It would appear that everyone here, including myself, is a bit confused as to what you think is "wrong". You say that "3QjnBKZAdUK3MVfekycu2FhCpT3hvmYa5X" is an address from your wallet, yet it is showing for "other wallets" (here and here). Is that what the issue is? Are you saying that the "3QjnBKZAdUK3MVfekycu2FhCpT3hvmYa5X" transaction should NOT be showing when you are looking at the wallets with 70 and 78 BTC?

Wallets don't "expire"... this confusion is all created by payment processors requiring that a transaction be "sent" within a set timeframe (ie. 10-15 minutes) and claiming that the address will "expire" if it isn't.

The short answer is, your coins were sent and received. So, whomever created that address (vendor or payment processor) has your coins. They either need to refund the coins or honour the purchase.

Sadly, this isn't an option when "restoring" your wallet using a Hardware device, it only gives the 3 choices for script-type/derivation... there is no "detect existing accounts" option:


Hopefully, they are able to implement this option for hardware wallets in an upcoming version.

I admire your tenacity... you have a goal, and you're determined to reach it. So, kudos for that!

I guess the main problem you're likely to face is that, it's not just a quick "chain params" edit... as you have already discovered there are other factors at play like the ports used, version numbers etc. Obviously, with the proliferation of altcoins that have been spawned back in 2016-2017 etc, it clearly isn't a "mission impossible"... it'll just need a bit of work.

Did you manage to figure out why the Windows version just crashed immediately on startup? Was there anything registered in the Windows Error Log that might indicate why it was crashing?

First you play the "gang card", then you go for "sig spam"... while wearing a sig... well played!

At the end of the day, how you want to use the trust ratings is up to you, just don't expect others to agree with you... and judging by the replies in this thread, it would appear that you are in the minority thinking that "spammers" deserve red trust.

To clarify my thoughts on this, red trust was designed as a trading/financial risk indicator... for spammers, the best tool is "report to moderator" on offending posts.

As PawGo suggested, recovering from the wallet seed mnemonic would be the preferable way, as you do not need to know the wallet file encryption password if you have the 12 word seed mnemonic. You can just restore using the "I already have a seed" option and it will recreate your wallet and allow you to set a new password.

In addition to using JohnTheRipper and hashcat, you can also try btcrecover, but I'm not sure if that is working with Electrum wallets used with newer versions of Electrum (ie. version 3 or 4).

There is no definite answer to your question, as a lot of it depends on things like:
- Your familiarity with cryptocurrency in general
- Your familiarity with C++
- Your familiarity with C++ software development methodologies and tools
- Your familiarity with the Bitcoin Core codebase
- Your familiarity with Linux
- Your familiarity with the various compilation tools and methods
- Your familiarity with cross-compiling Windows binaries on Linux

I'm sure that it would be relatively simple for one of the Bitcoin Core "main"^[1] devs to rework the code to do exactly what it is you're trying to do. Someone with a "reasonable" level of C++ and the tools, but no experience with BTC or cryptocurrency in general, would probably be able to do it, but would most likely need a bit of time and research to figure out how to do it. You have admitted that your experience level in a number of the areas I've listed above is "low".

"Anyone" is probably a bit of a stretch. Although given enough time and effort, most competent devs should be able to figure it out. It just probably won't happen "overnight".



[1] yes, this is a terrible term... but it's early and I haven't had any coffee and my brain is still waking up

I was reading an interesting thread the other day (can't find the source today but it was possibly on Reddit), that apparently there are fingerprint "blueprints" in circulation that enable one to print a "generic fingerprint" that have a decent chance of fooling most fingerprint readers.

I'm having trouble finding a good source for that tho... closest I can find is this: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/11/16/ai-generated-skeleton-keys-fool-fingerprint-scanners/

The ars technica article from earlier this year demonstrates that while it isn't exactly "cheap" or "easy", it is indeed possible to defeat fingerprint scanners with a reasonable amount of success.

Not sure I agree with the usage of the term "SPV Nodes"... Electrum clients connect to Electrum servers (using what I believe is an Electrum specific protocol). These servers, at the very basic level, are usually a combination of "Full Node Software" + "Electrum Server Software". For instance, Bitcoin Core + ElectrumX... So, I'm not sure I understand the question?

Are you wanting to know how to setup an Electrum server? or are you wanting to know how to setup an Electrum server that collates other users personal information?

