==== Eligius, please pay my 200+ BTC ====

[Jutarul]

if((sharesSubmitted > xxxxxxx) && (blocksFound < x)){
// notify pool ops to monitor that account
}
just a thought, I don't know if this will work or not but I don't see the reason why not, to at least notify you in such case.

The problem with an accounting method like that is that it can be subverted by a variation of what is called the Sybil attack. You just create new accounts every time you contributed xxxxxxx-1 shares. Because variation has to be reduced significantly to reduce the false positive rate for the "watchdog", xxxxxxx needs to be sufficiently large. An intelligent hacker will use a RNG to make it impossible to distinguish himself from small scale miners. The block withholding attack is not something which can be realistically defeated by statistical analysis.

The long term trajectory is that pools will eventually have to go the KYC route to limit their exposure to WBAs. The WBA is really an attack on the economics of decentralization, but not in the way you think it is.

[1715675561]

1715675561

[NewLiberty]

The long term trajectory is that pools will eventually have to go the KYC route to limit their exposure to WBAs. The WBA is really an attack on the economics of decentralization, but not in the way you think it is.

I think it is an attack on the economics of decentralization.  Are there more than one way this is true?
Decreasing the "luck" of the pool to get more to join a "luckier" pool increases centralization (and also the effectiveness of this attack).

It is a kin to dumping a product to market under cost to get market share.
The WBA gets nothing for a lost resource to increase the market share of the luckier competitors.

if only there is a way to send a known winning nonce to each suspicious miner to verify they are WBA, you would have incontrovertible proof in the monotoring.

[RoadStress]

Does block withdraw method work against p2pool?

[Luke-Jr]

Does block withdraw method work against p2pool?

You mean block withholding.
Yes, it does.
It's actually worse there because nobody can stop it.

[Legov]

But in p2pool the attacker automatically does not get any payout.
Right?

[Luke-Jr]

But in p2pool the attacker automatically does not get any payout.
Right?

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

[Legov]

It's my mistake.
If an attacker withholds blocks but transmits shares he gets payouts for the shares. Just in p2pool.

[jonnybravo0311]

It's my mistake.
If an attacker withholds blocks but transmits shares he gets payouts for the shares. Just in p2pool.

In every pool.  Not just p2pool.  That's the whole concept behind a block withholding attack: the attacker submits shares that are counted towards payouts, but if a share would satisfy the BTC block, that share is not submitted, and therefore, the block is not solved and no 25BTC reward.

[RealMalatesta]

Maybe a dumb question: If a share is not valid at pool "A", would it also be invalid at pool "B"?

[RoadStress]

Does block withdraw method work against p2pool?

You mean block withholding.
Yes, it does.
It's actually worse there because nobody can stop it.

Withholding yes. Thank you.

[psahx]

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

Could you please explain a 51% p2pool attack in more detail? I mean, lot of people believe, that p2pool is the most decentralized mining option available, and you state, that a 51% attack could be done to p2pool?

[eleuthria]

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

Could you please explain a 51% p2pool attack in more detail? I mean, lot of people believe, that p2pool is the most decentralized mining option available, and you state, that a 51% attack could be done to p2pool?

p2pool is like a miniature Bitcoin blockchain.  If you had 51% of the p2pool hash rate, you could (more often than not) force your own shares into the sharechain instead of someone elses by forking it until your chain was longer.  I'm not sure what, if any, precautions are present in p2pool to prevent somebody from purposely forking the sharechain in their favor.

An "obvious" one would be making it so nodes ignore a forked chain more than 'X' shares deep, if it all pays out to the same address (indicating somebody forked from the chain to build a longer one that only pays themselves), though all that you'd have to do to combat that is cycle through addresses when making your fork.

In other words, p2pool users would be mining a block which pays almost the entire reward to the attacker, even though they've only done 51% of the actual work.

[psahx]

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

Could you please explain a 51% p2pool attack in more detail? I mean, lot of people believe, that p2pool is the most decentralized mining option available, and you state, that a 51% attack could be done to p2pool?

p2pool is like a miniature Bitcoin blockchain.  If you had 51% of the p2pool hash rate, you could (more often than not) force your own shares into the sharechain instead of someone elses by forking it until your chain was longer.  I'm not sure what, if any, precautions are present in p2pool to prevent somebody from purposely forking the sharechain in their favor.

An "obvious" one would be making it so nodes ignore a forked chain more than 'X' shares deep, if it all pays out to the same address (indicating somebody forked from the chain to build a longer one that only pays themselves), though all that you'd have to do to combat that is cycle through addresses when making your fork.

In other words, p2pool users would be mining a block which pays almost the entire reward to the attacker, even though they've only done 51% of the actual work.

Hmm, that makes sense to me. So, there is no way of fighting against mining centralization? I thought p2pool is a decent solution...

