[2014-06-16] GHASH.IO statement about the 51 % problem

[LiteCoinGuy]

GHASH.IO statement about the 51 % problem

Rapid growth of GHash.IO mining pool, seen over the past few months, has been driven by our determination to offer innovative solutions within the Bitcoin ecosystem combined with significant investment in resource. Our investment, participation and highly motivated staff confirm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad acceptance of Bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or damage it. We never have and never will participate in any 51% attack or double spend against Bitcoin. Still, we are against temporary solutions, which could repel a 51% threat.

In any market, competition and innovation drives growth and that is particularly true in an emerging and disruptive environment such as Bitcoin. Successful and innovative companies cannot be expected to limit their growth or competitiveness as a direct result of their success. However, this is the situation we find ourselves in when faced with the community perception of the threat of a 51% attack on Bitcoin. Asking our users to not use our services or to use competing solutions is not conducive to fostering innovation. Implementing a pool fee to our pool contradicts principles of our operation from the very launch of GHash.IO. It also does not address the core issue only pushing the problem a few weeks or months down the road when another pool or perhaps GHash.IO again grows towards 51%.

We do fully recognise the concerns and possible threat posed by an entity with malicious intent taking control of enough mining power to exploit the 51% scenario, but we also have confidence and agree with the views expressed by the Bitcoin Foundation that any such exploitation or attack ”would be obvious it was happening, and pretty easy to defend against. The transparent nature of the blockchain provides unprecedented insight for all to investigate and report such behaviours.

We also recognise however that a long term preventative solution to the threat of a 51% attack does have to be found, the current situation we find ourselves in (essentially being punished for our success) is damaging not only to us, but to the growth and acceptance of Bitcoin long term, which is something we are all striving for.

To that effect we are in the process of arranging contact to the leading mining pools and Bitcoin Foundation to propose a ‘round table’ meeting of the key players with the aim of discussing and negotiating collectively ways to address the decentralisation of mining as an industry. Our aim is to do this quickly with a possible date coinciding with the CoinSummit Conference in London.


http://de.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28aldt/ghashio_is_open_for_discussion/



good start. lets solve this for all times hopefully.

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[CoinMode]

GHASH.IO statement about the 51 % problem

#1 "Our...staff confirm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad acceptance of Bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or damage it."

#2 "Successful and innovative companies cannot be expected to limit their growth or competitiveness as a direct result of their success.

#3 "Asking our users to not use our services or to use competing solutions is not conducive to fostering innovation."

#4 "Implementing a pool fee to our pool contradicts principles of our operation from the very launch of GHash.IO."

#5 "It also does not address the core issue only pushing the problem a few weeks or months down the road when another pool or perhaps GHash.IO again grows towards 51%."

#6 "we...agree with the views expressed by the Bitcoin Foundation that any such exploitation or attack would be obvious it was happening, and pretty easy to defend against."

#7 "To that effect we are in the process of arranging contact to the leading mining pools and Bitcoin Foundation to propose a ‘round table’ meeting of the key players with the aim of discussing and negotiating collectively ways to address the decentralisation of mining as an industry."[/i]

1. The staff said they aren't going to do it, so I guess we better just trust them on that, right?

2. Successful companies have been expected to limit their growth on a regular basis in every economy except communism to encourage competition. Apparently GHash.IO staff have never heard of a monopoly before, and a monopoly in the case of bitcoin mining is getting anywhere close, just 33%, to half of the total net hashrate. They have, by the very definition of the word when applied to bitcoin mining, a huge monopoly.

3. Mandating the use of alternatives is what I do every time that I build a new PC. I would rather deal with having a CPU that uses 50W more electricity than deal with $2000 CPU prices once Intel completely takes over the whole market. Sorry, top dog never gets my dollar, ever, for this reason alone.

4. GHash.IO is not being asked to implement a fee. Nobody cares about that at all. They are being asked to reduce their hashrate and they will comply or be shut down one way or another. That is a direct threat, and they would be wise to listen.

5. Asking users to leave the largest pools is actually the most effective method for distributing hashrate. It is a functional program that can never have any bugs and can not be hacked into so long as we can all view the hashrate of each pool. This is a never fail option that will always have some degree of success. It needs to be combined with a forced-distribution penalty for pools exceeding 10% of net hash on a block.

6. We already know the Bitcoin Foundation has been working against many of the principles of bitcoin for the last several months. They served a good purpose and are now obsolete and are infiltrated by former and current board members of the largest banks and credit agencies. GHash.IO making an alliance with BF is just another sign that they are not serving the best interest of bitcoin.

7. GHash.IO is positioning itself in some sort of leadership role at the "secret meeting of the central miners/bankers" in order to determine, without full transparency or decentralized decision-making, what the entire future of bitcoin mining will be for the entire world.


If you can't read between the lines of these evil "central miners/bankers", then you shouldn't be using bitcoin yet. We are still dealing with scammers like GHash.IO who feign ignorance when confronted about the notion that a centralized mining effort in itself is always damaging to bitcoin no matter how much their staff promise that they aren't evil. You've just marked yourself as an enemy of the entire financial future of the world. That's a really easy target to hit, and if I had the 1337 haxxorz skillz then I would permanently shut you down this second.

GHash.IO must be insane if they think we are stupid enough to fall for this bullshit. Do they know who they're fucking with?

[erono]

By the same logic, why other people who also sit on a lot of coins and do nothing, why dont they donate to the devs?

[Quantus]

Just like the Secret Meeting That Launched the Federal Reserve. The consolidation of power is inevitable. Bitcoin is doomed.

[Grinder]

Another question is what happens when the government in what ever country their owners live in orders them to do something that is harmful to bitcoin and keep quiet about it? In the US this is done all the time to ISPs and other internet related companies.

[murraypaul]

Rapid growth of GHash.IO mining pool, seen over the past few months, has been driven by our determination to offer innovative solutions within the Bitcoin ecosystem combined with significant investment in resource. Our investment, participation and highly motivated staff confirm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad acceptance of Bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or damage it. We never have and never will participate in any 51% attack or double spend against Bitcoin.

That is either a downright lie, or a shading of the truth, depending on how kindly you look upon them, and whether you view Cex and GHash as one entity.
Cex have admitted to previously being involved in a double-spend attack.

