Zapad-2013
A View From HelsinkiBy Pauli Järvenpää
As is the case with military exercises in general, the Russian exercises are important because
they reveal where, against whom, and with what kinds of capabilities Russia is prepared to
use its military forces. So it was with Zapad-2013. Though the exercise scenario and the force
strengths submitted to the OSCE notification regime envisioned a penetration of terrorist
elements and units into Belarus, Zapad-2013?s territorial coverage, scope of operations, and
the number of units and force types involved strongly indicate that Russia was training its
forces for a large-scale conflict against a conventional enemy.
Beyond this general point it is also clear that the troop strength the Russian authorities
declared to the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council was considerably below their real
strength. The actual number of troops in the exercise through its various phases seems to
have been 4-5 times as high as the number given in official Russian briefings. The exercise
was split into smaller parts, and these parts were connected to each other.
As to the nature of the operations conducted in Zapad-2013, while the official exercise
description talked about counter-terrorist operations, the Russian forces carried out typical
conventional military operations, including rapid reaction force operations, airborne perations,
tactical operations, and amphibious operations. Naval maneuvers and live missile
firings were carried out in the Baltic and Barents Seas, and, in a spectacular case, Iskander-M
missiles were fired from one shooting range to another. Nuclear forces were put on combat
readiness, and strategic bomber flights took place along the Finnish eastern border to their
live firing ranges in the Barents Sea. All of this strongly indicates that the Zapad-2013 exercise
went far beyond counter-terrorist operations.
Who, then, was depicted as an enemy in the Zapad-2013 exercise? From all available evidence it was
first and foremost the Baltic countries? troops backed by other NATO forces thrusting toward Belarus
and Kaliningrad. But quite intriguingly, Finnish troops were also depicted as attacking the Russian
positions on the Karelian Isthmus. This is particularly puzzling, since Finland has, over the past
two decades, time and again, stressed its military non-alignment, and the Finnish political leadership
has bent over backwards trying to make sure that the Finnish position was crystal clear: membership
in NATO for Finland is not in the cards.
Yet, in Russian military planning Finland does not seem to receive any special classification
for being militarily non-aligned. While visiting Helsinki in June 2012, General Nikolai
Makarov, then Chief of the Russian Defense Staff, chastised the Finns for carrying out their
own, strictly national military exercises in the vicinity of the Russian border. Furthermore, in
his opinion, NORDEFCO (Nordic Defense Cooperation) was considered a threat to Russia.
He also warned Finland, in tough turns of phrase, not to entertain thoughts of joining
NATO. So did Defense Minister Shoigu, when he visited Helsinki in May 2013. Both men
spiced up their warnings with the threat of dire consequences?strengthening of Russian
forces near the Finnish borders?should Finland not heed their advice. Minister Shoigu went
even as far as tying the possible Finnish membership in NATO to the modernization of
Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the Western Military District. 28 All in all, it seems
that Finland now lives in the worst of all the possible worlds: Russia regards Finland as a
threat, yet Finland, being outside of NATO, is not covered by the North Atlantic Alliance?s
Article V security guarantee.
Beyond the military exercises, there has also been a surge of other Russian military activities
in the Baltic Sea area. The Swedish air force experienced a shock on Good Friday in 2013,
when two Russian bombers, escorted by four fighters, simulated an air attack on Swedish
territory, primarily on Gotland in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Around the same time, there
was a probe against Stockholm, and in that attack the Russian bombers apparently simulated
a nuclear attack against targets in the Stockholm area.
It might be, as two respected diplomats argue in a recent article, that the Russian operational
interests are in the south and their strategic interests in the east, but it is also true that
President Putin and his defense ministers have put special effort into developing Russian
military capabilities in the Western Military District. 30 What Zapad-2013 has amply
demonstrated is that there is growing sophistication in Russia?s military capabilities,
including the command, control and communications systems. In the ground forces, the
transformation to a combined-arms brigade structure is proceeding, albeit more slowly than
originally envisaged. Also, interoperability with other government power ministries is
improving in leaps and bounds.
In sum, the overall reform aimed at developing better-trained, better-equipped and better-led
smaller and more mobile forces is well under way in Russia. It is clear that the Russian forces
are steadily marching toward that goal. It is also obvious that the 500 billion euros planned
for the development of the military forces is producing results. It is a long-term work in
progress but, as Zapad-2013 demonstrated, that work is proceeding and is producing a new
military reality on the ground.
full article:
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Zapad_2013_View_From_Helsinki_-_Full.pdf
