S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 04:54:13 PM |
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If the rest of the network has less hashrate than the dishonest network then they can't do anything about it other than be observers.
So an attacker can choose which transactions to include in the chain and which blocks to build on top of, but the rest of the network can not? That doesn't even make any sense. If there is a way to identify the malicious entity's blocks, the rest of the network can most certainly do something about it. No, they can't. And yes the attacker can choose what goes through or not. At least that is what I get from the "51% attack". The attacker can control the way transactions flow.
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sumantso
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June 22, 2014, 05:06:16 PM |
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http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/06/16/how-a-mining-monopoly-can-attack-bitcoin/The guys that wrote this aren't forum trolls, but people that have studied and studied this over and over. Really? ? How can Ghash be so destructive? 1. People are in denial 2. Ghash's strength lets it get an unfair advantage (selfish miners like this) 3. Ghash official un-decentralized bitcoin (now we can not longer say it is decentralized, but distributed like Ripple) This is another problem with PoW in general as implemented currently by Bitcoin. The actually system encourages this kind of thing to happen because people are incentivised to do it. If Bitcoin is to stay strong the system needs to be changed so that people are incentivised to keep it decentralized. This is not Ghash but a PoW problem. Something like DPoS or something else yet unknown might be the answer to this centralisation.
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:07:55 PM |
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http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/06/16/how-a-mining-monopoly-can-attack-bitcoin/The guys that wrote this aren't forum trolls, but people that have studied and studied this over and over. Really? ? How can Ghash be so destructive? 1. People are in denial 2. Ghash's strength lets it get an unfair advantage (selfish miners like this) 3. Ghash official un-decentralized bitcoin (now we can not longer say it is decentralized, but distributed like Ripple) This is another problem with PoW in general as implemented currently by Bitcoin. The actually system encourages this kind of thing to happen because people are incentivised to do it. If Bitcoin is to stay strong the system needs to be changed so that people are incentivised to keep it decentralized. This is not Ghash but a PoW problem. Something like DPoS or something else yet unknown might be the answer to this centralisation. Thank you That is exactly it, the only problem is that it wont be Bitcoin anymore......
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:10:25 PM |
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If the rest of the network has less hashrate than the dishonest network then they can't do anything about it other than be observers.
So an attacker can choose which transactions to include in the chain and which blocks to build on top of, but the rest of the network can not? That doesn't even make any sense. If there is a way to identify the malicious entity's blocks, the rest of the network can most certainly do something about it. No, they can't. And yes the attacker can choose what goes through or not. At least that is what I get from the "51% attack". The attacker can control the way transactions flow. Why is the rest of the network powerless to ignore blocks from the malicious entity? How does the attacker choose "what goes through or not"? Why can't the rest of the network also collectively choose "what goes through or not"? If every honest node and miner is refusing to accept anything from the attacker (in the same way the attacker is refusing to accept anything from the honest network), what power does the attacker have? It doesn't matter if the honest nodes don't want to accept anything from the attacker. The attacker has enough hashrate to change the rules. Seriously, either I didn't get what a 51% ownership of the network is, or you still don't understand the dangers of it. Don't know which. Maybe someone more knowledgeable on the subject can elaborate....... EDIT: Start from here: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknessesthen read this: http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/06/16/how-a-mining-monopoly-can-attack-bitcoin/
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sumantso
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June 22, 2014, 05:17:30 PM |
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The chance of an outright 51% chance is quite small as it doesn't make economic sense. The bigger worry, IMO, is the ability to decide which transactions to include which in effect means they control Bitcoin.
If, say they decide that they are not going to include Counterparty transactions, the execution time for Counterparty is immediately doubled to 20 mins and with a huge variation. The fact that a supposedly decentralised coin is almost controlled by 1 person/group is very scary
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:20:55 PM |
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It doesn't matter if the honest nodes don't want to accept anything from the attacker. The attacker has enough hashrate to change the rules. How is the attacker (a miner and node(s)) going to force me to change the software (node) on my computer so he can modify the rules of the protocol? Easy, he can't. Seriously, either I didn't get what a 51% ownership of the network is, or you still don't understand the dangers of it. Don't know which.
Maybe someone more knowledgeable on the subject can elaborate.......
Have you read the wiki which gives a very simple explanation of what an attacker with a lot of hash power can and can not do?Have you?
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:22:38 PM |
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The chance of an outright 51% chance is quite small as it doesn't make economic sense. The bigger worry, IMO, is the ability to decide which transactions to include which in effect means they control Bitcoin.
If, say they decide that they are not going to include Counterparty transactions, the execution time for Counterparty is immediately doubled to 20 mins and with a huge variation. The fact that a supposedly decentralised coin is almost controlled by 1 person/group is very scary
Once again, Thanks brother
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fryarminer
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June 22, 2014, 05:25:14 PM |
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If the rest of the network has less hashrate than the dishonest network then they can't do anything about it other than be observers.