[CoinMode]

Rapid growth of GHash.IO mining pool, seen over the past few months, has been driven by our determination to offer innovative solutions within the Bitcoin ecosystem combined with significant investment in resource. Our investment, participation and highly motivated staff confirm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad acceptance of Bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or damage it. We never have and never will participate in any 51% attack or double spend against Bitcoin.

That is either a downright lie, or a shading of the truth, depending on how kindly you look upon them, and whether you view Cex and GHash as one entity.
Cex have admitted to previously being involved in a double-spend attack.

Let's not forget the time when GHash.IO was hacked into and sending all of the coins it earned to the hacker's wallet for three days before GHash.IO staff even noticed what was going on. This is not about trusting people or even whether they are trustworthy. This is about the simple fact that centralized power always corrupts, always, and bitcoin is supposed to be a tool of decentralization. GHash.IO is just drunk with power right now, and it will be their downfall, likely something similar to the fireworks during the fall of Mt. Gox will ensue shortly.

[CoinMode]

By the same logic, why other people who also sit on a lot of coins and do nothing, why dont they donate to the devs?

Or even better than that, why don't people who are sitting on huge mountains of coins do something useful with them like invest in or start a bitcoin business? I was a fat lazy sack-of-shit trader for a few months, sitting on thousands of dollars of coins, and then I decided to start a business for cryptocurrency instead. My life has been far more productive and happy ever since then.

You need to redistribute your power and put it to good use or else bitcoin will die. That is a guarantee. Open you eyes and get active, people, the fight for the crypto future has just begun. Be a warrior.

[fryarminer]

GHASH.IO statement about the 51 % problem

#1 "Our...staff confirm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad acceptance of Bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or damage it."

#2 "Successful and innovative companies cannot be expected to limit their growth or competitiveness as a direct result of their success.

#3 "Asking our users to not use our services or to use competing solutions is not conducive to fostering innovation."

#4 "Implementing a pool fee to our pool contradicts principles of our operation from the very launch of GHash.IO."

#5 "It also does not address the core issue only pushing the problem a few weeks or months down the road when another pool or perhaps GHash.IO again grows towards 51%."

#6 "we...agree with the views expressed by the Bitcoin Foundation that any such exploitation or attack would be obvious it was happening, and pretty easy to defend against."

#7 "To that effect we are in the process of arranging contact to the leading mining pools and Bitcoin Foundation to propose a ‘round table’ meeting of the key players with the aim of discussing and negotiating collectively ways to address the decentralisation of mining as an industry."[/i]

1. The staff said they aren't going to do it, so I guess we better just trust them on that, right?

2. Successful companies have been expected to limit their growth on a regular basis in every economy except communism to encourage competition. Apparently GHash.IO staff have never heard of a monopoly before, and a monopoly in the case of bitcoin mining is getting anywhere close, just 33%, to half of the total net hashrate. They have, by the very definition of the word when applied to bitcoin mining, a huge monopoly.

3. Mandating the use of alternatives is what I do every time that I build a new PC. I would rather deal with having a CPU that uses 50W more electricity than deal with $2000 CPU prices once Intel completely takes over the whole market. Sorry, top dog never gets my dollar, ever, for this reason alone.

4. GHash.IO is not being asked to implement a fee. Nobody cares about that at all. They are being asked to reduce their hashrate and they will comply or be shut down one way or another. That is a direct threat, and they would be wise to listen.

5. Asking users to leave the largest pools is actually the most effective method for distributing hashrate. It is a functional program that can never have any bugs and can not be hacked into so long as we can all view the hashrate of each pool. This is a never fail option that will always have some degree of success. It needs to be combined with a forced-distribution penalty for pools exceeding 10% of net hash on a block.

6. We already know the Bitcoin Foundation has been working against many of the principles of bitcoin for the last several months. They served a good purpose and are now obsolete and are infiltrated by former and current board members of the largest banks and credit agencies. GHash.IO making an alliance with BF is just another sign that they are not serving the best interest of bitcoin.

7. GHash.IO is positioning itself in some sort of leadership role at the "secret meeting of the central miners/bankers" in order to determine, without full transparency or decentralized decision-making, what the entire future of bitcoin mining will be for the entire world.


If you can't read between the lines of these evil "central miners/bankers", then you shouldn't be using bitcoin yet. We are still dealing with scammers like GHash.IO who feign ignorance when confronted about the notion that a centralized mining effort in itself is always damaging to bitcoin no matter how much their staff promise that they aren't evil. You've just marked yourself as an enemy of the entire financial future of the world. That's a really easy target to hit, and if I had the 1337 haxxorz skillz then I would permanently shut you down this second.

GHash.IO must be insane if they think we are stupid enough to fall for this bullshit. Do they know who they're fucking with?

Excellent post. I couldn't agree more.

[bryant.coleman]

Has anyone checked today's hash rate? Seems that GHash has dropped by some 2% points. May be the result of Bitfury pulling out their mining rigs. Anti-GHash guys should be happy. 

[CoinMode]

Has anyone checked today's hash rate? Seems that GHash has dropped by some 2% points. May be the result of Bitfury pulling out their mining rigs. Anti-GHash guys should be happy. 

It is the 1.5PH that Bitfury pulled out that resulted in that drop. This whole debacle has clearly shown us who is and is not working with the credit agencies who have infiltrated the Bitcoin Foundation and are doing everything they can to try and control the whole network. If they win, they rule the world. If we win, they will be forced to play fair.

You should support this Kickstarter project. It has tons of great interviews with the best of the best in bitcoiners. https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/bitcointheendofmoney/bitcoin-the-end-of-money-as-we-know-it

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

------------------

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

---------------

FUD: Mining power =50%: Double-spends against 6-confirmed transactions are certain to succeed.

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.

---------------

Now if you have a 51% attack performed not by a pool but by an attacker with its own resources, then many of your points are valid. What that attacker would need to do is simply procure access to about $200M worth of SHA-2 ASIC hardware. Unfortunately for you in making your point -- that amount of hashing capacity likely exceeds the capacity of all the Bitcoin mining ASIC manufacturers, combined, today.





Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}


http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

[bryant.coleman]

Know what, the best solution to this problem would be to ask the smaller pools to reduce their fees to 0%, at least until GHash clocks below 40%. But is it too much to ask for? If Ghash can function without any fees, then why cant BTCGuild and Discus Fish do the same?

[Grinder]

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

How can we be sure they're following the same rules for when it's ok to commit fraud as you? Mine are that it's never ok, but I'm painfully aware that not everybody follows my rules.

[notthematrix]

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

How can we be sure they're following the same rules for when it's ok to commit fraud as you? Mine are that it's never ok, but I'm painfully aware that not everybody follows my rules.

Everybody will notice the mining of a private fork!!!!

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.

---------------

Now if you have a 51% attack performed not by a pool but by an attacker with its own resources, then many of your points are valid. What that attacker would need to do is simply procure access to about $200M worth of SHA-2 ASIC hardware. Unfortunately for you in making your point -- that amount of hashing capacity likely exceeds the capacity of all the Bitcoin mining ASIC manufacturers, combined, today.

[Grinder]

Everybody will notice the mining of a private fork!!!!

Not until it's too late.

If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack.

FACT: Just this morning ghash.io didn't find any blocks for 1.5 hours, and nobody raised an eyebrow. Later this morning they released 5 blocks in 20 minutes. They may be also be hiding their actual mining rate by releasing some blocks without telling. For instance http://blockchain.info/blocks/91.121.192.38 has only released 4 blocks, but 3 of them appeared within less than 2 hours. This strongly suggests that a lot of the unknown mining power belongs to a single entity which is frequently switching IP.

[murraypaul]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

------------------

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

------------------

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite.



Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

------------------

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite. UNCONFIRMID TRANSACTIONS WERE NEVER MENT TO BE SAVE AT AL!!!!
accepting 0 confirmations is no safety and is not  honoring the BTC protocol at all.  
accepting 0 confirmations as save is plain stupid.
this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS!
I don't like this very selective way of reading you are CLEARLY FUDDING , so here my answer......

Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}

[murraypaul]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite.
(snip unrelated information)

Quite. You've just said that they did perform a double spend attack.

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite.
(snip unrelated information)

Quite. You've just said that they did perform a double spend attack.

Not quite.a transaction WHITOUT confirmation is NO TRANSACTION
 UNCONFIRMID TRANSACTIONS WERE NEVER MENT TO BE SAVE AT AL!!!!
accepting 0 confirmations is accepting no safety and is not  honoring the BTC protocol.  
accepting 0 confirmations as save is plain stupid.
this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS to have a transaction!
Agian you are fudding.

Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}

combine this with....

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.
and we are very save

[murraypaul]

this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS to have a transaction!

Rubbish.

A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere.

It is known that GHash has previously done evil.
They are currently the biggest pool.
Most people don't seem to give a crap, and will mine wherever pays them the most.

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite.
(snip unrelated information)

Quite. You've just said that they did perform a double spend attack.

Not quite.a transaction WHITOUT confirmation is NO TRANSACTION
 UNCONFIRMID TRANSACTIONS WERE NEVER MENT TO BE SAVE AT AL!!!!
accepting 0 confirmations is accepting no safety and is not  honoring the BTC protocol.  
accepting 0 confirmations as save is plain stupid.
this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS to have a transaction!
Agian you are fudding.

Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}

combine this with....

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.
and we are very save

http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

[notthematrix]

this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS to have a transaction!

Rubbish.

A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere.

It is known that GHash has previously done evil.
They are currently the biggest pool.
Most people don't seem to give a crap, and will mine wherever pays them the most.

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

Not quite.a transaction WHITOUT confirmation is NO TRANSACTION
 UNCONFIRMID TRANSACTIONS WERE NEVER MENT TO BE SAVE AT AL!!!!
accepting 0 confirmations is accepting no safety and is not  honoring the BTC protocol.  
accepting 0 confirmations as save is plain stupid.
this is why there must be 6 CONFIRMATIONS to have a transaction!

This is how bitcoin works stick to it or get burned , its your own risk  , give real arguments of f***k off

[murraypaul]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

[notthematrix]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.
I dont need to be ghash.io to do dubble spend a 0 confirmation anybody can do this.
the netwrk wil simply confirm the fastest transaction , so yes only stupid users will do this.
when a transaction is confirmed 6 it is save. as I explained mutiple time's.

[bryant.coleman]

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.

OK. I magine that you are the owner of a coffee shop, which has recently decided to accept Bitcoin payments. And constomer comes to you and pays with Bitcoins. Would you tell him: "Buddy, wait for 3 hours. I need to get 6 confirmations to make sure that you don't double spend your coins" ?

[murraypaul]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.
I dont need to be ghash.io to do dubble spend a 0 confirmation anybody can do this.
the netwrk wil simply confirm the fastest transaction , so yes only stupid users will do this.
when a transaction is confirmed 6 it is save. as I explained mutiple time's.

And you don't think that makes GHash dishonest?

[notthematrix]

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.

OK. I magine that you are the owner of a coffee shop, which has recently decided to accept Bitcoin payments. And constomer comes to you and pays with Bitcoins. Would you tell him: "Buddy, wait for 3 hours. I need to get 6 confirmations to make sure that you don't double spend your coins" ?

A coffeeshop calculates the risk , a crediccard can also be cashed back , and money can be counterfitted.
a failed $1 transaction do to dubble spend when accepting 0 confirmations is accepible.
a $25000 transcation can wait for 6 confirmations easaly.
its a matterv risk calculation.

[notthematrix]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.
I dont need to be ghash.io to do dubble spend a 0 confirmation anybody can do this.
the netwrk wil simply confirm the fastest transaction , so yes only stupid users will do this.
when a transaction is confirmed 6 it is save. as I explained mutiple time's.

And you don't think that makes GHash dishonest?

the question is was it ghash.io it self or a  individual miner mining at that pool , you dont need a lot of hasing power to respend a unconfirmed transaction.

[murraypaul]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.
I dont need to be ghash.io to do dubble spend a 0 confirmation anybody can do this.
the netwrk wil simply confirm the fastest transaction , so yes only stupid users will do this.
when a transaction is confirmed 6 it is save. as I explained mutiple time's.

