Wasabi Wallet - Total Privacy For Bitcoin

[Kruw]

Privacy is your ability to selectively reveal yourself to the world. - [Cyperpunk Manifesto]

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Official website ➥ https://wasabiwallet.io
Onion link ➥ http://wasabiukrxmkdgve5kynjztuovbg43uxcbcxn6y2okcrsg7gb6jdmbad.onion/
Open source code ➥ https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/
PGP (software verification guide) ➥ 6FB3 872B 5D42 292F 5992 0797 8563 4832 8949 861E
Discover coinjoin coordinators ➥ https://github.com/Kukks/wasabinostr

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Wasabi provides network level privacy
Other light wallets sacrifice your privacy in exchange for synchronization speed by leaking all of the addresses in your wallet to a third party server. This third party server also is able to see the IP address your wallet connects from, which can provide them even more data to tie your Bitcoin addresses to your identity.  

We live in an Orwellian surveillance society where your information is being used to typecast and manipulate you. Bitcoin projects are being pressured to collect more and more data, if possible. This is why Wasabi Wallet is programmed to be a zero-knowledge software. Developers can't collect any sensitive information about you. What you do with your Bitcoin is your business.

Wasabi innovates on the light wallet design and solves these privacy leaks by masking your wallet addresses with client side block filters, and masking your IP address with Tor. Although combining these two technologies this reduces the privacy footprint for receivers to a single Bitcoin address, these addresses are still visible on a public ledger, so another step must be taken to hide the origin of the coins you received from the destination you send them to, and vice versa. This traceability is broken by coinjoins.

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Wasabi provides blockchain level privacy
WabiSabi research paper (Ádám Ficsór, Yuval Kogman, Lucas Ontivero, and István András Seres): https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/206.pdf

Wasabi's most impressive privacy feature is the ability to participate in coinjoin transactions. A coinjoin combines your coins non-custodially into a bulk transaction with other users in order to make your Bitcoin history untraceable when viewed on the public blockchain. The outputs of a coinjoin can't be tracked to the inputs because the outputs created have identical clones with the *exact* same value. Even the coinjoin coordinator themselves cannot determine which inputs and outputs belong to each participant:

The whole WabiSabi protocol is a really complex beast which involves a lot of cryptography from Pedersen commitments, zk-proofs, balance proofs, range proofs, ownership proofs, a strobe construction around Keccak and others that play together to create the credentials system. The protocol involves the construction of http messages that have to be sent to the central coordinator in a randomized schedule under different Tor identities to guarantee the unlinkability of the participants' transactions against the central coordinator.

Here's an example of a Coinjoin transaction on mainnet with 400 inputs and 407 outputs: https://mempool.space/tx/d465033214fd2309dcce5a90c45fcaa788aa4394ee36debe07aad8d8a37907d2

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Cold storage interface
Wasabi also allows you to connect your USB hardware wallet such as BitBox02, Coldcard, Jade, Ledger, or Trezor.

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Reputation for innovation
Wasabi Wallet was awarded a share of Bitcointalk's longstanding coinjoin development bounty, along with JoinMarket:

Congratulations to the Wasabi and JoinMarket developers! JoinMarket pioneered a lot of CoinJoin science (and BTW, belcher wrote an excellent & comprehensive wiki article on privacy), while Wasabi is the first wallet that implements CoinJoin in both a highly-usable and sound way. As both a signer and a donor to the CoinJoin bounty fund, I'm thrilled that these two pieces of software exist!

For everyone looking to improve their privacy, I highly recommend checking out Wasabi, especially over centralized "mixers".

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Wasabi's social network channels:

                             

[Pmalek]

Try to stay on topic and avoid posting nonsense to avoid having your topic achieved and locked by the admin team again. It should be in your best interest.

Cold storage interface
If you initially set up your hardware wallet using Wasabi as the front end instead of the default Ledger Live or Trezor Suite apps, it will prevent your IP address and Bitcoin wallet addresses from being leaked to Ledger's & Trezor's servers.

On a serious note. How would this work?
You need Ledger Live during the onboarding process and initial setup. You need to install the crypto apps on the wallet. I guess the software already records everything it needs/wants at that stage. Trezors are shipped with no firmware installed on the devices, but I guess you can get all that from their GitHub. Can you install Ledger apps including the 3rd-party apps from their GitHub as well and set everything up through Wasabi?

[Kruw]

Try to stay on topic and avoid posting nonsense to avoid having your topic achieved and locked by the admin team again. It should be in your best interest.

The ridiculous petition was locked, I didn't start that topic.

