Clearly we haven't seen a change yet so it seems presumptuous for you to pretend knowing what the market will want "eventually".
I'll even put my money where my mouth is: I would like to wager you 1 BTC that by this time next year (September 8, 2016) that the longest proof-of-work chain will include a block greater than 1 MB in size. If you agree, we will both deposit 1 BTC into a 2-of-3 multisig address. We will have a neutral third-party hold the third key. Would you like to accept this wager?  I am not interested in your wager Peter, I have better use for my money. Let me ask you again, have you considered Adam's block extension proposal? |
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Bitcoin as it is works fine and it can scale globally as it is, the proper way to see things is to think that bitcoin simulates gold with the added property of being portable. you would not buy a soft drink using gold or a $100 dollar bill, for that reason alt coins like litecoin o dash have a purpose, we do not need 500 alt coins, but maybe a few are needed. Bitcoin whitepaper describes it as "A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System" right in it's headline and "an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof". Wouldn't redefining it as e-gold be breaking the social contract and alienate lot of users? Only time gold is mentioned in the whitepaper is to explain mining, not usage. When you reduce the use cases for Bitcoin you also reduce its demand. With the reduced demand its valuation will decrease, unless you get enough new e-gold bugs to join to compensate for disappearing sectors of bitcoin economy. As bitcoin is obviously intended to work as payment system. Wouldn't it be better to create an alternate coin with a whitepaper that tells its users that it's main purpose is to work as e-gold? No one would feel cheated and everyone would be happy. If you felt cheated it's only because of your wrong interpretation of what Satoshi meant by p2p cash. It seems you are suggesting he meant a low-cost, frictionless means-of-exchange. Surely if that was his intention one must be left to wonder why he'd decide on an expensive and inefficient POW algorithm. Have you considered that maybe what he truly meant was a censorship-resistant bearer instrument free of third-party reliance? That would seem to fit the design he chose and reflect what Bitcoin is truly great at. Understand that the use cases you refer to are not what can serve as the makings of an economy. The next paypal maybe, but not the next gold standard which is what we should all hope Bitcoin becomes. Do you have any idea of what the valuation of Bitcoin would be if we attracted a majority of the existing gold bugs? Here's a little more on this: It is also important that you reconsider this myth that capping Bitcoin's transactions is a cap on its userbase.
Bitcoin, as is, can provide a refuge for the wealth of ANY person on the planet. It can currently accommodate an infinite amount of capital.
The distinction is important because reality shows us that actual Bitcoin users are by and large not much interested in transacting or spending their coins. A great majority of the coins in existence have been and should continue to sit pretty in their cold wallets for years to come.
Why should we expect this to be different for future users? If you believe, much like I do, that the next trove of adopters is likely to be institutional investors with an interest in Bitcoin as a commodity/asset then why should we be worried so much with the system's transactions throughput? Do you expect the Winklevies to go on a shopping frenzy with their 100,000 coins? The analogy with gold is tired but it remains true: it should be expect that most bitcoins in circulation will be stored in digital vaults and shall remain untouched for a long period of time.
All of this is to say that you should stop focusing on "mainstream" users and what you assume their interest in Bitcoin will be. We should expect these to be last in line in your mass adoption scenario.
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If a rule is "consensus approved" it means the rule is what the market wants. This is why the anti-spam (1 MB) limit was enforced for the past five years. However, now the market wants a higher limit. It will get that higher limit eventually. Clearly we haven't seen a change yet so it seems presumptuous for you to pretend knowing what the market will want "eventually". Right now the "consensus approved" limit on the inflation rate is <= 25 BTC / block. Since the market wants this limit, there is no pressure to change it. If the market wanted a different limit--and I suspect it will when the halving hits--then we will get a different limit (in this case 12.5 BTC per block). Your last sentence doesn't make much sense... the halving is baked into the protocol, the market has no responsibility over the upcoming change in inflation rate unless it wants to change it. The invisible hand of the market is always in charge of the consensus rules and will eventually prevail. What you're missing is that since this "market" is composed of the community of Bitcoin holders, it will never vote for changes that it believes would hurt it's interest. Funny you say that. You are aware that the same applies to the block size change? How can you claim to have a genuine picture of what the Bitcoin holders want? I think this chart (which I've shown you several times but I don't believe you've understood) shows the effect best: the blocksize limit was accepted as an anti-spam measure. It is no longer accepted now that it's beginning to serve as a political measure instead. The area shaded in brown represents the unmet demand clamouring for change… I understand it very well thank you and I do believe it continues to serve a great purpose as an anti-spam measure. Do you understand that only a fraction of the current network load are true p2p transactions between users? By all estimate we are sitting near an average of not much more than 300kb of legitimate transactions. Why would you want to lift the anti-spam measure under these conditions? |
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Don't you have your XT circlejerk forum now? Why don't you stay over there?