And you don't think that makes GHash dishonest?

the question is was it ghash.io it self or a  individual miner mining at that pool , you dont need a lot of hasing power to respend a unconfirmed transaction.

It was (the previous owners of) GHash itself.
It is the pool which decides which transactions to include in a block, not the individual miners at the pool.
Before lecturing people on fact vs fud, shouldn't you find out what the facts are?

[CoinMode]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

------------------

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

---------------

FUD: Mining power =50%: Double-spends against 6-confirmed transactions are certain to succeed.

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.

---------------

Now if you have a 51% attack performed not by a pool but by an attacker with its own resources, then many of your points are valid. What that attacker would need to do is simply procure access to about $200M worth of SHA-2 ASIC hardware. Unfortunately for you in making your point -- that amount of hashing capacity likely exceeds the capacity of all the Bitcoin mining ASIC manufacturers, combined, today.





Bitcoin transactions: Why it is recommended to wait for at least six confirmations?

Due to its decentralized nature, bitcoin can’t rely on a master authoritative source to prevent double-spending, when an attacker tries to spend some money more than once. Anyway, various defensive strategies have been implemented to minimize chances for such a fraudulent activity to happen in the bitcoin network.

One particular approach, described by the Bitcoin Wiki as a Brute force attack, can be attempted by an attacker with relatively high mining hashrate, but not necessarily above 50% level. The attack would follow this pattern:

1. The attacker submits a transaction to the network which pays the merchant.

2. At the same time, he will immediately start to privately mine his own blocks, where he will include the double-spending transaction instead of the one where he pays the merchant. But if he manages to find a new block, he will not broadcast it to the network.

3. The merchant will wait for 6 confirmations and then sends the product. But if the attacker managed to mine more than 6 blocks at this time, he can release his own private fork to the network, and since he has the longest chain, other nodes would accept it and the original transaction will get rejected. This way, the attacker gets both the merchant product and also his bitcoins back.

It might seem that such an attack is statistically unlikely to happen, but when we suppose, that the attacker possess for example 25% of the network hashpower, the probability that he will mine 7 blocks in a row is 0.25^7 = 0.006%. This looks like a very small probability, but with block time being 10 minutes, mining 7 block in a row will happen approximately once per four months.
Fortunately, there is another measure implemented in the Bitcoin protocol, which eliminates the possibility of such an attack. In the Protocol rules description at Bitcoin wiki, it is listed as a Rule 13 for “block” messages:

13. Reject if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.


Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
// Check timestamp against prev
if (GetBlockTime() GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}


http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

Wow, it sure did take a lot of words for you to say "Just trust GHash.IO because they aren't evil, pinky swear".

[notthematrix]

IF YOU ARE AS STUPID TO ACCEPT UNCONFIRIMED TRANSACTIONS EVRYBODY CAN DO EVIL IF THEY WANT.

As I asked above: But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?
Seems like the answer is yes.

Yes if you take unconfirmed transactions as transactios , you ask for it.
I dont need to be ghash.io to do dubble spend a 0 confirmation anybody can do this.
the netwrk wil simply confirm the fastest transaction , so yes only stupid users will do this.
when a transaction is confirmed 6 it is save. as I explained mutiple time's.

And you don't think that makes GHash dishonest?

the question is was it ghash.io it self or a  individual miner mining at that pool , you dont need a lot of hasing power to respend a unconfirmed transaction.

It was (the previous owners of) GHash itself.
It is the pool which decides which transactions to include in a block, not the individual miners at the pool.
Before lecturing people on fact vs fud, shouldn't you find out what the facts are?

FACT is that if ghash.io did not confirm the transaction oher miner would had done!
so it does not make any sense to do this as ghash.io .
if they block a transaction some other miner will handle it and will be the fastest.
they dont own the capasity so it will be noticed in the number of winning blocks......,,
so again whats the problem'? , waiting 6 confirmations is the solution , only if you are dumb you accept 0 confiramtions.
and as I told you you cant have more then 6 blocks in one row from one miner , so it wil take a bit longer to confirm this transaction but it WILL in the end be confirmed.

[MrTeal]

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

How can we be sure they're following the same rules for when it's ok to commit fraud as you? Mine are that it's never ok, but I'm painfully aware that not everybody follows my rules.

Everybody will notice the mining of a private fork!!!!

FACT: A pool does not have its own hashing capacity, it instead has suppliers -- those individual and corporate miners performing the pool's mining work. A pool that is doing evil will in time lose hashing capacity as those mining there discover that the pool is harming Bitcoin and take their hashing capacity elsewhere. For a pool to try to do a 51% attack for the purpose of double spending a transaction with confirmations 6-deep means that pool would need to take the hashing capacity offline and use it to start mining a private fork. Additionally, no subsequent blocks mined on the public Bitcoin network (while the attack is occurring) would be solved by the ghash.io pool. If ghash.io's 45,000 Th/s were to go offline, that would be bad. If at the same time no blocks over the next couple hours were ghash.io's, that would be a "network event" that would indicate quite possibly that a pool is attempting a 51% attack. There are a couple hours then, at least, before this attack could be successful at reaching the six confirmations needed (as, with only 51% of the hashing capacity but the same difficulty, blocks on the private fork get solved at about one block every twenty minutes). Miners, alerted to a potential 51% attack, could start pulling their hashing capacity from the pool causing it to drop below 51% before the private fork has reached six confirmations -- thus causing the attack to fail. i.e., An attempt at double spending by the pool is not certain to succeed. The pool would be taking a gamble that it can pull off such an attack before that activity is detected or that the response by its suppliers after detection would be too little, too late.

---------------

Now if you have a 51% attack performed not by a pool but by an attacker with its own resources, then many of your points are valid. What that attacker would need to do is simply procure access to about $200M worth of SHA-2 ASIC hardware. Unfortunately for you in making your point -- that amount of hashing capacity likely exceeds the capacity of all the Bitcoin mining ASIC manufacturers, combined, today.

I'm curious how you think the majority of miners will notice that they are mining on a GHash.io fork instead of the main chain? Even just looking at today's stats there are periods where GHash has mined 6 blocks in a half hour, and some where they have found no blocks for an hour and a half. Even apart from the fact a large portion of GHash is their private mining pool, you're giving way too much credit to the responsiveness of most miners. While it could take a decent bit of time to reorg a 6 deep chain if they got unlucky, it would still likely happen way before enough people moved off the pool to make a difference.

