A guy once lost 9.000 BTC by restoring a backup produced before a send transaction which had these 9.000 as input. That motivated Satoshi to implement the pool of addresses feature. EDIT: Here's the topic: http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=782.0as i recall it was 9000 btc! That's what I said above... (maybe I should have dropped the dot or write 9.000,00 to make it clearer) |
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i can hardly imagine who will buy bitcoins for 20...30...50? dollars? What for? In hope that they will grow even more?? Why they should? There must be the point to stop growing  For BTC to "stop growing" in comparison to USD, the Fed would have to stop printing money... I wouldn't expect that.  |
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You can already buy amazon products with bitcoins, with no fees. People are already working for bitcoins, there are even sites for bitcoin job offers. The conversion fees problem will eventually decrease. And, well, bitcoin is a much better money anyway... eventually what you save from inflation will probably compensate the conversion fees. |
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Q: Should it be "uBC"?
A: No; ISO standards and currency software want ALL CAPS.
No, it should be μBC... That makes more sense. I don't know why we have to follow this ISO standards anyway. Regarding he standard implementation, it doesn't need to change. Or if it's ever going to, it could allow the user to select the unit he wants to be displayed. |
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That'd be the equivalent of not having a change at all, I believe.
And, well, honestly, I don't know why it was implemented like this. Unless there's something in the protocol that forces an address to be completely spent when it's used as input, I don't see much utility in this change feature.
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Well for me, I would like to hide an emergency fund that NO ONE can touch or find. Forget gold, cash or swiss bank accounts.
I can make a wallet.dat file, encrypt it and then store it far far away in multiple locations that are only in my mind. NO ONE would ever find it.
Then I'd be able to get at my funds once I'm out of prison or running to another country.
Right?
If absolutely nobody else has access to it, if/when you die, your wealth will die with you... |
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Fiats are relatively stable because they've got central banks keeping them stable.
Seriously? The guy says such a thing and yet receives attention? Stop feeding the Keynesian troll. |
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Yeah, pretty much like the term liberal, which now means leftist in the US, and if you want to talk about original liberals, you have to say classical-liberal to avoid confusion.
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The inelastic supply of bitcoins is why it has 'market cap' of $40M and your idea isn't valued. Bitcoin can hold value, your system can't. Don't believe me, just do it. Maybe you are right and I'll eat my internet hat.
+1 |
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oh good lord.
right next to the encyclopedia entry for "Bread and Circuses" is a picture of Roger Ailes.
can anybody seriously believe that the channel of the republican party is going to boost - in any way - something like Bitcoin?
Have you ever watched at least parts of Judge Napolitano show? Or John Stossel? Despite their strong conservative bias, Fox does seem to have a tiny space for libertarian ideas. I guess that's mainly because they make good opponents for leftists, but still. |
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Why are there so many more comments on other ideas?
Because they're older. The one in the first position has been there for over an year, according to the age of some comments. |
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Libertarianism, as I understand, is about the non-agression principle. And that's incompatible with any form of state. The difference between minarchists and social-democrats is quantitative, not qualitative, as is the difference between libertarians and statists... but well, just words anyway.
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If the (only|most available) copy of an old block is the one that the spender has, this introduces an attack vector not present in Bitcoin now. The obvious one that I can think of is that Bitcoin depends on the independently verifiable blocks that are provided by multiple sources not connected to the parties involved in the trade, or at least enough sources that it's extremely unlikely that all those peers are connected to either party in the trade. If the only copy available to the miner of the input block is the one provided by the sender himself, a spoofed block is then possible. How hard do you think it would be to fake a block and transaction set that could hash to match the merkle root of one block too old for miners to keep? It might take a malicious node a few days to find the right combo of extra-nonce and false transactions to match the merkle root, but time is of little concern in such an attack.
Is this really feasible? One thing is to produce a hash that has a certain number of zeros in its beginning, another thing is to produce an exact hash from something else. To me it sounds as likely as brute forcing against cryptography, but well, I don't really understand all these cryptography stuff so I'm asking.... |
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This whole thread is based upon a false premise: there is a global storage cost for old transactions. This is untrue.
