Wasabi Wallet - Total Privacy For Bitcoin

[Kruw]

I don't understand why you are still arguing about this issue...
Kruw was literally calling everyone to be a scammer (and still doing it) without providing a single proof, and now karma got him as he is officially accused as being a criminal for working with North Korean hackers.

Here's the proof of Chipmixer scamming:

~snip~
Even my chips which I had in chipmixer service for which they claimed to "delete private" keys after 7 days or whatever, were seized/transfered.
and these transactions took place good 3 months ago.

It seems that you are right, whoever had vouchers or chips was left without them. I checked some old wallets older than 1 year that only contained chips from CM, and they were all emptied. Yes, it's a bit stupid that I didn't spend them, but honestly I forgot about a few $ in those old wallets. It's really strange that it wasn't all deleted, but now we at least know where even 7GB of data came from.

Can confirm, they stole a chip of mine a friend of mine that he hadn't yet spent. :/ Really fucking bad practice of ChipMixer to keep private keys, not gonna lie.
It was still there today morning and even when the news broke here; I he had not considered that private keys may have been backed up on CM servers to be honest.

[btc-freedom-money]

How to turn off tor after closing wasabi wallet?
It says somewhere in wasabi docs that tor keeps running after shutting down wasabi because otherwise you could get deanonymized if you close the tor route immediately after done with wasabi and start one when opening your wallet.
It just isn't enough information about it in the docs. But what if I want to be able to use internet without tor? And only want wasabi to use tor?

[lontivero]

How to turn off tor after closing wasabi wallet?

Go to Settings and switch the Terminate Tor On Exit.

But what if I want to be able to use internet without tor? And only want wasabi to use tor?

Tor doesn't prevent you from using internet without Tor at all.

[Kruw]

Congratulations to Opencoordinator who broke their coinjoin size record yesterday with this 88 input transaction - https://mempool.space/tx/83a3a998be8d74688ea8d04a5020b9c255b412a61aadbd6c8ea28ef8060198a7

[JollyGood]

Open Coordinator has started to increase the number of coins being processed. Kruw coordinator seems to be receiving smaller amounts from the 1000+ it regularly used to process but nevertheless 300+ are still huge numbers.

Wasabi Wallet allows users to select a coordinator of their choice but Ginger Wallet forces users to use their coordinator therefore I am not surprised Ginger Wallet is on zero. Even if they are raising their free coinjoin threshold, the fact remains they will charge you 0.3% for using their service beyond the free limits.

[Forsyth Jones]

-

Furthermore, I confess that I had several sync issues with my GingerWallet balance. Besides, my PC wouldn't allow me to install/run both software (Ginger and Wasabi) simultaneously, and there was some kind of conflict.

I had to uninstall Gingerwallet to install Wasabi. I really liked the idea of 2FA (Ginger) as an added security feature, but having my balance without sync issues made me switch back to Wasabi.

An important note is that since I already had a wallet created with GingerWallet, when I tried to open the same wallet using Wasabi, it was unable to open it, indicating the two wallet formats are incompatible between the two software. I had to re-enter my hotwallet's seed phrase in Wasabi.

As soon as I can, I'll test Ginger Wallet again and see if there are any improvements.

[JollyGood]

This is an interesting situation you found yourself in because it should not happen the way you are describing.

I also at one stage tested both Ginger Wallet and Wasabi Wallet after reading a post stating they could be used to open the same wallet but not used simultaneously but I did not experience the issues you faced. When I ran Ginger Wallet it opened the correct wallet and when I closed it in order to run Wasabi Wallet, it opened the same/correct wallet too. The only rule to remember was they could not simultaneously.

I cannot be sure of the exact date but I tested this last year, maybe something has changed in the latest releases that caused the problem.

Furthermore, I confess that I had several sync issues with my GingerWallet balance. Besides, my PC wouldn't allow me to install/run both software (Ginger and Wasabi) simultaneously, and there was some kind of conflict.

I had to uninstall Gingerwallet to install Wasabi. I really liked the idea of 2FA (Ginger) as an added security feature, but having my balance without sync issues made me switch back to Wasabi.

An important note is that since I already had a wallet created with GingerWallet, when I tried to open the same wallet using Wasabi, it was unable to open it, indicating the two wallet formats are incompatible between the two software. I had to re-enter my hotwallet's seed phrase in Wasabi.

As soon as I can, I'll test Ginger Wallet again and see if there are any improvements.

[nigerianprince420]

How do I create a Taproot wallet on Wasabi using Trezor? This has been an open issue for a long time but I don’t think anything has been done about it.
https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/issues/13601

[Forsyth Jones]

How do I create a Taproot wallet on Wasabi using Trezor? This has been an open issue for a long time but I don’t think anything has been done about it.
https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/issues/13601

Unfortunately, on both Wasabi and Ginger (its fork), taproot addresses are only available for hotwallets, not for hardware wallets connected to Wasabi.

