This app looks defunct now, telling by the most recent reviews. Also the appId is on GitHub and if that code is what's behind the app, it's a custodial wallet. My full review can be found here.

mysecurewallet.info is gone (which probably breaks the app) and apparently that is how Google Play listings can end up not having a website linked. Why does Google not delist once such important contact details rot away? Contact dev and if not fix is provided in two weeks, delist.

Thanks for spreading the word. Much appreciated!

I won't go into detail about my personal setup for my own security but you should generally not have easy access to your savings and you should make sure that if something happens to you, your loved ones will get your bitcoins. Google and you will find instructions. YetiCold tries to make this secure setup fool proof, for non- to semi-technical users for example.

Edit: I personally kind of trust before mentioned project as I voiped with a contributor about security concerns and he's certainly very knowledgeable although quite opinionated but strictly speaking I don't absolutely trust the website and share many of Dave's concerns below. When it comes to multi signature, I don't have anything better to point to neither though. Certainly not Casa, Specter maybe? Haven't investigated Unchained or other options. Electrum with multiple hardware wallets is an option but no fun for the non-technical user neither.

Hi. Creator of WalletScrutiny here. Just found this thread and thought to comment on some doubts:


No, not exactly. That would be "builds are not deterministic". WalletScrutiny is about the reproducibility of the binary provided by Google Play in this case. In many cases the build is perfectly deterministic but yields something other than what's on Google Play and in many cases the build fails completely. Both those cases are "not reproducible", too. Distinction is not really worth own categories as only reproducibility of the binary in question gives an assurance of the binary being compiled from the source provided.


... which doesn't change the problem of not even the team being able to check on their release manager. Do you think the release manager would refuse to release an evil update with a gun to his head? Or he might catch a backdoor? Or he might "catch a backdoor"? How much money is under that wallet's control?


Feel free to make a pull request to our public git repository. Working mostly alone on this, covering more than 200 apps, keeping it up to date with every new release of a reproducible wallet is kind of a challenge.


82 wallets, many of which don't even support Bitcoin and none of the review goes much to explain how the result came to be. WalletScrutiny is about reproducibility and the provider's potential to pull an exit scam or actually lose all the funds of all the users at once.


I'm incidentally also the release manager of Mycelium, so thank you for your trust. WalletScrutiny is my side project.

Please consider the incentives for long cons! Just because the wallet of your choice had no issues so far doesn't mean it will not lose yours and all the other users' funds in an instance at some point.


Sadly, the very non-free systems Android and iPhone are actually quite secure by not giving the user root access and by sand-boxing apps. Android and iPhone were designed from the start to run hundreds of adversarial apps on the same system. A random Windows user should not use his desktop for Bitcoin but rather a modern mobile phone or better a hardware wallet.


Weak compared to what exactly? Android has an excellent track record of keeping apps in their respective sandboxes. As the release manager of an Android Bitcoin wallet I am biased but also quite knowledgeable about the security aspects I would think. If you don't root your phone or at least don't grant root access to the wrong apps, your coins are certainly safer in an Android wallet than on your average Windows machine.


I agree. To quote from our methodology page:



HW wallets are a bit of a pain on the go but feasible. I'd still consider HW wallets primarily for hodling.

The problem is that you might not notice any difference because it's a long con. The provider might be collecting backups of all the users' wallets an carefully watch if the BTC are getting more or less. He would have some staff to provide a good product etc. Then at some point he cashes out. He might even sell the product and then, a week later pull the rug and put blame on the buyer who paid him already on top of the loot.

I'm 100% confident that there are are project out there that are highly regarded by their users but ultimately the providers are psychopaths with no regards for the damage they will do when they pull the rug.

We list

• Trust as closed source
• Eidoo as closed source
• Lunes as not reproducible (there is some code but who knows if it's behind the Google Play release).

Is there any mistakes?

Edit: Why the hack did you mention "Lunes" of all wallets? That one did not get updated in 2 years and looks like a dead project.

WalletScrutiny is expanding to Linux and could use your help.

For Android the take was that there is basically just one binary distributed via Google and Google defines an appId for every app that we go by.

On Linux this gets a liiitle bit more complicated. Projects like bitcoin core distribute not only via bitcoincore.org but also via bitcoin.org, a bunch of mirrors and different binary packages via the different Linux distributions and then there is the snap store.

