Bitcoin XT - Officially #REKT (also goes for BIP101 fraud)

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

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[knight22]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralise more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

If, for example, the majority of miners are in China (they are), and there is really poor connectivity in and out of China (there is) and a miner naively optimizes for profit, they will create blocks which are large and take a while to relay out of China. By simple trial-and-error an individual large miner might notice that when they create larger blocks which fork off miners in other parts of the world, they get more income.

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008364.html

Moreover, miners now know better than to repeat GHash's mistake. They can easily distribute their hashing power to different pools to maintain a "decentralization theater"

[knight22]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.

 

Reduce propagation costs of creating bigger blocks. They apparently are already doing it in some form under the existing block size.

What exactly do you mean by "from a market perspective"?

[knight22]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.

 

Reduce propagation costs of creating bigger blocks. They apparently are already doing it in some form under the existing block size.

What exactly do you mean by "from a market perspective"?

What incentives the users/businesses (those who ultimately give value to the coin) have for using a system being centralised by a single miner?

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!!

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out..

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The SPV mining fiasco is a better example of a situation users were not readily aware of yet causes considerable risk to the ecosystem. The miners do have incentives to maintain the users trust but they have a certain flexibility and ability to optimize for profit in a "bend but don't break" manner. Anyway, Peter Todd always makes a good point that we should not build this system based on "best-behaviour" assumptions but rather expect any potential attack.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.

[laurentmt]

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.   

Actually, I'm interested by your work because if the model is sound, it's useful for the present...and the future.
Anyway. One step at a time. The next step should be to validate the model against actual data.

[jonald_fyookball]

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.  

Both parties need a secure network.  If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away?  I don't think they would.
Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit?  I don't think they do.

[Peter R]

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.   

Actually, I'm interested by your work because if the model is sound, it's useful for the present...and the future.
Anyway. One step at a time. The next step should be to validate the model against actual data.

Agreed.  I was actually working on that yesterday.  Hopefully I will have something to say about validation against actual data in Montreal. 

[brg444]

What incentives the users/businesses (those who ultimately give value to the coin) have for using a system being centralised by a single miner?

Who spoke of "a single miner"?

Understand that the miners have to some extent the ability to maintain a certain illusion of decentralization.

I don't propose that bigger blocks will immediately translate to consolidation of miners in hashing power (what the user is really worried about) but it certainly leads to risky behaviours that reduces the security of the network. The cost externalization to nodes is not something most regular users would think twice about yet it severely undermines the nature of Bitcoin.

[knight22]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!!

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out..

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.

I don't think it is such a dark path as long as the market has the hability to fork if the system becomes too centralised. If that happen the market will reacted because they is no incentives for them to use such a system.

[brg444]

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.  

Both parties need a secure network.  If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away?  I don't think they would.
Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit?  I don't think they do.

Miners need to be coerced into limiting the load exercised on nodes who are not rewarded for their work.

Remember that our objective is not only to optimize the miners' revenue model but to do so while recognizing the impact this has on the security model of the network.

[jonald_fyookball]

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.  

Both parties need a secure network.  If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away?  I don't think they would.
Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit?  I don't think they do.

Miners need to be coerced into limiting the load exercised on nodes who are not rewarded for their work.

Remember that our objective is not only to optimize the miners' revenue model but to do so while recognizing the impact this has on the security model of the network.

I really don't understand what you're saying.  What do the non mining modes have to do with this? 

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!!

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out..

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.

I don't think it is such a dark path as long as the market has the hability to fork if the system becomes too centralised. If that happen the market will reacted because they is no incentives for them to use such a system.

How do you judge when the system becomes too centralised, particularely when it comes to nodes?

You guys have been suggesting the market is interested is in a global payment network/currency unrestricted by a transaction bottleneck. A more centralized network offers exactly that.

Are you not worried that miners can slowly capture the participants up until a point where they control a great majority of the network nodes and can trivially change protocol rules? At which point users might be presented with a choice to stay at the behest of miners and assume that they will act in everyone's interest or fork the coin and risk severely undermining the trust in cryptocurrencies in general (causing important financial losses).

[laurentmt]

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep it decentralized whilst mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

A short parenthesis about the miners and the market.
What really matters to miners is a market thinking that mining is decentralized, not a really decentralized mining ecosystem.
It's important to remember that most (all ?) available statistics describing the (de)centralization of mining rely on weak (and easy to cheat) heuristics.
End of the parenthesis

[brg444]

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.  

Both parties need a secure network.  If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away?  I don't think they would.
Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit?  I don't think they do.

Miners need to be coerced into limiting the load exercised on nodes who are not rewarded for their work.

Remember that our objective is not only to optimize the miners' revenue model but to do so while recognizing the impact this has on the security model of the network.

I really don't understand what you're saying.  What do the non mining modes have to do with this?  

Well of course they have to keep up with the appetite of the miners. Miners are perfectly happy to sell more block space since they don't pay for it (they pay for the hashing power). More blocksize essentially means more opportunity to capture transaction fees. This necessarily leads to an incentive to create bigger and bigger blocks therefore considerably increasing the cost of running a full node.

[brg444]

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep it decentralized whilst mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

A short parenthesis about the miners and the market.
What really matters to miners is a market thinking that mining is decentralized, not a really decentralized mining ecosystem.
It's important to remember that most (all ?) available statistics describing the (de)centralization of mining rely on weak (and easy to cheat) heuristics.
End of the parenthesis

Thank you, very important point!

[hdbuck]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!!

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out..

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The SPV mining fiasco is a better example of a situation users were not readily aware of yet causes considerable risk to the ecosystem. The miners do have incentives to maintain the users trust but they have a certain flexibility and ability to optimize for profit in a "bend but don't break" manner. Anyway, Peter Todd always makes a good point that we should not build this system based on "best-behaviour" assumptions but rather expect any potential attack.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.

ah yea well, do not underestimate the weight of real bitcoiners (as in early libertarian paranoid tech savy adopters with most bitcoins) that would seriously damage btc value by a click the minute they sense a security hole that some soft centralization would ultimately imply.

+ i think that besides the noobs over here and reddit, most of us know why we are here, and would retaliate (or even abandon ship, or stick to a more "core version") the second we feel our investment's security would be put at risk by the greedy corporations/banks/gov/ph0undation/etc.

[brg444]

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!!

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out..

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The SPV mining fiasco is a better example of a situation users were not readily aware of yet causes considerable risk to the ecosystem. The miners do have incentives to maintain the users trust but they have a certain flexibility and ability to optimize for profit in a "bend but don't break" manner. Anyway, Peter Todd always makes a good point that we should not build this system based on "best-behaviour" assumptions but rather expect any potential attack.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.

ah yea well, do not underestimate the weight of real bitcoiners (as in early libertarian paranoid adopters with most bitcoins) that would seriously damage btc value by a click the minute they sense a security hole that some soft centralization would ultimately imply.

+ i think that besides the noobs over here and reddit, most of us know why we are here, and would retaliate (or even abandon ship, or stick to a more "core version") the second we feel our investment's security would be put at risk by the greedy corporations/banks/gov/ph0undation/etc.

Yes that all goes without saying.

The exercise here is really in pointing out to the noobs the risks and holes behind their "demands".

Sometimes I do wonder why it is I spend so much time doing it   I guess it also helps me to model and sharpen my understanding of Bitcoin as a whole....