This --^


Please don't feed the paranoia... I really feel like we're close to a breakthrough

You should be able to configure the Bitcoin "Classic" (do you mean Bitcoin Core? ) to simply look at the files in their "new" location. No doubt, the drive letter has changed if it is no longer the "main drive".

But all your old blockchain data (and old wallet.dat) is probably still available on the old drive if it wasn't wiped/formatted. You just need to configure the "datadir" option when starting Bitcoin Core.

What OS are you running? Windows or Linux?
What version of Bitcoin Core are you running?

While those numbers are true for today's prices and equipment... what if BTC moons to like US$20K in the next 6-12 months... and NVidia bring out faster GPUs? Even a hidden 2 BTC would be starting to look attractive.

Don't plan for today... plan for the future.

No. That won't work... the new device/other wallet will have no knowledge of your 2nd PIN. It will only ever be valid on the device it was created on.


Correct. To recover a "passphrase account" on your Ledger, you have to put in the 24 word seed to restore your device... then enter the "temporary passphrase" (and then optionally assign the 2nd PIN to that passphrase again).


Again, it's not necessary... You can check it yourself by simply checking the address/account when you setup the temporary passphrase. It's also technically not possible for that app to check if your passphrase is correct... because it's not stored on the device, so there isn't anything to check against... But because you can check it yourself, it's not a big deal.


It's like asking people how they store their seeds or what the best bitcoin wallet is... it's different for everyone. Some people probably do this, some probably don't... some probably don't even use the Passphrase option. But the main "use-case" that is advertised for the passphrase option is the concept of the hidden wallet holding most of your funds.


Correct, the PIN's are just a method to unlock that specific device. Anyone who has your seed mnemonic and passphrase(s) has access to all the wallets.

---

Still not sure why you haven't simply tried it out?

Create a passphrase, check addresses... add 2nd PIN... disconnect/reconnect... unlock with 2nd PIN, check that it still works with the passphrase account/addresses... Then wipe your device and try restoring. If you attempt to unlock with 2nd PIN now, you'll get "invalid PIN" message as it no longer exists (just like it wouldn't on any new device). Then recreate passphrase and assign 2nd PIN.

I can guarantee that your understanding of how this all works will be 100% better if you "just do it", rather than asking the same questions over and over.

If you have access to your seed mnemonic (and you don't actually send any coins to any passphrase account until you're satisfied you have it set up correctly), you're not in any danger of losing any coins or breaking the device.

No, it would take 241 if they only use one "p3.16xlarge" instance... if they spun up 2, it would potentially halve the time required to bruteforce the password... if they spun up 10, it could be as low as ~24 days.

They could have the equipment, but it is expensive. Renting seems to be the "cheaper" option, but I think the cheapest one run at around ~$5/hr.

The point of the story is that using "words" is not the best idea, unless you're going to be using a lot of them (like 12/24 )... random mix of letters/numbers/symbols is definitely the preferred option, in my opinion.

But if you want pick 3 or 4 random words and chuck a number or 2 in there, then go for it... it'll likely stop all but the most determined (and wealthy) attackers from bruteforcing your password if the seed is compromised.

Using "words" is not really a good idea. You're essentially making your "long" password "georgelikesjuice59", from only 3 words and 2 digits... or 5 "characters". Assuming something like 500,000 "english" words (I believe the Oxford English dictionary is actually a lot less at ~275,000), you would have (500000^3 * 10^2) combinations = 12500000000000000000.  Password cracking utilities are able to take dictionaries of words and mix and match them together at extraordinary speeds.

A much better password is something "random" like: XzXCJkz*a68sL#xy

No one is bruteforcing that in a hurry... "random" UPPER, lower, numb3r5 and symb@!s is the way to go. It's 94^16 = 37157429083410091685945089785856 possible combinations. Even renting one of those fancy "p3.large" servers with 8 Tesla v100 GPUs that can do like 600 gigahash/second... its going to take years to bruteforce something like that.