I can't verify this for you right now, but it's been like this since the last time I checked.

If you are looking for a way to use taproot addresses in your hardware wallet using third-party wallets as reliable as Wasabi, I recommend Sparrow Wallet.

Depending on the brand of your hardware wallet, most reputable hardware wallets provide support for Taproot through their official clients (Trezor suite, etc).

I'm not sure, but if you already have funds in Taproot addresses on a hardware wallet, Wasabi will display the balance, the only difference is that it doesn't yet support receiving to Taproot addresses, could someone confirm this for me?

[Miramax12]

This is an interesting situation you found yourself in because it should not happen the way you are describing.

I also at one stage tested both Ginger Wallet and Wasabi Wallet after reading a post stating they could be used to open the same wallet but not used simultaneously but I did not experience the issues you faced. When I ran Ginger Wallet it opened the correct wallet and when I closed it in order to run Wasabi Wallet, it opened the same/correct wallet too. The only rule to remember was they could not simultaneously.

I cannot be sure of the exact date but I tested this last year, maybe something has changed in the latest releases that caused the problem.

Furthermore, I confess that I had several sync issues with my GingerWallet balance. Besides, my PC wouldn't allow me to install/run both software (Ginger and Wasabi) simultaneously, and there was some kind of conflict.

I had to uninstall Gingerwallet to install Wasabi. I really liked the idea of 2FA (Ginger) as an added security feature, but having my balance without sync issues made me switch back to Wasabi.

An important note is that since I already had a wallet created with GingerWallet, when I tried to open the same wallet using Wasabi, it was unable to open it, indicating the two wallet formats are incompatible between the two software. I had to re-enter my hotwallet's seed phrase in Wasabi.

As soon as I can, I'll test Ginger Wallet again and see if there are any improvements.

Thanks for sharing your experience. It's interesting how differently the setup behaved on your end compared to what I encountered.
When I tested Ginger and Wasabi, I made sure not to run them simultaneously either, but somehow I still faced syncing issues and a conflict during installation could be due to OS-specific quirks or even differences in software versions, like you mentioned.
The incompatibility between wallet formats caught me off guard too. Re-entering the seed in Wasabi worked, but it was a reminder that even subtle backend differences can lead to unexpected behavior.
Definitely curious to see if newer updates have improved the Ginger Wallet experience. If you get around to testing it again before I do, I’d appreciate your insight

[Kruw]

Check out Wasabi's new video guide! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tKwGkR3EcJY

Here's another new video guide 

https://youtu.be/fsAUhFr1VXU

[Wind_FURY]

I was browsing through the "Crypto Tracing Handbook" and I found this,

Case 2: Wasabi Coinjoin Analysis

(1) Background
A whale’s wallet private key was leaked and the funds were stolen, with the stolen assets moved into Wasabi CoinJoin. The affected user sought assistance from the MistTrack team. MistTrack conducted withdrawal analysis on the stolen funds mixed into Wasabi CoinJoin, successfully tracking and recovering the flow of the funds. Subsequently, the hacker attempted cross-chain transfers. MistTrack identified historical traces of the hacker’s addresses moving funds to exchanges and assisted law enforcement in contacting the exchanges to request evidence and apply risk controls on the relevant accounts. Later, as the hacker further transferred stolen funds to exchange-related accounts, part of the stolen funds was successfully frozen.

https://github.com/slowmist/Crypto-Asset-Tracing-Handbook/blob/main/README_EN.md#case-2-wasabi-coinjoin-analysis

This post is not a criticism towards Wasabi, I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable. If he used the Lightning Network as another "layer of privacy", would SlowMist entirely have no way of knowing what addresses those UTXOs went once they enter LN?

[lontivero]

I was browsing through the "Crypto Tracing Handbook" and I found this,

Case 2: Wasabi Coinjoin Analysis

(1) Background
A whale’s wallet private key was leaked and the funds were stolen, with the stolen assets moved into Wasabi CoinJoin. The affected user sought assistance from the MistTrack team. MistTrack conducted withdrawal analysis on the stolen funds mixed into Wasabi CoinJoin, successfully tracking and recovering the flow of the funds. Subsequently, the hacker attempted cross-chain transfers. MistTrack identified historical traces of the hacker’s addresses moving funds to exchanges and assisted law enforcement in contacting the exchanges to request evidence and apply risk controls on the relevant accounts. Later, as the hacker further transferred stolen funds to exchange-related accounts, part of the stolen funds was successfully frozen.

https://github.com/slowmist/Crypto-Asset-Tracing-Handbook/blob/main/README_EN.md#case-2-wasabi-coinjoin-analysis

This post is not a criticism towards Wasabi, I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable. If he used the Lightning Network as another "layer of privacy", would SlowMist entirely have no way of knowing what addresses those UTXOs went once they enter LN?

