[ANN][2POW] Luck - A new consensus algorithm to eliminate large mining pools

[Sherlock.Holmes]

What's new in luck:

In the Bitcoin network, as the computing power of the mining pool continues to increase, individual nodes can no longer independently participate in mining. Individual miners can only participate in mining by joining the mining pool, which completely deviates from "one-CPU-one-vote" vision. In essence, a mining pool is only equivalent to a node, monopoly mining is very terrible. In addition to unfair incentive, monopoly mining is possible for mining pools with greater computing power to be actively or passively carryed out attacks on the network, resulting in the collapse of the entire system.

We believe that in the Bitcoin network, the formation of the mining pool is inevitable, because in the proof-of-work mechanism, the miner can outsource part of his work to other miners. The cooperative mining between miners is obviously superior to non-cooperative mining. The traditional view is that the formation of the mining pool is due to the ASIC. We believe that this is not the key reason. Many existing projects eventually formed the mining pool after adopting the anti-ASIC strategy. The strategy only limits the growth speed of the computing power of a single node, but the advantages of cooperative mining are still obvious.

In the traditional proof-of-work mechanism, we believe that cooperative mining is inevitable. This is because there are no puzzles can’t be outsourced.

We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of "luck" in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.

In luck network, the systemic risk of the network is no longer a 51% computing power attack, but a 51% node attack, that is, a mine owner has mastered more than 51% of independent nodes in the entire network. Attacks are destructive to the system. But obviously, it is much easier to master 51% of the computing power than to master 51% of the nodes. In addition, for the  two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, if the number of honest nodes in the whole network is enough, for example, more than 1000 nodes, even if a miner has mastered 51% of the nodes, he wants to make a profit through a fork, he needs on average to mine 1000000 blocks to catch up with the main network, which is a huge cost.



We are looking for:

     1. If you have experience in social media, we would like to talk with you about spreading the project.
     2. Some miners who would like to paticipating in mining.

Feel free to contact us at Sherlock.Holmes.luck@protonmail.com


Some links:

Welcome to the Luck:
     https://lucknet.club
     Whitepaper: https://lucknet.club/doc/luck.pdf

Some other media links:
     Discord: https://discord.gg/TN6XhcD
     Telegram: https://t.me/luck_cryptocurrency
    

News

Testnet has been opened, Welcome to join.

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[Sherlock.Holmes]

Previously we have opened a discussion at https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5254327.0 and https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5249323.0

[sky-white]

It is a very interesting topic, good luck to you!

[wolfwolf]

Thank you for your sharing, I will always follow this project.

[angrybirds.allen]

I do not think that a model like this will work. It's just turning the power monopoly into node monopoly. A miner who have more nodes, his monopoly remain unchanged.
Maybe I am wrong, I hope this mechanism works better.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

I do not think that a model like this will work. It's just turning the power monopoly into node monopoly. A miner who have more nodes, his monopoly remain unchanged.
Maybe I am wrong, I hope this mechanism works better.

The power monopoly is theoretically caused by cooperative mining. In this project, the cooperative mining is irrational, which will generate a large number of miners instead of mining pools.

[WhiteLee]

So is there a test release for mining ? when is that date?

[Sherlock.Holmes]

So is there a test release for mining ? when is that date?

We will officially start testnet mining in July, and the mainnet will be officially launched a few weeks after testing

[angrybirds.allen]

I do not think that a model like this will work. It's just turning the power monopoly into node monopoly. A miner who have more nodes, his monopoly remain unchanged.
Maybe I am wrong, I hope this mechanism works better.

The power monopoly is theoretically caused by cooperative mining. In this project, the cooperative mining is irrational, which will generate a large number of miners instead of mining pools.

thanks, it looks like it will be better than Bitcoin. 

[orange094]

Very interesting solution. I have read the whitepaper, and I must say I am pretty impressed..

Good luck with "luck"


Also give a suggestion, I think you should name it "double proof of work" instead of "two-phase proof of work"

[moderator's note: consecutive posts merged]

[happybirthday12]

I like this mechanism.
In addition i'm interested to learn more as a miner.

[wolfwolf]

I like this mechanism.
In addition i'm interested to learn more as a miner.

As we all know, large mining pools are a threat to Bitcoin, and this solution will make mining more decentralized.

I also like this mechanism

[Sherlock.Holmes]

Thank you very much for your enthusiasm, we have received a lot of email feedback, we try to deal with each email in a timely manner.

[greenfrogred]

I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.

For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)<E1(m), which means that f(max) must be much larger than f(min). How is f(l) designed?

I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?


Due to the difference in difficulty, the fork probability of the system is reduced, which is indeed a good solution.

Good luck to you!

[moderator's note: consecutive posts merged]

[wolfwolf]

I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.

For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)<E1(m), which means that f(max) must be much larger than f(min). How is f(l) designed?

I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?

I think it can be understood like this.

when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.

Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2<E1.

[sky-white]

I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.

For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)<E1(m), which means that f(max) must be much larger than f(min). How is f(l) designed?

I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?

I think it can be understood like this.

when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.

Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2<E1.

From another perspective, the variance of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation. one-cpu-one-vote is the result.

[angrybirds.allen]

If this mechanism works properly, I think the project has great potential.
Indeed, no matter which hash function you choose, as long as you use the same idea of traditional PoW, pools are inevitable.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.

For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)<E1(m), which means that f(max) must be much larger than f(min). How is f(l) designed?

I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?

I think it can be understood like this.

when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.

Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2<E1.

From another perspective, the variance of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation. one-cpu-one-vote is the result.

Thank you very much. You are right. From the perspective of minimizing risk, the expected output of cooperation is low and the variance is large. Rational miners will choose to mine independently.

[x23a1s]

when will the test/mainnet launch ?

[orange094]

I want to know how to participate in mining.