and do use an absolute path.
Do not use an absolute path? Reread, he said do use  . Whoops, well, I've also tried (Which was working till it randomly stopped, includes hashbang to /bin/sh):- /home/bitcoin/block.sh %s I'm unsure how how to use an absolute path of sh or something of the like without quotes, as, the space for the argument would break it:- /bin/sh -c /home/bitcoin/block.sh<SpaceHereWouldBreakArgumentsBeingParsedToTheBashScript>%s I'd need:- /bin/sh -c "/home/bitcoin/block.sh %s" EDIT:- This was the .conf that worked just fine, until, well, it randomly stopped working without me updating anything (System, .conf, bitcoin, .sh, anything!):- rpcuser=no.
rpcpassword=no.
maxconnections=1000
checklevel=4
keypool=10000
rpcallowip=127.0.0.1
server=1
blocknotify=/home/bitcoin/block.sh %s
walletnotify=/home/bitcoin/wallet.sh %s
alertnotify=/home/bitcoin/alert.sh %s I have the exact same problem. Did you solve it? I did, but, I had absolutely nothing to do with it, one day it just started working. Sorry. |
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It's something I've been wanting to do over the last few days, I've currently got a single 1-of-1 recovery sheet of paper taped together (I.E. Tamper evident) sitting under my monitor. Not all that secure. I'm just wondering what you people do as I need some ideas.
1. What format of paper wallets do you have (I.E. Single sheet? Fragmented? If fragmented, what parameters?)
2. Where do you store the sheet(s)?
That's really it, thanks.
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I am still having no Fing luck.
It is only showing 1 more address each time I open it.
And 0 balances.
Im so fucking pissed off I cant even think straight.
Then go away and come back when you can, all you'll end up doing is breaking stuff more. Now, are you sure you're using the same wallet (I.E. By ID)? How many addresses did you generate before you lost your coins? Do you have an address of one of your addresses that contained coins? Do you have a paper backup? Do you have another computer you can test on? Do you use the offline functionality of Armory or not? I am positive it is the same wallet(by ID). There was about 10 addresses that I had generated. I see all the addresses in Armory. I Do know the addresses also that contained coins. I do not have a paper backup but I have several encrypted Digital Backups. Overnight, I have received payment from Westhash to 1 of those addresses and I also received another payment from Slush's Pool to another address I was using. Now my wallet is showing those 2 payout transactions in my wallet under the 2 different addresses(the same addresses that I had those 2 pools set to pay out to). But none of the previous transactions or balances are showing up. I am sorry but I am a total newbie and am still learning as I go. I kept making Digital Copies in various locations though as a just in case anything happened. Heading away to work. Tonight when I get home I'll try to set up a different fresh PC to get Armory Installed on. Thanx for the attempt to help. Go to Westhash, Slush's pool, or any other site that'll tell you the address you cashed out too, grab the address, create a new transaction and add that address to the "To" section, do you see the wallet name appear under it?  EDIT:- Do what Goatpig said first, didn't see that, yeah, if you're not synced you're not going to be able to check anything. |
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I am still having no Fing luck.
It is only showing 1 more address each time I open it.
And 0 balances.
Im so fucking pissed off I cant even think straight.
Then go away and come back when you can, all you'll end up doing is breaking stuff more. Now, are you sure you're using the same wallet (I.E. By ID)? How many addresses did you generate before you lost your coins? Do you have an address of one of your addresses that contained coins? Do you have a paper backup? Do you have another computer you can test on? Do you use the offline functionality of Armory or not? |
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Is it good now? I have a watch only copy on my online computer.
2 copies of my paper wallet
2 encrypted copies on 2 USB's
You seem to be taking extra steps to ensure that you have redundant backups in case something happens to one of them. The best way to achieve this goal is to have a fragmented backup, say a 3-of-6. This will give you 6 pieces of paper, such that any 3 will recover your wallet. Any other attempts to duplicate your backups increases the ways your bitcoins could be exposed to an attacker. I recommend that you throw out your current wallet, and start over with the following steps: 1. Create a new wallet on the offline computer. 2. Print a 3-of-6 backup with secure print, remember to write your secure print code on each page with extra careful penmanship. 3. Delete your wallet, and attempt recreate it from the backup on your offline computer with different combinations of 3 fragments. Repeat until you are certain that you will be able to repeat this process if needed. 4. Distribute your 6 pages to secure places and trusted people. 5. Then test your offline wallet with a couple small transactions. My issue with the paper wallets is... where do I store them? Seriously, where? Storing them in a bank is expensive where I live, giving them to friends means friends can get together to steal your money, keeping them yourself is pointless, etc... |
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Why Tor? Why not rent a cheap VPS and run bitcoind (without the wallet)?