That document doesn't provide any proof of their claim; it is a "just trust me, bro" pamphlet, in my opinion.

I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable.

You are asking what else could have be done to escape with the stolen money. Are you stupid or what? 

[Wind_FURY]

I was browsing through the "Crypto Tracing Handbook" and I found this,

Case 2: Wasabi Coinjoin Analysis

(1) Background
A whale’s wallet private key was leaked and the funds were stolen, with the stolen assets moved into Wasabi CoinJoin. The affected user sought assistance from the MistTrack team. MistTrack conducted withdrawal analysis on the stolen funds mixed into Wasabi CoinJoin, successfully tracking and recovering the flow of the funds. Subsequently, the hacker attempted cross-chain transfers. MistTrack identified historical traces of the hacker’s addresses moving funds to exchanges and assisted law enforcement in contacting the exchanges to request evidence and apply risk controls on the relevant accounts. Later, as the hacker further transferred stolen funds to exchange-related accounts, part of the stolen funds was successfully frozen.

https://github.com/slowmist/Crypto-Asset-Tracing-Handbook/blob/main/README_EN.md#case-2-wasabi-coinjoin-analysis

This post is not a criticism towards Wasabi, I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable. If he used the Lightning Network as another "layer of privacy", would SlowMist entirely have no way of knowing what addresses those UTXOs went once they enter LN?

That document doesn't provide any proof of their claim; it is a "just trust me, bro" pamphlet, in my opinion.

👍

You're right. I'll do more research on it.

I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable.

You are asking what else could have be done to escape with the stolen money. Are you stupid or what?  

 

Ser, wanting the hacker to get away with the stolen money is NOT the point. Assuming that SlowMist DID trace those transactions, then that probably means that other user transactions that used CoinJoin could probably be traced too, no?

The context is, what else can users, in general, do to make their transactions harder to trace?

[lontivero]

(sic)  Assuming that SlowMist DID trace those transactions, then that probably means that other user transactions that used CoinJoin could probably be traced too, no?

I assume that SlowMist did not trace anything because otherwise they would have used that case to prove the entire world how good they are with a detailed article, blog post, video or any other ways to bust their reputation. Instead the wrote: "Case of study #2 - Tracing Wasabi coinjoins: we did it, believe us. That's all, folks"

[Wind_FURY]

(sic)  Assuming that SlowMist DID trace those transactions, then that probably means that other user transactions that used CoinJoin could probably be traced too, no?

I assume that SlowMist did not trace anything because otherwise they would have used that case to prove the entire world how good they are with a detailed article, blog post, video or any other ways to bust their reputation. Instead the wrote: "Case of study #2 - Tracing Wasabi coinjoins: we did it, believe us. That's all, folks"

OK that's another discussion for another topic, and the main question still is hanging. - Can the Lighting Network provide an extra layer of privacy as a safety measure for users "in case" their CoinJoins can be traced?

I'm merely asking that question ser. I'm not forcing an issue whether SlowMist truly traced those transactions. That's for them to show the data for everyone to verify. No data, then it would be safe to assume that they didn't trace it, like you posted.

[Kruw]

New version! Wasabi Wallet v2.7.0 is a stabilization release that not only strengthens reliability but also brings a fresh look and smoother performance.

🟠 Enhanced Bitcoin Node Integration

Bitcoin node connectivity is now more seamless. RPC endpoint handling has been refined for smoother setup, with support for onion-service RPC interfaces.

Additionally, Wasabi no longer bundles bitcoind binaries, while block downloading has been simplified and made more dependable.

🎨 Refreshed UI with Icons & Animations

The interface has been given a polished update. Subtle animations and a balanced color scheme breathe new life into Wasabi’s design, making it both cleaner and less aggressive.

⚙️ Dedicated Config Files Per Network

Each network Mainnet, Testnet4, and Regtest — now has its own independent configuration file. Switching to test networks is easier and your preferences are always preserved.

🤯 Stronger & Smarter Coordinators

Coordinators are automatically published as onion services right out of the box: no manual Tor setup needed. Coordinators can now also run on pruned nodes in blocksonly mode.

Plus, fallback fee rate providers were implemented (mempool.space and blockstream.info), ensuring accurate fee estimates, even if your node can’t provide them.

