Reports about wallet-draining by Ledger users. Total losses $86M+

[ESG]

So the scenario is not a nonsense

Sorry, no. You can't take a scenario which is nonsense and compare it to different credible scenarios that have some superficial similarities and say that that validates the nonsense scenario.

I agree that any theory cannot be accepted as true simply because some similarity are found. Rather than dismissing this scenario outright we need to determine which of its assumption cannot be justified. This incident shows that risk of supply chain tampering and hidden hardware implant should be taken seriously. Ledger itself has confirmed that at least one affected device has an implant. However conclusion that all reseller, all device or entire Ledger ecosystem is compromised does not come from there.

I think we need to evaluate each claim individually and determine whether available evidence actually supports it. Any credible incident does not prove any other theory by itself. But that certainly give new weight to question of whether similar attack vector is actually possible.

   %)$=

 -I'm glad they made these workarounds to steal secret keys.

 Imagine if it was like the #pagers, they could be exploding!

 That is, there is no risk to life yet!

#*2024 Lebanon electronic device attacks

  

[philipma1957]

So the scenario is not a nonsense

Sorry, no. You can't take a scenario which is nonsense and compare it to different credible scenarios that have some superficial similarities and say that that validates the nonsense scenario.

I agree that any theory cannot be accepted as true simply because some similarity are found. Rather than dismissing this scenario outright we need to determine which of its assumption cannot be justified. This incident shows that risk of supply chain tampering and hidden hardware implant should be taken seriously. Ledger itself has confirmed that at least one affected device has an implant. However conclusion that all reseller, all device or entire Ledger ecosystem is compromised does not come from there.

I think we need to evaluate each claim individually and determine whether available evidence actually supports it. Any credible incident does not prove any other theory by itself. But that certainly give new weight to question of whether similar attack vector is actually possible.

   %)$=

 -I'm glad they made these workarounds to steal secret keys.

 Imagine if it was like the pagers, they could be exploding!

 That is, there is no risk to life yet!
   

I would love to be critical here, but yeah I could see that happening.

[ESG]

_~_
I would love to be critical here, but yeah I could see that happening.

*  there were thousands of pagers and hundreds of walk-talks, and they were modified directly in the factory....,

 yes I also see this possibility, minimal, but there is the possibility, of course, I would never like to see this happen, but, if it happened, first, they would steal the credentials that need it, and then they would blow up the HW and leave no trace, unless the owner of the HW is not hit in the explosion, and has the sk to track if they were stolen...

but I can't imagine anyone wanting to do that, and what would be the reason, and there are also several contradictions, they would have to invent a type of c4 that is not sniffable and or traceable to be able to go through customs and etc,

well, I hope I don't see that happen, and much less am I giving anyone an idea to do that...

for God's sake...

[Just Say]

It appears Ledger is still in denial that this scandal is much larger than it first seemed. They may be trying to contain a much more serious and larger backlash.

This person has already confirmed that Ledger supply chains have been damaged or compromised in Southeast Asia as well as in Europe. Actually I noticed that this person bought a second device today from another branch of the mediamarkt and it again detected spyware, even his second device was found to be damaged or tampered with in exactly the same way as the previous one and appeared to have the exact same additions or modifications such as an extra cable and an LTE module.

Therefore, it appears that this issue is likely to affect the Ledger inventory of MediaMarkt and Saturn stores (which consists of over 1000 stores in 11 countries) across Europe. Indeed, it seems that these devices should not be purchased except from official Ledger stores because if you purchase these devices from any source other than the official Ledger store, they should be thoroughly tested.



https://x.com/0xJohannes_/status/2109634513957527974

Here is the video proof, fresh device, directly from the store, video quality is kinda bad, sorry

[OmegaStarScream]

-snip-

I was just reading that on X. Insane if true. You would think Ledger would take the time to investigate this further instead of just referring everyone to their "update" tweet after the user's first claim.

And if both MediaMarkt and CryptoBillis are affected, they might as well start investigating their other resellers too.

[joker_josue]

And if both MediaMarkt and CryptoBillis are affected, they might as well start investigating their other resellers too.

Or maybe investigate some middleman.
Someone who has taken lots of equipment to those stores or regions of the world.




However, has anyone reverse-engineered to try to locate where the esim is sending the information?

I haven't read anything about it yet, bad it may have escaped me.

[NABiT]

Strange that the scales I used to weigh physical coins with might come in handy again...

[promise444c5]

It looks plausible to buy a device, compromise it, and return it to the shop for a refund.

