Petition to remove Wasabi from recommendations of bitcoin.org

[o_e_l_e_o]

If you want to curate the coins that you’re seeing in this proposed CoinJoin and you decide whether or not you want to CoinJoin based on the metadata risk factor, you need to ask the chain surveillance company and then you need to get an account and KYC, probably, in all of this. So—not that easy. In the meantime, just doing it top-down from the coordinator-side is a solution that—assuming that you want to do this—it is a solution that is cheaper, because only one person has to talk to the chain surveillance company compared to all the users who want to do it.

Yeah, this quote is particularly hilarious. The future of privacy, according to Wasabi, is for every single bitcoin user to KYC themselves to a blockchain analysis company and then pay the blockchain analysis company for information on every UTXO they interact with. Much private! Such fungible! Wow!

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[Medusah]

If people are not convinced yet that wasabi devs are incompetent clowns, here are a few notable assertions from the podcast:

You’re changing the acceptance of which coins do you consider valid—not on the Bitcoin consensus layer—that’s the other important thing. Bitcoin consensus is still permissionless and decentralized enough that you can make payments even if you are blacklisted: you can just either get hashrate yourself or bribe a miner to hash a block with your transaction in it—so Bitcoin works. But what we’re talking about here is: will you get access to someone else’s computer? Will someone else allow you to write stuff on his computer, basically? And in my opinion, ultimately it comes down to property rights. A coordinator is just someone else’s computer—and it’s not yours. So you ought to be quite thankful that someone actually provides you a service where you can use his computer for certain things like coordinating a round.

This guy just asserted that my decision to join my inputs with someone else is the same as taking control of his computer.  He also stated that blacklisting does not happen on Bitcoin because you could bribe a miner, which is not true.  The reason you do not get blacklisted is because it is censorship resistant.  A mining pool blacklisting transactions would directly attack their revenue and reputation, but even if it did not, then some other pool would mine it sooner or later.

By the way why doesn't the same apply on coinjoin?  "Coinjoin consensus is still permissionless and decentralized enough that you can make payments even if you are blacklisted: you can just leave Wasasi and use a censorship resistant alternative". 

But then the more pressing matter is it’s not always gonna be clear-cut, especially when you start making transactions, especially when you have things like CoinSwap, Lightning, PayJoin—we’re working really hard to make the life of chain surveillance miserable, and that means that they’re gonna have many more false positives.

This is the plan guys!  They are paying a blockchain analysis company so that they can verify beforehand that their product becomes less and less accurate!   

So they’re gonna say that this coin is owned by a criminal, even though it’s actually a peaceful individual. And they’re gonna have false negatives.

And we are going to censor the individual nonetheless because not only do we buy from blockchain analysis but we even allow them to reject any coins they dislike from the coinjoin!   

And I think technically how this is gonna work is that during input registration or at the end of input registration, an API request is made to the chain surveillance firm, and then you see which inputs are not allowed or blacklisted, and these then get a response from the coordinator with, Sorry, we could not allow your coin to be registered because of these reasons. But the cool thing is: your money never moved—this was all during the coordination of the PSBT.

Money never move because you are a criminal!  Cool! 

But if, on the other hand, only politicians and other violent criminals are getting blacklisted—well, you know, then I’m happy.

You do not deserve privacy if you are a bad boi!

There’s a lot of nuance here, but in general what we can say is: yes—that is another precedent that UTXOs are not fungible, that there is metadata associated to UTXOs that are outside of the consensus implementation. And that’s just super difficult because now you’re gonna have different surveillance companies that have different blacklists and different risk scores associated to it. And now you have competing soft forked clients, basically, that reach a different consensus of which coins are good and which coins are bad. And well—there’s no solution to it.

Blockchain analysis is flawed, different surveillance companies produce different "coin risk factors" so they are not to be trusted, but hey why not buying from one?

[PrivacyG]

But if, on the other hand, only politicians and other violent criminals are getting blacklisted—well, you know, then I’m happy.

You do not deserve privacy if you are a bad boi!

Of course.  Kruw loves this too.  He thinks only who deserves Privacy should get it.  But he also says Wasabi does not support Censorship.  If some body reads only ONE page of this topic and thinks Wasabi is part of the good guys and we are the bad guys then so be it.  They are lost causes.

I really think the only people who would STILL use Wasabi after all of this are the people who trade on Centralized Exchanges with Know Your Customer checked accounts. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

But he also says Wasabi does not support Censorship.

I mean another outright lie there; even Wasabi developers throw up their hands. They themselves admit they sacrifice censorship resistance:

We are fully aware of the gravity of our actions and had been even before the decision was made. By exploiting the only architectural flaw of Wasabi Wallet’s non-anonymously run coordinator: lack of censorship resistance; we broke one of the largest taboos of Bitcoin: blacklisting, to achieve something greater: survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology.

