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Author Topic: Ecdsa Bitcoin wallet key  (Read 142 times)
youcan_Vx (OP)
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November 15, 2026, 03:34:05 AM
 #1

Is it possible to crack a Bitcoin wallet key that contains multiple addresses and has a leak issue involving duplicate 14-character and number portions of the Nonce code?

Share your thoughts! 👀
nc50lc
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November 15, 2026, 06:58:34 AM
Merited by LoyceV (4)
 #2

This is most likely an X/Y Problem.

The current description is all over the place, which currently doesn't make sense or at least without the necessary information about the client that generated it.
Please provide more information or at least link(s) of anything related to it.
And the actual goal why you're asking the question.

Once there's enough info,
You may move this to Technical Support board (or a Mod might) for better visibility to more tech-savvy users.

ABCbits
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November 15, 2026, 07:40:47 AM
 #3

Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character, it's certainly possible. But the hard part is determining how likely it can be done in practice.

With naive assumption, 14 known hex character means possible combination reduced from 2^256 to 2^200. But amount of vulnerable signature and nature of the vulnerability could weaken the security even more.

MonNov16
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November 16, 2026, 03:35:21 AM
 #4

Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character, it's certainly possible. But the hard part is determining how likely it can be done in practice.

With naive assumption, 14 known hex character means possible combination reduced from 2^256 to 2^200. But amount of vulnerable signature and nature of the vulnerability could weaken the security even more.

Main thing to take from this is that rather than trying to brute force the attack, it can be turned into lattice problem (Hidden Number Problem). If you know some bits of k across multiple signatures made with same key, it may be possible to recover whole private key using lattice reduction (LLL). It is well known type of attack that has been demonstrated before. Minerva and LadderLeak vulnerabilities have shown that attacks can be carried out against ECDSA by exploiting information leaked through tming and side channels. How many signatures you would need to do this would depend on how much information has been leaked.

This i just one possible attack scenario. If there was more of issue with poor RNG/nonce generation and side-channel leakage then lattice attack would be far more relevant.

As if we look at OP so I will say, if there are multiple address leaks involving different keys, you wont get any benefit from combining those leaks. Youll require multiple leaks per key.
nc50lc
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November 16, 2026, 07:21:46 AM
 #5

Assuming "nonce code" actually refer to k value (part of ECDSA used by Bitcoin) -snip-
Possible, I might have read some articles involving vulnerabilities that lead to reproducible PRNG, so the supposed-to-be random nonce might have reproducible portions.

Quote from: ABCbits
and "14-character and number" means 14 HEX character
For me, it looks like this: "duplicate 14-character" and "number portions of the Nonce".

BTW, I found this thread in Bitcoin Discussion board but OP or a Mod moved it here without clarifying the OP.
I'm thinking that this could just be one of those common Bitcoin Discussion topic but tried to "step-up" to be technical that's why the OP contains technical jargons.

youcan_Vx (OP)
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November 16, 2026, 08:49:52 PM
 #6

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
pooya87
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November 17, 2026, 02:52:15 AM
 #7

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
What are you trying to steal?🤨

The algorithm depends on the flawed software that was used to generate the ephemeral key. There is no universal algorithm that works for all flaws and bugs "newbie coders" insert in their custom code to sign something using ECDSA.

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nc50lc
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November 17, 2026, 06:43:37 AM
 #8

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
How big is that "part", one Byte, one Bit?
Because something as small as one Byte will likely repeat more than 10 times on the signature or even a same-length randomly generated string with a low to moderate chance.
You might be looking at a coincidence.

If it's a large part and deliberately inserted to the signature more than ten times, then I highly doubt that the signature will be valid.
And the funny thing is (more than 10 times you said?) that the signature will be mostly consist of that part or the nonce, if so.

youcan_Vx (OP)
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November 17, 2026, 10:12:06 PM
 #9

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
How big is that "part", one Byte, one Bit?
Because something as small as one Byte will likely repeat more than 10 times on the signature or even a same-length randomly generated string with a low to moderate chance.
You might be looking at a coincidence.

If it's a large part and deliberately inserted to the signature more than ten times, then I highly doubt that the signature will be valid.
And the funny thing is (more than 10 times you said?) that the signature will be mostly consist of that part or the nonce, if so.
Not just one byte, but more; 14 numbers repeated inside R for over 600 signatures. Do you think all of this is a coincidence, or are you trying to make me believe it is?
youcan_Vx (OP)
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November 17, 2026, 10:32:27 PM
 #10

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
What are you trying to steal?🤨

The algorithm depends on the flawed software that was used to generate the ephemeral key. There is no universal algorithm that works for all flaws and bugs "newbie coders" insert in their custom code to sign something using ECDSA.
What I'm trying to explain is whether a wallet suffering from bias can have its key cracked, knowing that it's not a coincidence but rather that 14 digits are repeated in R for more than 600 signatures.
nc50lc
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November 18, 2026, 04:58:00 AM
 #11

Do you think all of this is a coincidence, or are you trying to make me believe it is?
It's the context of your previous replies, try to re-read them to see if you can get the same meaning as your last reply.
It's good that you've clarified it now.

But anyways, the length is still low but quite difficult to coincidentally repeat on over 600 R-values versus the number of transactions in the blockchain,
That "14 numbers" (if you're looking at hex) is just 7Bytes, chances of it repeating on lots of R values isn't far fetched but should be much rarer that what you've observed.
1 out of 2^56 chance.

What I'm trying to explain is whether a wallet suffering from bias can have its key cracked, knowing that it's not a coincidence but rather that 14 digits are repeated in R for more than 600 signatures.
If it's actually the case, then MonNov16's reply about LLL should be the answer to it.

pooya87
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Today at 04:05:22 AM
 #12

Are there other vulnerabilities or algorithms that can extract the private key, considering that Nonce repeats part of it more than 10 times at the beginning, middle, and end of the signature?
What are you trying to steal?🤨

The algorithm depends on the flawed software that was used to generate the ephemeral key. There is no universal algorithm that works for all flaws and bugs "newbie coders" insert in their custom code to sign something using ECDSA.
What I'm trying to explain is whether a wallet suffering from bias can have its key cracked, knowing that it's not a coincidence but rather that 14 digits are repeated in R for more than 600 signatures.
It still depends on why the flaw exists but if we assume you are talking about digits in a hexadecimal representation of a 256-bit number and assume that the rest are randomly generated, that is still 50 "digits" of random entropy and that is 200 bits. The range is still big enough to make it impossible to compute anything from it.

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