Mixing coins through exchanges

[virasog]

That's not mixing. Sending TC wallet from one wallet to another and then from that wallet to another and then finally to the destination wallet. These transactions can be easily tracked even by a newbie like me. A simple understating and usage of explorers can get you track.

From track means they can find your source wallet from where you made a transaction. To avoid the tracking of source wallet, you should prefer to use mixers or wallets that have the feature of coinjoin. Even many hardware wallets have coinjoin feature. If you do not know what is coinjoin, then its means that joining/mixing coins so that no one could track the source wallet address.

If you send a transaction from one wallet to another and then from that wallet to the third wallet, everything is being seen transparently on bitcoin blockchain however here we are putting the exchange address in between. This means that the OP will send his bitcoins to the exchange. You can verify from blockchain that he send the bitcoin to an exchange address. However, when he will withdraw bitcoin to another address, the exchange will not use his address as a source, so the connection of his source address will be broken and there is no way to link the source address of the OP to the new address where he send his bitcoin from the exchange.

In the case, which OP mentioned, the reason for this mixing is only personal (and not to hide coins from government / financial sector), the exchange can fulfill his requirements.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Can we do this on centralized exchanges to save the fee?  Need no privacy from the governments or the exchanges.

There exist mixers which can do this job much more effectively than a centralized exchange can do, and much cheaper. Dig up this place, here's a thread to begin with: 2023 List Bitcoin Mixers Bitcoin Tumblers Websites.

Will the Wasabi work well if there is no concern about the agencies doing the chain analysis, as the motive is only to hide from family / friends?

Yes, but I would avoid Wasabi as it's been multiple times found that it's flawed software: https://twitter.com/wasabistats

Do me a favor and read this thread of mine, I briefly explain each mixing method's pros and cons: Your options to having privacy in Bitcoin - and their tradeoffs.

[Z-tight]

Will the Wasabi work well if there is no concern about the agencies doing the chain analysis, as the motive is only to hide from family / friends?

It would, but instead of doing your CoinJoin on Wasabi wallet if that's what you want to do, you can do that through Samourai's Whirlpool, which is also available on Sparrow wallet. Wasabi blacklists certain UTXO from participating in their CoinJoin, so i don't recommend that you use them. A good mixer like https://sinbad.io/ is also sufficient to mix your coins for you, but do your own research before using any of these services.

[Kruw]

The hardware wallet that I know that supports coinjoin is Wasabi. If you want to avoid chain analyses not to spy on your transaction, it is better not to use Wasabi coinjoin. He can use Whirlpool on Sparrow or Samourai wallet instead if he does not want to use a mixer.

Chain analysis cannot spy on your transaction if you use Wasabi, it protects clients against any data leaks by using BIP158 block filters to mask your xpub address and Tor to mask your IP address.

So, if custody is an issue, I'd recommend to using Whirlpool via Sparrow. There's a great guide: https://sparrowwallet.com/docs/mixing-whirlpool.html

I would warn users again using Whirlpool since it creates "toxic change" that can be used for tracking future transactions and reveals common input ownership:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

However, these tracing tactics of common ownership and change outputs are solved by WabiSabi coinjoins.  Wasabi Wallet, Trezor, and BTCPay Server all support WabiSabi coinjoins.

[satscraper]

It is possible to mix coins through exchange ?

If the given exchange does not require the KYC procedure to go through out, why not. Even some dedicated mixers use coins acquired on exchanges to provide them to their customers, Look, for instance, what MixTum says:

 

/?__cf_chl_tk=_F56mok19pqON4zgspgvxyb5kHOkZMkWvYP4DPr1nrc-1693700957-0-gaNycGzNCbs]

 
Choosing this approach do not use  withdrawal address generated by   SPV wallet that was previously connected to 3^rd party server as more likely than not they already know it.  To preserve your privacy run your own node, For instance, when mixing my coins via exchange I'm using the following bond:  Passport2 (hardware wallet) - Sparrow (light client) - Bitcoin Core ( node). Passport2 secures receiving addresses, Sparrow insures good control of all relevant stuff (addresses, UTXOs, transactions, fee, etc) while Bitcoin Core  broadcasts/receives transactions.

[Pmalek]

That's not mixing. Sending TC wallet from one wallet to another and then from that wallet to another and then finally to the destination wallet. These transactions can be easily tracked even by a newbie like me. A simple understating and usage of explorers can get you track.

You can track the BTC amounts making their rounds, but you don't know the purposes of those transactions. You also don't know if the ownership has changed hands from User 1 to User 2, etc.