[notthematrix]

I'm curious how you think the majority of miners will notice that they are mining on a GHash.io fork instead of the main chain? Even just looking at today's stats there are periods where GHash has mined 6 blocks in a half hour, and some where they have found no blocks for an hour and a half. Even apart from the fact a large portion of GHash is their private mining pool, you're giving way too much credit to the responsiveness of most miners. While it could take a decent bit of time to reorg a 6 deep chain if they got unlucky, it would still likely happen way before enough people moved off the pool to make a difference.

the number of found blocks from ghash.io will be 0 for a very long time , because it is using its power to mine a private fork
but even then every block > 6 in a row will be ignored by the prtocol!

the code can be found here

 Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
        // Check timestamp against prev
        if (GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
            return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

...
}

http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

so you have to mine more then 6 blocks in a row , this is blocked by bitcoin source code thats why its NEVER more then 6.
and then notting for a while! , its just as the code says , http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html
so to make this possible it has to gues blocks of other miners too , and be more then 11 blocks faster!

 13. Reject [a block] if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.

exlpains this...
so no ghash.io cant do this even if they want it.

[murraypaul]

FACT is that if ghash.io did not confirm the transaction oher miner would had done!
so it does not make any sense to do this as ghash.io .

They did it.

if they block a transaction some other miner will handle it and will be the fastest.

If they solve a block including the second transaction, the first transaction will never be confirmed by anyone, because the shared inputs will have already been spent.
And the more %age of hashing power they control, the more chance they have of doing this.

[notthematrix]

FACT is that if ghash.io did not confirm the transaction oher miner would had done!
so it does not make any sense to do this as ghash.io .

They did it.

if they block a transaction some other miner will handle it and will be the fastest.

If they solve a block including the second transaction, the first transaction will never be confirmed by anyone, because the shared inputs will have already been spent.
And the more %age of hashing power they control, the more chance they have of doing this.

well yes bit this is why you need 6 confirmations!!!!!!!!!

[murraypaul]

FACT is that if ghash.io did not confirm the transaction oher miner would had done!
so it does not make any sense to do this as ghash.io .

They did it.

if they block a transaction some other miner will handle it and will be the fastest.

If they solve a block including the second transaction, the first transaction will never be confirmed by anyone, because the shared inputs will have already been spent.
And the more %age of hashing power they control, the more chance they have of doing this.

well yes bit this is why you need 6 confirmations!!!!!!!!!

You are going a long way round in circles to avoid answering this question:

And you don't think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

[notthematrix]

FACT is that if ghash.io did not confirm the transaction oher miner would had done!
so it does not make any sense to do this as ghash.io .

They did it.

if they block a transaction some other miner will handle it and will be the fastest.

If they solve a block including the second transaction, the first transaction will never be confirmed by anyone, because the shared inputs will have already been spent.
And the more %age of hashing power they control, the more chance they have of doing this.

well yes bit this is why you need 6 confirmations!!!!!!!!!

You are going a long way round in circles to avoid answering this question:

And you don't think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

its very simple a ,miner can NEVER do 7 blocks in a row.
see rule 13 http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html
7 blocks is the inital transactions + 6 confirmations
at best ghash.io can do the double spend + 5 confirmations  ... the 6thx (block 7) has to be done by somone else.
if thats not done the transaction will fial back to zero!
so its that simple , one miner can max do 6 blocks in a row , thats 5 confirmations , and thats why you need at least 6 confirmations (7 blocks) to be save because the 7th block can never be done by the same miner. , its so very simple
so you can never double spend , bacause you can never make more then 6 blocks in a row , so you NEVER get a double s[end with 6 confirmations.

[murraypaul]

You are going a long way round in circles to avoid answering this question:

And you don't think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

its very simple a ,miner can NEVER do 7 blocks in a row.
see rule 13 http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html
7 blocks is the inital transactions + 6 confirmations
at best ghash.io can do the double spend + 5 confirmations... the 6thx (block 7) has to be done by somone else.
if thats not done the transaction will fial back to zero!
so its that simple , one miner can max do 6 blocks in a row , thats 5 confirmations , and thats why you need at least 6 confirmations (7 blocks) to be save because the 7th block can never be done by the same miner. , its so very simple

Do you think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

[notthematrix]

You are going a long way round in circles to avoid answering this question:

And you don't think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

its very simple a ,miner can NEVER do 7 blocks in a row.
see rule 13 http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html
7 blocks is the inital transactions + 6 confirmations
at best ghash.io can do the double spend + 5 confirmations  ... the 6thx (block 7) has to be done by somone else.
if thats not done the transaction will fial back to zero!
so its that simple , one miner can max do 6 blocks in a row , thats 5 confirmations , and thats why you need at least 6 confirmations (7 blocks) to be save because the 7th block can never be done by the same miner. , its so very simple Smiley
so you can never double spend , bacause you can never make more then 6 blocks in a row , so you NEVER get a double spend with 6 confirmations.
its even stupid to hash the 7th block , because it will not be accepted by the chain , this wasting mining power.
so its even stuped to join a to big pool

Do you think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

Iits dumb of betcoin to accept transactions of les then 6 confirmation
, honisty does not exsits in the financhial world that's why we have a system as bitcoin
to rule out human temptation by code ruling.
Wolfs of wallstreet anyone?

[murraypaul]

its very simple a ,miner can NEVER do 7 blocks in a row.
see rule 13 http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

That doesn't say anything about a single miner producing 7 blocks in a row.
(And nor could it, as each node has no way of knowing which miner actually produced a block, unless the miner chooses to leave evidence behind.)