Thanks eleuthria

[crashoveride54902]

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

Could you please explain a 51% p2pool attack in more detail? I mean, lot of people believe, that p2pool is the most decentralized mining option available, and you state, that a 51% attack could be done to p2pool?

p2pool is like a miniature Bitcoin blockchain.  If you had 51% of the p2pool hash rate, you could (more often than not) force your own shares into the sharechain instead of someone elses by forking it until your chain was longer.  I'm not sure what, if any, precautions are present in p2pool to prevent somebody from purposely forking the sharechain in their favor.

An "obvious" one would be making it so nodes ignore a forked chain more than 'X' shares deep, if it all pays out to the same address (indicating somebody forked from the chain to build a longer one that only pays themselves), though all that you'd have to do to combat that is cycle through addresses when making your fork.

In other words, p2pool users would be mining a block which pays almost the entire reward to the attacker, even though they've only done 51% of the actual work.

Hmm, that makes sense to me. So, there is no way of fighting against mining centralization? I thought p2pool is a decent solution...

Thanks eleuthria

not really...in the end, big money will centralize it whether we want it to happen or not...unless the btc coders force them to decentralize idk

[eleuthria]

Hmm, that makes sense to me. So, there is no way of fighting against mining centralization? I thought p2pool is a decent solution...

Thanks eleuthria

I'm unable to think of a way to fix this problem, it's essentially the same problem as Bitcoin itself has when it comes to a 51% attack.  If p2pool did something like limit the size of a sharechain re-org to only so many shares deep, it would work most of the time, but it would fail if there was ever any major communication issues between countries, essentially forking p2pool into multiple p2pools because they would refuse to come back to a consensus.

[DumDumz]

He tried something, he got caught,now he owes 400 BTC and is trying to refocus the discussion away from that fact.

[Hunterbunter]

Sure he does. He could even 51% attack p2pool to get up to ~200% PPS (at the expense of everyone else).

Could you please explain a 51% p2pool attack in more detail? I mean, lot of people believe, that p2pool is the most decentralized mining option available, and you state, that a 51% attack could be done to p2pool?

An "obvious" one would be making it so nodes ignore a forked chain more than 'X' shares deep, if it all pays out to the same address (indicating somebody forked from the chain to build a longer one that only pays themselves), though all that you'd have to do to combat that is cycle through addresses when making your fork.

In other words, p2pool users would be mining a block which pays almost the entire reward to the attacker, even though they've only done 51% of the actual work.

The difference is a 51% attack on the p2pool chain would be immediately obvious to all miners monitoring it - p2pool finds a block, but no payment is made since the attacker has substituted their own btc addresses into the sharechain, instead of the legitimate miners.

In this event, I imagine miners would just jump ship, if a better solution isn't implemented by then. Until then, though, it still has its advantages.

[Luke-Jr]

Hmm, that makes sense to me. So, there is no way of fighting against mining centralization? I thought p2pool is a decent solution...

Sure, there's getblocktemplate, a decentralised client-server mining protocol.
Basically all the positives of p2pool without the negatives.
Just needs more time to finish implementing it...

The difference is a 51% attack on the p2pool chain would be immediately obvious to all miners monitoring it - p2pool finds a block, but no payment is made since the attacker has substituted their own btc addresses into the sharechain, instead of the legitimate miners.

In this event, I imagine miners would just jump ship, if a better solution isn't implemented by then. Until then, though, it still has its advantages.

Just like all the miners jumped ship from Arsbitcoin when it forked off the blockchain? Or when it shutdown?
Or like when they jumped ship when 0.8-based pools forked off the main bitcoin blockchain?
Or like when they jumped ship from Deepbit when it stopped mining valid blocks?

Sadly, most miners don't pay attention.

[Hunterbunter]

Hmm, that makes sense to me. So, there is no way of fighting against mining centralization? I thought p2pool is a decent solution...

Sure, there's getblocktemplate, a decentralised client-server mining protocol.
Basically all the positives of p2pool without the negatives.
Just needs more time to finish implementing it...

The difference is a 51% attack on the p2pool chain would be immediately obvious to all miners monitoring it - p2pool finds a block, but no payment is made since the attacker has substituted their own btc addresses into the sharechain, instead of the legitimate miners.

In this event, I imagine miners would just jump ship, if a better solution isn't implemented by then. Until then, though, it still has its advantages.

Just like all the miners jumped ship from Arsbitcoin when it forked off the blockchain? Or when it shutdown?
Or like when they jumped ship when 0.8-based pools forked off the main bitcoin blockchain?
Or like when they jumped ship from Deepbit when it stopped mining valid blocks?

Sadly, most miners don't pay attention.

Maybe a marginal number don't pay attention, but enough do. In this event, the block chain is still uncompromised and only P2Pool is naffed.

[DumDumz]

He tried something, he got caught,now he owes 400 BTC and is trying to refocus the discussion away from that fact.