The miners only need to keep the root hash of every block to verify transactions. However the owner of the old coins needs to keep an complete copy of the old block.
To spend the old coins. The owner announces both the transaction, and provides the old coin's block for upload. The miners (who wish to) will see this transaction an 're-download' the old block. (and compare the root Merkle hashes)
The miner only need to keep the more recent blocks, old blocks can be downloaded when needed. Only some of the miners will bother to download the old block, others will just focus on bitcoins in recent blocks.
This extra work of checking old blocks can adequately and naturally attract higher transaction fees. (but not demurrage, as there was no 'storage costs')
That's a better idea. People implementing light-weight clients should take that in consideration, and store at least the blocks from which they have money on their wallets. People providing offline bitcoins like bitbill should also either encode the entire block on the bill, or at least allow the block to be downloaded from a server of them. |
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Considering the proposition of demurrage itself, I don't like it very much, for the following reasons: - All it does it does is that it forces people to move money around, so that transaction fees are collected and the chain is pruned. If the transaction fees remain near a satoshi, that doesn't add much to miners. It would be better to make sure transaction fees won't go that low.
This is how we can keep it from "going that low" No, not really. If you have "infinite" block space, it doesn't matter that you're forcing people to move around their coins once in a while, the transaction fees to do so will probably be only 0,01µBTC each transaction. They would remain "that low". An adaptive max block size is fine for it's own reasons, if a system can be agreed upon, and that really would have to be code enforced. But that would not solve the problem.
Why not? With limited space, transactions would compete for it, and the only way to do so is by offering higher fees. There is little evidence that such compensation will be appropriate to overcome the 'free storage' problem, and much economic theory that suggests that over the long term free storage of old transactions will distort the market.
I'm not sure that's such an issue... comparing with bandwidth and processing power efficiency, storage space will probably not be such a problem. |
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I don't get it why there's Libertarian and Anarchist as different options. Libertarians are anarchists.... or by anarchist you mean the communist type?
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Concerning the whole chain size, I don't think that will be a major problem, compared to the bandwidth required.
And if it ever becomes annoying for some miners, they can try offering bounties to the owners of the oldest coins to move them to a new address. It can be done without the owner of the coins having to identify himself.
There is one major barrier though: some private keys are lost. These coins won't ever be moved again, and there isn't anyway to verify that the coins are really lost or someone is just lying about it. Considering that people probably lost private keys from the early days of bitcoin, when the coins were mostly worthless, I'd say there isn't much room for pruning the chain.
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Considering the proposition of demurrage itself, I don't like it very much, for the following reasons: - All it does it does is that it forces people to move money around, so that transaction fees are collected and the chain is pruned. If the transaction fees remain near a satoshi, that doesn't add much to miners. It would be better to make sure transaction fees won't go that low.
- It introduces a completely new and big feature/constraint to a system that doesn't necessarily need it. (transaction fees and maximum block size are already there)
- I can't see a way to make it automatically adjustable or "market-adaptive"... and hard-coded, arbitrary rules are not good.
I still prefer an adaptive maximum limit to the block size, that creates some artificial block space scarcity on peak hours of the day or peak days of the week/month/year. It is not a major new feature, and although the formula to be defined is arbitrary, there are no arbitrary constant values. And it may guarantee a minimum incentive to miners. |
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And one cannot expect that a few billion worth of BTC (let's be optimistic) will be properly guarded by a difficulty level corresponding to a few million dollar compute system.
Here you imply that someone could have "billions worth" of profit by exploiting the >50% vulnerability, but as I said multiple times, that is not that simple. You can't steal all bitcoins by having control of the chain. All you can do is double-spend. And that's fraud. You'd be vulnerable to the same risks anyone has when committing fraud. If you try to fraud a billion worth contract of any kind, you'll probably sleep with the fishes. And the amount doesn't even need to be that high. The chances of making profit out of such kind of attack are extremely low. And a non-profit oriented attacker couldn't steal billions worth of money either. It could temporarily pause the network until developers and miners find a way to get around him. The more money at stake, the stronger the incentive to get this scumbag government ostracized from the network. There really should be a FAQ about the true risks of a >50% attack. |
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