My initial take was to track each distributor but that will massively delay listing Linux wallets at all.

Now I lean towards tracking the best every project has to offer in terms of reproducible binaries and warn the user that the verdict "reproducible" doesn't imply reproducibility via alternative providers.

Any volunteers interested in helping with this, please chime in via https://gitlab.com/walletscrutiny/walletScrutinyCom/-/merge_requests/68

What happened to the website? https://btcarmory.com/ down? Git repo has no updates in years?

I'm expanding https://WalletScrutiny.com to Linux wallets and in terms of binary distribution this would be a "defunct" wallet?

And ask them when they will provide reproducible builds. But be warned: They won't handle critics with care

Your scenario of Mycelium turning evil is precisely the purpose of WalletScrutiny:

• If Mycelium turns evil (and security researchers verified the client isn't doing evil stuff, which is relevant as the client 99.99% of users are using matches the public source code, they can deny service and share information about your wallet. The privacy leak has indeed no other fix than to allow connecting to your own server. The service denial can be worked around by importing the backup to a different wallet.
• If Samourai turns evil, security researchers have no way of detecting it, as the code 99.99% of their client's users are running is closed. They can steal all users' funds.

That's Coinomi's claim but if you want to empty all wallets at some point, any claim that is believable works. Doesn't convince me they don't want to steal your funds.

If I had to bet which of the wallets in the second category will pull an exit scam, my bet would be on Samourai.

• The wallet on Google Play has little to do with their open source
• They hide in secrecy about who is behind the wallet
• They invite people to put as much money into the mixer at the same time as possible

There would be no recourse for an exit scam if they are really as private as they pretend to be. Of course there is Keonne Rodriguez who keeps defending Samourai but maybe he sold it to some anonymous entity. Who knows?

I'm not exactly eager to put much effort into adding more wallets In fact, I do not really analyze wallets that have not at least 1000 downloads. Just drop a link to the playstore listing once it's live.

If you share the Google Play link (or the appId), I will add it to WalletScrutiny.com but it will only be reviewed once it reaches 1000 downloads and if time allows. The priority is to provide timely evaluation of new releases of verifiable wallets and it's a side project, so ...

Thanks! Please keep in mind that WalletScrutiny so far only tests verifiability. It does not verify the source code itself. This is something for some phase two.


Currently I only add wallets that are on Google Play. If you have a link to their store listing, I add it to WalletScrutiny.


The criteria of being listed at all is that it looked a bit like a wallet. BitRefill in particular is a custodial service, so it's not a wallet but a "Bitcoin bank". This should be clear from how it's represented. If you wouldn't be able to lose "your" bitcoins with them, it would be "not a wallet".

WalletScrutiny is not just a study. It's an ongoing project which closely monitors updates of verifiable wallets. Check it out. The charts are now more informative and there are many more wallets covered now.

Is the idea also to coordinate offers on Paxful instead of competing within the group of traders? Else you might invite the very traders that take away your business, isn't it.

That is a good point. As they have to get the user to do a backup anyway, pushing to make two separate backups should not be that awkward and it would solve the problem with the timelock being a timelock when you might need the money.

Ping me on this issue if I forget to update the article.

I see your point and this is not the only wallet where things are not as black or white as we would hope for. I personally consider it a great and unique feature with little down-side but I would also love to allow critical voices to be accessible from the project. What about a block with a Twitter feed showing tweets mentioning both the wallet and @WalletScrutiny? Would also help to spread the word.

I might be wrong there but my understanding is that the script is a slight bit more complicated. Their 2of2 protects you as you can define rules and they enforce them by not signing if somebody tries to empty your account all at once but if they disappear or charge a huge fee, your funds can be spent with just one key - your key - after one year.

We are not recommending any wallets. Our hope was to drive awareness for the issue of verifiability and there is bad things to say about all 3 wallets listed as "verifiable" but no wallet is perfect and all the other wallets are potentially losing all the money of all their users at once without security researchers having a chance of detecting it before it happens. And most likely even the team is not exercising build verification, so a release manager in distress might be all it takes for all users losing their money.

That said, what is so bad about Green Wallet?

Please read the article on that wallet. It explains all we did to come to our conclusion. Let me know if that finding is outdated.