But what's censorship resistance worth if we take into account the "survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology"? Nothing!

If only there was a way to retain both... Oh wait there is: XMR swaps and other coinjoin implementations that aren't flawed!

[Kruw]

But what's censorship resistance worth if we take into account the "survival of the best Bitcoin privacy technology"? Nothing!

If only there was a way to retain both... Oh wait there is: XMR swaps and other coinjoin implementations that aren't flawed!

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology", and WabiSabi solves the flaws of other coinjoin implementations.

[PrivacyG]

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology"

Prove a BTC > XMR > BTC Atomic Swap is less beneficial to Privacy than a Wasabi Coin Join.

-----

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

[BlackHatCoiner]

XMR swaps aren't "Bitcoin privacy technology", and WabiSabi solves the flaws of other coinjoin implementations.

- I'd argue that atomic swaps is a kind of both Bitcoin and Monero.
- Wasabi coinjoins suffer from address reuse and other weaknesses which have been presented quite a few times already.

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

One less troll to account for. That's a blessing.

[Kruw]

- Wasabi coinjoins suffer from address reuse and other weaknesses which have been presented quite a few times already.

You haven't presented any weaknesses in WabiSabi coinjoins at all, you've merely repeated the lie over and over about "coinjoins suffering from address reuse" that Peter Todd already directly debunked:

Forget about that.  Wasabi is flawed.  End of story.

You should know by now not to listen to o_e_l_e_o, he will say any lie necessary about open source privacy software in order to trick people into losing their money to a custodian instead.  There is no "flaw", stop FUDing and start verifying:

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

o_e_l_e_o, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

BlackHatCoiner, another custodial shill, was also spreading this same lie of Wasabi being "flawed":

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

The custodians are desperate to attack open source privacy software.  It's the only way they can get their hands on your Bitcoins and data.  Don't fall for their obvious lies.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Some body may have to quote me on this one or ask the same question because again, Kruw either ignores my messages or put me on his Ignore List.

Kruw ignores every question which he can't answer with a meaningless soundbite.

Still, remember that Kruw thinks Monero is a shitcoin, so clearly doesn't understand the first thing about Monero or indeed privacy in general:

Fuck off to the shitcoin subforum.

Even more lols. If you think Monero is a shitcoin, then your opinions on anything privacy related are worthless. Monero is pretty much the only coin other than Bitcoin that isn't a shitcoin.

[Kruw]

Still, remember that Kruw thinks Monero is a shitcoin, so clearly doesn't understand the first thing about Monero or indeed privacy in general:

Fuck off to the shitcoin subforum.

Even more lols. If you think Monero is a shitcoin, then your opinions on anything privacy related are worthless. Monero is pretty much the only coin other than Bitcoin that isn't a shitcoin.

I'm happy that you like Monero, but a thread for Bitcoin privacy technology is the absolute worst place you could be shilling it.  It shows you are more interested in hurting Bitcoin than promoting privacy because you can already be private on Bitcoin with WabiSabi coinjoins.

[apogio]

It shows you are more interested in hurting Bitcoin than promoting privacy.

If you say this to o_e_l_e_o then I can only imagine what you say about all the rest  

It's one of the worst accusations you could make.

When we say Monero is good for privacy, why do we hurt Bitcoin? Do you really suppose that Bitcoin has anything to fear? Apart from that, privacy in Bitcoin can be achieved with multiple coinjoin options, not only with the WabiSabi coinjoins. I use Jam (Joinmarket) and Whirlpool. I feel good and safe! I also do Monero swaps and I also feel good about it.

[Kruw]

When we say Monero is good for privacy, why do we hurt Bitcoin? Do you really suppose that Bitcoin has anything to fear?

The problem is that o_e_l_e_o's claim that Monero's privacy is good is attached to a false claim that privacy from WabiSabi coinjoins is bad.  Lying about weaknesses that Bitcoin doesn't have in order to promote a feature on your shitcoin is clearly Vitalik tier deception.  Of course, this sort of betrayal of Bitcoin is nothing new, o_e_l_e_o even partnered with custodian "mixing sites" that stole Bitcoins from people who were stupid enough to trust him with their data and funds.

Apart from that, privacy in Bitcoin can be achieved with multiple coinjoin options, not only with the WabiSabi coinjoins. I use Jam (Joinmarket) and Whirlpool. I feel good and safe! I also do Monero swaps and I also feel good about it.

If you feel "good and safe" when using Whirlpool, then you must not be aware of the privacy leaks:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

With WabiSabi coinjoins, every transaction you make has full privacy, so there's no need for "XMR Swaps".

