Sorry for the delay.

You could try grabbing a newer driver and installing it.  If you use persistent storage, it should keep working across reboots.

I'm super busy in real life right now (buying a house and moving), and I actually build this on a slackware box, so I don't have access to any nice tools for package management, so swapping out the driver is a labor intensive process for me.  I've also heard that the newer drivers aren't as good for older cards, so I might end up having to support two versions.

In late May, or maybe even June, I might be able to do this, but probably not much sooner.  Honestly, I was sorta hoping that ASICs would take off before anyone asked for something like this. 

Shit.  You all beat me to it.

Welcome to ignore.  Doesn't matter if this is truth or lie, either way you've conclusively demonstrated that you will never say anything worth hearing.

What it will come down to in the end is that no court in the world will order reimbursement in bitcoin.  I could be wrong about that, but I'm not aware of any country that doesn't have legal tender laws.

Some day, that may change.

Generate three random private keys, print them on different pieces of paper.  Calculate the public keys for them, generate a P2SH 2-of-3 multisig address from them.  Send the funds to the new P2SH address.

Next, put each key into an envelope, and give the three envelopes to three different lawyers with instructions to deliver them to her when she is 18.  Cost of having a lawyer do escrow of an envelope for 6 years should be minimal.

No, he's completely correct.  It really is very easy to factor a number right after you create it by multiplying two carefully chosen primes.

Now if only there was some way for him to force bitcoin to use RSA instead of ECDSA.  And some way for him to force people to randomly generate shitty primes for their keys.

The closest thing to "danger" from a majority miner is that they can create a side chain in secret and release it to overturn a bunch of history.  Being a majority miner in full public view is no danger to anyone, regardless of what the trolls and noobs on the forums think.

Hashing power on the network is safe hashing power.

Compressed keys provide a modest but real space savings in the block chain.  I'm not aware of any reasons why anyone would ever want or need to create a new key without using the compressed form.

As for the hashing algorithm, I don't see any point in making generation slower.  The real security is in the ~162 bits of entropy embedded in the string.  As long as the transformation isn't leaking much entropy, it is still easier to just brute force search the 2¹⁶⁰ bitcoin address space.

Show your work: Minikey is base58, 30 symbols long.  The first symbol is fixed, so there are 58²⁹ possible strings, which is about 2¹⁷⁰.  Only 1 in 2⁸ are valid, leaving about 162 bits of entropy.

The minikey spec doesn't seem to indicate the compression status of the imported key.  Since there are multiple implementations already, I presume that they all are doing it either one way or the other.  If so, the spec should be updated.  Of course, if everyone is assuming that the key is uncompressed, then we need to rework the spec to fix that too.

Once that is taken care of, adding it to the client is easy enough.

You can't use createrawtransaction to do this.  You have to make the transaction by hand (or using some other tool that you'll probably have to write yourself, but it is pretty easy either way).

Once made, the stock client can sign and broadcast it as usual.  It causes absolutely no problems in the client, network or protocol.  TxOuts are identified by {txhash:sequence} so each output has a unique name and can be spent as usual.

The main problem is that JSON does not allow duplicate keys, and the only interfaces in the stock client to create multi-output transactions are through JSON.

No.

SHA has no known cycles.  And if any are ever found, they won't survive the double hash.

Nice thing about bitcoin is that everything is out in the open, for all to see.

If the planted agent can point to a transaction in the block chain with an invalid signature, then everyone will know that there is a weakness in bitcoin (but one that we can fix, probably pretty damn easily).  If he has to point to a transaction with a valid signature, then he is claiming that the entire cryptographic community of the world is wrong and ECDSA itself is broken.

He may have developed a reputation here on the bitcoin forums, but he has absolutely no credibility in the cryptography community. 

No.  This can't be done.

Transactions in bitcoin simply don't work they way you think they do.  Sorry.

Can you describe the power board better?

Is it a board that accepts the 20 or 24 pin ATX main plug and has spots for four 6-pin 12v PCIE connectors, and then distributes power to the modules, hub and router?  If so, is it a 20 or 24 pin socket?  Does it also have a 4 or 8 pin ATX CPU connector?  How many output spots does it have, and of what type?

I fixed your quote for you to make it more obvious that we are dealing with different grades of impossible.

Note that 2²⁵⁶, 2^253.5 and 2^251.7 all mean exactly the same thing:  NEVER.

It sounds like you understand very well the trade-off you are making.  Time or money.

In that case, your python script isn't right.  The client will disconnect a node once it realizes it isn't working right.  It can take a few minutes for your script to trigger the bogus node detection.  Out of curiosity, is your script generating a random nonce for the address message, or is it repeating what it sees?

Schneier has commented on this plenty of times.  You should go read his thoughts, but if I recall correctly, he thinks that this isn't the 70s any more.

Once upon a time, the NSA was so far ahead of everyone else that it was like they had alien technology.  Over the decades, cryptography research has spread out.  The NSA still tries to recruit the best, but not everyone is interested or available.  The NSA may still be the global leader, and very likely is, but now they are merely years ahead of the game, not decades.

Also, the techniques have changed.  Both new systems and new attacks are devised by teams, typically spread across many institutions.  And systems are built to be resistant even to hypothetical impractical attacks.  Attack progress comes in small parts, chopping off a few bits here and there, taking a 2²⁵⁶ attack down to 2²³⁷ or whatever.  New systems are devised in the decades between the very impossible attack and the merely totally impossible one.

Also, the NSA doesn't really need to do crazy secret stuff any more.  High security systems for military and government is mostly about good technique and good management (key management in particular).  If anyone can break our stuff, or anyone's stuff, it means that they have developed whole new branches of mathematics, and done so in secret.

You have the node connecting to itself, which will never work.  Self-connections are detected by a random nonce in the version message used in the initial handshake, not by IP address.

If you have a second node running that you want to connect to, specify the port in your -connect option.  127.0.0.1:port