The v2 fork, the spec, the code, will be all on GitHub. Anyone can run a node, anyone can review the code, anyone can build on it. That is the invitation. What the community does with it is up to the community, as always.
Can this not be done using a soft fork?Surely a hard fork causes a chain split?So what happens if I am using the original version from the beginning and never updated and continue past all these blocks after the hard fork?I am on a split chain right but the actual original one right?
Bitcoin had a hard fork that resulted in bitcoin cash/bitcoin gold/bitcoinsv etc so surely I am the original iocoin (like people still on the main original bitcoin/btc chain) so then and all coins after the hard forks i0coin has are actually different coins and I would be able to collect a same number of each with my private key the same way I could claim bitcoin cash and sv or what am I missing here?
What I mean is everytime you hardfork then you are causing a chain to split and the original chain before any split that continues is the actual original chain.
I think the developer knows what they are doing cornhodlr as they founded I0coin so know what is best for it. If you have any programming skills or know how to counter quantum attack vectors then maybe you can let us all know here but in the meantime here is an interesting post I read about this earlier.
The day Michael Saylor posts an AI slop video about STRC, Google drops a paper showing they're closer than anyone expected to cracking the encryption that protects Bitcoin and many other blockchain networks. Their quantum computing team figured out how to do it with 20x fewer resources than previous estimates. Here's the breakdown:
> Google compiled quantum circuits that can solve the math problem (ECDLP-256) protecting Bitcoin wallets, Ethereum, and most major blockchains
> A quantum computer with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits could run the attack in minutes. Previous estimates required millions.
> Google's own quantum processors are already approaching the hardware capabilities needed to make this work
> They coordinated with the U.S. government before publishing and used zero-knowledge proofs so third parties can verify the results without getting a step-by-step attack playbook
> Every blockchain that uses elliptic curve cryptography is affected, which includes Bitcoin, Ethereum, and most others
> The fix exists: post-quantum cryptography (PQC), encryption designed to resist quantum attacks. Google has been working on it since 2016.
> Google is recommending crypto users stop reusing wallet addresses immediately, since reused addresses expose more information to potential attackers
> Coinbase, the Ethereum Foundation, and Stanford's blockchain research institute are already working with Google on the transition
> Google set 2029 as their target date for full migration to quantum-safe encryption
> Abandoned wallets with no one to update them remain an unsolved problem
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HEtKFFfbQAAJsq3.jpg https://quantumai.google/static/site-assets/downloads/cryptocurrency-whitepaper.pdfPost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).
The expected emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) will represent
a singular discontinuity in the history of digital security, with wide ranging impacts. This whitepaper
seeks to elucidate specific implications that the capabilities of developing quantum architectures have
on blockchain vulnerabilities and potential mitigation strategies. First, we provide new resource
estimates for breaking the 256-bit Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem over the secp256k1
curve, the core of modern blockchain cryptography. We demonstrate that Shor’s algorithm for this
problem can execute with either ≤ 1200 logical qubits and ≤ 90 million Toffoli gates or ≤ 1450
logical qubits and ≤ 70 million Toffoli gates. In the interest of responsible disclosure, we use a zero-
knowledge proof to validate these results without disclosing attack vectors. On superconducting
architectures with 10−3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, those circuits can execute in
minutes using fewer than half a million physical qubits. We introduce a critical distinction between
“fast-clock” (such as superconducting and photonic) and “slow-clock” (such as neutral atom and ion
trap) architectures. Our analysis reveals that the first fast-clock CRQCs would enable “on-spend”
attacks on public mempool transactions of some cryptocurrencies. We survey major cryptocurrency
vulnerabilities through this lens, identifying systemic risks associated with advanced features in
some blockchains such as smart contracts, Proof-of-Stake consensus, and Data Availability Sampling
mechanism, as well as the enduring concern of “abandoned” assets. We argue that technical solutions
would benefit from accompanying public policy and discuss various frameworks of “digital salvage” to
regulate the recovery or destruction of dormant assets while preventing adversarial seizure. We also
discuss implications for other digital assets and tokenization as well as challenges and successful
examples of the ongoing transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).
Finally, we urge all
vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the migration to PQC without delay.
