It was caused by broken namecoin explorer. I reported it to Namecoin developers and few minutes ago I also fixed namecoin rewards. Everything is fine again.

BinoX is right, pool luck is calculated only from finished blocks from intervals now()-1 day, now()-7days, now()-30 days. That explains why pool luck can be high even when pool is working on ugly long round.

This is bug in GUIminer, it's broken since I added SSL support for profile page...

Afaik there was ~30% daily luck and ~80% monthly luck few months again. Luck in last few days is really strange, damn variance. However, long term luck (90 days and all time) is still 100%.

wow, 12mil shares, incredible... I hope that we'll have better luck now...

Longest round on the pool was 12+mil shares, so we (fortunately) didn't make the record today :-)

From the official LP specification (provided by deepbit, who firstly implemented LP) it can be full URL as well, so my pool isn't breaking any specification.


Thank you for the fix.

I don't have an idea why GUI miner is failing, but the bug appear also on other pools and I didn't modified pool core in last few days. I think it is something strange in gui miner...

Some people reported me issues with GUI miner on my pool, but I don't have an idea why it is doing that failure. I didn't modified pool software and also only guiminer is having issues. I think it is something strange in gui miner...

Message from Sierrachart? You can ignore it, sierrachart bridge runs even on unpaid SC version. Otherwise you're doing something wrong.

Also keep in mind that SierraChart is charting software for stock and commodity markets. 45$ for two months is really wtf - because it's the cheapest professioinal platform with trading data I've ever seen ;-).

Who said that one submitted share per minute will be enough for premium bandwidth? It's less likely with rising difficulty...

Also, "even CPU mining" - say this to people who have one share per one hour. And I don't believe chinese disidents have strong GPU rigs in their basement :-).

Actually redeemable codes have two main advantages:
* You can premine them, no need to wait to mining submits during tor session
* Price for transfer don't need to be same as "submit rate on common computer" to keep Tor running.

Disadvantages:
* There's some central entity (anonymous pool). However some pool will be still necessary, as relays don't want to mine solo, probably. And routing getworks and shares between pool and tor user over the relay is just another complication and overhead...


Of course relay redeem the code on issuer application, but it's very easy to implement. Actually my "no accounting" was related to issuing side; tor users don't need any account on pool issuing redeemable codes.

...and did you asked those users how large dataset they're comparing?

Those +20% in hashrate was my tip, pool knows only 30min average hashrate so I don't know exactly what's the boost on the beginning of the round.

I can imagine that my proposal can be compatible with current Tor and it's even less complex than "every relay is mining pool". Actually the only chance in your idea is "premine" traffic in every circuit, so you'll need to wait long time (hours?) before you'll be able to actually use the circuit. Don't forget that circuits are usually short-time constructs...



No... why? getwork() -> mining -> submit() -> redeemable code received. Miner can even choose target difficulty of getwork, so one redeemable code can be the equivalent of 100 shares, for example (with target in getwork set to 100). No bookkeeping, no accounts, no identity revealed. Every getwork can be as anonymous as in your proposal, except that you can freely premine codes independently on the circuits you'll want use in the future.


...because you didn't catch the idea of redeemable codes. No account is needed on the pool. Every getwork can be isolated, so you can get completely unlinked pieces of value (=redeemable codes, which are equivalent of some well-defined work on the pool). However you're right that once you'll use redeemable code on one relay, you should not use it on another. But it's ok, because one code can be 100kB of transferred data.


No; that's the basic improvement against "mine on the relay". You can mine overnight for codes and then use them all during your one-hour session when you actually need it.


No, once you redeem the code, you drop it, because it is useless; relay will redeem it's whole value.


I hope that I explained it better now :-)

Littleshop, Epoch - your payout in short rounds is lower, because there's more hashpower on the beginning of the round (yes, thanks to pool hopers). There's around 10-20% of increase in pool rate, which explains your math (because your own hashrate is smaller portion of total hashrate).

Cross-check for block validity on blockexplorer failed for some reason (I think BE was down for a moment). I fixed it manually right now.

Maybe, but there's simply no algorithm how to spread entry IPs between honest people and don't give it to China government :-). Paying for entry IPs isn't a solution, China still have much more money than chinese disidents.


What exactly you want to apply from Mike's proposal here? I think he's solving slightly different problem.

Then the question is: who needs overpriced guns from SR when normal people can buy guns in the US freely?

Yes, donating exit nodes is in my opinion the most important, because it's much harder to run exit nodes than classic relay (you need to fight all those DMCA calls, for example).

If you simply want to donate for building better Tor infrastructure, then feel free to send few coins to torservers.net, they're doing really good job for Tor. But if you want to "donate" for specific exit and then use some premium bandwidth, you still need changes in Tor protocol to auth yourself as a donator...

Yes, it is possible, but there's no big benefit in it, because usually the bottleneck is exit node, not entry node. Also by paying only for entry nodes, you're revealing that you're the client, which is leaking useful information for malicious nodes.

There are Tor bridges, private relays who're not published on tor router list. They're acting as entry nodes and it works for users behind Great Firewall pretty well. Btw it is possible to ask them directly for "premium bandwidth contract" even without extending the Tor protocol.


That won't work, it will just block regular users from using Tor if they won't be able to "pay" for router list. Once you have some access to Tor network, you can detect all exit node IPs in one hour using simple script. That's also the reason why Tor relay list is publicly accessible, because every attempt to hide it is "security by obscurity".