So an attacker can choose which transactions to include in the chain and which blocks to build on top of, but the rest of the network can not? That doesn't even make any sense. If there is a way to identify the malicious entity's blocks, the rest of the network can most certainly do something about it. No, they can't. And yes the attacker can choose what goes through or not. At least that is what I get from the "51% attack". The attacker can control the way transactions flow. Why is the rest of the network powerless to ignore blocks from the malicious entity? How does the attacker choose "what goes through or not"? Why can't the rest of the network also collectively choose "what goes through or not"? If every honest node and miner is refusing to accept anything from the attacker (in the same way the attacker is refusing to accept anything from the honest network), what power does the attacker have? K maybe I'm not over the obsession yet. "Why is the rest of the network powerless to ignore blocks from the malicious entity?" Maybe because the malicious entity is more powerful than the entire rest of the network. That's the whole point of 51%. There's no ganging up on the malicious entity because it is more powerful than every other mining pool combined. So we would just be watching. Remember that also the 51% can also do attacks like reject blocks found from other pools. We are literally helpless at that point.
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:25:31 PM |
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It doesn't matter if the honest nodes don't want to accept anything from the attacker. The attacker has enough hashrate to change the rules. How is the attacker (a miner and node(s)) going to force me to change the software (node) on my computer so he can modify the rules of the protocol? Easy, he can't. Seriously, either I didn't get what a 51% ownership of the network is, or you still don't understand the dangers of it. Don't know which.
Maybe someone more knowledgeable on the subject can elaborate.......
Have you read the wiki which gives a very simple explanation of what an attacker with a lot of hash power can and can not do?Have you? Why are you suggesting they can change the rules? Because with that much power they can create the longest chain AFAIK. They can do much more too....
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:26:17 PM |
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If the rest of the network has less hashrate than the dishonest network then they can't do anything about it other than be observers.
So an attacker can choose which transactions to include in the chain and which blocks to build on top of, but the rest of the network can not? That doesn't even make any sense. If there is a way to identify the malicious entity's blocks, the rest of the network can most certainly do something about it. No, they can't. And yes the attacker can choose what goes through or not. At least that is what I get from the "51% attack". The attacker can control the way transactions flow. Why is the rest of the network powerless to ignore blocks from the malicious entity? How does the attacker choose "what goes through or not"? Why can't the rest of the network also collectively choose "what goes through or not"? If every honest node and miner is refusing to accept anything from the attacker (in the same way the attacker is refusing to accept anything from the honest network), what power does the attacker have? K maybe I'm not over the obsession yet. "Why is the rest of the network powerless to ignore blocks from the malicious entity?" Maybe because the malicious entity is more powerful than the entire rest of the network. That's the whole point of 51%. There's no ganging up on the malicious entity because it is more powerful than every other mining pool combined. So we would just be watching. Remember that also the 51% can also do attacks like reject blocks found from other pools. We are literally helpless at that point. ^^^^ This
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:37:12 PM |
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S4VV4S
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June 22, 2014, 05:41:01 PM |
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Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? Probably, since people are pointing their miners elsewhere. God I wish we could solo-mine again
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rext
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June 22, 2014, 05:46:03 PM |
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oh well
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fryarminer
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June 22, 2014, 06:07:41 PM |
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Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? Probably, since people are pointing their miners elsewhere. God I wish we could solo-mine again I'm solo mining with a Jalapeño! hahaha!!! Absolutely retarded but at least I can brag about it! My other miners are in a pool though - not Ghash obviously. And not Discus either.
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galbros
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June 22, 2014, 06:11:40 PM |
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So what do you suggest we should do about it....
So any suggestions?
In that blog post the hacking, distributed guys lay out what they seem to think would be a good solution. It would require a hard fork and looks like it would make large pools impractical, which I guess is the point. Anyway, I would not be dismissive of the danger as there are lots of unfair things a 51% miner can do that wont destroy bitcoin but clearly make it centralized. Good Luck!
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jbreher
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lose: unfind ... loose: untight
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June 22, 2014, 06:17:23 PM |
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In that blog post the hacking, distributed guys lay out what they seem to think would be a good solution.
What solution exactly? I must have read a different blog than you did. I read a good description of some of the less-discussed attacks made possible by significant percentages of the network's hashing power. But I read precisely zero descriptions of ways to fix the problems.
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Anyone with a campaign ad in their signature -- for an organization with which they are not otherwise affiliated -- is automatically deducted credibility points.
I've been convicted of heresy. Convicted by a mere known extortionist. Read my Trust for details.
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sumantso
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June 24, 2014, 10:33:40 AM |
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In that blog post the hacking, distributed guys lay out what they seem to think would be a good solution.
What solution exactly? I must have read a different blog than you did. I read a good description of some of the less-discussed attacks made possible by significant percentages of the network's hashing power. But I read precisely zero descriptions of ways to fix the problems. I can't think of any ways out of this problem. Maybe make it such that probability of getting a block doesn't scale linearly with hash power? But then that would have other problems.
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spinf
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June 24, 2014, 03:10:20 PM |
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There is the Lamport sig solution, but it loads the blockchain somewhat. Other than that it sounds like GHash would kill the golden goose if it were to launch an attack...
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Coinbuddy
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June 24, 2014, 03:16:07 PM |
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GHASH Feeses sucks
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