If you know a bitcoin address of your friend and you notice he sent the coins to another address, you don't know why he did unless he tells you. He may or may not still be in possession of those coins. The destination address might belong to him, but it could also belong to a different person. He could have:

- Moved his coins from address A to address B.
- Exchanged his coins from BTC to a different cryptocurrency.
- Paid someone for goods or services.
- Gotten hacked and had his BTC stolen.

Unless you know that the destination address also belongs to your friend, you might be tracking a different person altogether.   

[LoyceV]

Will the Wasabi work well if there is no concern about the agencies doing the chain analysis, as the motive is only to hide from family / friends?

It depends what you're hiding from: are you afraid they're going to rob you? Do they ask for money? Do they even know your current Bitcoin addresses?

If they know your addresses, sending your Bitcoin to an exchange is the perfect way to get plausible deniability of owning Bitcoin: "No, you can hit me all you want, but I sold my Bitcoins last month". If you withdraw them again, they won't know your new address. If this is your concern, it sounds like you need to move and few new friends.
If you use Wasabi, they won't know which Bitcoin address is yours anymore, but they'll know you still own the coins.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I would warn users again using Whirlpool since it creates "toxic change" that can be used for tracking future transactions and reveals common input ownership

That's why it's called "toxic", so you avoid consolidating it with the coinjoined inputs. In fact, in Sparrow, it's pretty much impossible from the GUI to create a transaction spending both the toxic change and the coinjoined inputs.

However, these tracing tactics of common ownership and change outputs are solved by WabiSabi coinjoins.  Wasabi Wallet, Trezor, and BTCPay Server all support WabiSabi coinjoins.

I would warn users on using Wasabi, as it's caught into being flawed software: https://twitter.com/wasabistats

If the given exchange does not require the KYC procedure to go through out, why not.

The answer is as simple as "because it isn't designed to do it". Exchanges share tons of stuff, which user owns which addresses, trading volumes, etc., with governments and chain analysis companies. As I've already shared, there's even a site[1] which takes as input an address and returns you to which exchange it belongs. It's also more expensive.

[1] https://www.walletexplorer.com/

[Kruw]

Will the Wasabi work well if there is no concern about the agencies doing the chain analysis, as the motive is only to hide from family / friends?

It depends what you're hiding from: are you afraid they're going to rob you? Do they ask for money? Do they even know your current Bitcoin addresses?

If they know your addresses, sending your Bitcoin to an exchange is the perfect way to get plausible deniability of owning Bitcoin: "No, you can hit me all you want, but I sold my Bitcoins last month". If you withdraw them again, they won't know your new address. If this is your concern, it sounds like you need to move and few new friends.
If you use Wasabi, they won't know which Bitcoin address is yours anymore, but they'll know you still own the coins.

How would they still know you have any coins when using Wasabi if they don't know which postmix addresses your coins are contained in?  There's no way to know whether you held them or spent them after coinjoining.

I would warn users again using Whirlpool since it creates "toxic change" that can be used for tracking future transactions and reveals common input ownership

That's why it's called "toxic", so you avoid consolidating it with the coinjoined inputs. In fact, in Sparrow, it's pretty much impossible from the GUI to create a transaction spending both the toxic change and the coinjoined inputs.

It links your transactions no matter which coin you consolidate it with:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

I would warn users on using Wasabi, as it's caught into being flawed software: https://twitter.com/wasabistats

Why are you still trying to spread this lie after you already found out that the "wasabistats" Twitter account is flagging remixes as false positive merges?  This was already decisively proven to be a hit job account: https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1642612625883164672

[o_e_l_e_o]

Why are you still trying to spread this lie after you already found out that the "wasabistats" Twitter account is flagging remixes as false positive merges?  This was already decisively proven to be a hit job account: https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1642612625883164672

You only have to read the rest of that Twitter thread to see your "decisive proof" is nothing of the sort. I also don't know why you continue to quote that post of yours when I've already pointed out several times that it fails to deanonymize a single output: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62413682#msg62413682.

Please try to confine your Wasabi spam to the appropriate thread.

[Kruw]

I also don't know why you continue to quote that post of yours when I've already pointed out several times that it fails to deanonymize a single output: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62413682#msg62413682.

I continue to quote the post where I traced the Whirlpool transaction you provided because people need to be aware of the transaction links created by Whirlpool coinjoins that can be avoided by using WabiSabi coinjoins.

Please try to confine your Wasabi spam to the appropriate thread.

This thread is about privacy, it is the appropriate thread.

