Russian hybrid warfare: what are effects-based network operations and how to counteract themConfirmation that the command operates a network of paid pro-Kremlin commenters appeared on May 31, 2014. Anonymous International exposed the activities of the Russian Internet Research Agency, which feeds itself from Russia’s state budget. The goal of this organization is to create, through comments on the internet, the illusion of support for the Kremlin regime.
Interestingly, the owner of the agency, Eugene Prigozhin, is the founder of the holding company Concord, known as ‘Putin’s chef.’ The company’s direct management includes Maria Kuprashevich, who is known for having taken a job in the liberal media to commit espionage.
It was revealed that there is a staff team who are working with strict accountability to the curators. These staff writers are paid for writing pro-government comments on the internet.
The average salary of such a ‘commenter’ writing ‘politically correct’ posts is from thirty to forty thousand rubles (approx. 1,000 USD). Propaganda warfare is conducted on two fronts, on both the Russian and international internet. Each department has its ‘experts’, on which total spending for the last month amounted to 33 million rubles (1 million USD).
To confirm these facts, it is enough to compare scanned passports discovered through hacking email accounts with real people on social networks. A list of hacked correspondence, as well as some names and details on people, can be found in this publication (in Russian). Many more confirmations were published.
As highlighted by Stephen Komarnyckyj, an analysis of Russian propaganda content suggests that Russia: :
Disseminates conspiracy theories tinged with anti-Semitism to erode public trust in Western governments, and also to use support for Israel to inflame anti-Western sentiments. The core of the conspiracy theory is a narrative which suggests the USA is controlled by Zionists who in turn organised 09/11;
Influences politicians, often marginal figures, by granting them air time to gain support for Russia’s hostile actions towards other countries. However, this simultaneously boosts the image of extremist politicians promoting anti-Western views and political disengagement;
Promotes a narrative for the war in Syria favorable to the Assad regime. In turn, Assad, in exchange for the support of Oboronservis and Russian specialists, blocks the establishment of a pipeline from the Qatar gas deposits to the EU;
Incentivizes journalists who spread misinformation according to a centrally produced agenda. There are journalists who are directly employed by Russia Today and receive a script, and others who work as freelancers but produce material which conforms to the channel’s agenda;
Forms a climate of opinion in the West to allow an invasion of Ukraine to take place and boost tolerance for subsequent genocide/ethnic cleansing by stigmatising Ukrainian national identity.
The tools used to implement such mechanisms are derived from the concept of effect-based operations. Effects-based operations (EBO) concept was developed by Dr. Edward A. Smith. His book “Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War published” was published by US DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) in 2003. Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. In 2008, US Joint Forces Command stopped using the term “effects-based”, but the concept remains valid in the US Air Force.
“Effects-based operations (EBO) are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war. The concept of effects-based operations focuses “coordinated sets of actions” on objectives defined in terms of human behavior in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels, and measures their success in terms of the behavior produced.”
“Effects can occur simultaneously on the tactical, operational, military-strategic, and geo-strategic levels of military operations, in domestic and international political arenas, and in the economic arena as well. Effects cannot be isolated. All effects, at each level and in each arena, are interrelated and are cumulative over time. And lastly, effects are both physical and psychological in nature. Effects-based operations can be described as operations in the cognitive domain because that is where human beings react to stimuli, come to an understanding of a situation, and decide on a response.”
As we can see in essence not much difference with the concept of 6 priorities discussed in Russia since 1995. It does not mean that Russia was early in understanding of some concepts. Effects-based operations are not new. Good generals, admirals, and statesmen have focused on using military forces to shape the behavior of friends and foes for centuries.
New warfare concepts related to information age developments reflected in the new approaches. Direct approach of attrition based warfare changed with asymmetric warfare approaches.
Attrition warfare is a military strategy in which a belligerent attempts to win a war by wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and materiel. The war will usually be won by the side with greater such resources. Attrition warfare is the key element of conventional warfare. Conventional warfare is a form of warfare conducted by using conventional weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined, and fight using weapons that primarily target the opponent’s military. It is normally fought using conventional weapons, and not with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
In modern world where national states can not use obviously conventional war against opponent or where the networks appeared and developed the concept of asymmetric warfare which is element of non-conventional warfare comes in foreground.