On a serious note. How would this work?
You need Ledger Live during the onboarding process and initial setup. You need to install the crypto apps on the wallet. I guess the software already records everything it needs/wants at that stage. Trezors are shipped with no firmware installed on the devices, but I guess you can get all that from their GitHub. Can you install Ledger apps including the 3rd-party apps from their GitHub as well and set everything up through Wasabi?

I don't recommend Ledger generally since it's closed source, so you trust them completely.

[NotATether]

Try to stay on topic and avoid posting nonsense to avoid having your topic achieved and locked by the admin team again. It should be in your best interest.

To be fair, it was not a moderator or admin, the OP of the previous topic is still in a deranged mood and locking all his topics.

[Pmalek]

The ridiculous petition was locked, I didn't start that topic.

I wasn't talking about that one. It got achieved and locked a few days ago. I meant the Wasabi thread with over 50 pages. But I see now that the OP went on a locking and deletion spree for whatever reason. 

I don't recommend Ledger generally since it's closed source, so you trust them completely.

I am aware of that. You mentioned in your OP the initial setup going through Wasabi and I asked how and in what way? Has Wasabi created a tutorial for it?

To be fair, it was not a moderator or admin, the OP of the previous topic is still in a deranged mood and locking all his topics.

I think the petition thread was locked by the staff. The last post in it was from achow101 who told everyone to chill. After that it was locked but not achieved. Any idea what's going on with Symmetrick and why he is destroyig all of his threads?

[Kruw]

I am aware of that. You mentioned in your OP the initial setup going through Wasabi and I asked how and in what way? Has Wasabi created a tutorial for it?

I guess I can't say for certain because I've never used Ledger, I've only used Trezor and Coldcard.  Ledger claims that your xpub is never sent to their servers, but I think the 20 addresses within your gap limit is - https://support.ledger.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011069619-Extended-public-key-xPub-?docs=true

Thanks for the feedback.  I'll remove the claim from the OP since Ledger is closed source anyways and you have no guarantees about what they are doing with your private or public keys. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

Any idea what's going on with Symmetrick and why he is destroyig all of his threads?

Probably has to do with this: Should Ratimov aka Symmetrick be in DT1?. Let's not derail Wasabi's thread regarding that.

[Pmalek]

I guess I can't say for certain because I've never used Ledger, I've only used Trezor and Coldcard.

OK. Do you care to share some feedback about the initial onboarding process with a Trezor through Wasabi instead of the Trezor Suite?

Ledger claims that your xpub is never sent to their servers, but I think the 20 addresses within your gap limit is - https://support.ledger.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011069619-Extended-public-key-xPub-?docs=true

Ledger Live is open-source. Those who know how to could check that. I don't personally believe that Ledger or Trezor don't have knowledge of your master public keys and that those keys don't interact with their servers. At least with the Trezor Suite it can go through TOR. I don't think it's possible with LL. 

[ABCbits]

Reputation for innovation
Wasabi Wallet was awarded a share of Bitcointalk's longstanding coinjoin development bounty, along with JoinMarket:

Congratulations to the Wasabi and JoinMarket developers! JoinMarket pioneered a lot of CoinJoin science (and BTW, belcher wrote an excellent & comprehensive wiki article on privacy), while Wasabi is the first wallet that implements CoinJoin in both a highly-usable and sound way. As both a signer and a donor to the CoinJoin bounty fund, I'm thrilled that these two pieces of software exist!

Here are additional context about the bounty for other readers,
1. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=279249.msg2983911#msg2983911.
2. It's awarded when only Wasabi Wallet version 1 exist, before controversy of Wasabi Wallet/zkSNACKs exist.

[nopara73]

Wasabi earned the coinjoin bounty prior to the existence of its 2.0 version, which far exceeds what was seen in 1.0

[Kruw]

OK. Do you care to share some feedback about the initial onboarding process with a Trezor through Wasabi instead of the Trezor Suite?

Yes, the original text I wrote is now deprecated since Trezor has introduced native hardware wallet coinjoins directly through Suite earlier this year.  This separate coinjoin account in Suite uses a new xpub that only communicates with Tor and block filters, just like Wasabi does.

Ledger Live is open-source. Those who know how to could check that. I don't personally believe that Ledger or Trezor don't have knowledge of your master public keys and that those keys don't interact with their servers. At least with the Trezor Suite it can go through TOR. I don't think it's possible with LL.  

But Ledger's firmware is closed source, so you don't know if the key material was compromised before you even got your hands on the device.

[Kruw]

Ready for the coinjoin of the week? 30 BTC feels like a lot more than it used to... https://mempool.space/tx/f3d4ea873616b086959432f0b0797ca68ff7dacd5f4b8d27c707132b3dbb6c9e

Number of inputs: 333
Number of outputs: 326
Value: 30.54013805 BTC
Fee rate: 40.49 sats/vbyte
Input anonset: 3.78
Output anonset: 8.15

[Wind_FURY]

Kruw, nopara73, Wasabi, I have one question. It might currently not be a real concern, but it could be something of an issue if more and more people CoinJoin through Wasabi, and therefore with that, more and more "false positives" also happen.