Edit: GHash mining 8 blocks in a row:
299449: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000006e96c1dd143e094c6cc70cdb755baa958db83798e89f5fce
299450: https://blockchain.info/block/0000000000000000242bc21300cabfa5edaff4eb772ee8f4f0593c8ac23be6a7
299451: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000000f8957a5f3528f604b66eee78c33cfa133c6bcf4a88606e9
299452: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000006fbaf7f90bb6216cde52b4f15481ec68143375d3f4462c0d
299453: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000008717b430e96226a0c5e86c47b9c855fb3dc7ae67f911d08b
299454: https://blockchain.info/block/0000000000000000458c61f342867e941382b8b574d35e35681604b9e4f51410
299455: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000005f8ab9e7903ce23d134faa8216eeadca61b5418fd7a35669
299456: https://blockchain.info/block/000000000000000079b7bd02a69c6500df396ba5c144cbb9add0bd50fb4f36de
299457: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000000284638a2dcb6f44bcfad55eaa56c97b4594132bb6bc82c9

What I think you mean to claim is that you can't reorganise the chain by more than 6 blocks.

[murraypaul]

Do you think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

Iits dumb of betcoin to accept transactions of les then 6 confirmation
, honisty does not exsits in the financhial world that's why we have a system as bitcoin
to rule out human temptation by code ruling.
Wolfs of wallstreet anyone?

You really can't answer the question, can you?
No point continuing the discussion then.

[MrTeal]

its very simple a ,miner can NEVER do 7 blocks in a row.
see rule 13 http://btc-base.blogspot.sk/2014/01/bitcoin-transactions-why-it-is.html

That doesn't say anything about a single miner producing 7 blocks in a row.
(And nor could it, as each node has no way of knowing which miner actually produced a block, unless the miner chooses to leave evidence behind.)

Edit: GHash mining 8 blocks in a row:
299449: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000006e96c1dd143e094c6cc70cdb755baa958db83798e89f5fce (uK)
299450: https://blockchain.info/block/0000000000000000242bc21300cabfa5edaff4eb772ee8f4f0593c8ac23be6a7   (UK)
299451: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000000f8957a5f3528f604b66eee78c33cfa133c6bcf4a88606e9   (UA)
299452: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000006fbaf7f90bb6216cde52b4f15481ec68143375d3f4462c0d   (UA)
299453: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000008717b430e96226a0c5e86c47b9c855fb3dc7ae67f911d08b (UK)
299454: https://blockchain.info/block/0000000000000000458c61f342867e941382b8b574d35e35681604b9e4f51410 (UK)
299455: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000005f8ab9e7903ce23d134faa8216eeadca61b5418fd7a35669  (UK)
299456: https://blockchain.info/block/000000000000000079b7bd02a69c6500df396ba5c144cbb9add0bd50fb4f36de  (UA)
299457: https://blockchain.info/block/00000000000000000284638a2dcb6f44bcfad55eaa56c97b4594132bb6bc82c9 (UA)

What I think you mean to claim is that you can't reorganise the chain by more than 6 blocks.

CHECK THE IP ADRESS were the block is geiven from!

This is NOT 8 blocks in a row! , its 2 blocks , then again 2 blocks , then 3 blocks , followed by 2 blocks!!!!!



Rule  13. Reject [a block] if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.

Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
        // Check timestamp against prev
        if (GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
            return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));

you have 2 indipendent pools of ghash.io spreading capasity over 2 parts of the world.
a mining pool in the UK and one in UA.

What are you talking about? That rule has nothing to do with IPs, in fact there is nothing in the block itself about IPs. The IP listed by blockchain (if there is one) has nothing to do with the node that actually mined the block, it's just the IP of the node that first relayed the block to blockchain.info.

[notthematrix]

What are you talking about? That rule has nothing to do with IPs, in fact there is nothing in the block itself about IPs. The IP listed by blockchain (if there is one) has nothing to do with the node that actually mined the block, it's just the IP of the node that first relayed the block to blockchain.info.

youre right ip does not matter , was also wondering why it exepted 8 blocks bit the check is median time.

rule 13 is about Median time.... thats a hard concept.

block  #299457 2014-05-06 23:25:38
----
block  #299456 2014-05-06 23:02:13
block  #299455 2014-05-06 22:54:57
block  #299454 2014-05-06 22:51:31
block  #299453 2014-05-06 22:50:08
---
block  #299252 2014-05-06 22:37:53
---
block  #299251 2014-05-06 22:27:03
block  #299250 2014-05-06 22:21:21
block  #299249 2014-05-06 22:17:07

This means that you can NOT create more then 6 blocks in a row less then 10 minutes apart ,

Rule  13. Reject [a block] if timestamp is the median time of the last 11 blocks or before

This can be interpreted in a following way: If the attacker will try to mine his own private blockchain fork, other nodes will almost certainly reject it, if his length is more than 6 blocks, since the timestamp of the first such mined block will be almost certainly older than the median time of the last 11 mined blocks. Replacing 6 or less blocks is possible, but when attacker tries to replace 7 or more blocks, the first one will be too old to be accepted.

TL;DR: Six bitcoin confirmations is not an arbitrary number. If payee accepts a transaction with less than six confirmations, it is possible that the attacker, even without a majority of the hashpower, can launch a brute force attack by mining his private blockchain fork and reverse the transaction. With six or more confirmations, such an attack will be rejected by the Protocol rule 13 described above.

Note for programmers: The check is implemented in the method GetMedianTimePast() and called in method AcceptBlock(), file main.cpp:

bool CBlock::AcceptBlock(CValidationState &state, CDiskBlockPos *dbp)
{
...
        // Check timestamp against prev
        if (GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
            return state.Invalid(error("AcceptBlock() : block's timestamp is too early"));
 
 
If ghash.io does make a separate chain form the original chain , it needs to devote all its hashing power to the fake chain . and CAN NOT know when the next transaction will come.
so making a plasible fake chain at the same time is very hard if not imposible.
becaue you have to know when transactions are comming at forehand.

[CoinMode]

Do you think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

Iits dumb of betcoin to accept transactions of les then 6 confirmation
, honisty does not exsits in the financhial world that's why we have a system as bitcoin
to rule out human temptation by code ruling.
Wolfs of wallstreet anyone?

You really can't answer the question, can you?
No point continuing the discussion then.

I can answer that for you. Yes, anything that goes against the principles of a trust-less system makes GHash.IO dishonest, including their double spend attack.

Everybody, let's just think this one over for a second. In a system that is supposed to require absolutely no trust between any parties, why is GHash.IO saying we should trust them? This goes against everything that defines the very idea behind bitcoin, and they will pay for it.