Asymmetric warfare is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare (abbreviated UW) is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare is used to reduce the opponent’s military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.
On the surface, unconventional warfare contrasts with conventional warfare in that forces or objectives are covert or not well-defined, tactics and weapons intensify environments of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body.
The impact of means upon the outcome tends to vary arithmetically, while that of will varies geometrically. The more determined the foe, the less means he will require in order to succeed in the contest. The more constrained the task is, the greater the probability is of success with the means available. However, obviously if the means fall to zero, no amount of determination will suffice to make up the difference.
The general objective of unconventional warfare is to instill a belief that peace and security are not possible without compromise or concession. Specific objectives include inducement of war-weariness, curtailment of civilian standards of living and civil liberties associated with greater security demands, economic hardship linked to the costs of war; hopelessness to defend against assaults, fear, depression, and disintegration of morale. Two original definition are claiming: “The intent of U.S. Unconventional Warfare efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives.” or according to John F. Kennedy: “There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.
The ultimate goal of this type of warfare is to motivate an enemy to stop attacking or resisting even if it has the ability to continue. Failing this, a secondary objective can be to debilitate the enemy before a conventional attack.
Attrition warfare was based on symmetry of Means and Will
If a symmetric contest may be said to pit one adversary with great means and great will against another that also has both great means and great will, then an asymmetric contest might be expected to involve different combinations. The possibilities can be outlined in terms of a simple quadratic diagram.
Key in understanding of hybrid warfare concept is conflict is between one power that has great means and limited will and another that has limited means but great will. The result is likely to be far from being either certain or swift.
The success lies in attacking your opponent’s weaknesses and not his strengths and by extension, that warfare revolves about the creation and exploitation of asymmetries. There are really two different symmetries that might be exploited. One side has an advantage in means. Logically, we would expect that side to exploit its advantage by attacking and destroying the other’s more limited physical means, e.g. by pressing an essentially attrition-based approach. The other side has an advantage in will. Therefore, we would expect that side to exploit its advantage by attacking its opponent’s will to continue the struggle, e.g. an essentially effects-based approach focused on shaping the opponent’s behavior.
The impact of means upon the outcome tends to vary arithmetically, while that of will varies geometrically. The more determined the foe, the less means he will require in order to succeed in the contest. The more constrained the task is, the greater the probability is of success with the means available.
Does this mean that asymmetric forms of conflict have replaced the old attrition-based warfare driven by a symmetry of means and will? Actually no. This is mistake to think so. Asymmetric forms of conflict could serve to prelude of old attrition-based war after the goal of behavior shaping resulting from successful effect-based operations is achived. That is why for Western leaders it is naïve to believe that asymmetric conflict Russia with West can not grow to conventional conflict once the will as a key component of resistance has been suppressed. That is why the first and ultimate goal of Russia at this stage is the will of Western countries to resist. For this purpose the information and network operations is the key Russian strategy. That means that far more is behind Russian RT and informational operations.
There are many analytical reports of Russian think tanks on organization of network and informational operations. Many case studies and practical tools how to do efficiently information and network operations have been developed. In hybrid war news agencies, blogosphere and social networks are military tools (“actors” and “sensors’) in battlefield. The sooner the West understands this issue the better.
Pilosophic, theoretic and strategical approaches for informational and netwars have been formed among other authors by Alexander Dugin, the ideologist of the creation of a Eurasian empire that would oppose the “Atlantist interests”. Dugin, who is known for his fascist views, expounds his theory of warfare in his work – “Netwars – the threat of new generation”. Special portals have been established in order to exchange information and experience in informational and netwars (it contains also closed restricted part) exist. For example: Portal of netwar, Eurasia netwar subportal.
Another example, just one of many, can be used to illustrate the detailed and planned preparation of Russia for the conduct of network operations in social networks. Nikolay Starikov is an active proponent of information and netwars. He created schools for Russian “patriotic” bloggers and created a substantial volume of content for propaganda purposes and for the purpose of attacking “anti-Russian” views. He created the so-called Internet militia with blog for the exchange of information and experience. His latest books are used for brainwashing of “patriotic bloggers” including extracts from such works as “Ukraine, chaos and revolution – weapon of Dollar” and “Russia, Crimea, History”. An example of the resources developed by Nikolay Starikov can be found here: Nikolay Starikov blog; Nikolay Starikov Internet Militia: Nikolay Starikov traning for Russian “patriotic” bloggers (2011) - Video in Russian.