37157429083410091685945089785856 / 600000000000 = ~61929048472350152809.91 seconds
==> 1962453423015.95 years


Whereas your "georgelikesjuice59" = 12500000000000000000 / 600000000000 = 20833333.33 seconds
==> ~241 days

While that is still a relatively significant amount of time, it's realistically "doable"


Of course, all that is moot if your laptop gets infected with malware/keyloggers etc... then it becomes stupidly trivial for a thief to access your accounts etc. And the solution to stop a malware/keylogger infection leading to your seed being compromised? Write it down on a piece of paper and store it offline

Not to mention the hardware vulnerability in the Trezor devices that essentially require you to use passphrases in case you lose your device or it gets stolen, as the seed mnemonic can be extracted from the device relatively easily. So unless you use a passphrase, your coins are effectively "gone" if someone gets hold of your device

As for the Ledger, the "easiest" setup, in my opinion, is the 2nd PIN. It's relatively secure as a thief only gets three chances to guess either your normal PIN or 2nd PIN before the device wipes itself. Given you can use up to an 8 digit PIN (min 4 digits), the odds of them doing that are relatively small.

It does mean using multiple passphrases with the Ledger Nano S is a bit of a hassle, as you can only have one "2nd PIN", so if you use more than one passphrase the only way to access subsequent passphrases is with the "Temporary Passphrase" system, and entering the passphrase every time you want to access a passphrase account that isn't the one attached to the 2nd PIN. Still, at least the option is available.

For the reasons o_e_l_e_o has mentioned, I would also recommend using the 2nd PIN system that Ledger provides...

Define "really really small"... I run my system at a "standard" 1920x1080 and my partner thinks all the text on my screen is "really small"

Can you upload a screenshot to imgur or another image hosting service and post the link here? Also, what OS and version of Electrum are you running?

My guess (without looking at the code) is that there is code that is attempting to reference something like checkpointData[0] or checkpointData[1] etc... and you've effectively set it as a null array... so any references to an index in the array will likely be generating an "array out of bounds" type error... EDIT: or maybe not... now that I think about it, C/C++ may not do array bounds checking? I don't really remember, as I never did a lot of C/C++...


Did you check the Windows error log?

For the third time... When you setup the "temporary passphrase", you type it in... THEN IT IS DISPLAYED ON THE SCREEN AND YOU ARE ASKED TO CONFIRM IT

You can then, if you want, set up a 2nd pin... if you then use the 2nd PIN, you don't need to enter the passphrase to see your passphrase wallet, it just automatically goes there.


All the check app does is check that the 24 word seed mnemonic that you enter, generates the SAME seed that is stored in the device. Also, ANY passphrase that you enter, is technically "valid" and will successfully create a wallet...

PassWord1
PASSWord1
pAsswoRd1
1dorwssap
fklsadgeqrwtio3489t3yjeklthnakjbgvkjmnq34t7238y5346y45uy/W$t

All of those are "valid" passphrases and will successfully generate a wallet (with a valid seed mnemonic)... so quite what you expect the recovery app to be able to check with seed+passphrase I don't know? The passphrase is not stored in the device, so there is simply nothing to check regarding passphrases with the recovery check app.


Essentially, the 2nd PIN is exactly that method... put in 24 word seed mnemonic, add "Temporary Passphrase/25th word", set 2nd PIN.... Then, ALWAYS log in with 2nd PIN as if it was ordinary PIN... and there you go, you ALWAYS log in with 24 words+passphrase.... you just don't need to enter the passphrase.

The reason it wasn't the default option was that BIP39 passphrases are OPTIONAL (and not all wallets even support using them)... and also because entering a "decent" sized passphrase back in the "old days" took a LONG time and was very tedious if it had 10+ chars and used UPPER/lower/numb3r5/symb@!s etc. which would mean either:

1. it would just be a pain in the arse to unlock the device and see your wallet
or
2. users would choose stupidly easy to enter passphrases (which kind of defeats the purpose of having the passphrase in the first place)

It's just a never-ending conversation... you keep asking "what if? what if? what if?"... it's been explained over and over and over ad nauseum.

If you're comfortable encrypting it and putting it on a cloud device because you trust the encryption software and cloud storage, and you're more concerned about physical theft and burglars breaking into your house and stealing a piece of paper, then just do it.

There are just as many issues with storing it on paper (fire/flood/theft risk) as there are with storing stuff online (accounts/passwords compromised, faulty encryption systems etc)...

NOTHING is perfect. Just pick a method and go with it. Otherwise we'll be here in another 12 months saying the same things while you ask if moats full of pirahana's are better at keeping away cryptocurrency thieves than moats full of laser-beam wearing sharks