Use a VPN to send transactions from your place. Use the bitcoind RPC as the public interface.
If the transaction is signed then there is no reason to encrypt... it will be public anyway.
If you insist on Tor, rent a cheap VPS. Install the Tor hidden service software and configure the ssh (port 22) interface. Use iptables to close all inbound ports. At your end, get a copy of Tails, connect to the .onion address using ssh, and run bitcoind. Use the bitcoind CLI to send commands.
Transaction will be public, sure, but, routing the broadcast over tor prevents anyone listening to your traffic realizing you sent it, just that someone, somewhere in the world sent it. I can already (And have already) done things like you recommend (Albeit, without the VPS, just two copies of bitcoind, one configured for tor, one not), it's just a huge pain to constantly jump between the two clients, one for creating/managing funds/transactions, one for actually broadcasting. 'Tis be a huge pain for every single transaction. |
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There's little reason to put Armory's (or bitcoin-qt's) blockchain on SSD or have it encrypted from a cost-benefit point of view.
There's little reason to have unencrypted drives at all, for any application. My laptop is unencrypted because the CPU doesn't support Intel's AES instruction set so I can only pull about 100MB/s encrypt and decrypt, however, I can easily pull 500MB/s throughput without it. My desktop is unencrypted because I see legitimately no need for it, and, although I would do it if it were easy, configuring dm-crypt over mdadm would take about an extra hour and I'm way to lazy for that. There you go, there's two reasons. I do own some computers that do have full disk encryption on data drives, but, absolutely none with full disk encryption on the boot drive, way too much hassle and slows disk access down too much, even with perfect configurations. |
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There's little reason to put Armory's (or bitcoin-qt's) blockchain on SSD or have it encrypted from a cost-benefit point of view.
This. Honestly, I think if you just left an old PC on in suspend(2ram/S3) mode it'd probably be quicker (Than booting) and cheaper (Power for powering RAM vs for full boot & SSD). |
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I recently updated my online (watch only) to 0.92. When I attempted to create a transaction and sign it with my offline armory (0.90), it told me it must be updated (incompatible).
I updated it to 0.92 using "armory_0.92.1_ubuntu-64bit.deb", downloaded through the online client. No offline package was needed so I guess the dependencies were ok.
I'm still rocking 0.8 on my offline computer, I've yet to need to sign any transactions yet, although, I have generated a few wallets on the offline PC and brought them online (Watch only). That sounds like I'm going to have a huge pain updating. Gahhh. I'll probably just dd the HDD and use the paper wallets to recover the wallets, transferring files is a pain. |
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Is there anyway I can point armory at some brand new wallets (Some watch only, one local) and have it generate a multisig wallet on top of it? So I can just use it like a normal wallet and when I create a new address, it automatically generates one new wallet for the normal wallets and makes a multisig address out of that?
I really like the wallet mechanics in Armory, the lockbox feature seems to be made purely for holding funds you rarely touch, there's no real quick way (That I can see) to keep generating new addresses easily for day-to-day transactions.
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Is this possible? I don't want to use tor for everything else as there's no real private data being transferred 99.99% of the time (Just everyone else's data), what I want is for bitcoind to act as two different clients, one on tor (That literally only sends transactions) and one on the clearnet that does all the generic stuff like forwarding blocks and transactions, saving blocks, etc...
For reference, this does mean I want this to occur when I send a transaction:-
1. Send transaction via Tor
2. Wait for transaction to reach you via clearnet (Due to the fact it's propagated to everyone)
3. Forward the transaction anyway via clearnet as if you don't (And instead say "I already knew of this"), someone looking at your traffic would be able to determine that you could be the one that sent it.
I'd prefer not to run two copies of bitcoind, I know it's probably possible doing that, but, that's a large overhead.