It's not about XT. XT is only one of several new proposals to remove the limit. Yep, and not of them is any relevant until they get into core  Blocksize will be increased.Like or not.Laugh as much as you. We will see bigger Blocks!!It's inevitable. The majority of the community wants it.The big BTC companies want it.Big part of the Miners are in as well.So no doubt.  The "community" you speak of, ie. general redditards and bitcointalk users, are not representative of the bitcoin holders. As such, their opinion is as irrelevant to those of "big BTC companies" (corporate bankers shills trying to capture Bitcoin) and the other power hungry miners who don't know better. You might get a block increase, but you will be sorely disappointed by its scale and its results. |
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As for why I think mass adoption is necessary, I should probably qualify that a bit. I think it's important that the network not consolidate into the hands of a few large players very early on. I'd prefer it never did but that's likely a pipe dream. Currently, the hypothetical big players of crypto in the future are still small, because they require crypto to build the businesses that will make them big. Big players right now, in turn, are not likely to do anything very interesting at all with crypto, because they're already successful even without it, and are too entrenched in the financial system to risk upsetting it. So in a nutshell, my worry is that capping userbase too low too early will lead to a situation where the only parties with the clout to use the system are those with no interest in running it.
Let me address this part only as iCEBREAKER has done a good enough job at debunking the rest. The network is already consolidated into the hands of only a few player. An irresponsable increase of the block size risks precipitating this concentration. It is also important that you reconsider this myth that capping Bitcoin's transactions is a cap on its userbase. Bitcoin, as is, can provide a refuge for the wealth of ANY person on the planet. It can currently accommodate an infinite amount of capital. The distinction is important because reality shows us that actual Bitcoin users are by and large not much interested in transacting or spending their coins. A great majority of the coins in existence have been and should continue to sit pretty in their cold wallets for years to come. Why should we expect this to be different for future users? If you believe, much like I do, that the next trove of adopters is likely to be institutional investors with an interest in Bitcoin as a commodity/asset then why should we be worried so much with the system's transactions throughput? Do you expect the Winklevies to go on a shopping frenzy with their 100,000 coins? The analogy with gold is tired but it remains true: it should be expect that most bitcoins in circulation will be stored in digital vaults and shall remain untouched for a long period of time. All of this is to say that you should stop focusing on "mainstream" users and what you assume their interest in Bitcoin will be. We should expect these to be last in line in your mass adoption scenario. |
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Don't you have your XT circlejerk forum now? Why don't you stay over there?
It's not about XT. XT is only one of several new proposals to remove the limit. Yep, and not of them is any relevant until they get into core |
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Ignoring the question of whether or not there would be sufficient security, I question whether it is even possible to force fees upwards. Enforcing a production quota means that you are going against the natural desires of the market. Normally, to enforce a quota, you need a strong government or organization willing and able to use force if necessary. I'm not sure Bitcoin Core has sufficient power, especially when other implementations can fork from Bitcoin Core to attempt to satisfy the demands of the market like we've seen with XT.
I wonder if you question whether it's possible to keep the 21m cap as well. I guess if 'the market' desires it be scrapped, then we can't do anything? Exactly... Peter would have you believe the block size is the only centrally designed, consensus approved, hard limit in Bitcoin |
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Ignoring the question of whether or not there would be sufficient security, I question whether it is even possible to force fees upwards. Enforcing a production quota means that you are going against the natural desires of the market. Normally, to enforce a quota, you need a strong government or organization willing and able to use force if necessary. I'm not sure Bitcoin Core has sufficient power, especially when other implementations can fork from Bitcoin Core to attempt to satisfy the demands of the market like we've seen with XT. I don't really see any negative externalities, unless you do actually have a blocksize cap, in which case the negative externality would be the limitation of bandwidth.
