🔓 Lock.com - Software isolation will replace the hardware wallet [PREVIEW]

[snowpega]

Yes, I did, and if you are using Gmail, then check the Promotions tab. I saw that mail there.

Oh, my bad. Checking on it later, I found my mail in the spam folder; it was not in the Promotions section.

I also left my email in the field for early access testers on their website, but I haven't received any email yet. Although it seems to me that it would be logical to receive an answer: "your application will be reviewed as soon as a new stage of wallet testing begins. It is possible that you will participate." I was calm, knowing that my application had worked. Well, it's okay, we'll wait until we get letters about approved testing applications in the third quarter of this year. Who knows, maybe we'll be the ones who stand at the threshold of something great. I personally love being a beta tester. This feeling of being a pioneer is always exciting and wonderful.

Are you still looking for your email? Check your spam box. Maybe, just like me, your missed email is in the spam box section.


Other than this is feels better to see the team respond to all those queries that members have been asking for a long time.

[Dareo]

We know that the recent Trezor data breach exposed the names and home addresses of 81,000 users, which could pose a serious risk of physical attacks. In this regard, Lock model is great because you can use your old device as a hardware wallet. And since the code will be open, there is no fear of physical address leaks.

BIP-39 also has a much more mature ecosystem of independent recovery tools. As UQS documentation and tooling are published, independent recovery and interoperability will need to be part of its review.

Since you mentioned that UQS needs to develop an independent recovery ecosystem. This means we don't have to depend on any third-party tools, we can recover it ourselves.

[safar1980]

It turns out that not all modern hacks and thefts from hardware wallets are related to AI these days. You may have heard that yesterday news came out about the largest lawsuit, worth 500 million, filed by victims of a long‑ago Ledger hack. And now the representatives of this hardware wallet will need to defend their reputation, even though there are many victims and huge sums were stolen from each of them. And all of this is due to a database hack in 2020. For the Lock team, this is another opportunity to remind the community about their new technological solution in comparison with “hardware” methods.

The legal prospects for such cases are very slim, but perhaps the company will agree to pay compensation to prevent the case from dragging on for years and tarnishing Ledger's reputation. In the US, 95% of such cases typically result in compensation.


And in this project it would be interesting to see a working solution.

[internetional]

I've carefully read the entire discussion. As I understand it, Lock's architecture is designed to support Lightning without exposing the private key to the network-facing component. What I still don't understand from the discussion is how Lightning state will be stored and updated securely. madebylock, could you explain this in more detail?

[nc50lc]

I've carefully read the entire discussion. As I understand it, Lock's architecture is designed to support Lightning without exposing the private key to the network-facing component. What I still don't understand from the discussion is how Lightning state will be stored and updated securely. madebylock, could you explain this in more detail?

I'm interested on this as well.
Good question, it's a very small detail in the updated answers but a big question if it's feasible.

Unless it'll be handled by a third-party or custodial setup,
The common way to achieve this in a self-custodial way is to either require the treasury every time the user needs to use their channel(s),
Or to derive an extended private key from the master private key at a specific derivation path that'll be used for lightning network.
But the latter defeats the purpose of an air-gap setup (at least on the LN side) even though the master prvKey is still safely stored there.

[Ashawowo(OS)]

THE UNIVERSAL QUANTUM SEED

UQS addresses a different part of the long-term security model: generation, transcription, and recovery of the wallet's root seed.

The 36-word UQS format encodes 272 bits of entropy and includes a 16-bit checksum.

It is more secure than the current 12-word BIP system; however the 36-word UQS visual icon format implies that the seed backup must be stored digitally. Is there any way to write it down on a piece of paper, or must it be kept in digital form?

I really don't think we'll be able to write visual representation down by ourselves, but I know that since there's an option of using it as a cold storage setup, then it means there would be a provision to back it up, a quick guess should be exporting it in QR code format, then print and store offline. so when you want to reimport,  it's scanned by the wallet and the keys retrieved to set it up. It would be good if madebylock clears the air on this as well.