This is only one example. There are many similar organizations and authors working for Russian think tanks in this sphere.
What actions are possible to oppose Russia both symmetrically and asymmetrically and counteracting Russian information and network aggression?
First of all a shared vision of both West and Ukraine. This vision shall be based on understanding that Russia have been waging a war against not only Ukraine, but also the West using a wide array of means and tools. One of the most important elements is to strengthen and protect the will of the West and Ukraine (key target for effects-based operations) to stop Russia. Russia, by targeting the West’s will, will be able with lower resources to efficiently target the West, and first of all the EU until it reaches the point of compliance with Russia.
Ukraine is the first country to face this type of total hybrid war and has developed conclusions regarding how to fight a well-prepared enemy using new warfare tools and among them informational and network warfare. An understanding of the military priority is growing rapidly in Ukraine, but regarding the information and network priorities there is still a lack of understanding and action. In order to withstand this hybrid war efficiently Ukraine needs help from the West including non-governmental organizations.
Another point of concern is that volunteer efforts in the area of information and network activities could decrease as as the economic factor started to prevail and some volunteers are returning to business or to self-employment. Ukraine as a state provides no visible support and investments to NGOs and similar organization in the informational sector of Ukraine both for internal audience and for Western audience. The help from Western foundations and NGOs are not visible too as major point of application of projects and grants are conventional journalistic and mass media and not blogs and social networks.
If NGOs and groups supporting Ukraine and Ukrainian NGOs and groups will not coordinate their activities, not efficiently cooperate and will not get sufficient resources then they unfortunately will lose and remain at the best a nice intellectual passive discussion clubs. The question is just when it happens if not to change current approaches. One of the myth of network and information operations in peace time or hybrid wars that they apply only to a peer competitor (in this case Russia). This myth seems to be in minds of the Ukrainian defense ministry and government: if Russia spends so huge resources and funds on network and informational warfare that Ukraine is simply helpless and can do nothing. This is a very dangerous delusion. They forgot about being smarter and more efficient networking, coordination and efficient investments and fundraising. However even if we manage to be smart and possess huge will without investments, fundraising and resources (means) the information war against Russia could be lost Obviously if the means in asymmetric warfare equation (means*will2 ) fall to zero, no amount of determination will suffice to make up the difference.
The actions within mass-media and conventional journalistic domain have been discussed widely, but Internet informational resources were left without attention. What shall an organization or set of organizations do to efficiently counteract Russian information aggression against the West and Ukraine. The action shall be symmetrical compared to what is Russia is doing otherwise information and network war will be lost.
The actions described below proposed by “A strategy for damaging Russia’s propaganda machine” by Stephen Komarnyckyj,were intended as a starting point for discussion. The main principles on which they are based are:
mapping Russia’s propaganda resources- we need to develop a conceptual framework to do so which breaks the resources into categories such as
a) directly financed media agencies
b) directly paid agents of influence
c) Soviet legacy political parties who are still Russian centric in orientation
a shift away from uncoordinated initiatives towards pooling resources and coordinating actions;
a move away from reacting to the material produced by the propaganda apparatus to a focus on coordinated action to destroy the apparatus itself;
a focus on undermining Putin’s virtual world and its hired creators by exposing its – and their – dishonesty;
an emphasis on non-violent action. The strategy must adhere to best practice in terms of being anti-discriminatory. It is likely that the traditional ploy of depicting Ukrainians as Nazis will be utilised against any organised campaign. It is also possible that attempts will be made to discredit the campaign by planting agents who will make provocative, inflammatory statements. Indeed, Ukrainian politics has been affected by a number of right wing parties who may have been sponsored by Russia.
The document was only an initial outline of a strategy. The key messages are:
a planned campaign focusing on the structure of Putin’s propaganda apparatus and involving a coordinated effort will be more effect than sporadic, uncoordinated campaigns;
such a campaign could permanently and decisively ruin Russia’s propaganda apparatus;
the campaign must be part of a programme to decolonise the West’s perception of Ukraine;
the campaign must adhere to the principles of transparency, equality, and diversity both as a matter of principle and because this will neutralise several means by which Russia might attempt to discredit the attack on its propaganda apparatus.