The negative externality could be lower security, just like you said. Another negative externality could be that people with low-cost hardware and slow internet connections might not be able to run full nodes. Yeah we've seen how successful XT was To enforce a quota in Bitcoin you only need to include it in the consensus code. The code reflects the desire of the consensus. Those who are against it are free to leave but this exit is not without cost. |
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Well I'm certainly not dismissing any of them as potential solutions. Unlike some, I'm actually capable of looking at a proposal and thinking "It's not quite there in its present form, but if we modify this and a few bits here and there, then it might work". Why can't you do that? Why do you have to attack, dismiss, ridicule and torpedo every single proposal that alters an arbitrary 1mb cap?
...
But I can't help but notice the block extension proposal still retains a 1MB cap and an inevitable asset-class elitist chain that only benefits a small minority. I'm still not seeing a hint of compromise from you and I've still yet to hear your master plan of how you're going to prevent BIP100 when you've painted yourself into a corner and no one is any closer to agreeing with you. I am DONE taking you seriously. Understand that inconsiderate, irresponsible and disingenuous proposals will continue to be "attacked, dismissed, ridiculed and torpedoed". I am not one to wear the pink glasses of "oh well it might be better than nothing". I have offered you a compromise: you get whatever size block you like while we keep our 1MB chain WITHOUT the need for a hard fork. Of course you wouldn't understand it since it is painfully obvious you haven't actually "looked at the proposal". If you can't understand that a 1MB chain favors the entire network and not only "a small minority" you are either being intentionally dishonest or outright ignorant. Let me spell it out for you: a 1MB block size guarantees access to the most open, private and secure chain. Open: every users has an ability to trivially run a node and store their wealth on that chain Private: relying on SPV means relying on a third-party to relay your transactions, there are considerable privacy risks. Secure: an ultra conservative block size allows the number of independent nodes in the system to grow infinitely, considerably increasing the strength and decentralization of the network. it enables possibilities like the commoditization of hardware such as the existing Bitnodes ( https://getaddr.bitnodes.io/hardware/) Now your obvious complain is that not everyone will get to transact on this chain since it might be considerably pricier. If we're being honest, that's not a problem. A strong & decentralized protocol layer will work as a guarantee that third-parties involved in superficial layers are being kept honest provided that their actions can be checked against the one absolute truth layer. That's the role you should expect Bitcoin to play in the future: CodeShark the blockchain is there to protect you in the event of an uncooperative counterparty
gmaxwell A more useful mental model for the system is that the network is a trustworthy AI Judge that makes sure you complied with the contracts specified in your contracts. Now, it's possible to transact by taking every contract to the judge, but this is inefficient.
CodeShark right, the blockchain is like a court
CodeShark you don't go to court over every contract you enter
CodeShark only the ones where there's a breach As for you frankly tiresome and quite useless BIP100 blatter let me insist it will never be part of Bitcoin. The whole idea of having miners vote is broken beyond repair. I don't care if 100% of the miners get behind it the users will never let it happen since most of us know better than to leave them in control. You are a danger to Bitcoin and your servility appals me. You are like an animal reacting only to fear without consideration for the impacts of your action. A "one-percenter blockchain" is the only rational vision for Bitcoin, whether you like it or not. Fortunately for the first time ever you will be allowed a seat at their table. It will cost you some if you wanna trade with them but you will have other options to enjoy the security of your wealth. |
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your so-called 'Blockstream coin' is a near perfect proxy for Bitcoin represented in the main chain due to the 2-way peg. The main 'downside' is that it becomes much more difficult to correlate transactions to individual users and this drives those who wish to do so crazy.
It's becoming clear TPTB (ie sigint.google.mil and tla.mit.gov) have set a strategic goal of forcing most or all full nodes to be relocated in their data centers. Can you imagine the Google/A16/GS/JPM board meetings where they concede Bitcoin's blockchain is going to be worth trillions? Do you think they're happy with every Joe Sixcoins being able to run his own bank/stock market/credit union/payment rail? ' Oh Hell NO,' they said. And then deployed Hearn on his mission to expand node footprints until unsupportable almost anywhere outside of vulnerable, carefully-controlled colocation facilities. These SHR MIC VC ratfuckers won't stop until they scour every last trace of cypherpunk influence from Bitcoin, and they are able to profit from correlating transactions to individual users. I think it needs to be mentioned the war also seems to be on China. It is a perfectly rational fact to expect that most of the big time bankers backing these VC companies are not comfortable with +50% of the network being run from there. Mike Hearn has been extremely clear in his position that mining should be available only to those with the best bandwidth connection. It is quite obvious he would prefer bitcoin to be run from datacenters and concentrate mining into geo-politically favorable locations. His attempt to promote SPV wallets shows how little he care about actual full node users. To him they are "casualties of the network growth" but he absolutely doesn't realizes they actually maintain its strength. If there is one right that should exist in Bitcoin it should be that one is able to enjoy the full privacy of the p2p network through running his own personal node. This is worth all the transactions in the world. Mike Hearn wants to take Bitcoin away from us and hand it over to a bunch of corporations supported by his SPVcoin so that they have absolute control over transaction relaying and the governance of the network. What a horrible human being  |
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More blocksize essentially means more opportunity to capture transaction fees. This necessarily leads to an incentive to create bigger and bigger blocks therefore considerably increasing the cost of running a full node.
