You are being disingenuous. I didn't write it. It's not my website. I don't have access to fix it. And it's not even related to bustabit, which is the entire reason I started off by saying you're confusing people by talking about it here instead of the appropriate thread.


Before I say something I regret, I'm just putting you on ignore. Have a good day. ><

I'm trying to be as diplomatic as possible, but you're making it hard. Bustabit has no special investor system, it's quite literally 100% trust-daniel-to-not-cheat. I am confident this has never been misrepresented at any time, especially not by me.


Bustadice on the other hand has better investor guarantees, especially so for me (as I act in the privileged position as auditor, which AFAICT gives me provably-fair level guarantees) and because of that I actually have invested more in bustadice than bustabit, despite worse expected returns (as I see it as less risky for me).

If you want to discuss the bustadice investor system, I suggest you do is do it in the bustadice thread as it's not relevant to here.

Take your time. I promise I won't edit or delete any posts in the mean time  



No. I didn't write that. Besides, that's for bustadice. We're talking about bustabit here, remember?



I 100% standby everything I wrote there. It's factually correct, and not misleading in the slightest. If you think that supports your arguments that I misrepresented both ("bustabit" and "bustadice") as being provably fair for investor, you should probably close your computer and come back tomorrow and reread over this stuff with a clear head.

lol, easy on the trigger there. I'll give you a bitcoin if you can remotely substantiate that. I've never said, or implied such a thing. I just checked the bustabit webpage and FAQ, and there's no claims like that either. Not to mention, bustabit doesn't even have an auditor system like bustadice does.

@BayAreaCoins I think you're just confusing people by talking about bustadice in the bustabit thread. The investor guarantees and claims there are different than the ones here. For the sake of everyone's sanity, it's best to discuss bustadice in the bustadice thread, and bustabit in this thread.

The full dot-point in question is:


which states the caveat pretty explicitly. Although I actually agree with you in that provably-fair is the wrong term for it. I'd probably write the copy as "Assuming you trust the two not to collude, investors are given additional protections against cheating" or something of that sort

It's a nice idea, but I think I could give you half a dozen reasons it wouldn't help (and might do the opposite). It'd be just as practical as if Smirnoff used a thinner neck in their vodka bottles, so that alcoholics can't pour as much as quickly.

But gambling addiction is a serious problem, although I'm not sure the solution. I toyed with the idea of creating a "charity casino" where people could play zero-edge games against a "donor" bankroll (where they have 0EV). That way people could get their fix of gambling without having to pay in expected value. (Basically the gambling equiv. of a "safe injection site" ) but I worry that it might end up just make people rationalize gambling that otherwise wouldn't have.

So the only thing I can see that I think is strictly beneficial is trying to make sure that casinos are consumer-friendly casinos as possible (i.e. fair, transparent, no manipulative/lockin bullshit like roll-over reqs etc.)

If your invested funds were only used for lots of low-risk bets, then Daniel would have absolutely no reason to even take your money Pretty much the only reason that bankroll investing even exists is because the site owner doesn't want to take the risk/variance themselves, so they give it to investors in exchange for some of the EV.

Unfortunately there's no free-lunch, and the sites that promise such (e.g. "bitcoin doublers") tend to be scams. But I think you did the right thing by divesting.

I think the good rule of thumb for bankroll investing, is never put more in than you're comfortable losing. It's been a long time since i've done it, but with a full-kelly of risk, my "angry whale" simulations show that the vast majority (like 80%???) of times an angry whale (someone with a lot more money than the site itself has, and determined to fuck the site) will be able to cause the site to lose >50% of the bankroll (the other 20% of the time, investors do extraordinarily well though ).

But yeah, the part that's quite unfortunate is that there's not always so much action. So you kind of get used to (and expect) the low volatility, and then a whale comes and drastically alters everything.

The chart that DarkStar_ posted is from https://dicesites.com/bustabit and showing investor's profit (and not players). So when a player wins X bitcoin, investors lose X bitcoin. If a player wins Y bitcoin, then investors get Y-commissions bitcoin.

---

BTW with the new commission structure, how does that affect dilution fees? Like say the site is at an ATH profit, and someone pays 1 BTC in dilution fees. Will bustabit take a 50% cut, or is it commission free?

 I guess getting the site back online is an ultra-low priority for him, as he's already got all the investors money and moved on. But it's also pretty important for him to try keep it up, so he can at least pretend he tried but it was a commercial failure instead of admitting he just scammed investors by changing the investment terms to his sole benefit.

I'm still really curious to see his next payments ICO, although I doubt he'll be able to put his name on it.