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Yes it is my addresses. Just for rating/advertising system  . For place your offer you can pay 0.0001btc+bitcoin fee. If you pay more your goods upper, and categories sorting depend on sum of paymens all items in this category. Payment actual 10 days. It is symple spam protection. Most decentralized spam protection, without moderators. My question is why do *you* get it? Why not send it to "1BitcoinEaterAddressDontSendf59kuE" or some other statistically impossible address to own the private key to? Right now it's fine, as a proof-of-concept, but, let's say it were to take off, and, everyone who had a Bitcoin client installed also had this software they used to make trades, along with that, hundredds of people where commiting to the Github page all the time and it was a huge community-driven project, like what Bitcoin is. Why is it fair for you to get the money? Look at Bitcoin, the developer of it doesn't get any money, the only fees (I.E. Transaction fees) go to the people that actually did the work in the scope of the system, not some meta-developer. Second question is, how do nodes verify the transaction in that address is linked to a transaction on the chan? What stops me from jut commenting the send code out? I do admit, I should probably read the source in more detail, but, unfortunately, the times I come on here are normally the times I'm too tired to go source reading. |
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Why don't the two peers (Buyer & Merchant) communicate what TXIDs they're going to use to spend, then, one party (Either one) can create a transaction using the two TXIDs and destinating in the 2-2 address, sign it, then send it to the other party. This way the other party can only cash in the other person's money if they also agree to cash in their money as well, otherwise, the transaction is invalid as it's missing signatures.
Seems like such a simple feature of Bitcoin you completely skipped over making this wholle project infinitely worse, as, I think we can all agree, we want a trustless system, currently, this system is highly trustful.
Case in point:- I just lost ~ $0.07 because the seller disappeared (Or went offline) after I had sent the 5% to the initial address, if you used my above system, I'd have either of never sent it, or, the seller would have also have just lost 5%.
EDIT:- And can you explain something else for me? Imagine this:-
1. Seller puts up sale for product
2. Buyer purchases, sends 5% to address, so does the seller, then buyer deposits 100%.
3. Seller refuses to give buyer anything
What happens now? Is there anything the buyer can do? The only way I can see the buyer of getting *any* of his money back is to authorize the transaction to receive 5% of his money back, otherwise, he's out 105%, rather than 100%. This could easily be used to extort people, especially if dealing with large amounts (Say I was buying something for $1,000, I'd rather have lost $1,000 than $1,050).
Your system almost same but rly more trustless if it can be released. I will try soon. Please be realistic. In any situation, someone can lose money. The system makes it so that all were interested in a fair deal. But it can not protect you from incident. For example we have laws, but someone might take up arms and kill you, and would be sent to jail, but you're going to die, so laws dont help. Unless I'm missing something huge, you can relatively easily (Keyword:- Relative, I'm not saying it is easy) make a method where nobody, or, both parties lose money. In your system the buyer is always at risk of losing money. When both parties lose money it's a lot more incentivising than when just one does. Obviously the perfect environment would be where only the person who backed out loses money, but, that seems impossible with our current setup. EDIT:- This system should also probably add each other's Bitmessage address to the address book after the first communication, this means that *no* work is required for messages to be sent between each other, which, is probably a good thing when making trades. The work is useful on the first message, but, after that, it's just degrading usefulness. |
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Why don't the two peers (Buyer & Merchant) communicate what TXIDs they're going to use to spend, then, one party (Either one) can create a transaction using the two TXIDs and destinating in the 2-2 address, sign it, then send it to the other party. This way the other party can only cash in the other person's money if they also agree to cash in their money as well, otherwise, the transaction is invalid as it's missing signatures.
Seems like such a simple feature of Bitcoin you completely skipped over making this wholle project infinitely worse, as, I think we can all agree, we want a trustless system, currently, this system is highly trustful.
Case in point:- I just lost ~ $0.07 because the seller disappeared (Or went offline) after I had sent the 5% to the initial address, if you used my above system, I'd have either of never sent it, or, the seller would have also have just lost 5%.
EDIT:- And can you explain something else for me? Imagine this:-
1. Seller puts up sale for product
2. Buyer purchases, sends 5% to address, so does the seller, then buyer deposits 100%.
3. Seller refuses to give buyer anything
What happens now? Is there anything the buyer can do? The only way I can see the buyer of getting *any* of his money back is to authorize the transaction to receive 5% of his money back, otherwise, he's out 105%, rather than 100%. This could easily be used to extort people, especially if dealing with large amounts (Say I was buying something for $1,000, I'd rather have lost $1,000 than $1,050).
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Unless bitcoind has updated recently, you cant do this. You'll have to create your own database by crawling through the blockchain.
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Hi , add nachesmaches on steam
Thank you for your business, sent a copy to you. It should be in your Steam trade offers when you get back online. Sorry, I had to wait for one confirmation before sending and you were in a rush. |
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Hi , add nachesmaches on steam
Added, PM'd you my Steam Nickname and a random string to verify it's me, request I send you the exact same random string via Steam to match my Steam profile and Bitcointalk profile. |
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