🛠️ Refinements & Fixes

    Full-RBF by default – All transactions are treated as replaceable.
    Resilient HTTP communication – Smarter retry handling makes connections sturdier.
    Seed recovery fixes – Annoying typing issues are resolved.
    Sharper fee estimations – Precise decimal calculations with no rounding loss.
    NBitcoin updated to 8.0.14 – Latest Bitcoin protocol improvements included.
    Clearer terminology – “Backend” is now called “Indexer.”
    Lean codebase – Legacy components like TurboSync and BlockNotifier removed.
    Safer Coinjoin handling – Excluded Coins can only be changed when Coinjoin is paused.
    Donation Button removed from Main Screen – The button is gone, but donations are still possible via the search bar.
    Conflux by default - Better Tor configuration for improved connectivity.

[ABCbits]

I was browsing through the "Crypto Tracing Handbook" and I found this,

Case 2: Wasabi Coinjoin Analysis

(1) Background
A whale’s wallet private key was leaked and the funds were stolen, with the stolen assets moved into Wasabi CoinJoin. The affected user sought assistance from the MistTrack team. MistTrack conducted withdrawal analysis on the stolen funds mixed into Wasabi CoinJoin, successfully tracking and recovering the flow of the funds. Subsequently, the hacker attempted cross-chain transfers. MistTrack identified historical traces of the hacker’s addresses moving funds to exchanges and assisted law enforcement in contacting the exchanges to request evidence and apply risk controls on the relevant accounts. Later, as the hacker further transferred stolen funds to exchange-related accounts, part of the stolen funds was successfully frozen.

https://github.com/slowmist/Crypto-Asset-Tracing-Handbook/blob/main/README_EN.md#case-2-wasabi-coinjoin-analysis

This post is not a criticism towards Wasabi, I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable. If he used the Lightning Network as another "layer of privacy", would SlowMist entirely have no way of knowing what addresses those UTXOs went once they enter LN?

FWIW, CoinJoin on Wasabi Wallet 1.x create output with ~0.1BTC amount. If anyone make LN channel with such amount, it would stand out. I also notice they show 2 image that shows tracking/clustering visualization, but it has low resolution nobody can verify it.

[Wind_FURY]

I was browsing through the "Crypto Tracing Handbook" and I found this,

Case 2: Wasabi Coinjoin Analysis

(1) Background
A whale’s wallet private key was leaked and the funds were stolen, with the stolen assets moved into Wasabi CoinJoin. The affected user sought assistance from the MistTrack team. MistTrack conducted withdrawal analysis on the stolen funds mixed into Wasabi CoinJoin, successfully tracking and recovering the flow of the funds. Subsequently, the hacker attempted cross-chain transfers. MistTrack identified historical traces of the hacker’s addresses moving funds to exchanges and assisted law enforcement in contacting the exchanges to request evidence and apply risk controls on the relevant accounts. Later, as the hacker further transferred stolen funds to exchange-related accounts, part of the stolen funds was successfully frozen.

https://github.com/slowmist/Crypto-Asset-Tracing-Handbook/blob/main/README_EN.md#case-2-wasabi-coinjoin-analysis

This post is not a criticism towards Wasabi, I merely want to know what more the hacker could have done to make his/her transactions more untraceable. If he used the Lightning Network as another "layer of privacy", would SlowMist entirely have no way of knowing what addresses those UTXOs went once they enter LN?

FWIW, CoinJoin on Wasabi Wallet 1.x create output with ~0.1BTC amount. If anyone make LN channel with such amount, it would stand out. I also notice they show 2 image that shows tracking/clustering visualization, but it has low resolution nobody can verify it.

But who would run CoinJoin in Wasabi Wallet 1.x if he/she truly cared about privacy. Definitely he/she would run Wasabi Wallet 2.x, no?

Plus I'm not talking about opening a direct channel to himself/herself. It's merely to use two different custodial Lightning wallets from different builders and sending a transaction to himself/herself from one wallet to the other wallet.

[NotATether]

FWIW, CoinJoin on Wasabi Wallet 1.x create output with ~0.1BTC amount. If anyone make LN channel with such amount, it would stand out. I also notice they show 2 image that shows tracking/clustering visualization, but it has low resolution nobody can verify it.

But who would run CoinJoin in Wasabi Wallet 1.x if he/she truly cared about privacy. Definitely he/she would run Wasabi Wallet 2.x, no?

Plus I'm not talking about opening a direct channel to himself/herself. It's merely to use two different custodial Lightning wallets from different builders and sending a transaction to himself/herself from one wallet to the other wallet.

0.1BTC outputs with the current price seems like an awful lot of money to condense in a single output. In my opinion, having the ability to create 0.01BTC outputs would be a helpful addition, but understandably, if it's not already possible today then I don't think it will be considered for a while. Because I don't think zkSNACKs is working on a newer version of WabiSabi anytime soon.