[o_e_l_e_o]

Kruw ignores every question which he can't answer with a meaningless soundbite.

He just can't resist proving this point over and over again.

[BlackHatCoiner]

For the sake of the discussion, o_e_l_e_o has helped people care about their privacy and improve it more than anyone I know of in this board. He always seems to distinguish misinformation and cares to share his thoughts in a simple, yet comprehensible and constructive manner.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

The problem is that o_e_l_e_o's claim that Monero's privacy is good is attached to a false claim that privacy from WabiSabi coinjoins is bad.

No, it is not. They are two facts on their own.

- Yes, Monero's privacy is good, everyone should consider using that, and if they don't, then you can still retain your Bitcoin privacy by swapping your BTC with XMR back and forth.
- Yes, privacy from Wasabi coinjoins appears to be questionable, because there are lots of instances of people claiming they were de-anonymized, and there are crystal clear signs of address reuse.

[o_e_l_e_o]

If you say this to o_e_l_e_o then I can only imagine what you say about all the rest 

It's one of the worst accusations you could make.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

I appreciate the sentiments, but don't worry about it - I'm not going to lose a second of sleep over what a pro-censorship, pro-surveillance, anti-privacy Wasabi shill thinks of me.

[Kruw]

For the sake of the discussion, o_e_l_e_o has helped people care about their privacy and improve it more than anyone I know of in this board. He always seems to distinguish misinformation and cares to share his thoughts in a simple, yet comprehensible and constructive manner.

It really is one of the worst accusations one can make in this board. He is a treasure for bitcointalk, and for Bitcoin as a whole.

o_e_l_e_o is intentionally miseducating people about Bitcoin privacy.  He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced? This sort of deception about Bitcoin's privacy properties is the absolute most harmful thing you could possibly spread:

Another example of a Wasabi coinjoin completely failing: https://nitter.cz/ErgoBTC/status/1723700744576971012#m

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi (wait, I thought their blacklisting was supposed to prevent that? ), and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account: https://nitter.cz/coinableS/status/1723806321441710412#m. You know, the same thing Kruw has been telling us is impossible with Wasabi.

I'm sure we'll be treated to the usual litany of excuses, but the bottom line is that Wasabi does not work.

As I've said before, blockchain analysis is based on guesswork.

Bitcoin, by design, is fungible. As soon as a transaction has more than one output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where. It cannot be done. Everyone who claims to be able to do it is guessing, lying, or both. All blockchain analysis companies, all centralized exchanges, and now Wasabi too (which is particularly hilarious considering they base their whole existence on coinjoins). They have made up a system based on guesswork, and have successfully marketed it for their own profit to large parts of this space as some infallible law. It is not, and the only way to get rid of it is for the community to agree to shun companies and entities which support and enforce this made up nonsense.

As soon as a transaction has been made, it is impossible to say that those coins haven't changed hands. As soon as a transaction has more than out output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where (and indeed, "which" bitcoin doesn't even exist at a protocol level). It is trivially easily to fool many of the heuristics blockchain analysis uses, such as script type matching to identify the change output, or inputs being spent together to identify co-ownership. And not just to fool them as in "they can't draw any conclusions", but to fool them as in "they actively draw the incorrect conclusion". And of course one incorrect conclusion leads them to build more and more incorrect conclusions on top, building an entire chain of nonsense which they then pass off as irrefutable fact.

I've said for a long time that blockchain analysis is provable nonsense with no scientific basis. It seems even the directors of blockchain analysis companies agree with that. But of course they will continue to peddle their nonsense to centralized exchanges and governments alike because it pays handsomely to do so.


I did a small experiment some time ago regarding blockchain analysis: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5395035.msg59905002#msg59905002

One particular piece of blockchain analysis software put a significant amount of coins in the wallet of various centralized exchanges in one of the categories of scams, hacks, or blacklists. Obviously the blockchain analysis software being used by these exchanges did not classify these coins in this manner, otherwise they wouldn't have accepted those coins. The fact that two different pieces of software can come to completely different conclusions about the exact same coins should be more than enough to tell you that blockchain analysis is made up trash.

One of the core principles of any piece of science is that its results are repeatable and independently verifiable. If I come up with a process to say, isolate gold from an alloy, then I publish my methods and other people perform the same steps, end up with the same results, and verify my process works. If I come up with a process to say some coins are tainted, and other people do the same thing and end up with completely different results, then my process is bullshit.

- Yes, privacy from Wasabi coinjoins appears to be questionable, because there are lots of instances of people claiming they were de-anonymized, and there are crystal clear signs of address reuse.

