable but by doing so, they simply destroyed what they built up.
So, as far as I understood, Wasabi analyzes who sends coins for coinjoin to prevent coins from so called 'blacklisted' addresses, this is where you are identified, right? But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

I don't love the idea of Wasabi telling me whether my coins are dirty or not because we don't have one official, the most accurate CA company that operates worldwide, so who is going to tell me whether my coins are dirty or not?

Chain analysis is fundamentally not accurate and evidently not scientific, so your concern is reasonable: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5464886.0

That's 100% right, chain analysis is not accurate, so I don't understand the point of their proactivity in this case.

Can CA or Whirlwind analyze and sort those differences?

Umm... How's whirlwind relevant here?

Sorry, that was a typo, I had to write Wasabi, already edited my post, thanks. I don't know why but I typed Whirlwind instead of Wasabi

[Kruw]

But as we know, most Bitcoiner doesn't bother run full node even when they have skill, experience or resource to do so. And i doubt running WabiSabi coordinator is as easy as running full node. For example, Bitcoin Core have GUI, various installer option and good default setting.

Stop doubting, start running: https://i.imgur.com/dA1YkUp.png

I had more questions than that.

I only know the answers about how Wasabi works, I do not know the answers for your questions about how chain analysis works.

But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

No.  Wasabi coinjoin coordinators cannot match outputs to inputs.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

If Coinfirm deems this "naughty", it will be rejected. The point of discriminating against some "naughty coins" is to create the perfect environment so that large corporations like Binance can justify requesting all that ton of KYC info when you make an account, which in addition is extremely useful for a surveillance state.

Quoting myself:

Blockchain analysis companies are the practice of "being guilty until proven innocent". Living under a state which can put me behind the bars because I might be involved with some activity, with absolutely no scientific evidence is totalitarian. Literally everyone in the blockchain is potentially involved in some illegal activity.

But it's just genius. They've convinced the world that it's needed. A weapon to intrude into people's liberty and having them voluntarily handing it over is just the ultimate weapon.

But as we know, most Bitcoiner doesn't bother run full node even when they have skill, experience or resource to do so.

Additionally, they don't even have a guide which would make setup easier for the average person. The only thing relevant with that in their documentation is this:

Is the Backend's (Coordinator) code open-source?

Yes, you can verify the code on GitHub

Extreme desire for decentralization there.

So, as far as I understood, Wasabi analyzes who sends coins for coinjoin to prevent coins from so called 'blacklisted' addresses, this is where you are identified, right? But once you coinjoin your coins via Wasabi, does Wasabi still know who you are? Sorry if my question sounds dumb.

Wasabi wallet (the software) doesn't know who you are, and in fact it uses pretty decent techniques to protect your privacy like block filtering. But, the company responsible for the vast majority of WabiSabi coinjoins (which as far as I'm aware of, runs the only public coordinator), uses coinjoin fees to fund the operation of a surveillance firm, which will indeed spy on you.

That's 100% right, chain analysis is not accurate, so I don't understand the point of their proactivity in this case.

Maybe. I say maybe, Wasabi team was offered some good amount of money for that. This is complete conspiracy, but I say maybe. 

User n0nce had sent them a letter, you can grab a snack and read their funny answers in here: Wasabi blacklisting update - open letter / 24 questions discussion thread.

[Kruw]

Start running, but how? Can you point me to any documentation or guide? That screenshot seems to be from Wasabi Wallet, but last time i tried it[1] such feature/option doesn't seem to exist.

[1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5402090.msg60506242#msg60506242

The screenshot I posted is of the WabiSabi plugin on my BTCPay Server, which easily allows anyone to run a coinjoin coordinator.

[Pmalek]

Why would you participate in a petition to have open source privacy software removed from Bitcointalk since you can solve any problems of arbitrary censorship by running your own coordinator?

Three things.

1. Your open-source software with its default settings working with the default coordinator isn't privacy software.
2. This petition concerns a request to have Wasabi removed from bitcoin.org, not Bitcointalk.
3. If you paid more attention to my previous posts instead of coming up with innovative ways to dodge questions, you would notice that I am not for removing the privacy-invasive Wasabi wallet from bitcoin.org. But I am for lowering its privacy ratings as I mentioned earlier. And since you are going to say that the code is open-source and I can run my own coordinator, I am still for lowering the wallet's privacy rating.

However, paying money to a chain analysis company can still be useful even when checking a single unspent addresses because even an address that is not linked to others could have been reported as a direct recipient of stolen money.

You have no way to know that. You don't know if that is true. You are a trustless entity that relies on a blackbox to tell you what is acceptable and what is not with no way of verifying the accuracy of the information.

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question. 