For context your post said:

"""
I have not fully tested it myself, but I like the presence of a group where sports news, memes are published, with the ability to write comments for discussion, and not every group can boast of this.  I believe that a clear advantage is the availability of a forecast for the basketball system
"""

which has pretty much zero applicability to what betking offered (and not to mention, the site has been down for days now).

Honestly, I don't really have an opinion on this either way. I don't really have the time or energy to look through all the context at the moment. There's an awful lot of screenshots, which are not easy to validate or authenticate. So I'll let the community decide on this one.

I'm no longer associated with bustabit (i sold last year), but if I sold them a license it really just means they paid the money. It's not an endorsement for past or future behavior, just they paid what was due to correctly use the product.  

Quoting to prevent change. At the time of quoting this, block 598635 has already been mined. However I've checked both archive views, and they appear to be before the block was mined, and the original OP message does not show "edited" at the time of this posting. So everything looks good.

Your notes about the mempool seem fine. Just remember, the mempool is sort of an implementation detail to make the system work smoother.

The mempool just makes it easy for nodes to predict what transactions are going to be in future blocks. And also for miners, it helps miners know what to put in blocks. But each node can have it's own mempool policies if it wants, and in fact you can (and I regularly do) run a full-node without a mempool at all.

To simplify things, forget about the difficulty stuff for now. A node will always reject any blocks that are invalid (e.g. double spending money, or otherwise silly). Each block references a parent block or the original block. This in effect creates a chain (hence: blockchain).  A node will also consider the longest chain of blocks to be the only ones that matter. If two different chains have the same length, it's not really that important what it does but nodes will stick the one they saw first.

Bitcoin miners follow this procedure, but are also trying to find a new block to add on top of the best block they know of.

Basically the real important thing here is the rule: "the longest valid chain" results in nodes converging (i.e. if you have the longest chain, you can prove it to any node and they will accept it. Or if they have the longest chain, they can prove it to you).


Once that all makes intuitive sense, you need to realize that the difficulty (how hard it is to find a new block) is dynamic and the rule "the longest chain" would be trivially exploitable, so nodes instead use the metric "most work" instead (although its generally the same as 'longest' under normal circumstances).


Hopefully that makes it a little clearer

The failure is probably mine for not explaining well, but you are misunderstanding the concept. Fast-forwarding a seed is a destructive operation, it can't be undone even with all the computing power and time in the world.


A simple example:  I sha256'd something to get 0b63083dcbb3881c70a3f2693a07e27ea5e6f5926fef3c2c6517b78a107f3e11. There's no one in the world who's going to be able to figure out what I hashed. And I haven't saved what I used to get it, so there's no way to (successfully) compel me to giving it.

That's how a fast-forwardable wallet seed works. In the fast-forward operation, you replace the seed with a hashed version of the seed. Unless you have saved a copy of the old seed somewhere, that information is permanently lost.  And you would obviously only fast-forward the seed when you are OK with losing this information.

Yeah. It's definitely pretty weak, but I guess my point is that if wallets used a "Fast-Fowardable Wallet Seed", they would have pretty much no downside for using them normally (maybe slightly slower deriv, or slight extra risk from gmaxwell's cosmic rays) but it gives you one (possibly catastrophically dangerous) "fast-forward" operation which can you use, if you want.

Or looked at another way: if Fast-Fowardable Wallet Seed were the norm, would anyone be wanting to use the current deriv scheme? 

Like I said in my OP, I don't think anyone will implement it, nor do I think it's worth diverging from norms for. But it's just an idea I wanted to write down, and wish my wallet supported it  

Given a seed, you wouldn't be able to tell how fast-forwarded it was. Besides, the request boils down to finding a preimage of a cryptographic hash (N times), so I would tell them they can check back with me in a few trillion years while I'm spending the time required to calculate it. 

It's actually linear, not exponential. To get N addresses, it takes O(MAX(index)) time. But I don't think performance is a realistic concern, as indexes are generally just a counter you bump not some large randomly generated value.



That's a reasonable point.



While seed-rotation is conceptually simpler, in practice it's a pain in the ass. Unless of course you do a big consolidation from your old wallet to your new wallet, which is unideal from multiple perspectives.

I guess ideally you'd have some sort of first-class wallet support for wallet rotation, where it would temporarily load both wallet and preferentially spend from the old wallet and put the change in the new wallet, and then eventually you can unload the old wallet and delete it if you will.

Just to be clear, the point isn't that I want to "not show" my old transactions, it's that I no longer want to have access to it. Willful ignorance, if you may. For example  I can legally be compelled to provide information, yet don't have any obligations to keep such records.  So by fast-forwarding my seeds once I'm confident I don't need the old information, I can lower my potential liability.