Yes but... 1. non mining nodes are already doing this altruistically. Not necessarily. Payment processors have an interest to run a full node to more efficiently broadcast their transactions to the network. You'd be surprised by the amount of wallet services provider that don't actually run a full node. Do you have anything that can supports that claim or is it just an assumption? It is well known that blockchain.info for example did not run their own node until very recently. There was a lot of discussion about this on the dev mailing list. A lot of companies rely on services like chain.com, blockcypher.com, etc. They have somewhat valid reasons as they don't have to build the whole software infrastructure for node indexing that these services have already built. |
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More blocksize essentially means more opportunity to capture transaction fees. This necessarily leads to an incentive to create bigger and bigger blocks therefore considerably increasing the cost of running a full node.
Yes but... 1. non mining nodes are already doing this altruistically. Not necessarily. Payment processors have an interest to run a full node to more efficiently broadcast their transactions to the network. You'd be surprised by the amount of wallet services provider that don't actually run a full node. Also, I have no interest in a network where only payment processors run nodes. |
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How do you judge when the system becomes too centralised, particularely when it comes to nodes?
You guys have been suggesting the market is interested is in a global payment network/currency unrestricted by a transaction bottleneck. A more centralized network offers exactly that.
Are you not worried that miners can slowly capture the participants up until a point where they control a great majority of the network nodes and can trivially change protocol rules? At which point users might be presented with a choice to stay at the behest of miners and assume that they will act in everyone's interest or fork the coin and risk severely undermining the trust in cryptocurrencies in general (causing important financial losses).
I guess nearing 50% hashrate centralization is enough for the market to start panicking as shown by the Ghash episode and another similar episode with another pool which I can't recall ATM. We all know the advantages decentralized system have over centralised one. And no, I don't think a centralized miner will be able to fool everyone as long as the system remains open. The blockchain is too heavily monitored for this to happen. See here: What really matters to miners is a market thinking that mining is decentralized, not a really decentralized mining ecosystem.
It's important to remember that most (all ?) available statistics describing the (de)centralization of mining rely on weak (and easy to cheat) heuristics.
Also you have again conveniently ignored my point that hashrate centralization is not the only centralization concern. Well remove hashrate and my point still remain the same. Your point doesn't really hold unless you predicted the SPV mining centralization that occured recently and caused a fork of the network. The miners action are far from transparent. |
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How do you judge when the system becomes too centralised, particularely when it comes to nodes?
You guys have been suggesting the market is interested is in a global payment network/currency unrestricted by a transaction bottleneck. A more centralized network offers exactly that.
Are you not worried that miners can slowly capture the participants up until a point where they control a great majority of the network nodes and can trivially change protocol rules? At which point users might be presented with a choice to stay at the behest of miners and assume that they will act in everyone's interest or fork the coin and risk severely undermining the trust in cryptocurrencies in general (causing important financial losses).
I guess nearing 50% hashrate centralization is enough for the market to start panicking as shown by the Ghash episode and another similar episode with another pool which I can't recall ATM. We all know the advantages decentralized system have over centralised one. And no, I don't think a centralized miner will be able to fool everyone as long as the system remains open. The blockchain is too heavily monitored for this to happen. See here: What really matters to miners is a market thinking that mining is decentralized, not a really decentralized mining ecosystem.
It's important to remember that most (all ?) available statistics describing the (de)centralization of mining rely on weak (and easy to cheat) heuristics.
Also you have again conveniently ignored my point that hashrate centralization is not the only centralization concern. |
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More blocksize essentially means more opportunity to capture transaction fees. This necessarily leads to an incentive to create bigger and bigger blocks therefore considerably increasing the cost of running a full node.