[dkbit98]

If i deposit from my wallet BTC to the exchange and then withdraw them to another btc address, will my coins be tracked?

If you are using exchange that has no kyc verification than you can't be directly connected with coins you send and withdraw, especially if amount of coins is different, but be careful to use good address management and don't use same address multiple time.
There is a danger with if you are using centralized exchanges because they can always lock your account and ask for verification, but there are several good alternatives to avoid these (one eXch is in my sig).
Using dex exchanges like Bisq is also great for this purpose, maybe even atomic swaps and Lightning Network or other second layer solutions.


 

[satscraper]

If the given exchange does not require the KYC procedure to go through out, why not.

The answer is as simple as "because it isn't designed to do it". Exchanges share tons of stuff, which user owns which addresses, trading volumes, etc., with governments and chain analysis companies. As I've already shared, there's even a site[1] which takes as input an address and returns you to which exchange it belongs. It's also more expensive.
[1] https://www.walletexplorer.com/

Nice response from guy who proudly wears the signature relevant to mixer which uses exchanges to shuffle customer's coins  . If you could read Russian I would refer you to the real life case when user  used exchange to clear his coins he got from dedicated mixer. He had to do that because those "mixed" coins were refused to be accepted by   one of the service.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I continue to quote the post where I traced the Whirlpool transaction you provided because people need to be aware of the transaction links created by Whirlpool coinjoins that can be avoided by using WabiSabi coinjoins.

No. You're continuing to quote the post where an individual consciously decided to consolidate Whirlpool coinjoin toxic change with other toxic change. I have used Whirlpool with Sparrow, and I have never had my toxic coins consolidated with my coinjoined.

If the given exchange does not require the KYC procedure to go through out, why not.

The answer is as simple as "because it isn't designed to do it". Exchanges share tons of stuff, which user owns which addresses, trading volumes, etc., with governments and chain analysis companies. As I've already shared, there's even a site[1] which takes as input an address and returns you to which exchange it belongs. It's also more expensive.
[1] https://www.walletexplorer.com/

Nice response from guy who proudly wears the signature relevant to mixer which uses exchanges to shuffle customer's coins

What does the fact that I'm wearing a signature with MixTum has to do with me recommending people to not use exchanges as mixers as they aren't designed for that?

If you could read Russian I would refer you to the real life case when user  used exchange to clear his coins he got from dedicated mixer.

There are no "tainted coins". There are only tainted businesses. Ratimov uses a lot of exchanges which don't treat bitcoin as fungible. You shouldn't be using an anti-Bitcoin service in the first place.

[satscraper]

What does the fact that I'm wearing a signature with MixTum has to do with me recommending people to not use exchanges as mixers as they aren't designed for that?

In my understanding people who wear signature associated with a specific entity are essentially endorsing the services offered by that entity. MixTum openly acknowledges its utilization of coins from exchanges to deliver mixed coins to its clients. However, it appears that you hold a stance against incorporating exchanges into the mixing process started by individual saying exchanges are not mixers. It appears that  you primarily care about the  signboard but not a result.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Firstly, if someone is not very afraid for their privacy, using an exchange as a mixer is corny cheaper, easier and faster for an ordinary crypto user.

And sometimes it is unexpectedly pricey to use a centralized exchange, as it takes arbitrary commissions like "20,000 sat for withdrawal". And that implies the user does have an account already, otherwise it takes more time to create an account, deposit and withdraw than do it a la mixer.

Secondly, exchanges help clean up bitcoins for AML.

That's a concern only if you're using a centralized exchange beyond mixing. People who don't use them, don't buy the taint thing.

In this case, the exchange comes to the rescue, which bleaches bitcoins after the mixer.

How confident are you that money coming from an exchange will be deemed as "clean" by every other exchange? I wouldn't be so sure that an exchange can "come to the rescue" and make the bitcoins acceptable by everywhere, because the manner which chain analysis companies deem them as "clean" / "taint" is entirely subjective and can differentiate across their industry.

However, it appears that you hold a stance against incorporating exchanges into the mixing process started by individual saying exchanges are not mixers

I'm all in for mixing coins coming from exchanges. I'm against using exchanges as mixers.

[o_e_l_e_o]

You're continuing to quote the post where an individual consciously decided to consolidate Whirlpool coinjoin input with toxic change. I have used Whirlpool with Sparrow, and I have never had my toxic coins consolidated with my coinjoined.

The post doesn't even demonstrate that. It only demonstrates unmixed change being consolidated with other unmixed change.