That’s because they knew the store will restock it back.. but why restock what’s been returned as a defective product, that’s probably the only convincing complaint that can be attached to get a refund .
CryptoBilis:

One-to-One Replacement Warranty service contract provides for the replacement of the Device purchased by you if found to be defective during the term subscribed from the date of purchase. A 3 month 1-to-1 warranty is provided by default for all purchases. When the Device failure occurs due to an electrical, screen or mechanical defect, you will receive a brand-new replacement device of like kind, quality, and value. Once the Device has been replaced, the Contract will automatically terminate.

I know Mediamarkt should similar policy..

So the question is who’s reviewing this product? Aren’t they supposed to be sent to Ledger instead.

Ledger or not, how  did they miss the implant or they never opened it before restocking.. [what should we call that if that’s the case]

Ledger told authorized resellers never to restock returned products, and urged buyers to avoid unauthorized sellers.

lol

[OgNasty]

Strange that the scales I used to weigh physical coins with might come in handy again...

I know a guy.

These hacks have been proven to not be confined to ledgers or a single country. Shops all around the world have now been discovered to be putting these chips in all sorts of hardware wallets to sell in shops around the world. I have never and will never touch a hardware wallet. Others should probably do the same.

[Dogedegen]

This is not a true comparison and your claim that the brand is done is false. Ledger has nothing to do with this case

They could have added anti-tamper measures. Instead, I found this card in my Ledger box years ago:

Considering the number of devices involved, I would have expected many alarm bells if the software could detect the tampered hardware. So my guess it it couldn't find it.

When I bought a Trezor, it came with many anti-tamper measures, up to annoying stickers that leave hard to remove sticker residu. But it helps improve the device's security.

That is a good example, and I don't understand why they could not have just left them there too. But I don't think that anti tamper stickers prevent this kind of thing. It makes it just harder, as we have seen the anti tamper checks on the hardware in this case have failed too. I don't think there is an anti tamper sticker that can not be bypassed too, and that is my concern. I am looking for a measure or method that would make this completely impossible and that would guarantee the customer that their hardware wallet is safe, besides the option to fully open the device which is not an option for general sales.

Followed the link and eventually ended up reading through a lot of comments .
The owner got the device from mediamarkt and AFAIK, that store is an official reseller in Austria,Germany,Italy and Spain. Apparently, it seems the owner got it from a physical sore.

It looks plausible to buy a device, compromise it, and return it to the shop for a refund.

Which puts back the blame at the merchants if this is how the devices got into the supply chain, but we still don't know the full extent of the situation?

Weight checking will never provide protection. An attacker can simply grind down the inner walls of the case, making them thinner. This will provide a ground buffer for their chips.

PoW - Proof of Weight  

For the future yeah, but for the current case I really doubt that the attackers thought about something like this. Usually they design them with limited time in mind because otherwise they have an increased chance of discovery before doing something significant. And anyway if this attack was discovered, there is no good method to fix the situation with the public before it alerts the attacker to the discovery.

[Meuserna]

This is not a true comparison and your claim that the brand is done is false. Ledger has nothing to do with this case

They could have added anti-tamper measures. Instead, I found this card in my Ledger box years ago:

Considering the number of devices involved, I would have expected many alarm bells if the software could detect the tampered hardware. So my guess it it couldn't find it.

When I bought a Trezor, it came with many anti-tamper measures, up to annoying stickers that leave hard to remove sticker residu. But it helps improve the device's security.

That, right there? That's game over. That picture is a mic-drop, except the mic was dropped on a landmine. BOOM.

Ledger falsely stated in writing that their devices offered a level of security capability which the devices were not capable of delivering. And, because of that, Ledger customers are being robbed. Ledger printed their false statement of security capability on the box as if was a fact. It's right there, in writing, on the box.

Brutal.

Anyone who makes apologies for Ledger or attempts any form of whataboutism is not serious about Bitcoin self custody.

[alexrossi]

However, has anyone reverse-engineered to try to locate where the esim is sending the information?

I haven't read anything about it yet, bad it may have escaped me.

Problem is: if the attacker is prepared enough the esim are going to be 100% prepaid anonymous (they can even be bought with crypto with instant activation), and I can imagine that the endpoint for the seed collection will be a disposable VPS with useless logs (tor or other kind of anonymised access)

[DireWolfM14]

Speaking of self custody...

I wonder if there is a globalist (i.e. world central bank) conspiracy to make self custody as scary as possible.  First it was a little known company; CoinKite that took the hits.  Now, we have one of the largest (if not the largest,) hardware wallet manufacturer getting raked.  This looks like too big of a deal to pin on one or two medium sized retailers.