Bitcoin does not have to destroy banks, it does not need to be completely free of fees and taxes, but bitcoin must, absolutely must rip the financial control from the wealthy elites cold dead hands so that we never have to "trust" any authority figure when it comes to monetary policy or cryptocurrency. If it can't do that, then we should just give up right now because everything else is pointless.

[notthematrix]

Do you think that [double-spend attack against BetCoin] makes GHash dishonest?

Iits dumb of betcoin to accept transactions of les then 6 confirmation
, honisty does not exsits in the financhial world that's why we have a system as bitcoin
to rule out human temptation by code ruling.
Wolfs of wallstreet anyone?

You really can't answer the question, can you?
No point continuing the discussion then.

I can answer that for you. Yes, anything that goes against the principles of a trust-less system makes GHash.IO dishonest, including their double spend attack.

Everybody, let's just think this one over for a second. In a system that is supposed to require absolutely no trust between any parties, why is GHash.IO saying we should trust them? This goes against everything that defines the very idea behind bitcoin, and they will pay for it.

Bitcoin does not have to destroy banks, it does not need to be completely free of fees and taxes, but bitcoin must, absolutely must rip the financial control from the wealthy elites cold dead hands so that we never have to "trust" any authority figure when it comes to monetary policy or cryptocurrency. If it can't do that, then we should just give up right now because everything else is pointless.

Was the double spend sucsessfull? if detected as double spend it was clearly not
attemting one is wrong but it failed because of the way bitcoin is setup.

[notthematrix]

Let's have some FUD vs. FACT now.

FUD: Double-spends: GHash actually engaged in such an attack before it reached the 51% mark, and it could do so again

FACT: Ghash.io has never committed double spending against a CONFIRMED transaction. Apparently at one time Ghash.io had committed fraud against an online gambling site by performing a Finney attack to cancel their non-winning bet transactions. This was possible because the casino recognized payment on 0/unconfirmed transactions -- something that NOBODY would recommend a merchant do for an anonymous, online service.

So you've just agreed that they did engage in a double-spend attack? Not really FUD then, is it?
But it is ok because they only attacked stupid people?

Not quite.
(snip unrelated information)

Quite. You've just said that they did perform a double spend attack.

If it is detected as a double spend in blackchain.info it was not sucsessfull , I explained how hard it is to realy do it , when sticking to 6 confirmations , Further more if ghash.io was realy bad people would have droped it by know or at leased miners would have stoped accepting mined blocks from them
So this is why i dont worry , if one miner act bad other can stop acccepting blocks from that miner , so acting bad is in nobody's intrest.
also the median time rule makes it almost imposible to act bad because you need to know the time when feature transaction will come . mutiple times in a row.
I incurage evrybody to try to hack and play with the bitcoin protocol! . and emulate all senarios

[CoinMode]

If it is detected as a double spend in blackchain.info it was not sucsessfull , I explained how hard it is to realy do it , when sticking to 6 confirmations , Further more if ghash.io was realy bad people would have droped it by know or at leased miners would have stoped accepting mined blocks from them
So this is why i dont worry , if one miner act bad other can stop acccepting blocks from that miner , so acting bad is in nobody's interest.

FUD: Surely nobody in a large bank or credit agency would ever try to infiltrate the Bitcoin Foundation or GHash.IO and arrange a meeting to make plans for the new Central Banker-Miners to take over and rule the world for their bosses. Yep, you are right. We should just leave 50% of the hashing power in one pool so somebody can come in and use it to permanently damage the trust in bitcoin enough to possibly damn it forever. Sounds legit.

FACT: An alarming amount of CEOs and other top executives have been infiltrating many bitcoin businesses and organizations. The ease with which you suggest that they would never have the power to take down the network this way is also alarming. Leaving all that hashpower in one location is a 100% sure sign that somebody will attempt to abuse it in order to kill bitcoin for real.

Decentralization in every possible way! This is very simple stuff to figure out, and no amount of hand-waving and fancy whitepaper posts will ever change anything about that.

[cech4204a]

So what GHASH.is is saying is that they enjoy havin 51 % and that they don't give a fuck about centralisation ? Thats a very nice statement wraped up, you could use different words but then it would be much more obvious that you don't even care about it.

[nwfella]

What's that old saying?

Oh yeah:

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."  -Lord Acton

[Grinder]

This means that you can NOT create more then 6 blocks in a row less then 10 minutes apart ,

Nope, that's not it either. It means that if you want to replace the block chain you either can't use too much time, or you have to set the time stamp into the future to give yourself some extra time. "Fortunately" for ghash.io they control a lot of the miners in their pool, which gives them a better probability.

[murraypaul]

Was the double spend sucsessfull? if detected as double spend it was clearly not
attemting one is wrong but it failed because of the way bitcoin is setup.

Yes, they were successful, they confirmed the second transaction, thus cancelling the first. That is what a double-spend is.
This meant that they kept their winning bet transactions and revoked their losing bet transactions.

[CoinMode]

What's that old saying?

Oh yeah:

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."  -Lord Acton

This times a million is the one and only core value that is driving bitcoin and the only real thing of value that bitcoin has to offer. Realistically, I could wire somebody in Antarctica money in a few minutes using the bank. I can buy anything anywhere with banks cards, and most people don't even think about the fees they might save doing otherwise. Many of the everyday uses for bitcoin seem pointless right now. But it isn't really about that.

What makes bitcoin worth fighting for so much is the technology behind it that removes the centralization of power in the economic system and creates a worldwide network where all users have the same rights and privileges. It is about removing all possible corruption from banking, wall street, government, credit agencies, and the individual citizen as well. It is about being able to buy penny stocks of a farm in Africa when you live in Argentina. It is about traveling the entire world and never having to submit to the local currency restrictions. It is about not having the money in your pocket stolen from you by an invisible hand.

Bitcoin is about fairness. The more fair we can be, the better we can work towards the future. Without cryptocurrency, the world is doomed. I wish I could be joking right now.

[notthematrix]

This means that you can NOT create more then 6 blocks in a row less then 10 minutes apart ,

Nope, that's not it either. It means that if you want to replace the block chain you either can't use too much time, or you have to set the time stamp into the future to give yourself some extra time. "Fortunately" for ghash.io they control a lot of the miners in their pool, which gives them a better probability.