In development of this initiative Euromiadan Press following discussions and exchange of opinions defined preliminary set of action to efficiently counteract Russian information aggression against West and Ukraine
Build up and maintenance of Internet informational resource for:
coordinating of activities in social networks in Ukraine and abroad to present truthful information on Ukraine;
presenting truthful information on Ukraine by translations
exposing Russian propaganda directed against Ukraine
exposing the links of Western organizations, foundations, agencies, NGOs, journalists, politicians with Russia (shall be based only based on proved information obtained through investigational journalism)
referral of information to Western journalists involved in presenting information on Ukraine
contacting Western think tanks with presentation of information on Ukraine
closing the gaps in analytics about Ukraine (cultural, historical, day-to-day life, news e.t.c. )
exposing Russian doctrines and strategies which were not covered by Western NGOs, agencies, consultancies, think tanks and Western mass media
presenting position of Ukrainian government in informal way through social networks on topics related to counteraction of Russia
presenting the views and information which government can not express directly due to diplomatic restrictions by the way of assumptions and analytics
Placing the information in order to study public reaction (“feeler”) to possible scenarios and actions
Networking
a planned campaign focusing on the structure of Putin’s propaganda apparatus and involving a coordinated effort
Build up and maintenance of Internet informational resource for (separately from news and informational project)
Informational war against Russia
Psychological war against Russia
Positive commenting in Western mass media and in social networks of selected topics and points (“Ukrainian trolls”)
presenting the views and information which government can not express directly due to diplomatic restrictions (in contrast to points in topic 1 – more radical views)
Placing the information in order to study public reaction (“feeler”) to possible scenarios and actions (in contrast to points in topic 1 – more radical views)
Disinformation for creating uncertainties for Russia to plan efficient actions against Ukraine
a planned campaign focusing on the structure of Putin’s propaganda apparatus and involving a coordinated effort
Academic activity
Study and presentation of Russian doctrines, strategies and motivations which were not adequately covered by Western NGOs, think tanks, agencies, consultancies and Western mass media
Study and presentation of new strategies and tactics employed by Russia in hybrid war against Ukraine (could be used by Russia further to destabilize the situation in Europe)
Cooperation with Western think tanks with purpose for them to better understand current Russian ideology and motivations
Research of current situation and moods in occupied territories
Psychological studies of refugees from occupied territories, Ukrainian servicemen participants of war against Russia and Russian – backed terrorist with the aim to develop optimal rehabilitation approaches
Investigational journalism:
Exposing Russian politicians, Ukrainian politicians working against Ukraine
Exposing the links of Western journalists and politicians with Russia (shall be based only based on proved information)
Exposing Russian involvement in activities against Ukraine
Exposing war crimes committed during hybrid war against Ukraine
Exposing Western lobbyists of Russia
Educational support, training
For Ukrainian NGOs, think tanks and activists:
o Efficient work through social networks, internet resources
o Trainings on software (wordpress, php, seo etc.)
o Sharing experience on particulars of hybrid war warfare
For Western NGOs, think tanks and experts:
o Russian ideology, doctrines and strategies and their applications
o Ukrainian culture and history
o Sharing experience on particulars of hybrid war warfare
Build up and maintenance of Internet popular educations resource explaining complicated topics in simple and entertaining format targeted for wide public and busy people (examples:
http://www.vox.com/) for younger audience even comics could be used. Humor could be used (perhaps on a separate site) as an emotional means for exposing Russian propaganda (information connected with positive relaxing emotions is effective in engraining perceptions while avoiding critical evaluation).
In order to make these actions a reality Ukraine needs the help of Western non-governmental organizations and foundations to provide a coordinated network activities which will facilitate the destruction of Russia’s propaganda machine.
Written by Dr. Vitalii Usenko, MD, MBA, expert in international business management and communications and by Dmytro Usenko, student at Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Special thanks to Steve Komarnyckyi and Edmond Huet for their review advice and comments which were very valuable during preparation of this article
http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/11/05/russian-hybrid-warfare-what-are-effect-based-network-operations-and-how-to-counteract-them/