Certainly banks and governments have a vested interest in preventing self custody.  Central exchanges also have a vested interest in limiting it.  With investment banks adopting ETFs and Coinbase's plans to add stocks to their trading platform, the lines between fiduciaries and CEX are quickly starting to blur anyway.  For years they tried to scare us away from bitcoin, but that didn't work.  Could they now be trying to scare us away from self custody?  Self custody limits their control and knowledge of what we have.  It makes it harder to monitor out money's movements, difficult to tax us, and impossible to control our private transactions.

Didn't Europe recently enact regulations that require users to prove they own the address before moving funds from CEXs to private addresses?  Will governments soon attempt to ban the practice all together?  If these hacks are actually planned and orchestrated to be scare tactics, most people will welcome laws being enacted to "protect the public."

Just because I'm paranoid, doesn't mean they aren't out to get me.

[pawel7777]

According to X user by the name of Johannes (4, 4), Europe's Ledger wallets supply is also infected with spying chips:
https://x.com/0xJohannes_/status/2109634513957527974

To be fair, I didn't have a clue you could buy Bitcoin hardware wallets in big chain stores. This does not sound very secure to me.
I'm not sure if that post is accurate though. Posting a photo the author included in his post:

[LuckyCrypto777]

Ledger also has resellers who, due to regional proximity, could also pose a threat due to potentially altered technical design.

Update:

[Darker45]

Mark Karpelès published a video showing all known implants on Ledger Nano X as of October 2026

You can use this to verify your Ledger Nano X for any spy implant

VIDEO: Known implants on Ledger Nano X as of October 2026

I'm wondering why the implants aren't the same. The materials aren't the same. The arrangements aren't the same. The differences are significant. One has 8 soldering points, for example. The other has only 4. In other words, there are most likely more than 1 or 1 group of attackers.

Or, the attack has been an ongoing experiment; meaning, changes or improvements were made along the way. Attempts were pretty much trials and errors. Some worked, some didn't. Which made me curious whether some of those earlier thefts attributed to owner errors, phishing due to data leaks, and so on were actually caused by implants.

They could have added anti-tamper measures. Instead, I found this card in my Ledger box years ago:

Considering the number of devices involved, I would have expected many alarm bells if the software could detect the tampered hardware. So my guess it it couldn't find it.

When I bought a Trezor, it came with many anti-tamper measures, up to annoying stickers that leave hard to remove sticker residu. But it helps improve the device's security.

That is a good example, and I don't understand why they could not have just left them there too. But I don't think that anti tamper stickers prevent this kind of thing. It makes it just harder, as we have seen the anti tamper checks on the hardware in this case have failed too. I don't think there is an anti tamper sticker that can not be bypassed too, and that is my concern. I am looking for a measure or method that would make this completely impossible and that would guarantee the customer that their hardware wallet is safe, besides the option to fully open the device which is not an option for general sales.

Then let them bypass it, too. Give them 5 obstacles to bypass. 5 is better than 1.

You want to open the device, fake the holographic sticker first. Then fake the box, too. Fake the sticker on the device as well.

There's nothing wrong with putting several layers of security measures for buyers to readily check. A holographic sticker that looked somehow different could have saved one from losing all his/her lifesavings. With Ledger's misplaced confidence, customers are left with nothing to check, either for legitimacy or integrity or whatever. Nobody checks unmarked plastic wrappers seriously. They could be perfectly faked even with a sidewalk vendor.

"Engineered to be tamper-proof" my foot! A can of sardines or a jar of sandwich spread seems more protected.

I've bought 3 hardware wallets so far. It's Ledger that overconfidently offers almost zero packaging protection.

[jamyr]

Ledger is investigating reports of loss of funds from users in South East Asia who purchased products from a reseller named CryptoBillis...https://x.com/Ledger_Support/status/2108551100613714002?s=20

According to their status page they are doing a ‘scheduled’ maintenance “Ledger Recover”

Please be aware that Ledger Recover™ maintenance is scheduled for October 13th, 07:00 AM CEST.

During the maintenance window, your Ledger Recover™ operations may be temporarily unavailable.

We will update this notification with progress. It will be closed once the maintenance is completed and the service is fully operational.

https://status.ledger.com/incidents/q6x9mtxvmy2z

(edit to add:)

Considering the number of devices involved, I would have expected many alarm bells if the software could detect the tampered hardware. So my guess it it couldn't find it.

according to : https://www.tibane.net/research/ledger-nano-x-implant#timeline
(Thank you Theymos)

An “implant” doesnt trigger Ledger’s “Genuine Device” check because the implant never touched the Secure Element(the chip). …

(the short version of this research is available on the link as well as the very detailed report)

( … )

[omegaelite]

I made a 5-minute animated explainer of this case from the public reports (Ledger's posts, Tibane Labs' teardown, Bitquery's on-chain analysis): https://youtu.be/hBWQipRLv70 (disclosure: it's my channel).

