Wasabi Wallet - Total Privacy For Bitcoin

[Kruw]

Why not just make every client have an encrypted indexer?

Wasabi is a light client, you need a full node to build an indexer.

(Unless I'm misunderstanding your post, the rest of the context confuses me)

[NotATether]

Why not just make every client have an encrypted indexer?

Wasabi is a light client, you need a full node to build an indexer.

(Unless I'm misunderstanding your post, the rest of the context confuses me)

Basically I'm assuming that the output of an indexer is just a list of silent payment addresses that it is aware of, along with some supplementary metadata.

The rest of the post is just a design idea on how to encrypt that list so that it can be saved on to light clients without compromising privacy.

[Kruw]

Bump.

[alani123]

I kinda understand why so many Devs supporting bitcoin's decentralisation quit or disappear from the public eye.

Here's some DeFi idiots trying to frame wasabi wallet as supposedly being implicated in DPRK hacks.



 These defi idiots want to ruin decentralisation for everyone.

[Coinjoiner21]

It is not inherently bad to publicly post your analysis.  Chain analysis companies already know those bitcoin have been coinjoined through Kruw's coordinator. 

Bitcoin privacy should not be at stake just because one entity ever might shutdown.  God willing, future releases of Wasabi Wallet will come with a coordinator list that allows you to select any coordinator advertised over Nostr, without leaving the app.  I am working on this.

[BlackHatCoiner]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

[JollyGood]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

I have a question about this matter. Regarding de-anonymising people based on timing patterns (as you have stated), how is the de-anonymising process affected if coinjoin settings are changed to increase or enhance privacy thus raising the anonymity score from the default settings.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

Basically, does increasing the anonymity score have any effect on the de-anonymising process at all or is your suggestion about users randomly scheduling coinjoins a better solution?

[lontivero]

Whoever says that Wasabi can be deanonymized is laying. And to prove you this is true, I offer anyone to participate with a coin in only one round and then you have to tell me which outputs belong to me, in other words, you have to track my coin. I don't need tens, hundreds or thousands of rounds, just one.

There had been many challenges like this before and nobody have never accepted them, why? because they are not fools, they think that you are a fool. Many have offered significant amounts of money for those who track Wasabi but even tho, nobody have never accepted it, ever.

* https://x.com/ob_hodl/status/1300429481711153152
* https://x.com/snaxion/status/1642337824820305922
* https://x.com/Kruwed/status/1300635613037813761

Of course these challenges are from poor community members, if you can track Wasabi then you could do a lot of money selling that service.

[FinneysTrueVision]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

On Kruw’s coordinator there are only about 1 or 2 coinjoins per hour. If two forum users get paid at the same time because they are with the same manager, and they each open their wallets soon after, within an hour of each other, chances are they are occasionally going to participate in the same or adjacent rounds. It wouldn’t necessarily mean they are the same person. You would have to consider other factors to make that determination.

Regardless, somebody exposing their alt account(s) can only happen if there is user error. It’s not something that is entirely preventable by simply using Wasabi Wallet.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I have a question about this matter. Regarding de-anonymising people based on timing patterns (as you have stated), how is the de-anonymising process affected if coinjoin settings are changed to increase or enhance privacy thus raising the anonymity score from the default settings.

Wasabi comes with a toggle setting that is enabled by default, and allows the wallet to coinjoin only up to 1 non-private input in each coinjoin. A non-private input is one that has never joined a coinjoin round before. This is enabled so that you do not mix separate identities into one coinjoin.

Basically, does increasing the anonymity score have any effect on the de-anonymising process at all or is your suggestion about users randomly scheduling coinjoins a better solution?

My suggestion is simply to randomly schedule when each non-private input gets coinjoined, so that there is no timing correlation between many non-private inputs. Being able to see they coinjoin at around the same time is very telling.

Whoever says that Wasabi can be deanonymized is laying. And to prove you this is true, I offer anyone to participate with a coin in only one round and then you have to tell me which outputs belong to me, in other words, you have to track my coin. I don't need tens, hundreds or thousands of rounds, just one.

You must have misunderstood. I didn't say I can track your coin once coinjoined. I said, given that Alice and Bob, two public identities, coinjoin at around the same time, there is strong timing correlation they are the same person. This is irrelevant to where their coins go after.

Regardless, somebody exposing their alt account(s) can only happen if there is user error. It’s not something that is entirely preventable by simply using Wasabi Wallet.

This is completely beyond having an alt-account. There are far too many activities an Internet user might do to make money.