If you know what you are doing, there is nothing wrong with this. I do this literally all the time. Let's say I withdraw 0.1 BTC from Exchange X and Whirlpool it. It creates some unmixed change. Next week I do the same thing. The week after, the same thing again. There is minimal privacy loss from consolidating those three unmixed change outputs together to feed back in to Whirlpool, since all three are already linked together and to my KYC data as held by Exchange X.

Samourai and Sparrow prevent you from consolidating unmixed change with coinjoined outputs, as you say. Not only that, but in the example Kruw keeps bleating on about, the unmixed change on P2WPKH addresses is consolidated with outputs on both P2PKH and P2SH addresses. The user in question has manually crafted these transactions and moved them between different wallets for signing, or has exported all the relevant private keys and imported them in to the same wallet.

This is absolutely not a case of Whirlpool being flawed or there being any privacy leaks at all. This is quite obviously a case of an advanced user who knows exactly what they are doing.

[BlackHatCoiner]

You're continuing to quote the post where an individual consciously decided to consolidate Whirlpool coinjoin input with toxic change.

Thanks. I must have misread. It would make more sense if he was talking about consolidating mixed with unmixed inputs. Consolidating unmixed with unmixed change, and deeming this as software flaw is another level of intelligence.

There are a lot of exchanges that ask for withdrawals of less than 20,000 Satoshi. In addition, it is strange for me that you pay attention to 20,000 satoshi when the same mixtum asks for 4% -5% + 0.0007 BTC.

Why is MixTum relevant? When I refer to mixers, I don't specifically refer to the one I carry in my signature. I refer to the best ones according to reputation, pricing, effectiveness and coinjoin or XMR.

The adoption we deserve. I have bitcoins, but they don't accept them from me, because these bitcoins do not pass some kind of fucking verification from a third party. All my life I dreamed of such crypto freedom.

So, pardon me, but the solution to this problem in your opinion is to buy the fucking verification and comply? All my life I dreamed of crypto as permissionless.

[o_e_l_e_o]

The adoption we deserve. I have bitcoins, but they don't accept them from me, because these bitcoins do not pass some kind of fucking verification from a third party. All my crypto life I "dreamed" of such crypto freedom.

Allow me to quote a post I made a year ago:

Here's an analogy:

I am a merchant. You want to buy some things from me. You try to pay with cash. I say "I cannot see the full history of this cash, so I refuse your money". So instead, you tap your debit card. I say "I cannot accept this money without knowing the full history of it". I demand access to your bank account so I can see where all your money comes from. You leave and come back with your bank statements, but I don't like what I see, so I refuse payment. You then try to pay with PayPal. I demand access to your PayPal account so I can see where all your money comes from. You unlock your PayPal account on your phone and hand it over for me to look at. This PayPal money looks OK to me, so I accept it. You then leave the shop and start telling all your friends "Make sure when you shop there you have all your bank statements with you so the merchant can look at them, and make sure none of your money comes from anywhere except your employer, since they can't trace those funds." Your friends all look at you like you are crazy, and then simply choose to shop with the merchant next door who doesn't do any of this nonsense.

Whenever this situation comes up, with the discussion of centralized exchanges and privacy, it always seems that the default position is "Sacrifice all your privacy and let people spy on you so that you can use a centralized exchange". In any other financial situation that would be seen as utterly crazy, as I've just shown above, but for some reason with bitcoin people just accept this nonsense? The problem here is not mixers, or coinjoins, or Monero, or any other privacy technique - the problem here is centralized exchanges. If you don't want a centralized exchange to seize your coins, then don't use a centralized exchange. There are plenty of decentralized exchanges to choose from.

The logical position when faced with entities which are stealing coins is not "I should bend over backwards and sacrifice everything to hopefully mean they don't steal my coins!", but rather to simply not use the entity which is stealing coins.

Most of the power of authoritarianism is freely given. In times like these, individuals think ahead about what a more repressive government will want, and then offer themselves without being asked.

If all bitcoin users, collectively, completely ceased to use and support any such exchange or other service which implemented such blacklists, then the whole provably nonsense concept of taint would simply cease to exist. The only reason that some coins can be deemed as tainted is because we continue to use services which fund the very entities who made up this bullshit.

Any time you come across an exchange or other service which makes you pass some kind of fucking verification, as you say, then A) stop using them and find an alternative, and B) encourage others to do the same as well. This is the only way bitcoin will actually give us the freedom we are looking for.

[Kruw]

I have used Whirlpool with Sparrow, and I have never had my toxic coins consolidated with my coinjoined.

Thank you for confirming my initial warning that toxic coins are created by using Whirlpool with Sparrow.