[NotATether]

I love how discontinuing their coordinator would have set Bitcoin's privacy for decades when Bitcoin is only a decade old.  

Not only that, but Kruw keeps highligting that the software and code is open-source, so why would there be a problem for Bitcoin if zkSNACKs disappeared tomorrow? I know why I am asking this, lets see if Kruw takes the bait or dodges the question. 

If zksnacks evaporates, then some whale will just create another coordinator that works with Wasabi. It's not rocket-science to bootstrap a coordinator, as there is an open-source repo with instructions somewhere on Github.

Wasabi Wallet has not quite become more unknown despite its popularity tanking over the last couple months. So in any case I find it highly unlikely that coinjoining will suddenly fail on Wasabi for whatever reason.

[BlackHatCoiner]

1. Your open-source software with its default settings working with the default coordinator isn't privacy software.

The funny part is that their legal document describes the terms of use in a way that you I assume there is one coordinator. It's as if there is no other coordinator, or desire to run a separate coordinator. The software is released under the MIT license, but there is a very strict list of terms you need to agree on to use it. And I still haven't got anything in response to that. (I genuinely don't know what's the legal approach for a person who isn't affiliated with Wasabi, but want to run their own instance of Wasabi backend)

You have no way to know that. You don't know if that is true. You are a trustless entity that relies on a blackbox to tell you what is acceptable and what is not with no way of verifying the accuracy of the information.

This is as simple as that. I really don't know why we've extended this discussion so far. They're like presenting themselves as transparent, but then pay someone to tell them who they believe is a criminal with no evidence? And also, how valuable can this information be for an entity that protects privacy? I just don't get it.

[Medusah]

I have closed the github issue.  I will pull a request correcting these:

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default. This means a third party must be trusted to not hide or simulate payments.

Prevents spying on your payments

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance and payments by rotating addresses. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

I think these descriptions are more accurate:

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default which blacklists certain coins if they come from illicit activities according to chain analysis.

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance using coinjoin, however with default settings, coordinator will use coinjoin fees to fund chain analysis. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

I want to read your feedback on this.  What do you think it would be more appropriate?

[Kruw]

This wallet relies on a centralized service by default which blacklists certain coins if they come from illicit activities according to chain analysis.

This is wrong, you do not rely on a centralized service that can blacklist your coins.

This wallet makes it harder to spy on your balance using coinjoin, however with default settings, coordinator will use coinjoin fees to fund chain analysis. You should still take care to use a new Bitcoin address each time you request payment.

This section is about Wasabi implementing BIP32, coinjoin functionality isn't mentioned.  What makes you think the most relevant information to educate users who are introduced to the coinjoin function is a single item on the expense side of the default coinjoin coordinator company's balance sheet?  Do you think that all wallets that do not offer coinjoin functionality at all should have their privacy downgraded or a warning attached since you think the concept of not using coinjoins is something the user be intimately aware of?

[goldkingcoiner]

*snip*

Pretty much — the user should just be responsible enough to do at least a little bit of digging before using a certain wallet service/feature. Because if we'd like to delist every wallet that has some controversy, we'd probably run out of wallet to list besides Bitcoin Core.

Plus Bitcoin.org is probably just following its own business model as an info-aggregation website. I do not see them removing anything from their current recommendations as they probably got a lot of money to list them in there in the first place. It's all about the money, I think.

Which I personally believe to be a good thing. Bitcoin promotion is very important, and as long as that profit goes towards expanding the adoption rate of Bitcoin, I am all for it.

[Wind_FURY]

Then what's the point of having to check them for "taint"? Would UTXOs received from a Dark Market dealer pass through their coordinator?

If Coinfirm deems this "naughty", it will be rejected. The point of discriminating against some "naughty coins" is to create the perfect environment so that large corporations like Binance can justify requesting all that ton of KYC info when you make an account, which in addition is extremely useful for a surveillance state.

Then how can users be sure that centralized mixers themselves don't use Coinfirm or the services of blockchain analysis companies? To be frank, I believe it's merely a trade-off for mixers to protect themselves from the state, but like you posted it could be an attack vector.

Quoting myself:

Blockchain analysis companies are the practice of "being guilty until proven innocent". Living under a state which can put me behind the bars because I might be involved with some activity, with absolutely no scientific evidence is totalitarian. Literally everyone in the blockchain is potentially involved in some illegal activity.

But it's just genius. They've convinced the world that it's needed. A weapon to intrude into people's liberty and having them voluntarily handing it over is just the ultimate weapon.

The question is for Kruw and the developers of mixers that use the services of blockchain analysis companies. If all UTXOs are "guilty until proven innocent", how can users refute evaluations that are "false-positives"?