Does not mean the can do it all the tme , yes we need to watch big pools , but no we dont need to get parabnoia about it other pools can refuse blocks of ghash.io because they make to many blocks.
So for ghash.io it is NOT in its intrest to build a big pool , because you waste mining capasaty becasue other miners will not accept the blocks.
and remenber there is a mutch BIGGER problem , with our economy , its called the imposible hamster ,
Resources VS endless growing bitcoin by it nature can solve this puzzle , so can save hamanity!
so don't underastimate the incentive to make this work!

[CoinMode]

This means that you can NOT create more then 6 blocks in a row less then 10 minutes apart ,

Nope, that's not it either. It means that if you want to replace the block chain you either can't use too much time, or you have to set the time stamp into the future to give yourself some extra time. "Fortunately" for ghash.io they control a lot of the miners in their pool, which gives them a better probability.

Does not mean the can do it all the tme , yes we need to watch big pools , but no we dont need to get parabnoia about it other pools can refuse blocks of ghash.io because they make to many blocks.
So for ghash.io it is NOT in its intrest to build a big pool , because you waste mining capasaty becasue other miners will not accept the blocks.
and remenber there is a mutch BIGGER problem , with our economy , its called the imposible hamster ,
Resources VS endless growing bitcoin by it nature can solve this puzzle , so can save hamanity!
so don't underastimate the incentive to make this work!

It is amazing how you Ghash.IO "supporters" keep mentioning how it is in their best interest to not tamper with the blockchain. YOU ARE COMPLETELY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE MOST POWERFUL GROUPS IN THE WORLD WOULD LOVE TO INFILTRATE GHASH.IO AND TO SEE BITCOIN DEAD!

Why can't at least one of you shillbots own up to the fact that absolutely no trust at all should ever be put into any exchange, pool, or entity of any kind? THEY CAN ALL BE INFILTRATED EASILY!

All of you are making Ghash.io look like shit right now. Thanks!

[notthematrix]

This means that you can NOT create more then 6 blocks in a row less then 10 minutes apart ,

Nope, that's not it either. It means that if you want to replace the block chain you either can't use too much time, or you have to set the time stamp into the future to give yourself some extra time. "Fortunately" for ghash.io they control a lot of the miners in their pool, which gives them a better probability.

Does not mean the can do it all the tme , yes we need to watch big pools , but no we dont need to get parabnoia about it other pools can refuse blocks of ghash.io because they make to many blocks.
So for ghash.io it is NOT in its intrest to build a big pool , because you waste mining capasaty becasue other miners will not accept the blocks.
and remenber there is a mutch BIGGER problem , with our economy , its called the imposible hamster ,
Resources VS endless growing bitcoin by it nature can solve this puzzle , so can save hamanity!
so don't underastimate the incentive to make this work!

It is amazing how you Ghash.IO "supporters" keep mentioning how it is in their best interest to not tamper with the blockchain. YOU ARE COMPLETELY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE MOST POWERFUL GROUPS IN THE WORLD WOULD LOVE TO INFILTRATE GHASH.IO AND TO SEE BITCOIN DEAD!

Why can't at least one of you shillbots own up to the fact that absolutely no trust at all should ever be put into any exchange, pool, or entity of any kind? THEY CAN ALL BE INFILTRATED EASILY!

All of you are making Ghash.io look like shit right now. Thanks!

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

so my questing is why dont you go to a shopping mall and kill some people?
you CAN do it nobody will stop you from doing it if you want to do it.
so why don't you?
Exectly You will likely sucseed but the what happens after you did it what are the  consequences?
and that's why sane people don't kill.
Ghash.io can not get away with it consequences  it  lose its business to other miner gulde's!
We are not dependent on them.
That's why most people don't care , they know this unless you suffer from  paranoid schizophrenia bacause then your brain can now longer make this differentiation anymore!

[CoinMode]

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

so my questing is why dont you go to a shopping mall and kill some people?
you CAN do it nobody will stop you from doing it if you want to do it.
so why don't you?
Exectly You will likely sucseed but the what happens after you did it what are the  consequences?
and that's why sane people don't kill.
Ghash.io can not get away with it consequences  it  lose its business to other miner gulde's!
We are not dependent on them.
That's why most people don't care , they know this unless you suffer from  paranoid schizophrenia bacause then your brain can now longer make this differentiation anymore!

You are just another shill saying "I swear Ghash.IO isn't being infiltrated by banks or credit agencies." We have heard your bullshit argument that conveniently always leaves out this scenario and also leaves 51% of the net hash open for the picking. Go home. Your tactics no longer work here.

[murraypaul]

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

This is demonstrably false, because they have already misbehaved and yet now they are the largest mining pool.
Most people simply don't care, they just want to maximise their own profits in the short term.

[notthematrix]

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

This is demonstrably false, because they have already misbehaved and yet now they are the largest mining pool.
Most people simply don't care, they just want to maximise their own profits in the short term.

Its about a few cents and they are detected , with the banks we know ,but we cant do anything but with ghash.io people can its to small , its like you shout to some one in trafic thts bad but not so bad you get in jail , so please shutup , its about a few cents.
 

[Remember remember the 5th of November]

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

This is demonstrably false, because they have already misbehaved and yet now they are the largest mining pool.
Most people simply don't care, they just want to maximise their own profits in the short term.

And yet if you look at the stats, they are at 34%.

[notthematrix]

all FEAR is INSIDE YOU HEAD.... we dont give a F*CK , if ghash.io misbehaves it will lose its good name . and will be replaced by someone else we are noet DEPENEDENT obn ghash.io nor do they own all mining hardware its custumers  use
so do executing your fear , is suicide for ghash.io , they can do it but wont get them very far!

This is demonstrably false, because they have already misbehaved and yet now they are the largest mining pool.
Most people simply don't care, they just want to maximise their own profits in the short term.

And yet if you look at the stats, they are at 34%.

Yep exactly the fear sellers , if they were in power they would do it , why because they think they can get away with it,
like ghash.io "can" is they think
this is  symptoms of paranoid schizofrenia not evrything what you CAN do is done , because it has consequences for your self and your
environment.
If you can't see that you will likely do it your self if you had the change.
 

[LiteCoinGuy]

maybe a solution:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=659275.0