Summary of what's established so far, as of Oct 12 (AI-generated, checked against the sources above):
- Ledger says every confirmed theft case involved a device bought from CryptoBilis, and it found an unauthorized hardware implant in one victim's device. It hasn't described that implant.
- Karpelès / Tibane Labs tore down a different tampered Nano X (Amazon Japan third-party seller, shipped from Malaysia, not CryptoBilis): a board tapping the display lines, with its own modem, SIM and antenna. Karpelès says it still passed Genuine Check, and Ledger's Donjon page says the check can't detect physical implants if the Secure Element is intact.
- Analyst loss estimates run from about $72M to $94.5M (Bitquery: $93.2M from 315 wallets). Tether froze about $10M of USDT.
- If you bought from CryptoBilis, Ledger says don't set the device up. If you already did, move funds to a new device with a NEW recovery phrase. Old words on a new device are still exposed.

Corrections welcome if anything in the video is off.

[Meuserna]

Ledger is investigating reports of loss of funds from users in South East Asia who purchased products from a reseller named CryptoBillis...https://x.com/Ledger_Support/status/2108551100613714002?s=20

According to their status page they are doing a ‘scheduled’ maintenance “Ledger Recover”

Please be aware that Ledger Recover™ maintenance is scheduled for October 13th, 07:00 AM CEST.

During the maintenance window, your Ledger Recover™ operations may be temporarily unavailable.

We will update this notification with progress. It will be closed once the maintenance is completed and the service is fully operational.

https://status.ledger.com/incidents/q6x9mtxvmy2z

Ledger Recover is a time bomb.

"The bombshell here is the explicit confirmation that Ledger themselves hold the master decryption key for all Ledger Recover users."

> SOURCE: @sethforprivacy
https://x.com/sethforprivacy/status/1671532787294191618

One has to assume hackers are using AI to reverse engineer API access to users' wallets. And since internet access is now baked into every Ledger device as part of the firmware, it's only a matter of time before somebody figures out how to do it.

For all we know, Ledger's key extraction API has already been hacked. Remember: The first ColdCard attacker didn't attack those wallets when he found them. He probably spent months finding them and building up a huge list of seeds to drain before he drained any of them, because he knew... as soon as he started draining wallets, the exploit would become known. So he built up a huge collection of wallets with coins, and then he drained them all at once.

The same thing will happen with Ledger Recover. When that API gets cracked, the attackers won't drain wallets. He'll build up a collection of as many seeds with coins as he can. Then he'll drain them all at once. And when it happens, people will act shocked even though they should have seen it coming.

Ledger cannot be trusted.

[jamyr]

Ledger is investigating reports of loss of funds from users in South East Asia who purchased products from a reseller named CryptoBillis...https://x.com/Ledger_Support/status/2108551100613714002?s=20

According to their status page they are doing a ‘scheduled’ maintenance “Ledger Recover”

Please be aware that Ledger Recover™ maintenance is scheduled for October 13th, 07:00 AM CEST.

During the maintenance window, your Ledger Recover™ operations may be temporarily unavailable.

We will update this notification with progress. It will be closed once the maintenance is completed and the service is fully operational.

https://status.ledger.com/incidents/q6x9mtxvmy2z

Ledger Recover is a time bomb.

"The bombshell here is the explicit confirmation that Ledger themselves hold the master decryption key for all Ledger Recover users."

> SOURCE: @sethforprivacy
https://x.com/sethforprivacy/status/1671532787294191618

One has to assume hackers are using AI to reverse engineer API access to users' wallets. And since internet access is now baked into every Ledger device as part of the firmware, it's only a matter of time before somebody figures out how to do it.

For all we know, Ledger's key extraction API has already been hacked. Remember: The first ColdCard attacker didn't attack those wallets when he found them. He probably spent months finding them and building up a huge list of seeds to drain before he drained any of them, because he knew... as soon as he started draining wallets, the exploit would become known. So he built up a huge collection of wallets with coins, and then he drained them all at once.

The same thing will happen with Ledger Recover. When that API gets cracked, the attackers won't drain wallets. He'll build up a collection of as many seeds with coins as he can. Then he'll drain them all at once. And when it happens, people will act shocked even though they should have seen it coming.

Ledger cannot be trusted.

Ledger Recover doesnt store keys, according to what Ive read. Instead, it kind-of identity-verify you not entirely KYC-verify , only then will Ledger Recover make a request for the fragmented Private K/e/y (divided into three parts which goes to 3 different third party “CERTIFIED” custodian yada yada. (thats the best I could come up with apologies for not being “Dandy” in explaining. )