Privacy from Wasabi coinjoins is not questionable.  No one has provided proof of anyone being deanonymized.  Your misinformation about "address reuse" has already been completely debunked by Peter Todd:

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

Didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

[BlackHatCoiner]

He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced?

Your urge to twist his words is nearly impressive. Nowhere has he stated that "2 outputs" make you untraceable. What he's argued is that it's impossible to know if the bitcoin changes hands, so it is absolutely unacceptable to base evidence on blockchain analysis.

That doesn't mean that you're "untraceable" (nowhere has he stated that in the quoted post). He merely said that it is impossible to know with confidence if the money changes hands, because blockchain analysis (which you're proudly funding) is flawed.

Privacy from Wasabi coinjoins is not questionable.  No one has provided proof of anyone being deanonymized.  Your misinformation about "address reuse" has already been completely debunked by Peter Todd

- Lots of people in Twitter are reporting the opposite. So you're claiming they are all lying.
- I have heard Peter Todd, and I agree with allowing inputs to be reused (i.e., if they come from a donation address), but Wasabi has been caught to reusing outputs which is unacceptable, unless you think that every time that happened the user specifically attempted to donate (which as far as I know doesn't happen on the front end, the coinjoin process just starts automatically).

[Kruw]

He claims 2 outputs makes you "impossible to trace", but then o_e_l_e_o also claims 195 output coinjoins can be traced?

Your urge to twist his words is nearly impressive. Nowhere has he stated that "2 outputs" make you untraceable. What he's argued is that it's impossible to know if the bitcoin changes hands, so it is absolutely unacceptable to base evidence on blockchain analysis.

That doesn't mean that you're "untraceable" (nowhere has he stated that in the quoted post).

I have not "twisted his words" at all, read exactly what he said about 2 output transactions:

As soon as a transaction has more than one output, it is impossible to say which bitcoin ended up where. It cannot be done. Everyone who claims to be able to do it is guessing, lying, or both.

Now read exactly what he said about this 195 output coinjoin transaction:

Another example of a Wasabi coinjoin completely failing: https://nitter.cz/ErgoBTC/status/1723700744576971012#m

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi (wait, I thought their blacklisting was supposed to prevent that? ), and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account: https://nitter.cz/coinableS/status/1723806321441710412#m. You know, the same thing Kruw has been telling us is impossible with Wasabi.

I'm sure we'll be treated to the usual litany of excuses, but the bottom line is that Wasabi does not work.

The hypocrisy is off the charts.  No lie is too bold for someone who wants to funnel Bitcoins out of open source privacy wallets and into data collecting, coin stealing custodians.

- Lots of people in Twitter are reporting the opposite. So you're claiming they are all lying.

"Lots of people in Twitter" doesn't sound like proof to me.

- I have heard Peter Todd, and I agree with allowing inputs to be reused (i.e., if they come from a donation address), but Wasabi has been caught to reusing outputs which is unacceptable, unless you think that every time that happened the user specifically attempted to donate (which as far as I know doesn't happen on the front end, the coinjoin process just starts automatically).

Peter Todd is talking about OUTPUTS being reused in coinjoins:

That's not Wasabi fucking up, that's Wasabi users fucking up.  Wasabi, they fundamentally, are not in a position where they can go and prevent people from installing the same seed in multiple wallets at once and using it in multiple wallets at once.

Your attempts to convince people that BIP32 deterministic address generation is a "flaw in coinjoins" is pure deception and you know it.  

[o_e_l_e_o]

Anyone with even a basic comprehension of the English language can clearly understand the context of those two statements - one is talking about bitcoin at a technical level (where there is no such thing as individual sats) while the other is talking about blockchain analysis heuristics. As I've pointed out before, your continual deliberate misrepresentations mean you are either deliberately lying to fuel your narrative, or you literally don't understand the first thing about what you are writing.

Good job diverting the topic away from the questions you repeatedly refuse to answer again though.

[Kruw]

Anyone with even a basic comprehension of the English language can clearly understand the context of those two statements - one is talking about bitcoin at a technical level (where there is no such thing as individual sats) while the other is talking about blockchain analysis heuristics. As I've pointed out before, your continual deliberate misrepresentations mean you are either deliberately lying to fuel your narrative, or you literally don't understand the first thing about what you are writing.

Good job diverting the topic away from the questions you repeatedly refuse to answer again though.

o_e_l_e_o, I did answer you:

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

o_e_l_e_o, didn't you hear Peter Todd?  https://youtu.be/oPNFdhZUGmk?t=162

I want you to admit you heard Peter Todd tell you that address reuse is not Wasabi fucking up and then I want you to explain why you are still attacking open source Bitcoin privacy software by spreading the lie that there is "evidence" of "flawed coinjoins".