How do we refute that an "alert" is a "false positive"? Because the blockchain analysis company could always claim that a "true positive" is proof of the reliability of the system, while a "false negative" could be used to claim that the company should set up tighter filters.

I believe that's something that the developers, and the community, could get together and work on.

[Kruw]

Kruw, nopara73, Wasabi, I have one question. It might currently not be a real concern, but it could be something of an issue if more and more people CoinJoin through Wasabi, and therefore with that, more and more "false positives" also happen.

How do we refute that an "alert" is a "false positive"? Because the blockchain analysis company could always claim that a "true positive" is proof of the reliability of the system, while a "false negative" could be used to claim that the company should set up tighter filters.

I believe that's something that the developers, and the community, could get together and work on.

I suppose you could always voluntarily disclose where/how funds were obtained if you think a false positive ban has occurred.  The ban might not be lifted, but this feedback may help indicate that wallet clustering heuristics are being applied too aggressively.

[NotATether]

I suppose you could always voluntarily disclose where/how funds were obtained if you think a false positive ban has occurred.  The ban might not be lifted, but this feedback may help indicate that wallet clustering heuristics are being applied too aggressively.

How can this information be fed into the clustering algorithm to make it more precise?

This might be one of the challenges that is impeding the development of the banning software, since I'm pretty sure you'd be feeding transaction chains into a neural network, and the only way to take this information into account would be by adjusting weights, but that's assuming the clustering is using NNs in the first place.

[DaveF]

This is not just about Wasabi but any service relying on TOR for security.
Just keep in mind, you are relying on the fact that the TOR exit node you are using is actually not malicious / monitoring what you are doing.

https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year

Just something to keep in the back of your head.

-Dave

[Kruw]

How can this information be fed into the clustering algorithm to make it more precise?

An exception would have to be entered manually, I would assume.

This might be one of the challenges that is impeding the development of the banning software, since I'm pretty sure you'd be feeding transaction chains into a neural network, and the only way to take this information into account would be by adjusting weights, but that's assuming the clustering is using NNs in the first place.

The most reliable heuristics in order are:

-Address reuse
-Common input consolidation
-Matching input script type to change script type
-Other matching change fingerprints (like version/nlocktime value, RBF flag, fees paid in sat/vbyte or in total sats) when all output scripts are the same

The less reliable ones would be:

-Round payment amount
-1 output transfers, which could be a self spend or a payment
-Matching origins/destinations

[ABCbits]

This is not just about Wasabi but any service relying on TOR for security.
Just keep in mind, you are relying on the fact that the TOR exit node you are using is actually not malicious / monitoring what you are doing.

https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year

Just something to keep in the back of your head.

-Dave

I don't see much relevance when AFAIK WabiSabi coordinator (run by zkSNACKs) use .onion address and Wasabi Wallet only connect to either your local node or someone else full node which also use .onion address. CMIIW.

[NotATether]

I don't see much relevance when AFAIK WabiSabi coordinator (run by zkSNACKs) use .onion address and Wasabi Wallet only connect to either your local node or someone else full node which also use .onion address. CMIIW.

The worst that can happen is censorship in the form of a Sybil attack, but nobody's going to be able to gather enough Tor exit nodes for carrying one out, because the Tor network keeps kicking them out. Besides, it's really only of interest to a nation state - career criminals see there's no money to be gained here and move on.

[Wind_FURY]

Kruw, nopara73, Wasabi, I have one question. It might currently not be a real concern, but it could be something of an issue if more and more people CoinJoin through Wasabi, and therefore with that, more and more "false positives" also happen.

How do we refute that an "alert" is a "false positive"? Because the blockchain analysis company could always claim that a "true positive" is proof of the reliability of the system, while a "false negative" could be used to claim that the company should set up tighter filters.

I believe that's something that the developers, and the community, could get together and work on.

I suppose you could always voluntarily disclose where/how funds were obtained if you think a false positive ban has occurred.  The ban might not be lifted, but this feedback may help indicate that wallet clustering heuristics are being applied too aggressively.

I was afraid that you might say that, but it could be a start and raise the topic that there SHOULD be challengeability, or else we're merely going to follow their rules.

Another question. Is setting up a coordinator difficult? Or could anyone, a non-coder, who was basic technical knowledge, and who could compile and troubleshoot be enough to set up and install one?

Plus the documents and the readme doesn't have much information on compiling/installing/configuring one. Perhaps it's time to encourage the BitcoinTalk community to run and boot-strap their own coordinators?