Yes but... 1. non mining nodes are already doing this altruistically. Less so than ever before and increasing costs will not help.
2. Technology is getting better and cheaper all the time. Technology would not keep up under a scenario without a blocksize cap. Moreover security systems can not be built on assumptions of technological progress.3. As adoption widens, there may be more nodes coming on board, even if that hasn't happened in the last 2 years Increased costs makes this unlikely. The number does not necessarily matter, it is the barriers to entry that do4. The more you move things offchain, the more you introduce centralized elements. The importance is to leave a choice: "Bitcoin is a trustworthy court enforcing contracts between parties. It's possible to take every contract to the judge, but it is rather inefficient." -gmaxwell The simple fact that Bitcoin holds the truth and can rule over and sometimes enforce contrats between user and third-party necessarily diminishes attempt for the third party to fraud. |
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Will mining centralize around one single miner? No one knows. This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion. My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).
I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario. And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin. It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example. Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners. The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code. hey! i disagree!! in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) . remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out.. hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential. so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything... this is bitcoin's consensus. I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point. The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The SPV mining fiasco is a better example of a situation users were not readily aware of yet causes considerable risk to the ecosystem. The miners do have incentives to maintain the users trust but they have a certain flexibility and ability to optimize for profit in a "bend but don't break" manner. Anyway, Peter Todd always makes a good point that we should not build this system based on "best-behaviour" assumptions but rather expect any potential attack. The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue. It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine. That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes. ah yea well, do not underestimate the weight of real bitcoiners (as in early libertarian paranoid adopters with most bitcoins) that would seriously damage btc value by a click the minute they sense a security hole that some soft centralization would ultimately imply. + i think that besides the noobs over here and reddit, most of us know why we are here, and would retaliate (or even abandon ship, or stick to a more "core version") the second we feel our investment's security would be put at risk by the greedy corporations/banks/gov/ph0undation/etc. Yes that all goes without saying. The exercise here is really in pointing out to the noobs the risks and holes behind their "demands". Sometimes I do wonder why it is I spend so much time doing it I guess it also helps me to model and sharpen my understanding of Bitcoin as a whole.... |
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hence, miners do have an incentive to keep it decentralized whilst mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...
A short parenthesis about the miners and the market. What really matters to miners is a market thinking that mining is decentralized, not a really decentralized mining ecosystem. It's important to remember that most (all ?) available statistics describing the (de)centralization of mining rely on weak (and easy to cheat) heuristics. End of the parenthesis  Thank you, very important point! |
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The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.
Both parties need a secure network. If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away? I don't think they would. Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit? I don't think they do. Miners need to be coerced into limiting the load exercised on nodes who are not rewarded for their work. Remember that our objective is not only to optimize the miners' revenue model but to do so while recognizing the impact this has on the security model of the network. I really don't understand what you're saying. What do the non mining modes have to do with this? Well of course they have to keep up with the appetite of the miners. Miners are perfectly happy to sell more block space since they don't pay for it (they pay for the hashing power). More blocksize essentially means more opportunity to capture transaction fees. This necessarily leads to an incentive to create bigger and bigger blocks therefore considerably increasing the cost of running a full node. |
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Will mining centralize around one single miner? No one knows. This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion. My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).
I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario. And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin. It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example. Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners. The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code. hey! i disagree!! in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) . remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out.. hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential. so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything... this is bitcoin's consensus. I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point. The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue. It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine. That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes. I don't think it is such a dark path as long as the market has the hability to fork if the system becomes too centralised. If that happen the market will reacted because they is no incentives for them to use such a system. How do you judge when the system becomes too centralised, particularely when it comes to nodes? You guys have been suggesting the market is interested is in a global payment network/currency unrestricted by a transaction bottleneck. A more centralized network offers exactly that. Are you not worried that miners can slowly capture the participants up until a point where they control a great majority of the network nodes and can trivially change protocol rules? At which point users might be presented with a choice to stay at the behest of miners and assume that they will act in everyone's interest or fork the coin and risk severely undermining the trust in cryptocurrencies in general (causing important financial losses). |
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The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.
Both parties need a secure network. If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away? I don't think they would. Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit? I don't think they do. Miners need to be coerced into limiting the load exercised on nodes who are not rewarded for their work. Remember that our objective is not only to optimize the miners' revenue model but to do so while recognizing the impact this has on the security model of the network. |
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